The "Party Branch Established in the Wat":Social Cooperation between Local Authorities and Religion in the Theravada Buddhist Community of South-west China
The Communist Party of China enhanced its local presence by establishing a branch in the Theravada Buddhist wat in Dehong. Such direct political engagement in a religious venue, however, does not lead to grievances from the locals. This article finds that if the purely ideological differences can be well managed at the local level, the religion and the Party can cooperate with each other and maintain a harmonious relationship. This article reflects on the state–religion antagonism paradigm and argues that an alternative paradigm—an interests-based paradigm—should be prioritised when studying relations between the state and religion in China.
INTRODUCTION
Dehong is a Dai and Jingpo autonomous prefecture in the south of Yunnan province of China. Dehong has many ethnic minority groups, including Dai, Jingpo, Achang, Lisu and De'ang and the total ethnic population, at around 603,200, accounted for 45.7 per cent of the local population.1 Dai is the largest ethnic minority group, with a long history and religious ties with Theravada Buddhism. Theravada Buddhism is a part of their daily life that fits well not only in the Dai traditional way of living but also in their old spirit worship.2 [End Page 45]
In the Dai community, wats (zhuangfang 奘房)3 are the religious and social centres of the villagers. "The wat and the village share a fundamental relationship. All the villagers gather at the wat when there is a ceremony".4 Various religious activities, such as Buddhist rituals and ceremonies, are regularly held in the wats and the statues of Buddha and the religious symbols are enshrined and presented there. However, today, it is very common that the grassroots organisations (jiceng dangzuzhi) of the Communist Party of China (CPC), like the village Party branch, also establish their physical presence in wats in the form of a Party's room, an activity centre for Party members, a centre for Party cadres and so on. This is not an accidental phenomenon as the CPC's substantial presence prevails in almost every village wat in Dehong. It also signals the CPC's social infiltration into the religion-affiliated ethnic minority community, thus yielding interesting observations of the interaction dynamics between local authorities and religion at the grassroots societal level in south-west China.
The phenomenon of the "Party branch established in the wat" in the Theravada Buddhist community of Dai in Dehong prefecture is an ongoing process, which can be traced to 2009 and 2010. The situation continues to evolve. This phenomenon forms a contrast with other regions' religious governance measures in the context of the "sinicisation of religion". "Sinicisation of religion" is a slogan announced by Xi Jinping in 2015, which requires all religions to proactively fit into the Chinese characteristics of a socialist society and to adjust the aspects that are not in line with the mainstream culture defined by the CPC.5 According to Wang Zuoan, a director of the National Religious Affairs Administration, the "sinicisation of religion" policy requires strengthening the ideological and political guidance for religious circles to guide religious leaders to support the CPC leadership and the socialist system, and to rally closely around the CPC Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core.6 In other words, under Xi's administration, the CPC has strengthened its discipline [End Page 46] and control over religions. Therefore, the state's political intervention and involvement in religious events have become increasingly obvious.7
However, the "Party branch established in the wat" portrays a very different picture. First, the Party organisation would rarely establish its physical unit in a church, mosque or Han Buddhist temple, as this would make the CPC's image visible in religious contexts and cause ideological ambiguity. Second, the author's detailed study of both the English and Chinese media on Baidu, Google, Weibo, TikTok and Twitter shows that "the Party branch established in the wat" has not aroused social controversy and tension. Situations in Zhejiang and north-west China, where Christianity and Islam have been required by the local governments to modify their religious architecture according to the sinicised requirements, are different, resulting in social protests.8 Such a sharp distinction constitutes a very interesting research question.
This article attempts to understand the interaction between local authorities and religion in the grassroots society of south-west China by delving into the following research questions: How were the Party branches established in wats in the Dai community? How was this possible? What are the local CPC officials' and Dai people's attitudes towards direct and visible political existence in wats? Investigating these questions may elucidate the micro-dynamics of the local authorities and the Theravada Buddhist community in south-west China more vividly. This study can be considered crucial in shedding light on the religious governance strategies at the local level in south-west China's ethnic minority areas and in providing reflections on the state–religion antagonism paradigm when studying state and religion relations in China.
The article is structured as follows. The first section presents the literature on the paradigms of state and religion relations in China, as well as relevant studies in the context of south-west China. The second explains the methodology used. The third, based on fieldwork in the Dehong Dai community and research into the local people's attitudes, describes how the CPC's units were established in the wat. The fourth section presents a theoretical discussion using the interests-based paradigm to summarise the collaborative mechanism between the local authorities and religion in the grassroots society.
RESEARCH ON STATE AND RELIGION IN MODERN CHINA
The Need to Change the Research Paradigm
At different historical periods in China, religious views, as the advocacy of a belief in mystical forces, have been a worry for the state, as they may play a significant role in toppling weak authorities.9 Generally, and particularly in the quarter century [End Page 47] or so after the founding of the People's Republic of China (post-1949), political control over religions has not been relaxed. In this climate, the so-called state–religion antagonism paradigm gradually developed, accentuating tense incompatibility between the state and religions.10 Such a paradigm is to be expected. First, the CPC is known for its uncompromising atheistic position. According to the doctrines of classical Marxism, especially Leninism, the communist belief is not compatible with the religious worldview. It has been suggested that the relationship between religion and communism is generally antagonistic, and "the struggle against religion is not a single goal, and it cannot be treated alone; rather, it should be taken as one of the constituents of the proletarian revolution".11 Second, this paradigm is also corroborated by history. The Mao Zedong era saw an extremely hostile and tense relation between the Chinese state and religion. Chinese religions at the time were undermined, restricted and even destroyed nationally, especially in the "destroy the four olds" (posijiu) movement. Therefore, the state and religion were diametrically opposite and hostile under the administration of Mao Zedong, and religion in this period was reportedly in rapid decline.12
After Deng Xiaoping came to power (post-1979), China gradually became a more open society and was more tolerant towards civil differences and disputes; the adoption of the open-door policy had lessened the degree of compulsory collective orthodoxy.13 Although the state still maintained political control over religion in this period, the tension between state and religion was somewhat relaxed.14 The less strict environment under Deng's administration led to the rapid growth of the religious population.15 The state–religion relationships since the Deng era thus present a much more complex picture.16 At the local level, for example, the recognition of religion [End Page 48] and guidance of religious development are counterbalanced by containment of religious activities and suppression of non-sanctioned religions as tendencies pragmatically and comprehensively employed.17 These realities highlight the limitation of the state–religion antagonism paradigm. Ashiwa and Wank have suggested amending the traditional paradigm which considered state and religion in a dichotomous framework of antagonism and conflict. This paradigm may ignore multiple political processes and strategies including competition, conflict, adaptation, as well as cooperation adopted by various actors like government agencies, the clergy, religious associations, overseas Chinese, etc.18 Similarly, Cao also argues that instead of focusing on the antagonistic aspect, a new research paradigm is needed to focus on the dynamic relationship between religion and nation-building by highlighting how national and local religious leaders collaborate with China's nationalist modernisation and secularisation projects. According to Cao:
These [paradigms] will not only allow us to challenge conventional dichotomous frameworks of state–religion antagonism and conflict but eventually help transform "religion" from a fetishized ideological object into a multidimensional empirical concept in contemporary Chinese public discourse.19
The Interests-based Paradigm
As an alternative to the state–religion antagonism paradigm, Koesel suggests introducing an interests-based paradigm. She argues that daily contacts between local authorities and religion at the subnational level can lead to a better understanding of each other's interests. In this case, instead of considering, as does the state–religion antagonism paradigm, that local government and religion have fixed roles, the interests-based paradigm can investigate whether cooperation or conflict is the best way to address these issues by examining how religious and political actors define their interests, how they express their expectations of one another, and how they articulate what they can receive from one another.20 The interests-based paradigm considers the regime and religious actors as flexible and dynamic agencies that can help each other to meet pressing needs and interests.21 [End Page 49]
The conflict resolution theory uses a well-developed interests-based paradigm to analyse tensions that occur at both individual and social levels. According to this theory, "position" and "interests" are two completely different concepts. The positional mindset assumes that money, time, material goods, respect, status or honour are limited; therefore, the parties should strive to win as much as they can, rather than enlarge collaborative opportunities.22 Such a mindset may eventually strain and shatter the relationship between the parties and lead to antagonism.23 The interests-based approach, however, believes that a positional mindset is superficial and changeable because the interests, which cover a party's basic needs, wants and motivations, are the fundamental drivers of the party's behaviour.24 The interests-based approach provides a wide range of possibilities, from substantive goals such as money to emotional desires like recognition or even seeing happiness in another person, for the parties to negotiate.25 If interests are satisfied, the antagonistic position can be adjusted.
From the perspective of the interests-based paradigm, the state–religion antagonism paradigm thus ignores the active function and various needs of actors. It presumes that both the state and religion have fixed interests that always remain static. As a "zero-sum game", the more interests the state entitles for itself therefore leave fewer interests for religion, and this would inevitably lead to antagonism in their relationship. However, in contrast, Deutsch, who conceptualised the win-win theory, argues that in most situations people have a mixture of interests, so it is common for some of their goals to be positive initially while some are negatively interdependent.26 As Moffitt argues:
Disputants hold multiple interests; it is reasonable to expect that sometimes they will have some interest that is opposed. (You want to pay less, but I want to receive more from you.) Disputants may have other interests that are differing, but not opposing. (I care about a change in policy and you care about confidentiality.) Finally, it is reasonable to assume some of the disputants' interests are shared. (You and I both want the project to be completed on time. You would prefer a cleaner environment. And so would I. Both divorcing parents want their children to receive a quality education.) Shared interests present the opportunity for crafting an arrangement that makes both sides better off in a non-competitive way.27 [End Page 50]
In such a situation where interests are mixed, "effective actions" will improve the actor's chances of achieving a goal, whereas "bungling actions" may worsen the actor's chances of this desired outcome.28 Whether conflict and tension can be well managed depends, to a large extent, on whether the parties can recognise the existence of nonconflicting interests, including both the common and different ones, and adopt effective actions.29 In real regime–religion interaction situations, for example, Koesel has noted that the Chinese local government helps Buddhist abbots to waive their fees for MBA degrees in exchange for greater support from the temple to attract tourists; religion helps the local government build roads in exchange for official acceptance.30 According to the conflict resolution theory, Koesel's observation gives a typical example of the exchange of different interests. By adopting effective actions, nonconfrontational cooperation between state and religion can be achieved to some extent.
Religious Governance Strategy in South-west China
More specifically for the south-west China context, scholars have contributed research on the Theravada Buddhist community in Yunnan. State and religion, ethnic identity issues, the monastic education system, tourism and cultural protection in Dai villages are some of the main topics of this research. With respect to the relationship between local authorities and religion, McCarthy notes that Chinese officials at different levels actively promote economic connections with the local minorities by expanding trade, tourism, tax revenues and commodification of minority culture and religion to enhance the control and interdependence between government and ethnic minority groups.31 At a more operational level, the local governments in the Dai region usually adopt behind-the-scenes strategies to complete their political agenda.32 The local government attempts to make itself nonidentifiable when working towards its political goals. For example, by examining the local government's observance of the Dai's festival in Xishuangbanna, McCarthy found that the subjectivities of the participants were highly [End Page 51] ambiguous and overlapping. Most participants in religious events and festivals, including the officials, are both performers and spectators, rather than forming a so-called subject-object relationship.33
Similarly, Komlosy's findings reveal very subtle identity construction of the Dai in Xishuangbannna festivals. The Dai people do not attempt to distinguish between local people and outsiders, Han people and Dai people, officials and ordinary people when they engage in the religious activities of the Water Splashing Festival (cp. Songkran).34 That is to say, the state does not explicitly impose its political agenda in a coercive way, and its agenda is not achieved via subject-object domination. On the other hand, the CPC diffuses its political agenda into the lively festival atmosphere and natural human interaction. The local government constructs a "political theatre" in which different subjects can move beneath the political curtain and achieve their goals.35 However, local governments became highly visible in religious venues when the Party branches began to be established in the wat in the late 2000s. The obvious presence of the CPC unit in the wat, in fact, directly exposes its political agendas and purposive ideological control. Given that this is a relatively new social phenomenon, it seems that the local authorities have changed their behind-the-scenes strategies. Research on this new phenomenon is still scarce.
Religious issues are prominent in the worldviews of ethnic minorities in southwest China. In Chinese ethnic minority autonomous regions like Dehong, state intervention in and control over ethnic and religious issues still exist, and in general, the state intends such intervention as a means of elevating minorities' civilisation to that of the Han and of Chinese modernity.36 According to official documents, ethnic and religious policies in Dehong are more like the repetition of Beijing's official voices. However, subtle differences exist. First, the local authority has clearly stated that "it is important to actively mobilise the enthusiasm of the majority of religious believers, and jointly study Dehong's ethnic and religious culture, and spread Buddhist culture and the teachings of Buddha, so as to enhance their vibrancy".37 Second, given the relative harmonious relations of ethnic minorities in Yunnan compared with Tibet and Xinjiang, there is more space for the minorities in Yunnan to use various discourses (like ethnic minority development, national unity and ethnic minority autonomy) to localise the central policies. It has been noted in Dehong that "if Buddhists obey the authority and control of the government and are seen to be supportive of the policy, [End Page 52] nothing more is required".38 In other words, the minority and religious policy of Dehong can be understood as "a dialogical interaction of shared traditions of descent within sociopolitical contexts, constantly negotiated in each political-economic setting".39 These realities reflect the richness and diversity of ethnic minorities and lead to the implementation of religious policies at the local level.
Most research on the Theravada Buddhist community in Yunnan was conducted in Xishuangbanna, which is a popular tourist attraction. The author, however, focuses his research on Dehong because it is also another important Dai region, but one which is not easily accessible. While research on state and religion is generally sensitive in China, the choice of Dehong, which is located in China's southern border, traditionally known as the "five border counties" (Luxi, Longchuan, Yingjiang, Lianghe and Ruili of Yunnan province), for research is even more so.40 China has always been concerned that the international boundaries had become the "bases for the intelligence departments of the US, India, and Taiwan to collect information regarding the situation in China, and for Christians to carry out religious penetration into China".41 Before the "reform and opening-up policy" was initiated during the late 1970s, to control social mobility and national security risks, ordinary Chinese required an entry certificate to enter the region. In the past 40 years, the entry limitation has been gradually relaxed and the importance of counterintelligence has abated. The "five border counties" have become a prominent frontier for foreign trade. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, Dehong received 586,000 and 663,000 foreign tourists in 2018 and 2019, respectively.42 However, knowledge of the interaction between local government and religion in Dehong is still scarce.
FIELDWORK METHOD
The fieldwork was conducted in the Dehong Dai and Jingpo Autonomous Prefecture. The research focus is on the Dai people in Dehong with a long history and religious ties with Theravada Buddhism. The records of the Dai people as an ethnicity date back to the Han dynasty when Sima Qian wrote his landmark history, the Shiji. Since the Dai people live in the southern border area of China, they have close ties with [End Page 53] Southeast Asian countries like Laos, Myanmar and Thailand and share common Theravada Buddhist beliefs.43 The Dai people's religious practices were banned during the Cultural Revolution period but they have resumed since the late 1980s. Today, Theravada Buddhism in Dehong has revived, especially at the village level. Before conducting fieldwork, the author had visited several counties in Dehong and the border area since 2012, interviewing local intellectuals, officials, college students and ethnic minority people to determine the most typical and appropriate places to conduct the research. The author eventually chose to conduct his research in a Dai village in Mangshi city. This village is considered one of the biggest Dai communities in not only Dehong but also China. With a population of around 6,000 villagers, it has a 300-year-old Buddhist wat headed by helu (贺露). In the Dai language, he means head and lu, worship and donation. Helu refers to a lay Buddhist in the Dai village who is familiar with the Buddhist texts and rituals and can lead Buddhists in religious activities. The villagers' livelihoods are dependent largely on agriculture for food and income. The village is still an original Dai village, not a tourist attraction. Combined with survey questionnaires compiled from 97 villagers in 2017 and support from the local people, the author used Yunnan dialect and conducted in-depth interviews with around 25 locals, including helu, Dai villagers, village cadres and local leaders of the Dehong government in August 2017, February 2018, July 2020 and 2022 (online), respectively.44 Based on the analysis of the questionnaire findings, the author devised and developed a main direction and theme for the interviews, which varied from half an hour to two hours.
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PARTY'S BRANCH IN THE WAT
Policy Background and Implementation Process
The Party's engagement in the wat can be traced to around 2009. In order to strengthen Party-building in the ethnic minority region, a series of policies called "building the corridor of Party-building in China's frontier" (jianshe bianjiang dangjiang changlang) was initiated in Yunnan province in 2007. In 2009, the Dehong Prefectural Committee of the CPC issued the "Opinions on Implementation of Deepening the Corridor Party-building in Frontier and Further Strengthening the Implementation of Party-building" as a local response to the Party-building policy. The Dehong Opinions clearly required that the Party's policy propaganda should enter the wats to strengthen the transmission of the Party's ethnic and religious policies. These opinions exemplified the trend that "the Chinese state has increasingly integrated its religious work into the national system of state governance and party-building".45 In 2009, the policy propaganda finally materialised. The Party organisation began to actively establish its [End Page 54] physical branches in Dehong's village wats, under such names as the party member activity room, party cadre centre, etc.
In the investigated Dehong village, the construction of the party organisation activity room in the wat began in October 2009. As there was no such activity room in the village then, the village Party branch secretary (CPC member and Dai), helu and village head (also a CPC member and Dai) discussed the possibility of establishing a party member activity room by merging with the activity centre for the elderly in the wat. After the reconstruction proposal of the wat was put forward, the village Party branch members consulted several village representatives for their opinions. The village representatives gave relatively positive feedback and the proposal was then made public. Voluntary donations from villagers in 2009 went towards funding the construction.46 Before 2009, the elderly activity centre served a relatively simple function, mainly for performing and organising ethnic artistic activities. It did not have a political function and did not hold CPC-related activities, and also CPC emblems and insignias were absent on the premises. Upon the completion of the project eight months later, the party organisation activity room used the place of the elderly activity centre, sharing the same physical environment with the wat. The CPC emblem and propaganda banner were displayed outside the activity room in the wat (Figure 1). The presence of Party symbols and emblems in the premises provided Party branch members with a justification to organise political activities in the wat, such as Party members' thematic study activities and Party branch elections, while religious and other activities are still held in the wat.
The present Xi Jinping era further promotes the establishment of a Party unit in wats. In 2014, for example, Lianghe county of Dehong had constructed more Party branches at the village level. The county aimed to complete the construction of 334 party member activity rooms within four years.47 Many of these rooms were established in wats if the village wat had enough space.
The CPC's Interests and Strategy
Based on the author's interviews with the local government officials of Dehong, the number of Party members in some Dai villages is less than one-tenth of the number of religious believers. The author designed a questionnaire for this fieldwork to investigate the villagers' situation. Among 97 respondents aged 16 to above 60, 9.3 per cent claimed that they were CPC members and 83.5 per cent indicated that they were Buddhists. In terms of religious observances, 23.7 per cent of respondents reported that they never participated in religious activities and a large majority [End Page 55]
The Party's Branch in the Wat (View from the Second Floor of the Wat, 2017)
Source: Photo taken by the author.
(76.3 per cent) indicated that they would participate in religious activities irregularly. In 2019, the Dehong government changed the statistical method for calculating the religious population. Participation in religious activities, not ethnicity, was used as a statistical criterion. Hence, statistically, the official religious population of Dehong had declined dramatically from 410,000 in 2018 to 190,000 in 2019.48 However, this number is still much larger than the number of CPC members. In 2019, for example, there were 74,471 CPC members, of which 30,894 were ethnic minority CPC members.49 According to different statistics and interviews, the number of Party members is significantly fewer than that of religious believers, which may challenge the Party's ideological position at the local level. To local Party cadres, establishing a Party branch in the wat bears significant strategic meaning in terms of both Party-building and the "sinicisation of religion". A local Dai cadre shared in an interview [End Page 56] conducted in 2018 that "the wat is the centre of the Dai community and people gather there not only for religious purposes. The wat is thus a great promotional location for the CPC to seek to occupy".50
Unlike the local Party cadre's ambitious political goal regarding "occupying the wat as the promotional location", a very sophisticated strategy was needed for the CPC to gain entry into the wats. In his fieldwork in 2017, the author observed a scholarship programme designed by the Party for the wat. The Party cadres provided scholarships by collecting donations from township enterprises and then awarded them to five Dai students who successfully enrolled in universities after the Chinese university entrance examination. The scholarship award ceremony was not a religious activity but was held in the wat with the young generation's participation. All students, scholarship recipients and their friends were at the ceremony; the scholarship recipients were required to go on stage to receive the prize and deliver their speeches. Some students expressed their gratitude to the Party organisation, despite the setting being in a religious venue. The ceremony ended with the village cadres making a concluding speech, highlighting the significance of unity and community-building. Such activities serve the function of political propaganda and are examples of holding secular activities in the wat with both the Buddhist and CPC symbols displayed in the background.
As party organisation activity rooms were built and are located in the wats, local cadres can rightly use the wat's physical space for both secular and CPC-related activities. The Party's work, in local cadres' words, can therefore "more effectively integrate into the local community" (genghao de rongru shequ).51 Certain political activities, such as discussing the CPC political reports and publicising the Party's policies for political propaganda and ideological control purposes, can be organised and held by the Party's branches in a religious venue. For the same reason, the CPC branch in the village can also donate to or support issues related to the "livelihood activities" (minshen) or "ethnic minority customs" (minsu) in the wat by using the "effective integration into the local community" discourse, although some of the activities may also contain religious elements. In the investigated Dai community, some important social events are even held in the name of both the wat and the village government, such as the local marriage customs reform proclamation (Figure 2).52 The wats then become a multifunctional place where religion and Party-run social services can be accessed, collective sentiments and information can be shared, and the Party cadres and monks collaborate on non-ideological work. The establishment of the Party branch in the wat has explicitly emphasised the Party's existence in the religious venue; [End Page 57]
Notice of Public Affairs with the Seals of both the Village Committee (Government) and the Wat for Local Marriage Customs Reform (2017)
Source: Photo taken by the author.
however, it seems that behind-the-scenes strategies are still adopted to hide the long-term objective of politics behind the curtain of pragmatism.
However, there are certain limits to the cooperation between the grassroots Party unit and religion: a 1982 "CCP edict insists that the CCP members must be atheists and unremittingly propagate atheism".53 There exists a fine line between religious and non-religious activities. The local officials shared with the author in interviews that they were promoting the culture, grassroots livelihood, economic developments and ethnic group unity in the wat, but not the religion. One of the village leaders clarified in an interview conducted in 2020: [End Page 58]
We, Party members, must take part in social activities, as we are actually in the service of the people and in uniting the people. As is widely known, the Water Splashing Festival is our Dai ethnic festival, not a religious event, and thus people from all around the world can participate. Provincial and prefectural leaders can attend the event. Shouldn't we attend? However, our Party members do not participate in purely religious activities; the reason is clear.54
Party members, therefore, will not participate in "purely religious activities" (chun zongjiao huodong) like Buddhist worship ceremonies or the Buddhist scripture recitation activities.55 In this context, the term "purely" matters but is not easy to define. First, Theravada Buddhism, as mentioned earlier, is deeply ingrained in villagers' daily lives. In this sense, boundaries between culture, ethnic minority customs and religion are vague. Second, the government has not delineated the separation of culture and religion any more clearly. It is noteworthy that Chinese local governments have framed religious action by attaching sociocultural labels to socialise and culturalise religious activities in the public field for political and economic purposes.56 This strategy has also been comprehensively adopted by the Dehong government. In 2007, the government began to celebrate the two officially recognised ethnic minority festivals, the Dai Water Splashing Festival and the Jingpo's Munao Zongge (mass dance) Festival, on a large scale. These two festivals with religious roots have also become gala events. In these celebrations, local leaders deliver their speech and mainstream media are invited to cover the festivals, and they attract thousands of tourists.57
A close analysis of the data in the yearly reports of the Dehong government may reveal the economic reasons for these celebrations. The term "tourism" (lüyou) was increasingly mentioned in the yearly reports on the work of the Dehong government, from 18 times in 2013 to 29 times in 2020; this demonstrates the potential of tourism as a crucial part of developing a third industry. According to the 2017 statistics, the tourism industry generated 22.143 billion yuan in general income, contributing about seven per cent of the fiscal revenue of Dehong.58 To maximise the economic value of religious and cultural heritage and to ensure political correctness, the distinction between culture and religion needs to be blurred. In this case, the political discourse from Beijing regarding the revival of traditional culture is borrowed as an effective narrative to legitimise the religious activities that have [End Page 59] their sociocultural aspects in the Dai community (Figure 3). In this case, these festivals and local tourist events that are rooted in the religious tradition of the Dai ethnic minorities are transformed and reframed into sociocultural or local customs events. Through this transformation, the government has a politically correct reason to support religion-related activities.
A Billboard on the Highway Featuring Xi Jinping's Slogan "Good Traditional Culture is the Foundation of National Inheritance and Development" in both the Chinese and Dai languages (2018)
Source: Photo taken by the author.
In his fieldwork carried out in 2020, the author had a discussion with local CPC members about the religious and social activities usually held in the wats (Table 1). From the perspective of local CPC members, religion-related activities59 held in the wats can be classified into three types. The first is the "purely" religious activities, such as the Guangmu Festival (worshipping of Buddha after the harvest) and the Hanshanghanmeng Festival (an ordination ceremony for a boy to become a monk, and a young monk to become a senior monk). Religious worship and rituals are the [End Page 60] distinguishing features of these ceremonies. Second are the fully culturalised festivals, like the Water Splashing Festival,60 Lengxi Festival (in celebration of the homecoming of Buddha) and Jinjing Bimai Festival (New Year's celebration activities coinciding with the Han's Spring Festival). Although these activities involve religious rituals, they have now developed into mass celebrations, ethnic minority customs or tourism activities. Merits and virtues ceremonies (gongde bai) are the third type of religious activities that have religious roots but are not considered fully transformed social events. Local CPC members have not yet arrived at a consensus on this third type due to its vague religious nature. Merits and virtues ceremonies are typically organised to bless the village upon completion of infrastructure construction such as roads, bridges and wells, etc. To sum up, local CPC members would not participate in the first type of religion-related activities but they can participate in the second type. As for the third type, local CPC members can exercise their discretion and personal judgement to evaluate the actual situation before participating.
Activities in Wats (2020)
Local People's Interests and Attitudes
Dehong's long-standing shortage of monks poses challenges to the sustainable development of wats. As in other regions that practise Theravada Buddhism, most of the Dai villages have their own wat. However, few young people want to enter the religious system, receive religious education and devote themselves to work in wats. A local official shared with the author that there were 611 Theravada Buddhist wats [End Page 61] and pagodas in Dehong, but there were only 49 Chinese monks in 2022.61 For political and social-economic reasons, introducing foreign monks cannot solve the lack of religious personnel in Dehong.62 Due to the shortage of local monks, the religious hierarchy system in Dehong has collapsed—village wats hold their religious activities separately and not concurrently with the city wat. Dehong's religious structure has thus changed from a centralised to a decentralised one, and the religious beliefs and ritual activities of the Dai people have become increasingly fragmented.
The wat has been the centre not only of religious worship but also of community life, both in the past and currently at the village level. For example, villagers usually hold their wedding and funeral ceremonies in wats. A functional wat thus bears secular significance in terms of maintaining the Dai community's collective life and identity. Today, most of the jobs in the village wats are taken up by helu, as mentioned above. According to the Helu Management Method of Theravada Buddhism in Dehong Prefecture (Pilot) issued by the Buddhist Association of Dehong Prefecture in 2010 (the helu management method in short),63 a Buddhist helu is one who has received a traditional Buddhist education, has been recognised by the Dehong Theravada Buddhist Association, and can lead Buddhists to practise Buddhism and preside over general religious activities. The helu management method provides the standards and procedures for selecting and appointing helu. However, the management method places top priority on political criteria. A qualified helu should be patriotic and law-abiding (aiguo shoufa), advocate the socialist system (yonghu shehui zhuyi zhidu), insistent on religious self-independence (jianchi duli zhizhu zhiban), etc. Moreover, a helu should also have passion for Buddhism (reai fojiao), have pure faith (xinyang chunzheng), devotion for Buddhists (aidai xinzhong), respect for monks (zunzhong sengren) and be familiar with Theravada Buddhism institutions, rituals and ceremonies (shuxi nanchuan jiaozhi liyi yigui), etc. In addition, the helu should be recommended by the village (usually via a selection procedure), approved by the local Buddhist association and be responsible only for the village wat affairs. Upon approval, the helu serve five-year terms.
Helu has different names in different Theravada Buddhist regions in Yunnan province. A helu in Dehong is called "bozhang" in Xishuangbanna and "anzhang" in Lincang city.64 When monks are present to assume duties, a helu does not need to conduct such religious works as the transmission of Theravada Buddhist dharma but he is specifically responsible for the daily operation and financial management of the [End Page 62] wat. Some scholars even call helu the CEOs (chief executive officers) of the wats.65 When monks cannot be present, mainly because of their shortage, the helu is also responsible for organising religious activities and spreading the Theravada Buddhist Dharma as well. Such dual identity requires helu to lead believers to conduct religious activities and also to administer the social affairs of the wat. Their dual identity ensures the secular and religious functioning of the wat. According to the author's fieldwork, around 1,000 helu currently work in different wats of Dehong. There are 13 helu in the investigated village, and their average age was 71 (2022). During the wa (洼, which, in the Dai language, means studying Buddhist sutras and worshipping the Buddha) period from July to October every year, about 1,200 people in the investigated village, accounting for nearly one-fourth to one-fifth of the village population, would enter the wat to participate in the religious activities. The religious worship and Buddhist sutras study activities are held once weekly from 6 am to 7.30 pm. Villagers are divided into two to six classes and they take turns in participating in the religious ceremonies (Figure 4).
Religious Activities in the Wat (2017)
Source: Photo taken by the author.
According to the author's interviews with a local helu, despite the heavy workload, helu do not have a fixed income.66 They oversee the day-to-day operations of the village wat but do not receive a salary. Helu earn their income mainly from the event hosting fees. If they are invited by the villagers to host an event or a religious ceremony, the [End Page 63] person who invites them will pay them a token sum known as the hardship fee (xinkufei) or the merit fee (gongdefei). As the helu management method has stipulated, it is legal for the helu to charge a service fee. In Lianghe county, the hardship fee or the merit fee is about 20 to 30 yuan per event. In other places in Dehong, the fee would be about 60 to 100 yuan per event. It should be noted however that helu do not frequently have the opportunity to host events. As helu are not well paid and they are generally advanced in age, it is impossible to keep the wats operational at high quality by relying solely on the helu's voluntary efforts. Therefore, to maintain the wat's social life and religious function, support from the outside society, like that provided by the CPC, is essential.
In this investigated Dehong village, helu support the establishment of a Party branch in the wat, because they consider such arrangement a form of support for the development of the wat. A village helu revealed:
The rebuilding of the wat and Party office is a big project. We construct them in brick and concrete. The construction resulted in an expanded new space for the wat. Why were there no objections from the villagers? The reasons are: village activities are not reduced but are enriched; the venue has not shrunk, but has expanded instead. This has drawn the distance between the wat, the Party and the masses even closer.67
After construction of the new wat was completed, the physical space of the wat was layered. The spatial arrangement of religious activities and Buddha statues for a new wat is on the second floor, while the ground floor is used for villagers' secular activities. As such, the religious and secular functions of the wat are concurrently separated and integrated. Figure 5 shows a villager holding a housewarming reception on the first floor of the wat. In his fieldwork in 2018, the author interviewed this Dai villager, who invited neighbours, relatives and friends from the village to celebrate the completion of a new house. This family held its reception at the wat, given that the new home could not accommodate so many guests. The family used the tables, chairs, kitchenware and the kitchen that were all available on the wat's ground floor; the family then invited friends and relatives to help prepare dinner in the wat. The family paid 600 yuan in fees to the village for using the site. Such collective activity has significant social meaning, as it will strengthen community connections and ethnic identity. It is noteworthy that secular activities are usually held on the ground floor of the wat, with the Buddha statue consecrated upstairs and the Party emblem displayed on the other side of the wat building. The two-storey new wat presents a possible overlap of politics, society and religion in the same physical space. Whether from the perspective of aesthetics or pragmatism, political activities have entered the religious venue; at the same time, religious activities have also entered the political realm. Such overlapping functions can be considered as public goods provision for the villagers. Citing a [End Page 64] comment made by a helu, the wat is a manifestation of "one space with two functions" (yige difang, liangzhong gongneng).68 In this two-storey wat with intertwining symbolic significance, Buddhists can benefit from the Party-organised activities and villagers will also be more willing to come to the wat for more diverse activities held by the wat and by the CPC.
Secular Functions of the Wat: A Family Holding a "Housewarming" Reception on the First Floor of the Wat
Source: Photo taken by the author.
As mentioned earlier, the CPC's existence in the wat is embodied not only in strengthening political control, but also in providing pragmatic services. Although Dehong villagers show no interest in participating in the CPC's political activities like "three conferences and one class" (sanhui yike),69 they are keen to receive social services in the wat. Besides collective activities and ceremonies, other events organised at the wat like free nucleic acid testing to detect COVID-19, a sharing session of social insurance knowledge, free haircuts at festivals and free massages for the elderly on the [End Page 65] Double Ninth Festival are welcome by the Dai villagers. When these events are held under the banners of the wat and the Party organisation, the wat becomes vital and useful for villagers and Buddhists, as their interests can be met. The non-ideological social function can therefore become one aspect whereby the CPC and religion can cooperate to win the support and participation of villagers. A Dai villager shared his view: "The Party centre in the wat not only organises Party members' activities but also provides many useful and realistic things. The richness and usefulness of the wat have been enhanced."70
IDENTIFYING NON-CONFLICTING INTERESTS BETWEEN STATE AND RELIGION
The state–religion antagonism paradigm has built a primarily adversarial image between regime and religion in China. However, the situation in the Dehong Theravada Buddhist community shows a different picture. Although the state revealed its presence in the religious venue, a non-antagonistic relationship between regime and religion is still maintained. If the analytical framework is not limited to the state–religion antagonism paradigm, this phenomenon is understandable. According to the interests-based paradigm, whether there is an irreconcilable antagonistic relationship between the subjects depends not on intrinsic ideological stances but on whether the active subjects can utilise the constructive strategy, identifying the non-conflicting interests (different and common ones) between them and then "enlarging the pie". Following this vein, the interests between the CPC and religion can be categorised into three types, as illustrated in Figure 6.
Types of Interests between the Regime and Religion
Source: Compiled by the author.
[End Page 66] The ideological tension between the CPC's atheism and the teachings of the Buddha constitutes conflicting interests. When the CPC expands its control at the ideological level, the practice of Theravada Buddhism will be restrained correspondingly. But with regard to the social function aspects, the Party and religion share common interests on which they can cooperate and different ones about which they can exchange views and strategies. Firstly, both the CPC and religion are multifunctional in that they have multiple interests. There is hence a possibility of cooperation in the non-ideological field. From the perspective of religion, the social functions have been well documented in the scholarship. Religion not only has a spiritual function but also incorporates latent social functions that must be fulfilled for society to work properly.71 In Chinese society, the temple and shrines provide visible indications of the strong and pervasive social functions of religion.72 From the perspective of the CPC, the Party will play not only the ideological role by unifying the mainstream ideology, strengthening political recognition and propagandising the Party's policies, but it also needs to play a pragmatic and practical role, such as legal governance, economic development, social mobilisation and management, and the provision of public goods and services. The multifunctional aspects of state and religion make social services common concerns for both sides.
Secondly, it is undeniable that the pragmatic view Beijing has preferred in its religious policy is being weakened in the Xi Jinping era, considering the policy orientation of the sinicisation of religion. However, "China is a very complex land where multiple realities are operating beneath a facade of a unitary nation-state… Variation across the province and even within the province is enormous".73 In southwest China, local variations and social complexity make the uniform application of the central policy unfeasible. For example, according to the Party's rule, all members are strictly prohibited from participating in religious activities. In the Dai community, however, religion has been fully integrated into people's lifestyle, especially in rural areas, not to mention that many grassroots cadres of the Party and government themselves are Dai. If the CPC's rule that forbids participation in religious activities were strictly enforced, this would create a tense situation whereby Dai Party members would be forced to separate their religious activities from their daily life. Hence, religious policy needs to be always localised for pragmatic implementation,74 and official documents like Document 19 permit the CPC members to participate in ethnic [End Page 67] ceremonies and mass festivals with religious traditions and significance, thus ensuring that Party members continue maintaining close links with the masses.75
Thirdly, the complex and special structure of wats has facilitated collaborative ties between the CPC and religion in areas of nonconflicting interests. Unlike Han and Tibetan Buddhism, the religious sites of Theravada Buddhism, i.e. the wats, are deeply embedded in Dai villages and are not located in remote mountainous places. Wats serve multiple functions, covering various social and secular aspects that are closely connected with the daily lives of ordinary Dai villagers. In addition, compared to Han and Tibetan Buddhism, Theravada Buddhism has a dual-track management system, namely the management system of Buddhism and the helu system. The dual-track management system "has been the conduit that orderly mingles Theravada Buddhism with the social management system of Chinese ethnic people".76 The helu system in this case facilitates wats to perform secular functions and provides human resource support in this regard; the helu's dual identity also aligns their task to play a bridging role between religion and the secular society.77 These particularities of Theravada Buddhist wats in the structure and functions in fact pave the way for the CPC and religion to explore and achieve further cooperation.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
China's religious policy has contributed to a spectrum of religion–state relations across Chinese society that can be described variously: as symbiotic, adversarial or in terms of a zone of indifference. These diversified implementations of religious policies make the application of the state–religion antagonism paradigm problematic "because it ignores the fragmented nature of many authoritarian political systems and the important variation in how these regimes regulate religious groups"78 and presumes that religion–regime relations are fixed and static, which cannot account for the day-to-day interaction between religious and political actors.79 This article echoes Koesel's argument that "issues of faith do not necessarily (or indeed usually) shape the relationship between the authoritarian state and religious groups. Instead, as with most bargaining processes, the nature of the interaction is one of give and take".80 [End Page 68]
Based on the author's fieldwork and by identifying the nonconflicting interests, this article sheds light on how the social cooperation in wats between state and religion happened in a Theravada Buddhist community in south-west China. If the research paradigm shifts from the state–religion antagonism paradigm to the interests-based approach, it is not hard to recognise that both the CPC and religion have multifunctional characteristics and common pragmatic interests. While the wat needs the CPC to support its development, the CPC also requires the wat to expand its influence in the Dai community. Although their interests are conflicting in the ideological field, their interests overlap or are at least exchangeable in the social service field. Collaboration then becomes an effective strategy for both the subnational government and religion to seek stability, influence and legitimacy.81 If the nonconflicting interests are identified, religious activities, collective events, village service, social reunions and the Party's publicity could become shared goals and a common responsibility for both the CPC and religion. Further research based on this new paradigm can be undertaken to investigate the relationship between state and religion in different local and religious contexts.
Xiong Hao (xionghao@fudan.g.sjuku.top) is an Associate Professor of Law at Fudan University Law School. He received his PhD in Law from the University of Hong Kong. He specialises in alternative dispute resolution as well as empirical and interdisciplinary legal studies.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The research for this article was supported by a grant from the Shanghai Philosophy and Social Sciences Annual Planning Project (project: 2022BFX007) and the Major Humanities and Social Science Project of Shanghai Education Commission (grant no. 2021-01-07-00-07-E00124). The draft of this article was presented at the Third English Writing Workshop for the Social Scientific Study of Religion in China and the annual meeting of the East Asian Society for the Scientific Study of Religion held at the Singapore Management University in 2018. The author would like to extend his sincere thanks to Yang Fenggang, Susan McCarthy, Carsten Vala, Yousef Yang, Joanne He and Orlando Woods for their comments and suggestions to the earlier draft.
Footnotes
1. See Dehong Dai and Jingpo Autonomous Prefecture, at <https://www.dh.gov.cn/Web/_F0_0_4XHKOT2P8C7302A1DFE343C6B0.htm> [18 May 2022].
2. J.A. Berlie, "A Comparative Study of Buddhism and Islam in Yunnan Province: Dai and Paxidai", The Muslim World 100, no. 2–3 (2010): 340–1.
3. In Dehong, the temple is called a wat (zhuang, 奘). The Theravada wat and Han temple in the Dai community are called zhuangfang (奘房) and zhuangxie (装谢), respectively. Most Theravada wats were destroyed during the Cultural Revolution period and were rebuilt in the 1980s. Nowadays, participants of religious activities are not necessarily affiliated with Buddhism but they demonstrate their collective identity as Dai. In today's Dai village, people who strictly follow religious rules and attend religious rituals are mainly of the older generation. Based on the interviews, although the younger generations also participate in important religious events like the Water Splashing Dai Festival and the Open-door Festival, they are, in general, less passionate about the religion than the older generation. See Liu Jiang, Guanchun: Bianqianzhong de tusi shuguanzhai (Guanchun: A Village of Headmen and Their Families in Change) (Kunming: Yunnan University Press, 2008), pp. 44–140.
4. Ibid., p. 342.
5. Richard Madsen, "Religious Policy in China", in, Handbook on Religion in China, ed. Stephan Feuchtwang (Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020), pp. 26–7.
6. Wang Zuoan, "We Should Adhere to the Orientation of Adapting Religions in China", The Study Times, at <https://paper.cntheory.com/html/2022-03/21/nw.D110000xxsb_20220321_1-A1.htm> [21 May 2022].
7. Benoît Vermander, "Sinicizing Religions, Sinicizing Religious Studies", Religion 1, no. 10 (2019): 4–5.
8. Chang Kuei-min, "New Wine in Old Bottles. Sinicisation and State Regulation of Religion in China", China Perspectives 37, no. 2 (2018): 40.
9. Lawrence Cox, "Freedom of Religion in China: Religious, Economic and Social Disenfranchisement for China's Internal Migrant Workers", Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal 370, no. 8 (2007): 375.
10. See Daniel H. Bays, "American Public Discourse on the Church in China", The China Review 9, no. 2 (2009): 1–16. For some empirical analysis in this regard, see Carsten T. Vala, "Protestant Reactions to the Nationalism Agenda in Contemporary China", in Christianity in Contemporary China: Social-Cultural Perspectives, ed. Francis Khek Gee Lim (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 64.
11. Gong Xuezeng, "Survey of Marxist Perspectives on Religion in New China", in Marxism and Religion, ed. Lü Daji and Gong Xuezeng, trans. Chi Zhen (Leiden; Boston, MA: Brill, 2014), p. 295.
12. Chan Kim-Kwong, "Religion in China in the Twenty-First Century: Some Scenarios", Religion, State & Society, no. 33 (2005): 87–8.
13. Xiong Ping, "Freedom of Religion in China under the Current Legal Framework and Foreign Religious Bodies", Brigham Young University Law Review, no. 3 (2013): 605–7, at <https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2013/iss3/9> [8 February 2023].
14. Eric R. Carlson, "China's New Regulations on Religion: A Small Step, Not a Great Leap, Forward", Brigham Young University Law Review, no. 3 (2005): 747–54, at <https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2005/iss3/8> [8 February 2023].
15. Wang Zuoan, "New Changes in the Situation of China's Religions", Zhongyang shehuizhuyi xuebao (Journal of the Central Institute of Socialism), no. 3 (2008): 51–2. See also "Pew-Templeton Global Religious Future, China", at <http://www.globalreligiousfutures.org/countries/china#/?affiliations_religion_id=0&affiliations_year=2010®ion_name=All%20Countries&restrictions_year=2014> [25 August 2019].
16. Yang Fenggang, "A Research Agenda on Religious Freedom in China", The Review of Faith and International Affairs, no. 11 (2013): 6–7.
17. Chan, "Religion in China in the Twenty-First Century", pp. 87–8.
18. Yoshiko Ashiwa and David L. Wank, "Making Religion, Making the State in Modern China: An Introductory Essay", in Making Religion, Making the State: The Politics of Religion in Modern China, ed. Yoshiko Ashiwa and David L. Wank (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), pp. 3–5.
19. Cao Nanlai, "Chinese Religions on the Edge: Shifting Religion–State Dynamics", The China Review 18, no. 4 (2018): 4–5.
20. Karrie J. Koesel, "Religion and the Regime: Cooperation and Conflict in Contemporary Russia and China", World Politics 69, no. 4 (2017): 679.
21. Ibid., pp. 676–81.
22. Christopher W. Moore and Peter J. Woodrow, Handbook of Global and Multicultural Negotiation (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2010), p. 82.
23. Ibid.
24. Bruce Patton, "Negotiation", in The Handbook of Dispute Resolution, ed. Michael L. Moffitt and Robert C. Bordone (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2005), p. 280.
25. Ibid.
26. Morton Deutsch, "Cooperation and Competition", in The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice, ed. Morton Deutsch and Peter T. Coleman (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2000), p. 24.
27. Michael L. Moffitt, "Disputes as Opportunities to Create Value", in The Handbook of Dispute Resolution, ed. Michael L. Moffitt and Robert C. Bordone (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2005), p. 176.
28. Ibid.
29. Although the negotiation and conflict resolution theories are usually not used to analyse Chinese political issues, the theories are not limited to the individual level, and can also be used at the national and even the international levels. Some examples of the use of negotiation and conflict resolution theories to solve political problems include the achievement of the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt at Camp David in 1978, the negotiation of the Iran hostage event in 1979 and the boundary dispute negotiation between Ecuador and Peru in 1998. See Roger Fisher and Daniel Shapiro, Beyond Reason: Using Emotions as You Negotiate (New York: Penguin Group, 2005), pp. 6–7, 76–9 and 183–99.
30. Koesel, "Religion and the Regime", pp. 692–3.
31. Susan McCarthy, Communist Multiculturalism: Ethnic Revival in Southwest China (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2009), p. 8.
32. In other cases, for example, scholars have found that the government will not interact with the Buddhist followers directly but through other semi-formal organisations, such as the Buddhist Association, to influence religion and its followers. See Yoshiko Ashiwa and David L. Wank, "The Politics of a Reviving Buddhist Temple: State, Association, and Religion in Southeast China", The Journal of Asian Studies 65, no. 2 (2006): 345–8.
33. Susan McCarthy, "Gods of Wealth, Temples of Prosperity: State Participation in the Minority Cultural Revival", China: An International Journal 2, no. 1 (2004): 45–6.
34. Anouska Komlosy, "Procession and Water Splashing: Expressions of Locality and Nationality During Dai New Year in Xishuangbanna", Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, no. 10 (2004): 351–70.
35. McCarthy, "Gods of Wealth, Temples of Prosperity", p. 41.
36. Thomas Borchert, "Of Temples and Tourists: The Effects of the Tourist Political Economy on a Minority Buddhist Community in Southwest China", in State, Market, and Religions in Chinese Societies, ed. Fengang Yang and Joseph B. Tammney (Leiden: Brill, 2005), p. 90.
37. Local Annals Compilation Committee of Dehong Dai and Jingpo Autonomous Prefecture, Dehong Nianjian 2016 (Dehong Yearbook 2016) (Mangshi: Dehong Minzu Press, 2016), p. 41.
38. Takahiro Kojima, "Tai Buddhist Practices in Dehong Prefecture, Yunnan, China", Southeast Asian Studies 1, no. 3 (2012): 422.
39. Dru Gladney, "Clashed Civilizations? Muslim and Chinese Identities in the PRC", in Making Majorities, ed. Dru Gladney (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 109.
40. Xiong Hao, "Identity and Public Administration of the Myanmar Settlers on China's Border: A Comparative-Empirical Study of Myanmar Students and Local Officials", The China Review 19, no. 4 (2019): 156.
41. Li Chenyang and Liang Fook Lye, "China's Policies towards Myanmar: A Successful Model for Dealing with the Myanmar Issue?", China: An International Journal 7, no. 2 (2009): 255–9.
42. See Local Annals Compilation Committee of Dehong Dai and Jingpo Autonomous Prefecture, Dehong Nianjian 2019 (Dehong Yearbook 2019) (Mangshi: Dehong Minzu Press, 2019), p. 366; Dehong Nianjian 2020 (Dehong Yearbook 2020) (Mangshi: Dehong Minzu Press, 2020), p. 342.
43. Berlie, "A Comparative Study of Buddhism and Islam in Yunnan Province", pp. 339–40.
44. Due to the serious epidemic situation in Dehong, the area was not always accessible in 2022. The interviews could be conducted only online.
45. Cao, "Chinese Religions on the Edge", p. 2.
46. The author was told by the village head that almost every household gave donations but the amount varied for each household. Given the very large number of donors, the village did away with the usual practice of building a stone monument to record the religious donation. Instead, the donation amount was eventually announced to the public on the village radio.
47. Zhang Zhiren, "Construction of 334 Party Member Activity Rooms in Villages Expected to be Completed within Four Years", Dehong tuanjiebao (Dehong Newspaper), 26 November 2014.
48. See Local Annals Compilation Committee of Dehong Dai and Jingpo Autonomous Prefecture, Dehong Nianjian 2019 (Dehong Yearbook 2019) (Mangshi: Dehong Minzu Press, 2019), p. 508; Dehong Nianjian 2020 (Dehong Yearbook 2020) (Mangshi: Dehong Minzu Press, 2020), p. 401.
49. See Local Annals Compilation Committee of Dehong Dai and Jingpo Autonomous Prefecture, Dehong Nianjian 2020 (Dehong Yearbook 2020), p. 93.
50. Author's interview with a Dai Party cadre in the investigated village, 20 July 2018.
51. Ibid., 19 July 2020.
52. The competition for how luxurious one's wedding ceremony is has been a prominent feature in the Dai community. Following the reform of wedding customs issued by the village and wat in 2017, the gift money is limited to less than 100,000 yuan, and the wedding celebration is shortened from three days to one. The objective of the reform is to simplify weddings.
53. Yang, "A Research Agenda on Religious Freedom in China", p. 7.
54. Author's interview with a village leader in the village investigated, 18 July 2020.
55. There are 107 CPC members, who are all of Dai ethnicity, in the village investigated.
56. Yoshiko Ashiwa and David L. Wank, "The Politics of a Reviving Buddhist Temple: State, Association, and Religion in Southeast China", pp. 337–47; McCarthy, "Gods of Wealth, Temples of Prosperity", p. 40.
57. See photos of the Water Splashing Dai Festival and Munao Zongge Jingpo Festival in Dehong, Dehongzhou Cutlure Center, at <http://www.dhzwhg.org.cn/content/3349>; and <http://www.dhzwhg.org.cn/mlxm/3463> [2 February 2023].
58. Bureau of Statistics of Dehong Dai and Jingpo Minority Autonomous Prefecture, Dehong 2017 lingdao ganbu jingji gongzuo shouce (Dehong 2017: Economic Working Booklet for the Leaders), 2017, pp. 55–78.
59. Other non-religious activities, such as weddings, elections, village conferences, agricultural skill training and volunteer services, are not categorised as religion-related activities. The CPC members can participate in these non-religious activities as well as the CPC's political activities.
60. For more details on the religious roots of the Water Splashing Festival, see Anouska Komlosy, "Procession and Water Splashing: Expressions of Locality and Nationality during Dai New Year in Xishuangbanna", Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 10, no. 2 (2004): 357–68.
61. Author's online interview with a local official of Dehong, 10 May 2022.
62. McCarthy, "Gods of Wealth, Temples of Prosperity", p. 33; and Takahiro Kojima, "Tai Buddhist Practices in Dehong Prefecture, Yunnan, China", p. 422.
63. In Chinese, this regulation is "Dehong zhou nanchuan fojiao helu guanli banfa (shixing)" (Helu Management Method of Theravada Buddhism in Dehong Prefecture [Pilot]), which was adopted at the second plenary meeting of the Sixth Council of the Buddhist Association of Dehong Prefecture on 15 July 2010.
64. Zheng Xiaoyun, "An Analysis of the Chinese Threshold Theory of Theravada Buddhism from the Anthropological Perspective: A Case Study of the Anzhang Phenomenon in the Management System of Theravada Buddhism", Sixiang zhanxian (Thinking) 36, no. 2 (2010): 5, note 1.
65. Ibid.
66. Author's online interview with a helu in the investigated village, 12 May 2022.
67. Author's interview with a helu in the investigated village, 22 July 2020.
68. Author's interview with a helu in the investigated village, 22 July 2020.
69. The CPC requires its branches to regularly organise meetings of all Party members, caucus meetings and branch committee meetings, and to provide Party members with educational lectures. This policy was summarised as "Three Conferences and One Class".
70. Author's interview with a villager in the investigated village, 22 July 2020.
71. Andrea Diem-Lane, How to Study the Sacred: An Introduction to Religious Studies (Walnut, CA: MSAC Philosophy Group, 2nd ed., 2014), pp. 43–56.
72. Yang Chingkun, Religion in Chinese Society: A Study of Contemporary Social Functions of Religion and Some of their Historical Factors (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1961), p. 6.
73. Tony Saich, Governance and Politics of China (London; New York: Palgrave, 4th ed., 2015), p. 2.
74. Yang Fenggang, "The Red, Black, and Gray Markets of Religion in China", The Sociological Quarterly 47, no. 1 (2006): 101–9. See also Tim Oakes and Donald S. Sutton, eds., Faiths on Display: Religion, Tourism, and the Chinese State (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), p. 227.
75. "The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious Question during Our Country's Socialist Period", Chinese Law & Government, 31 March 1982, at <https://www.globaleast.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Document_no._19_1982.pdf> [2 February 2019].
76. Zheng Xiaoyun, "On the Religious Management Model in Chinese Theravada Buddhism", International Journal of Sino-Western Studies, no. 17 (2019): 52.
77. Zheng, "An Analysis of the Chinese Threshold Theory of Theravada Buddhism from the Anthropological Perspective", p. 7.
78. Koesel, "Religion and the Regime", p. 678.
79. Ibid., p. 679.
80. Ibid., p. 704.
81. Ibid.
