
Carnivore Minds: Who These Fearsome Creatures Really Are by G. A. Bradshaw
Gay Bradshaw's latest book provides a welcome new perspective on predators as she attempts to understand these fearsome animals from the inside. Nonhuman animals in general, and predators in particular, are often examined via the distorting lens of human fear and projection. Bradshaw attempts to understand these animals from a different point of view to make a case that they are more than the mindless killers they are often portrayed to be. She draws on a range of scientific disciplines, particularly neuroscience and neuropsychology, to explore the complexities of their emotional, [End Page 229] cognitive, and social natures: their fears and anxieties, the factors that influence their emotional development, and the difficulties they must negotiate in order to survive. She argues that science "compels us to step beyond dualism's demand for black-and white" (p. 17) so as to recognize the similarities, as well as the differences, between ourselves and other animals. It is we humans, after all, who are "the most dangerous predator" (p. 17). By embracing, rather than shunning, our kinship with other animals, Bradshaw hopes to "open up an opportunity to find out who our species can become" (p. 17). This book is about ourselves as much as it is about predators.
Each chapter of the book is devoted to a specific predator: white sharks, grizzly bears, orcas, crocodiles, rattlesnakes, pumas, and coyotes. It is impossible in a review to do justice to Bradshaw's discussion of each, but I shall highlight some of the interesting insights she shares with the reader. In her discussion of grizzly bears, for example, she draws on psychologists John Bowlby and Mary Ainsworth's work on attachment theory, which illustrates how different ways of mothering impact infants' emotional development. Arguing that psychological symptoms such as stress and anxiety have neurobiological effects, Bradshaw claims that we can apply many insights gained from attachment theory to nonhuman animals. Because grizzlies begin their lives during maternal hibernation, "infant bears nurse on their mother's rich milk and remain in this hermetically sealed world until they emerge in late spring to early summer" (p. 73). Bradshaw notes the complexity of the grizzly mother-infant relationship and remarks that mothers must respond appropriately to their offspring's needs; she surmises that stress caused by human interference has impacted bears' emotional development. Since bears "pass down their fears to their cubs for several generations" (p. 82), it's likely that these stressors may be causing bears to deviate from their predictable rules of engagement—"the mind of the grizzly today is not the grizzly mind of the past" (p. 82).
The chapter on orcas focuses on their highly organized societies, which Bradshaw argues are akin to cultures. There is also complexity and diversity among pods of whales within populations; pods are matrilineal, and "matrilines within a pod are related by a common maternal ancestor and often span five generations" (p. 93). Each orca is born into a complex community, with highly evolved social and cultural patterns; natal relatives have very strong bonds and are "never apart for more than a few hours" (p. 94). Orca clans have distinct dialects, and orcas use different modalities of communication via a range of acoustic signals, "depending on the need at hand" (p. 101).
Even reptiles are treated sympathetically; Bradshaw argues that both crocodiles and rattlesnakes exhibit highly developed cognitive and emotional capacities and do not deserve to be labeled as mindless cold-blooded killers. Noting the symbiotic relationship between ground squirrels and the rattlesnake, Bradshaw writes that the rattlesnake is "a psychologically attuned individual who feels … and thinks … in empathic relationship with his prey" (p. 162). She cites evidence that rattlesnakes seem to prefer the company of conspecifics, even to the point of assisting former mates in times of illness. Bradshaw urges us to transition to "a new, social snake paradigm" (p. 189) that dispels the myth that rattlesnakes are antisocial and mindlessly aggressive animals. These myths generate an irrational fear of snakes and other reptiles that hinders conservation efforts and are scientifically problematic. An animal's psychological life is an integral part of the kind of creature that it is; ignoring or underplaying these aspects is concerning not [End Page 230] only because it undervalues these beings, but it is also bad science.
By providing insight into the worlds of the predators from their own perspectives, Bradshaw does an excellent job of encouraging the reader's sympathies toward the subjects of her studies. Her lively prose will engage both the layperson and the academic. Given her approach to the subject matter, Bradshaw's book draws on personal anecdote as well as on scientific research. Some readers looking for a more objective "scientific" approach may be skeptical about the use of anecdotal examples, but the anecdotal discussions provide an important method of conveying information that a more general, empirically based approach would not. They acquaint the reader with individual animals and encounters that sharpen, rather than obscure, the more theoretical claims in the book.
Despite my sympathy with the general aim and approach of Bradshaw's book, I shall end my review on a note of caution. Bradshaw is certainly right that humans have vastly underestimated the mental and emotional lives of other animals. Predators in particular have been unfairly maligned and misunderstood. But I am concerned that Bradshaw, in attempting to redress the balance, goes too far in the other direction. For example, although one may be able to apply Bowlby's theory of mother-infant attachment in a very general way to nonhumans, a great deal more empirical research is required in order to show that the theory does indeed support interspecies translation. Bowlby's own hypotheses were heavily supported by decades of empirical research. Bradshaw's application of his work to the grizzly bear should be read as a suggestion for future empirically based research rather than as a definitive confirmation of cross-species application.
Another example where cross-species claims raise some worries is in Bradshaw's remarks that crocodiles exhibit empathy because they are able to predict their prey's behavior. Now, although there are a variety of ways of understanding the term "empathy," at the core is the notion of "feeling with" another. Alice is said to empathize with Bill's anger if Alice feels angry because Bill feels angry and Alice knows or understands that he feels this way (e.g., Coplan, 2011). Simply knowing how another is likely to behave is insufficient for empathy—psychopaths, for instance, are able to predict their victims' behavior in order to manipulate them, but this is clearly not evidence of their capacity for empathy. And similarly, mutatis mutandis, for crocodiles. Bradshaw also claims that, neurologically, crocodile brains are more similar to mammalian brains than previously thought: "Our mammalian cerebrum, including its highly regarded neocortex, the part of the cerebral cortex that is considered to be the most recently evolved, is homologous with that of birds, crocodiles and other reptiles" (p. 120).
But being homologous with is insufficient to ground functional and especially phenomenological similarity or likeness. Again, more research and argument is required to show that these sorts of analogies point to genuine similarities. Of course, even if the similarities between us and (some) predators are less than Bradshaw claims, the main argument she presents still holds—namely that "humans will have to change their attitudes and actions towards carnivores, or we all, like the albatross and dodo, will experience extinction, and soon" (p. 266). This book provides an engaging and important contribution to that change.
ELISA GALGUT earned her PhD from Rutgers University and now teaches in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Cape Town. She is also a member of the University of Cape Town Bioethics Centre. She is currently a member, and served for several years as the chair, of the University of Cape Town's Senate Animal Ethics Committee. Her research interests include animal ethics, the philosophy of art and literature, and the philosophy of psychoanalysis. Email: elisa.galgut@uct.ac.za