Journal of Burma Studies

The Myth of Gender Equality in Myanmar

There is a popular perception that women in Myanmar experience “inherent equality” with men—a myth which the military regime has historically used to bolster its legitimacy both domestically and in the international sphere (Ikeya 2005; Tharaphi Than 2014). The roots of this myth go back many years—from Queen Pwa Saw’s reign in the eleventh century to the writings of colonial officers who portrayed the women of Myanmar as enjoying greater freedoms and a higher status than their Western counterparts.¹ Part of this was because Burmese women kept their maiden names and enjoyed some levels of social and legal equality with men, including related to property, inheritance, divorce, and voting rights. Burmese women have also traditionally held considerable influence in both the domestic and economic sphere, with women active in the market as both customers and store holders. However, historical research shows that claims related to the traditionally high status of women in Myanmar “are oversimplified and highly problematic” (Ikeya 2005:52) and that women’s participation in financial matters did not transfer to [End Page 69] positions of power within what is and always has been a highly patriarchal and hierarchal society (Harriden 2012; Ikeya 2005).² Under military rule (1962–2010), women’s opportunities for participating in politics and for advancing issues related to gender equality were further diminished. During this time, the junta used organizations led by the wives of military leaders to contribute to the gender equality myth in international forums and to respond to obligations set out under the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (Harriden 2012). However, women’s role in society was firmly positioned within the home, “under the leadership of male patriarchs” (Ibid.), with males portrayed as active breadwinners whose duties revolved around providing for their families and defending the nation. Females, in contrast, were “presented as passive, obedient and largely confined within domestic spheres, emphasizing their duties as mothers and carers within the nuclear family” (Maber and Khin Mar Aung 2019:410; see also Gender Equality Network [GEN] 2015a). These views and gendered expectations deeply shaped the aspirations of women, and the social and cultural attitudes of people across the nation (Agatha Ma, Phyu, and Knapman 2018; Loring 2018).

The political reform process which commenced under the military-aligned Union Solidarity and Development Party in 2011 created a significant opening for civil society activism and progress in terms of freedom of speech. Although the military retained significant power over the direction of the country’s political and economic [End Page 70] affairs, many women also felt increasingly encouraged to raise their voices and take up leadership roles in civil society and advocate for issues around sexual and gender-based violence (Agatha Ma, Phyu, and Knapman 2018; Aye Thiri Kyaw and Miedema 2020; Faxon, Furlong, and May Sabe Phyu 2015).³ The election of Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD party in 2015 created further momentum around gender equality. When the NLD came to power in March 2016, there were high hopes from many women’s activists and organizations that concrete steps would be taken to support female representation in government and to bolster initiatives related to gender equality. At the policy level, collaboration between women rights groups and the civilian government achieved some gains, such as the introduction of Prevention of Violence Against Women Law, and the launch of the National Strategic Action Plan for Advancement of Women (see Khin Khin Mra and Livingstone 2020). As access to the Internet and social media increased, new forms of self-documentation “from the margins” also emerged (Francis 2021; see also Aye Thiri Kyaw and Miedema 2020).

In many ways, however, women’s ability to enact change was constantly undermined by the influence of the military over national and political affairs, due to deeply entrenched patriarchal values and associated cultural and institutional constraints (see Khin Khin Mra and Livingstone 2020; Women’s League of Burma [WLB] 2022).⁴ While it was not uncommon to see women [End Page 71] in Myanmar holding positions of power in feminized sectors such as education and health, women remained extremely underrepresented in decision-making roles, from the village/ward level up to the national parliament (Loring 2018; Minoletti 2016; United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] 2015).⁵ Indeed, there is a large body of evidence to show that despite holding one of the most influential positions in the country, Aung San Suu Kyi’s powerful role in domestic politics was widely perceived as the “exception rather than the rule” (Transnational Institute 2016:11; see also Mala Htun and Jensenius 2020; WLB 2022). However, whilst women and women’s groups faced significant challenges, it is clear that the decade prior to the 2021 military coup saw a blossoming of action and networks focused on gender equality, including for lesbian, gay, bisexual transgender and other queer communities, which sought to directly challenge the conservative, patriarchal values of the powerful military establishment (see, e.g., Chua 2015, 2018; Chua and Gilbert 2015).

A Feminist Research Agenda

Feminist scholarship has been instrumental in critiquing the normative masculine point of view of societies as a unitary and relatively homogenous entity. Research shows that women are not a unitary category of analysis, but comprise multiple axes of difference, such as class and race, which make the experience of being a woman widely variant in any given society (Moore 1993, 1994:6–27). In [End Page 72] recent decades, research by feminists of color highlighted the intersectional experiences of subjugation, arguing that gender, race, class, sexuality, age, ethnicity, and ability “cannot be analytically understood in isolation from one another” (Collins and Chepp 2013:58). Intersectionality has become a key analytical tool for assessing the joint effects of power and complex social structures on people’s lives (Collins and Bilge 2016:4; Hancock 2016; Weldon 2019). In brief, intersectionality highlights the ways that disadvantage is conditioned by multiple interacting systems of oppression, which create distinct experiences of subjugation from what would be felt while having only one marginalized identity (e.g., Crenshaw 1991; Doetsch-Kidder 2012:3; Harris 1990).

In Myanmar, feminist research shows that patriarchal norms structure women’s everyday lives, relationships, and aspirations in multiple and complex ways, across different ethnic and religious groups. Social and cultural discourses reinforce women’s role within the household, effectively excluding them from positions of leadership at the domestic, local, and national levels (Agatha Ma, Phyu, and Knapman 2018; Faxon, Furlong, and May Sabe Phyu 2015; GEN 2015a; Mi Thang Sorn Poine 2018; MWO 2016). As women are largely seen as responsible for childcare, cooking, cleaning, and other household responsibilities, the gendered division of labor in the family also serves as a practical barrier to participation in politics, including peacebuilding (Agatha Ma, Phyu, and Knapman 2018; Loring 2018:77; Myint Myint Mon 2019). Indeed, research shows that women in Myanmar encounter a range of gender-related forms of discrimination which are often deeply rooted in local social and cultural norms. The widespread belief among the Buddhist majority that men possess hpon—spiritual glory or masculine power is a highly abstract quality [End Page 73] which is widely believed to provide men with a higher status over women (Keeler 2017; Spiro 1970)—often enables men to pursue higher political positions and stops women from pursuing political careers (see GEN 2015a; Harriden 2012). Mi Mi Khaing (1984:78) argues that the widespread belief in hpon reinforces a gender divide which ultimately limits women’s role and involvement in political and religious life. Moral stories from the Buddhist scriptures are also interpreted and used to justify unequal power relations between women and men (Keeler 2017; Tharaphi Than, Pyo Let Han, and Shunn Lei 2018:5).

Outside of the Buddhist majority, patriarchal norms and beliefs also affect women from Christian, Muslim, animist, and other minority religious communities (see, e.g., Hedström 2016a,c; Lue Htar, Myat The Thitsar, and Kyed 2020; Lwin Lwin Mon 2020). Research shows that women from ethnic and religious minority communities are disproportionality affected by gendered relations of power and privilege (Hedström 2016a,b,c; Hedström, Olivius, and Kay Soe 2020). In part, this is directly embedded in Myanmar’s long-standing civil conflicts and the use of rape as a weapon of war by the state military in their campaigns against various ethnic resistance organizations (e.g., GEN 2015b; Karen Human Rights Group [KHRG] 2016; Karen Women’s Organization [KWO] ; The Shan Human Rights Foundation [SHRF] and The Shan Women’s Action Network [SWAN] 2002; WLB 2002). However, not only are ethnic nationality women more vulnerable to human rights abuses, but Jenny Hedström’s important body of work shows that a gendered political economy has institutionalized “gender-specific experiences of insecurity and oppression” in conflict-affected communities (Hedström 2016a:68; see also Ferguson 2013; [End Page 74] Hedström and Olivius 2020). Like in Bamar-Buddhist-majority areas of Myanmar, gendered norms and relations impact ethnic nationality women’s access to resources, authority, and power and also intersect with conflict and other forms of violence (see, e.g., Agatha Ma and Kusakabe 2015; Hedström 2016a; KHRG 2016; KWO 2010). Even though intersectional dynamics shape the experience of individuals throughout the country in different ways, gender plays a key role in determining access to power, privilege and authority.

In addition to gender, young women face a double form of discrimination because of their age. In Myanmar, age is a powerful determinant of power and respect, and young women are taught not to question the authority of elders or others in power as part of their moral status (Chambers 2019; see also Agatha Ma, Phyu, and Knapman 2018; GEN 2015a). However, young people have also historically been situated as powerful forces for change. The growth of student political action in the 1920s and the 1930s accelerated the national cause under the British raj, for example, and was at the forefront of the independence movement as early as 1920 (see Aye Kyaw 1963). It was student revolutionaries who emerged during the World War II as both national leaders and front-runners of the early communist uprisings against the central state and ethno-national resistance movements. Growing discontent in Myanmar against the military junta in 1988 led to wide-spread pro-democracy demonstrations famously led by university students and the emergence of Aung San Suu Kyi as a human rights icon (Lintner 1990).⁶ In the past, [End Page 75] these youth movements have often been led by men, but changes over the last ten years have galvanized young women to the forefront of the Spring Revolution, creating the foundation for a feminist revolution.

Women’s Participation in the Spring Revolution

Despite deep-rooted patriarchal, and traditional beliefs about women’s role in society, young women have been some the most outspoken and prominent leaders of Myanmar’s Spring Revolution. Organized resistance to the military coup began with the female-dominated health sector workers who announced a boycott of state-run hospitals and led protests in what was initially dubbed the “white coat revolution” (Head 2022). Just five days after the coup d’etat, Kachin activist Esther Ze Naw Bamvo and Shanni feminist leader Ei Thinzar Maung led protests wearing distinct ethnic Karen red shirts, calling not only for the end of military rule but also for greater recognition of ethnic nationality rights.⁷ On 6 February, another anti-coup protest led by young women in Mandalay chanted “Root out the fascist army which commits sexual violence. Come out! Come out to drive out the power-hungry people” (see also Myanmar Peace Monitor [MPM] 2021:2). From the busy commercial capital Yangon to the hills of Chin State, this soon morphed into a wider Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) of more than 40,000 people who refused to return to their jobs until democracy was restored, paralyzing [End Page 76] banks, hospitals, education, and other female-dominated sectors of the administration.⁸ Built off the back of a growing labor rights movement, where female workers regularly organized strikes to secure their livelihoods and legal rights, garment sector workers also came out in full force, with the industrial center of Hlaingtharyar soon the locus for a strong feminized resistance movement (see Ma Moe Sandar Myint 2021).⁹

In the days after the coup, women of all ages, across all ethnic, socioeconomic, and religious groups rallied against the military takeover. These were not just urban, well-educated civil society activists, but factory workers, teachers, and healthcare professionals—all sectors which are dominated by women. Using ever more creative strategies to humiliate and shame the junta, women from Generation Z, in particular, were at the forefront of the protest movement, spreading satirical memes, singing songs, painting murals, and dressing up; a rebuke to military establishment and everything it represented (Jordt, Tharaphi Than, and Lin 2021; Mi Mi Aye 2021; Su Mon Thant 2021). What began as jubilant scenes of mass protest led by these tech-enabled and meme savvy youth, however, soon descended into scenes of sheer horror and violence, as Myanmar’s security sector brutally cracked down on the largely unarmed protestors. In the capital of Naypyidaw, twenty-year-old Mya Thwe [End Page 77] Thwe Khaing was the first protestor to be killed by the military at a protest. In response, resistance tactics from the protest leaders changed, and they adopted increasingly defensive tactics, forming powerful People’s Defense Force (PDF) units which included women. Images of beauty queens and actresses in jungle training camps, rifles slung over their shoulders, soon circulated widely on social media (see McPherson and Shoon Naing 2021; Radio Free Asia 2021a).¹⁰

In conversations with some of the young women who participated in the various forms of protest, there was a deep sense of shock, sadness, and betrayal at the military’s takeover. Despite the increasing dangers, many had job offers and educational opportunities for which they had worked very hard and felt like they had no option but to go out onto the streets and fight for their disrupted futures and aspirations (see also Mi Mi Aye 2021; Su Mon Thant 2021:8). In an age of increased mobility and economic transformation, women we interviewed spoke about their fears of a return to a so-called dark age, fighting for their dreams, hopes, and aspirations for a “better life” (cf. Chambers 2021). In interviews with female activists from women’s rights groups, the reimposition of military rule has been experienced as a blatant attack on all the work they have done to dismantle patriarchal views and build people’s understandings of gender equality, particularly around the need to address gender and sexual violence and the ongoing impunity of the military. For older activists, there is not only a great deal of anger but also a deep feeling of déjà vu with their [End Page 78] own experiences of growing up under military rule and the violence inflicted on the country and its young prodemocracy leaders in the wake of the 1988 youth uprising. In contrast to 1988, however, young women are a much more prominent feature of the Spring Revolution’s resistance movement and have made this struggle a fight not only to restore democracy, but also to counter the patriarchal values and traditions which underpin the military establishment.

Htamein Protest

In the early days after the coup, calls from protesters focused on Suu, Yway, Hlut—the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and other political leaders and a return to civilian rule. However, the demands of protesters quickly become more encompassing, shifting to calls for more fundamental change in society: to abolish the 2008 Constitution, build a genuine federal democratic union, and to end all kinds of authoritarianism, including discrimination against women and other marginalized groups. One of the most famous creative acts of resistance led by young women was the Htamein (a sarong-like skirt worn by women) Campaign of 8 March, on International Women’s Day. Facilitated by social media platforms, the htamein protest specifically challenged the perceived traditional role of women in society and politics, asserting their active participation to the collective cause for freedom. Throughout the country, women’s htameins were hung on makeshift clotheslines above streets in cities and townships. From major cities like Yangon, Mandalay, and Naypyitaw, to towns in Kayin, Kayah, and Mon State, the htamein became a protective shield against policemen and soldiers, who were too scared to walk underneath due to their superstitious beliefs. Standing alongside their sisters, young men also [End Page 79] honored the symbolic protest of women against the patriarchal military institution, by wrapping htameins around their heads. Drawing on patriarchal gendered norms to mock and shame the senior generals, people stuck menstrual pads and women’s underwear to photos of military Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing, and images of these acts were widely shared online through social media platforms.

The use of the htamein as a symbolic defensive line plays on local beliefs related to hpon and the superstitious view that women’s undergarments are unclean and have the power to affect men’s inner power (or glory). Within Myanmar, it is widely believed that men’s hpon will diminish if they walk under or come into contact with menstrual blood, which by association includes women’s undergarments and the htamein. Soldiers and senior military leaders are notoriously superstitious, and tradition holds that King Anawrahta was gored to death after his hpon was affected by women draping their htamein over his effigy.

The International Women’s Day organizers therefore raised the htamein as a flag in a clear subversive act of defiance of the patriarchal institution and its superstitious soldiers. Led by young women primarily between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five, their slogan “Nga Doh htamain, nga doh ah lan, nga doh aung bwe” (Our Sarong, Our Flag, Our Victory), served as a direct challenge to the patriarchal social system and values under-pinning conservative military-led authoritarianism. By using this deeply symbolic act to undermine the power of the police and the military, the protestors jointly challenged not only the military junta and their control of the country but also the patriarchal conservative values that they represent and allowed to flourish under their rule. The htamein protest was a call not only for the end of [End Page 80] military rule but also for gender equality in a future Myanmar. As participants elaborated,

There are superstitions associated with women’s htameins in Myanmar. It is believed that walking under women’s sarongs will bring misfortune and men can lose their hpon. I want to eradicate these illogical ideas about women’s htameins. I am fighting against the dictatorship and its male dominated Tatmadaw, proudly putting up women’s htameins as a flag.

(Thirty-one-year-old female protestor, interview with author, 26 October 2021)

We performed and participated in the htamein campaign to challenge the cultural misconceptions about women’s sarongs and to uproot ingrained misogynist beliefs. We wanted to show that women’s sarongs are not misfortunate.

(Twenty-five-year-old female protestor, interview with author, 26 October 2021)

We came out to campaign against the dictatorship by holding the htamein as a flag, as a way to show that we are in this revolution equally together with all the people. We want to fight and destroy the age-old stereo-types about women and that we are supposed to be in the kitchen cooking and doing all the household duties, staying away from businesses and politics.

(Twenty-eight-year-old Muslim female protestor, interview with author, 14 January 2022)

I want people to realize that being noble or ignoble is independent of the types of clothes you wear. Both the htamein (women’s sarong) and pasoe (men’s sarong) are just pieces of clothing regardless of the names they are given/called.

(Thirty-one-year-old female protestor, interview with author, 26 October 2021)

As highlighted in the statements above, the htamein protest was a deliberate provocation of the military establishment and the patriarchal values it espouses, including superstitious views around women’s undergarments [End Page 81] and the htamein. By actively joining the htamein protest, many of the young women interviewed saw themselves as questioning the patriarchal norms of the military establishment. Such views are also reflected in commentary from women who have joined armed PDF units. As one member of the MWGG in Sagaing region explained: “It is assumed that women’s hands are meant for rocking the cradle, but we want to show the people that our hands are also capable of armed resistance to the military regime” (cited in Radio Free Asia 2021b). In this way, young women’s participation in the Spring Revolution is embedded in much wider calls for deep and enduring structural change, including rejecting the patriarchal norms that are embedded in the very institution of the military and its role as the so-called father of the nation. In addition, young women are also directly challenging societal norms about their position in society and their role in the revolutionary movement.

Interviews with women activists and participant observation of the discussions that led up to the htamein protest also highlight a generational divide. In some respects, the use of the htamein in the Spring Revolution is symbolically connected to earlier efforts such as the 2007 “Panties for Peace” campaign to shame the generals.¹¹ However, in interviews with female activists, many describe women from Generation Z as more assertive and emboldened to push gender boundaries then previous generations. In interviews, it was suggested that older women were more reluctant to use the htamein as a protest flag due [End Page 82] to cultural norms around respectability. In contrast, women from Generation Z are widely viewed as more radical—openly challenging some of the outdated, superstitious, and traditional views, such as toward the htamein, which reinforce discriminatory norms at a broader social level. As highlighted in the comments below:

Compared to the past protest movements against military rule, there is a clear difference in the 2021 revolution. Some strikers hang htameins and sanitary pads on the front line. Whereas in the past, women did not feel confident to use this kind of provocative action and many would say it is inappropriate. In this era, young people used the htamein as a way to show they are not only against the military, but also its patriarchal and misogynist ideology.

I think this revolution is different from 88. In this revolution, women fight not only the junta but also the patriarchal, misogynist and conservative ideology. We are fighting against all of these.

(Twenty-six-year-old Bamar Buddhist female protestor, interview with author, 14 January 2022)

The htamein protest with the slogan “Our Sarong, Our Flag, Our Victory” is a strong movement representing all women. In the past, women like my mother were afraid and didn’t get directly involved in the protests, but instead supported from the background . . . If we look at our society, there are many women like my mother, especially ethnic women, with parents whose didn’t allow their daughters to participate in the 8888 movement and who were afraid to be raped and killed. Nowadays, there are many changes amongst young women. There are no more stereotypes like “we shouldn’t participate in protests because we are women.” Many women are participating today with the perspective like “we should participate more because we are women.

(Twenty-four-year-old Karen Christian woman, interview with author, 12 January 2022) [End Page 83]

The participation of young women in the 2021 Spring Revolution is very strong. [In the last ten years] we have tasted freedom and seen the world around us and we don’t want to lose what we have gained. In the past 88 revolution, people lived in a dark era because of the closed policies of the Burma Socialist Program Party, so they had a darker situation than us. In this Spring Revolution, we have already felt and tasted freedom for a decade. Women are afraid that they are going to lose that freedom, so they are strongly against them [the military] and they have to fight together for their lives.

(Twenty-eight-year-old Muslim female protestor, interview with author, 14 January 2022)

However, while recognizing their contribution to exercise their political rights, one must not generalize young women’s agency or power in Myanmar. It is important to remember the diversity of women in Myanmar and to note the different interpretations of the htamein protest. Indeed, as shown by intersectional scholars, women’s relationship to the protest movement should be understood as multi-scalar and situated, conditioned by ethnic norms, religious background, class, and family structures. While in some places, the htamein was used as a symbolic challenge to beliefs in hpon as described above, other women had different interpretations. For example, women who participated in Kayah State saw the htamein primarily as a defensive tool, protecting them from the excessive use of violence by the junta. Whereas Christian Kachin women interviewees suggested their overall intention was to challenge and provoke the conservative and superstitious Bamar Buddhist military establishment and their male superiority vis-à-vis Buddhist beliefs, such as those related to hpon. Despite these differences, many women from ethnic and religious minority communities suggested that the coup has created a platform which has placed all women [End Page 84] together against a common enemy. As described below, young women have also helped to advance an “intersectional approach” (Cole 2008) to coalition building, which has pushed the Spring Revolutionary movement to have much wider goals that sit beyond the removal of the military from power.

Gender and Social Change: Postcoup Developments

The current change in the sociopolitical landscape provides possibilities for solidarity and positive change for women in Myanmar. This builds off the powerful work of women’s groups and ethnic civil society activists that have spent the last three decades campaigning for change and that, in many ways, were able to flourish under the liberalization period. Ethnic community-based organizations such as the Women’s League of Burma, the Shan Women’s Action Network, and the Karen Women’s Organization, in particular, have long played a powerful role in advocating for women’s rights under the patriarchal military institution in Myanmar, including documenting the use of rape as a weapon of war and other forms of gender-based violence against ethnic nationality women (e.g., KHRG 2016; KWO 2007; SHRF and SWAN 2002). These groups served as a strong example from which other women’s organizations inside the country built from as the country began to open up from 2011 onward. However, it is important to keep in mind the many hurdles that women continued to face under the civilian-military partnership and not to take an idealistic view of the reform period (2011–2020). As described earlier, even under Aung San Suu Kyi’s leadership, women remained largely absent from leadership roles across the country, from the Ward/Village Tract [End Page 85] level up. Gender inequality was also evident in the attitudes of many people (including women), toward women in leadership (see, e.g., Agatha Ma, Phyu, and Knapman 2018; GEN 2015a,b; Mala Htun and Jensenius 2020; Minoletti 2016).

Despite the incredible role that young women have played in the Spring Revolution, collectively women face deep and enduring challenges in Myanmar under military rule. As of January 2023, 2,778 women have been arbitrarily detained and at least 363 women have been killed (Radio Free Asia 2023).¹² About 1.2 million civilians have been internally displaced by conflict and insecurity since the coup, many of whom are women and children (ReliefWeb 2023). The increasing militarization of some areas of the country has also put women and girls at risk of forced labor, portering, arbitrary arrest, and sexual violence by soldiers. Women and gendered minorities have also been disproportionately affected by the military takeover and its impacts on the country’s healthcare and economic system (Quadrini 2021; UN Women 2021). Research also shows that rising insecurity has impacted women’s freedom of movement and, in turn, their ability to earn a living and access health services (UNDP 2022). Without proper access to services, women and girls are also experiencing challenges to access sexual and reproductive health services (Fishbein and Nu Nu Lu San 2021; UNDP 2022).

Despite these deep and enduring challenges, the prominent role young women played in helping to lead and define the goals of the Spring Revolution gives hope for a future Myanmar. Research from other parts of the [End Page 86] world highlights the powerful role women play in prodemocracy resistance movements against authoritarian regimes. Political scientists Erica Chenoweth and Zoe Marks (2022) argue that large-scale participation by women affects the success of these movements and long-term trajectories toward democratization, especially in those cases which include gender-inclusive ideologies. While the participation of women helps to lend legitimacy to resistance movements and its social, moral, and financial capital, the inclusion of women also expands “the range of tactics and modes of protest” and forms of social noncooperation (Chenoweth and Marks 2022), such as seen in the Htamein Campaign in Myanmar in March 2021.

In Myanmar, young women broke the glass ceiling and left behind their traditional supportive image by positioning themselves at the forefront of the prodemocracy movement. Furthermore, as Myanmar’s Spring Revolution has evolved since the initial days after coup in February, so have its demands for more fundamental change in society, including for a future federal democratic Myanmar. The coup not only highlighted the fragile nature of the previous power-sharing arrangement and the ultimate control the military had over the country’s leadership and governing institutions,¹³ but it has also brought the voices of young female leaders to the fore. They are a generation of young civil society activists, labor unionists, and ethnic leaders which the former NLD government often tried to silence and ignore. Building off the important work of ethnic activists and [End Page 87] ethnic women’s groups in particular, many of these young female activists have also sought to draw attention to the intersectional experiences of oppression throughout the country as a result of military rule. Indeed, what is so interesting about the young female leaders that have emerged from the coup is that they are not only trying to restore civilian rule, but they have taken what feminist theorist Elizabeth Cole (2008) refers to as an “intersectional approach” to coalition building in the pro-democracy movement, highlighting the ongoing experiences of discrimination experienced by ethnic, religious, and gender minorities at the hands of the military since independence.

Since the early days of the protests in Myanmar, young female activists have sought to assemble a coalition of organizations and activists with interests that represent a wide range of social issues, drawing attention to the experiences of ethnic and religious minority groups under the former power-sharing arrangement. Many young women activists are committed, for example, to not only fighting the military, but also ensuring that the predominantly NLD-led National Unity Government remains accountable to its commitment around building the foundations for a more equitable and inclusive Myanmar. Female garment sector workers too have also been important in shaping the revolution, lobbying for the rights of workers and low-income groups in particular. This is not to ignore the way the coup has created new issues around social cohesion (see Chiu 2022). Young women’s relentless resistance against the coup, however, gives hope for reform in a future Myanmar. Indeed, the Myanmar Spring Revolution has morphed into a social, cultural, and gender revolution, which seeks to establish a more equitable society for women, from all ethnic and religious communities. [End Page 88]

Conclusion

Unlike rebellions, revolutions “question the system of institutions . . . [and aim] at altering the existing social and political order” (Gluckman 1963:127). While there are many challenges facing Myanmar’s revolution— not least the power of the military as an institution— young women are playing a pivotal role in imagining a future for Myanmar which has the potential to transcend the existing social and political order and upend the traditional order of things. The coup d’etat staged by the Myanmar military on 1 February 2021 provoked young women to take a core role as agents of change in the revolution. Their active participation and leadership throughout the protests demonstrates the powerful role played by women in Myanmar as the bedrock of society, in ways which upend their traditional roles as wives and caregivers. As one sign at a protest in Monywa, Sagaing region, referenced: “Root out the military regime with our hands that rock the cradle.” Although the protests began with general resentment against the military and calls for the return of democracy, young women deliberately sought an intersectional approach to coalition building, making claims for much wider social change— including recognition for past acts of violence experienced by minority ethnic and religious communities.

There is no denying the powerful role that various women’s organizations and movements played in laying the groundwork for a full bloom nationwide feminist struggle within the Spring Revolution. Part of this change, however, can also be explained by the newfound freedoms that young women experienced during the liberalization period. For many young people, increasing access to technology and educational opportunities has allowed them to be exposed to human [End Page 89] rights discourses including democratic institutions, federalism, and the importance of gender equality, racial, and social justice. As highlighted in this article, many women protestors see the struggle against the military as not only a struggle for democracy but also a fight for gender equality. As one member of the armed MWGG described:

The situation [since the coup] has led us to demonstrate that women can do the same jobs as men. I think these resistance movements bring more equality and may help to eliminate discrimination in the future.

(cited in Radio Free Asia 2021b)

This is also reflected in conversations with members from the LGBTQI community, who saw a flourishing of activism around sexual orientation and gender discrimination between 2011 and 2020 (see Chua 2018; Chua and Gilbert 2015). Indeed, despite the many deep and enduring legacies of military rule which continued to hamper efforts to reform Myanmar over the previous ten years, it is clear that the country changed in ways which gave young women more confidence to fight for their rights alongside young men in the Spring Revolution.

The Htamein Campaign should be seen as the beginnings of a wider feminist cultural revolution in Myanmar, in its attempts to deconstruct the concept of hpon, a prevailing social belief that men are superior and should be treated differently from women. The powerful voices of young women leaders in the resistance movement have also sought to embed other protections in a future Myanmar, including for ethnic nationality communities, religious minorities, and for workers. Women’s voices have also encouraged growing recognition of the violence faced by various marginalized communities, [End Page 90] including the long persecuted Rohingya community. Although there are many reasons to fear the future for women in Myanmar, the emerging dialogue from young female activists gives hope for a way forward for the country in the future, to reconcile its past and move beyond the patriarchal identity-based politics which the military has long helped to foster.