The Americas

Introduction

In this short letter, first published in a little-known Veracruz gazette in July 1806, Pedro Ajequiezcane sets out to discuss the defects plaguing Spain's system of trade with its American empire.¹ In doing so, he presents an unusually broad-based and insightful analysis of the chief factors fuelling the growth of trade between Great Britain and the Spanish colonies in the Caribbean in the final decades of the colonial era.

Nothing is known of Ajequiezcane beyond his name, though he is likely to have been someone closely associated with the Veracruz mercantile community, and possibly wrote under a pseudonym.² He begins his survey with the late-Bourbon 'Free Trade' legislation, specifically with the great Reglamento del Comercio Libre published in 1778. While acknowledging the positive effects of Free Trade, he is rightly skeptical as to the ability of the program to counter the commercial competition of rival nations. Ajequiezcane next discusses the special permits which proliferated during the [End Page 245] 1780s and which sanctioned trade between the Spanish colonies and neighboring foreign territories. These contracts, whose origins lay in emergency measures taken during the American Revolutionary war, typically licensed the exchange of plantation produce or livestock for agricultural implements and mill machinery. Ajequiezcane's letter focuses upon the special regimes introduced at this time by the crown in Puerto Rico and Trinidad, though the majority of permits of this kind were granted at the provincial or regional level rather than from Madrid. They now spread throughout most of the Spanish colonies, and the resulting trade—often referred to as the comercio de colonias extranjeras ('foreign colonies trade') or simply comercio de colonias—provided a perfect pretext for smuggling by Spanish merchants. The trade, in fact, gave rise to such extensive contraband that in my view it constituted probably the key development in British commerce with the region during the 1780s.

Having hinted at the commercial advantage the British reaped from such permits, Ajequiezcane then offers valuable comments on the system which, I would argue, had the effect of superseding them in many regions a few years later. This was free trade in slaves throughout the Spanish empire, first decreed in 1789 and extended and developed over the following years.³ In essence, this system granted permission to both Spaniards and foreigners to trade freely at each others' ports for slaves. Ajequiezcane suggests that it further facilitated contraband in Spanish vessels, relieving the British of the need to go to the Spanish coasts to trade while giving them effective access to Spanish colonial produce. Cuba played a crucial role in the genesis of the free slave trade, as Ajequiezcane was probably well aware, but he correctly remarks that its effects in fomenting illicit trade were comparable in all the colonies where it was introduced.⁴ He also observes correctly that, contrary to expectations, trade for slaves by Spaniards directly with Africa failed to thrive, with the business remaining very substantially in foreign hands.

Worthy of note at this point is Ajequiezcane's assertion that, uniquely among the Spanish colonies, Mexico remained largely immune to penetration by foreign commerce until the onset of the Napoleonic wars. This point should certainly not be over-stated, but it does appear to be the case that illicit trade in Mexico remained relatively limited—limited relative to the [End Page 246] scale on which it was carried on in other colonies—until the late 1790s, its development perhaps hindered by factors including the geography of the coast, a stronger domestic economy and closer administrative control. In this sense, my own research suggests that New Spain was the only major colony in the region not to be affected by the permits for trade with foreign colonies which, as Ajequiezcane well understood, became so widespread during the 1780s and 1790s.

Probably the most valuable section of the letter is that which refers to the development of trade during the Anglo-Spanish Napoleonic wars which broke out in late 1796. In the second half of the eighteenth century, and especially following the creation of Free Ports in the British colonies in 1766, trade by Spanish vessels in the British islands became the most important vehicle for commercial relations between the two nations in the Caribbean, relegating trade by British smugglers on the Spanish-American coasts to a secondary position. As a result, as Ajequiezcane states quite clearly, the economic disruption occasioned by the Anglo-Spanish wars was felt not only in the Spanish empire (through British naval seizures of Spanish shipping), but also in the British colonies (through the consequent collapse of the lucrative trade by Spanish merchants at the British Free Ports). In consequence, and after vigorous protests on the part of British mercantile interests, from 1797 it was ordered that trade by Spaniards with major British colonies be granted special protection by the British colonial governors. Spanish vessels were now issued with licenses protecting them from seizure by British warships, thus permitting them to trade freely with the British even as war raged around them. This 'Licensed Trade' lapsed with the Peace of Amiens in 1802, but was revived after the renewal of hostilities in 1804, and persisted until the definitive peace in 1808, during all of which time it remained probably the chief vehicle for Anglo-Spanish commerce in the region.⁵ A great many Spaniards in the colonies certainly knew of the trade and understood the basis on which it was carried on, and copies of British licenses may be found in Spanish imperial archives. Nevertheless, the trade was rarely discussed openly; in point of fact, Ajequiezcane's letter is the only contemporary published description of it by a Spaniard I am aware of.⁶ [End Page 247]

As part of his discussion of the licensed trade, Ajequiezcane mentions the closely-related (and still less-known) phenomenon of trade carried on under cover of permits for the ransom of Spanish vessels and cargoes held as prize goods in the British colonies. The term employed for this practice was rescates, and the resulting trade was sometimes known as the comercio de rescate ('ransom trade'). Ajequiezcane's brief description of the ransom trade is characteristically perceptive, something evident for example in his observation that several of the ransom permits persisted, quite illicitly, throughout the peace of 1802-04.

The final part of Ajequiezcane's analysis is concerned with the question of trade with neutral powers in the Spanish colonies, which was sanctioned by a decree of November 1797 issued in the context of the wartime commercial crisis. Neutral trade was formally revoked by a subsequent decree of April 1799, but in reality it persisted—either by grace of the government, or by special dispensation of the colonial governors—in most regions for the duration of the wars.⁷ Although the question has been relatively little studied, trade by neutrals appears to have now become the second great vehicle for commerce between the British and the Spanish in the Caribbean, comparable in value to trade by Spanish merchants under license in the British Free Ports.⁸ Widespread contemporary suspicions among Spaniards that the British infiltrated this trade on a large scale are reflected in Ajequiezcane's assertion that ninety percent of the goods imported by neutrals were of foreign manufacture. Also of interest is his statement to the effect that most goods not actually British were manufactured in northern European countries allied at this time with London. Ajequiezcane was writing soon after the renewal of neutral trade with Mexico in 1805, when it came to be organized on a still more extensive scale, much of it within the framework of contracts with the commercial houses of Hope, Barings and Gordon & Murphy permitting the transfer to Europe of bullion stockpiled in the Spanish colonies during the war.⁹ We are thus denied his comments on this later trade, from which the British appear to have derived equal or still greater benefit. [End Page 248]

Almost as interesting as the contents of Ajequiezcane's letter is the major issue it does not address, which is to say the question of contraband trade carried on by British merchants on the coasts of Spanish America. It will be noted that smuggling by the British themselves is almost entirely absent from Ajequiezcane's account, most strikingly from his survey of commercial affairs during wartime. This is not to suggest that British commercial interloping declined altogether during these years; indeed, there is evidence that it remained a phenomenon of greater or lesser significance in various Spanish-American regions after 1796. It continued to be, along with trade by Spaniards in the British islands and the intermediary trade carried on by neutrals, the third major vehicle for Anglo-Spanish trade in the Caribbean during these years. Nevertheless, Ajequiezcane's silence on this question may be expressive of the minority role that contraband trade by the British themselves now played in the transfer of manufactures from producers in Great Britain to consumers in Mexico City, Havana, Cartagena de Indias or Caracas. The development and protection under license of trade by Spanish merchants, and the advent of large-scale neutral trade during the wars, eroded still further the historically dominant position of British contraband, preparing the way for the onset of overt commercial relations between the British and the Spanish-speaking territories after the Anglo-Spanish peace of July 1808.

The Document

Letter by Pedro Ajequiezcane, in Jornal Económico Mercantil de Veracruz, nos. 146-9, 24-27 July 1806.

Since any individual born into a civilized Society contracts a strong obligation to contribute according to his lights to its well-being, so I shall shed mine on the defective current system of our Trade with the Colonies.

Foreigners have at all times given us many lessons on this matter, and in general, albeit tardily, we have imitated them in the facts, but not in essentials. The regulations of the year 1778, and the successive measures to promote industry in the Metropolis, and American Agriculture, appeared to guarantee the inevitable prosperity which was hoped for; it may be said that the general revolution brought about by Free Trade, will always constitute a memorable epoch; but without question the results were unequal to the flattering hopes we allowed ourselves; it was thought that everything had been achieved, but time and experience very soon proved the inadequacy of the means. The neighboring nations which surround us, jealous witnesses to this great step, feared its consequences and redoubled their efforts to frustrate it; indeed they left no step untaken to secure the sale of their manufactures, and it seems that just as for our part we raised obstacles to their consumption, they gave a new and strong impetus to their industry, and supplied other means of invigorating and extending their Trade ever more, especially with the Colonies. [End Page 249]

From that time we believed that the consumption of the industrial products and the Agriculture of the Metropolis were assured in our [Colonies], and we merely attempted to ensure that they prospered; the knowledge of what Saint Domingue produced to France, and Jamaica to the British, doubtless contributed powerfully to our determination to make all our own [colonies] flourish, and especially the islands of Trinidad, and Puerto Rico; it was thought no doubt that the profits which those Nations derived from Trade with their Islands, were simply the product of the flourishing state of their Agriculture, without considering what was its origin.

This error strengthened our determination, and permits proliferated to attract new Colonists and foreign Trade to those Islands; indeed, Agriculture began to make progress, albeit much more slowly than was expected, but the Metropolis, far from partaking of this trade, exporting its products and fomenting its merchant marine, had to pay the costs of government, and of its defense, so that these possessions served only as a heavy charge upon it. These visible effects notwithstanding, the system was reinforced still further, in view of the success attributed to the freedom conceded by France to its Islands in 1784 to supply themselves, by means of neutral [merchants], with flour, wood, staves and other articles for their sugar-mills. Let us not enquire whether the French merchants could or could not supply their Colonies entirely with those articles from their own soil, a matter which was hotly disputed at that time by the Delegates from [the colonies], and those of the Maritime Cities, nor whether that measure was useful or otherwise; what seems almost beyond doubt is that their prosperity would have increased, even without it.

But the situation of our Islands was altogether different; the competition of French industry with the British prevented the entry of contraband in their [islands], where the only goods consumed were those manufactured in the Metropolis, whose Trade and wealth made very rapid progress; the articles imported by neutral [merchants] had very little effect on their Trade in the same products, in competition with them. For our part, just as we admired this progress of Agriculture in the French islands, so we opened the doors to foreign Trade; their ships brought to our [islands] direct from Europe and the United States whatever articles were necessary for their consumption; but Agriculture there, the constant object of our desires, made little progress.

The Island of Cuba was not so unfortunate as the two colonies afore-mentioned; foreigners were only permitted to supply [Cuba] with Negroes, and our Trade took a share in that exchange; but nonetheless it felt the effects of the fanatical doctrine of the times; to that fatal evil was added that of the freedom granted to the Colonials themselves to go willingly to seek Negroes and tools in the foreign Islands. Mutual trade between those privileged islands [of Trinidad and Puerto Rico] and this one [of Cuba] had thrown open the doors to contraband, and already in the latter island a taste had been created for foreign manufactures, especially for British ones; but this unhappy occurrence finally decided the fate of our Trade in favor of our assassins, who effectively profited from the Agriculture of the Colony. [End Page 250]

Since then [the British] ceased to trouble to come to our Coasts to supply our necessities; our ships and smugglers were admitted with open arms in all their Ports; [our merchants] took off our precious coin, and in return received, under cover of four Negroes and a few tools, their rich cloths of cotton. In vain direct Trade under our flag with the Coasts of Africa was urged and encouraged, both from the Islands and part of the American Continent and from Europe; the voyages made with this motive were very few, because those to the near-by Islands were more profitable and less hazardous; in sum, illicit Trade became most active, while that of our Metropolis weakened.

In all our settlements on the Continent which have enjoyed this disastrous freedom, the same lamentable effects have been experienced. The concessions granted in 1789 to the lesser Ports were insufficient to counter the flood of evil. Only N[ew] S[pain] seemed to remain immune to this terrible plague, despite the fact that European goods paid import duties [here] much higher than in the other dominions of the King in this part of America; but the constant contact or commerce with the infested Countries meant that the luxury of the rich became familiar with that merchandise, which little by little came into common use, at a price cheaper than national goods of the same class. This unhappy era can be dated to the war with Britain which broke out in 1796; our Colonies witnessed the interruption of their Trade not only with the Peninsula, but also with the neighboring British [colonies], and were obliged to grant free access to the neutrals, albeit with certain restrictions; but our flag could not approach [the British colonies], and British Trade suffered by the absence of its former guests; what trade went on in [British] goods, albeit indirectly, passed through many hands before reaching those of the consumer, and [the British] sought to draw our ships to their Ports; such were the petitions of the British Colonials to their government, that the respective naval commanders in their Islands were authorized to grant passes to such of our vessels as wished to undertake the trade for the space of three or four months, with the facility to extend them, and on condition of remaining within certain geographical limits. After a short time, scandalous thing! Our flag flew amidst our enemies in all the Ports of their Islands; the Spaniards who undertook this trade were admitted with the impatience and avaricious cordiality with which they awaited their pesos fuertes; our Islands, and almost all the Continent, took part in this new and lucrative trade, with a fervor which grew with the inactivity brought about by the absolute interruption of [trade] with the Metropolis, with the permits to ransom our vessels taken as prizes, and lastly with [the permit] granted to the Trade to make voyages in neutral ships from Europe and the United States of America.

All these permits, and all these favors, were granted by the Metropolis with no intent other than that of the general good of all its subjects, but, as almost always happens, through an abuse as painful as it is criminal, they were made harmful to us, and beneficial to our mortal enemies; such was the sad result of these concessions.

Those permitted to ransom the ships and goods of our nationals managed by means of the same favor to obtain funds in the British Islands; the use that several of our merchants [End Page 251] made of this simple operation may readily be imagined, by the ease with which the restrictions imposed by the Royal Exchequer to avoid the fraudulent importation of goods other than those permitted were eluded; several of these permits endured up until the beginning of the present war, from which it may also be inferred whether the [merchants] so favored took care to maintain these relations in force.

Still more disastrous was the permission granted to our Trade to make expeditions from neutral Ports under the same [neutral] flag. The British had declared that it was most hazardous to enter into Portugal, Denmark, the Hanseatic Towns, and other neutral Countries, to assault our interests; but that they would attack with the courage native to them all those [interests] which came within their reach, under the protection of any unarmed flag; in consequence, no neutral could carry our property without grave risk of insult; but it was simplicity itself for them to declare to the British that the cargoes they carried belonged to individuals of their Country, and to prove to us that they were Spanish property. Few will be unaware of the means used to do this, and it is similarly well known that of a hundred parts of what was imported, ninety, at least, belonged to foreigners, and much of it to enemies. But this was not the only evil: a great part of those cargoes were of British merchandise, and the rest manufactured in the North of Europe, by the allies or supporters of England; from Spain and France only a few brews were imported, and from Italy nothing; such that our declared or disguised enemies alone enjoyed the Trade of our rich possessions. Not even the exorbitant price of paper in this kingdom [of New Spain] stimulated them to purchase it in the Metropolis, for shipment, and to supply us with so necessary an article; all conspired to ruin our industry and Trade.

This was recognized by the government, as is evidenced by the Royal Order of 20 April '99 which revoked, to general applause from every Spanish patriot, that of 18 November '97, the cause of so many evils; the same [order] also revoked all the permits granted to private individuals, about which favors or privileges, with their consequences, so much has been written; the truth is that such privileges are always granted to repay certain services made to the State in straightened circumstances. But what fatal services to our Nation! Never have those who have obtained or enjoyed them been seen to pursue any other than their own private interest, nor have they failed to neglect the most sacred and essential [interest] of all, which is that of the Nation. But what a noble petition, and how grateful to the ears of our magnanimous and beneficent Sovereign, if after relieving their necessities similar favors were used to succor their compatriots! Such might be the case if national goods and products paid no duties on export from the Peninsula, importation to America, or in Alcabala on consumption, and if the returns enjoyed a similar favor, even if not made [directly] to the Peninsula, nor under our flag; but no, this is not the reward requested; the merchandise manufactured by our ferocious enemies must needs be consumed before all others. What joy, and what flattering hopes were not conceived upon the announcement in the public papers of the Royal Order of 21 June 1804 which discusses this matter! No Spaniard who requests such privileges, can be a lover of his Nation; no Trade undertaken with our Colonies which does not come from our Peninsula can be other than disastrous for us, so long as national industry cannot compete with that of our neighbors. Agriculture, industry and [End Page 252] Trade, if they do not nourish each other mutually in a great Kingdom, and especially in a maritime power, will find it difficult to prosper. Enough.

If the Editor has the goodness to publish in his Daily what has been said so far, then this his attentive and faithful Servant will continue his discussion on the subject.

Pedro Ajequiezcane.

Original Text

Como todo individuo que nace en una Sociedad civilizada, contrahe la estrecha obligación de concurrir con sus luces al bien estar de ella, voy yo a manifestar las mías sobre el defectuoso actual sistema de nuestro Comercio con las Colonias.

Los extrangeros nos han dado en todos tiempos sobre esto multiplicadas lecciones, y generalmente, aunque tarde, los hemos imitado en el hecho, pero no en lo esencial. El reglamento del año de 1778, y las sucesivas disposiciones en favor de la industria de la Metrópoli, y de la Agricultura Americana, parecían salir garantes de la infalible prosperidad que se esperaba; puede decirse que la revolución general que causó el Comercio libre, formará siempre una época memorable; pero sin duda no correspondió el resultado a las lisongeras esperanzas que nos prometimos: se creyó haberlo hecho todo, pero el tiempo y la experiencia demostraron muy pronto la insuficiencia de los medios. Las vecinas naciones que nos rodean, zelosas observadoras de este gran paso, temieron sus consequencias y redoblaron su actividad para frustrarle: efectivamente no perdonaron medio para dar salida a sus manufacturas, y parece que a medida que por nuestra parte se oponían obstáculos a su consumo, ellos dieron un nuevo y fuerte impulso a su industria, y proporcionaron otros medios de vigorizar, y extender más y más su Comercio, especialmente con las Colonias.

Desde aquel momento creímos asegurado el consumo de las producciones industriales, y de la Agricultura de la Metrópoli en las nuestras, y sólo se trató de hacer que prosperaran: el conocimiento de lo que producía a la Francia la de Santo Domingo, y la Jamaica a los Ingleses, hizo sin duda gran fuerza para empeñarnos en hacer florecer todas las nuestras y en especial las islas de Trinidad, y Puerto Rico; se creyó sin duda que las utilidades que sacaban aquellas Naciones del Comercio con sus Islas, eran sólo efectos del estado pujante de su Agricultura, sin examinar de donde traía su orígen.

Este error aumentó nuestro empeño, y se multiplicaron las gracias para atraher nuevos Cólonos, y el Comercio extrangero acia aquellas Islas; efectivamente, la Agricultura empezó a hacer progresos, aunque mucho más lentos de lo que se aguardaba, pero la Metrópoli, lexos de participar de este tráfico, dando salida a sus producciones y fomentando su marina, tenía que pagar los gastos del gobierno, y de su defensa, de modo que sólo le servían estas posesiones de una pesada carga. Sin embargo de estos efectos visibles, aún se fortificó este sistema, en vista del buen suceso que se atribuyó a la libertad que la Francia concedió en 1784 a sus Islas de surtirse, por medio de los neutrales, de harinas, maderas, duelas, y otros artículos para sus ingenios. No nos [End Page 253] metamos en si los comerciantes Franceses podrían surtir, o no enteramente de aquellos artículos de su propio suelo a sus Colonias, cuyo asunto fue ventilado en aquel tiempo con el mayor ardor entre los Diputados de estas, y los de las Ciudades Marítimas, ni en si fue o no acertada aquella providencia; lo que sí casi se puede asegurar es, que su prosperidad hubiera ido en aumento, sin esta medida.

Pero la situación de nuestras Islas era del todo diferente: la competencia de la industria Francesa con la Inglesa, no daba entrada al contrabando en las suyas, y sólo se consumían los géneros fabricados en la Metrópoli, cuyo Comercio y riqueza se iba robusteciendo con suma rapidéz; los artículos que les llevaban los neutrales, perjudicaban muy poco a su Comercio de las mismas especies, en concurrencia de aquellos. Nosotros al paso que admirábamos estos progresos de la Agricultura en las islas Francesas, franqueamos la entrada al Comercio extrangero; sus naves conducían a las nuestras directamente desde Europa, y los Estados Unidos, quantos artículos necesitaban para su consumo; y sin embargo se adelantaba poco en su Agricultura, objeto constante de nuestro anhelo.

No fue la Isla de Cuba tan desgraciada como aquellas dos: los extrangeros sólo tuvieron permiso de llevar a ella Negros, y nuestro Comercio, tomó parte en sus cambios; pero no por eso dexó de sentir los efectos de la doctrina fanática de su tiempo: a más de aquel funesto mal, se agregó el de la libertad concedida a los mismos Colonos de ir a buscar solícitos a las Islas extrangeras Negros y herramientas. El mutuo tráfico entre aquellas islas privilegiadas, con ésta había abierto puerta franca al contrabando, y ya en esta isla se había tomado el gusto por las manufacturas extrangeras, especialmente por las Inglesas; pero este desgraciado accidente acabó de decidir la suerte de nuestro Comercio a favor de nuestros asesinos, con una efectiva utilidad de la Agricultura de la Colonia.

Desde entonces cesaron los cuidados de aquellos de acercarse a nuestras Costas, para socorrer nuestras necesidades: nuestros buques y contrabandistas fueron admitidos con los brazos abiertos en todos sus Puertos; estos llevaban nuestras codiciadas monedas, y en cambio recibían, a la sombra de quatro Negros y algunas herramientas, sus ricas estofas de algodón. En vano se recomendó y estimuló el Comercio directo, baxo nuestro pabellón con las Costas de Africa, tanto desde las Islas y parte del Continente Americano, como desde Europa: las expediciones que se hicieron con este motivo, fueron muy raras, porque eran más lucrosas y menos arriesgadas las que se hacían a las Islas inmediatas; en fin el Comercio ilícito se hizo muy activo, al paso que el de nuestra Metrópoli se debilitaba.

En todos nuestros establecimientos del Continente donde se ha gozado de esta funesta libertad, se han conocido los mismos tristes efectos. Las franquicias concedidas en 1789 a los Puertos menores, no fueron bastantes para contrarestar el torrente del mal. Sólo la N.E. parecía preservarse de esta terrible plaga, sin embargo de que los géneros de Europa pagaban unos derechos de importación mucho más considerables que los demás dominios del Rey en esta parte de América; pero la contínua frotación o tráfico con los Paises infestados, hizo que el luxo de los ricos [End Page 254] empezase a conocer aquellas mercaderías, que poco a poco llegaron a hacerse del uso común, por un precio más cómodo que las nacionales de la misma clase. Puede fixarse esta desgraciada época en la guerra con la Inglaterra, que dió principió en 1796; nuestras Colonias vieron interrumpido su Comercio, no solamente con la Península, sino también con las Inglesas sus vecinas, y les fue preciso dar entrada franca a los neutrales, aunque con ciertas restricciones; pero nuestro pabellón no podía acercarse a aquellas, y el Comercio Inglés se resentía de la falta de sus antiguos huéspedes; el que hacía activo de sus mercaderías, aunque indirecto, pasaba por muchas manos antes de llegar a las del consumidor, y trataron de atraer a sus Puertos a nuestros buques; tales fueron las solicitudes de los Colonos Ingleses a su gobierno, que este autorizó a los respectivos Almirantazgos de sus Islas, para poder dar pasavantes a los buques nuestros que quisiesen hacer el tráfico por el tiempo de tres o quatro meses, facultándolos para renovarlos, y con la condición de no alexarse de ciertos paralelos. A poco tiempo ¡cosa escandalosa! nuestro pabellón ondeaba enmedio de los enemigos en todos los Puertos de sus Islas; los Españoles que hacían este tráfico, fueron admitidos con la ánsia y codiciosa cordialidad con que aguardaban sus pesos fuertes: nuestras Islas, y casi todo el Continente, tomó parte en este nuevo y lucroso tráfico, cuyo ardor se aumentó con la inacción que ocasionaba la absoluta interrupción del que se hacía con la Metrópoli; con los permisos para rescatar nuestros buques apresados, y últimamente con el que se concedió al Comercio de hacer expediciones en buques neutrales desde Europa, y los Estados Unidos de América.

Todos estos permisos, y todas estas gracias, no fueron concedidas por la Metrópoli con otro espíritu que el del bien general de todos los vasallos, pero como casi siempre sucede, por un tan doloroso, como criminal abuso, se convirtió en daño nuestro, y beneficio de nuestros mortales enemigos; tal fue el triste resultado de estas concesiones.

Los que podían rescatar nuestros buques y efectos nacionales, lograban por efecto de la misma gracia hacerse de fondos en las Islas Inglesas: ya se dexa conocer el uso que algunos de nuestros comerciantes harían de esta sencilla operación, por la facilidad con que se eludían las restricciones puestas por la Real Hacienda, para evitar la introducción fraudulenta de otros géneros que de los permitidos; algunos de estos permisos duraron hasta principios de la presente guerra, de lo que se inferirá también si los agraciados se interesaban en mantener en pie esta relación.

Todavía fue más funesta la concesión hecha a nuestro Comercio de hacer expediciones desde los Puertos neutrales baxo la misma vandera. Los Ingleses habían declarado que era muy arriesgado el entrar en Portugal, en Dinamarca, en las Ciudades Anseáticas, y demás Paises neutrales, y asaltar a nuestros intereses; pero que acometerían con el valor que les era propio, todos los que se pusiesen a su alcance, baxo la protección de qualquiera pabellón desarmado; por consecuencia ningún neutral podía cargar nuestros intereses sin gran riesgo de ser insultado; pero a aquellos les era muy fácil manifestar a los Ingleses, que los cargamentos que conducían pertenecían a individuos de su Pais, y acreditarnos a nosotros que eran de propiedad [End Page 255] Española. Pocos ignorarán los medios empleados para esto, y es bien sabido también que de cien partes de lo introducido, las noventa, a lo menos, pertenecían a extrangeros, y mucho de ella a enemigos. Pero no era este sólo el mal: una gran parte de aquellos cargamentos eran de mercaderías Inglesas, y el resto fabricadas al Norte de la Europa, por los aliados o partidarios de la Inglaterra: de España y Francia sólo se importaron algunos caldos, nada de Italia; de modo que sólo nuestros enemigos declarados, o encubiertos disfrutaban el Comercio de nuestras ricas posesiones. Ni el exhorbitante precio que mantenía en este Reyno el papel, les estimuló a comprarlo en la Metrópoli, para traerlo, y surtirnos de este tan necesario artículo: todos conspiraban a la ruina de nuestra industria y Comercio.

Así lo conoció el gobierno, como lo manifiesta la Real Orden de 20 de Abril de 99 en que se revocó, con aplauso general de todo Español patriota, la de 18 de Noviembre de 97 causa de tantos males; también se revocaron en la misma todos los permisos concedidos, a particulares, sobre cuyas gracias, o privilegios y sus consecuencias se ha escrito tanto: verdad es que semejantes privilegios siempre se conceden para remunerar algunos servicios hechos al Estado en circunstancias apuradas. !Pero qué servicios tan funestos para nuestra Patria! Jamás se ha visto que los que los han conseguido o disfrutado, lleven otro interés que el suyo particular, y que no hayan olvidado el más sagrado y esencial de todos, que es el de la Patria. !Pero qué noble solicitud, y qué grata sería a los oídos de nuestro magnánimo y benéfico Soberano, si después de haber socorrido sus necesidades se valiese de semejantes gracias para alimentar a sus compatriotas! Tal pudiera ser la de que los géneros y producciones nacionales no pagasen ningún derecho a la salida de la Península, entrada en América, el de Alcabala de consumo, y que en el retorno lograse la misma gracia, aún quando no fuese para la Península, ni baxo nuestro pabellón; pero no, no es ésta la remuneración que se solicita: es menester que sean consumidas de preferencia las mercaderías fabricadas por nuestros feroces enemigos. ¡Que regocijo, y que esperanza tan alhagueña no se concibió al ver estampada en los papeles públicos la Real Orden de 21 de Junio de 1804 que trata sobre la materia! Ningún individuo Español que solicite tales privilegios, puede ser amante de su Patria: ningún Comercio que se haga con nuestras Colonias, que no parte de nuestra Península puede dexar de sernos funesto, mientras la industria nacional no compita con la de nuestros vecinos. La Agricultura, la industria y el Comercio, si mútuamente no se alimentan en un gran Reyno, y especialmente en una potencia marítima, dificilmente pueden prosperar. Basta.

Si V. Señor Editor, tiene la bondad de insertar en su Diario lo dicho hasta aquí, continuará discurriendo sobre la materia este su atento seguro Servidor.

Pedro Ajequiezcane.