Journal of Shi'a Islamic Studies

Introduction

While Muslim scholars have presented many proofs for the existence of God,¹ perhaps one of the most famous is the proof of the veracious (burhān al-ṣiddīqīn). Here I will attempt to convey the intent of this proof as expounded by the eminent philosopher and exegete Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabāʾī (d. 1981), popularly known by the title 'ʿAllāma'. Although Ṭabāṭabāʾī is primarily known for his monumental exegesis al-Mīzān fi Tafsīr al-Qur'an he is also known amongst specialists and students in the Shi'a teaching institutions (the ḥawza) for his two textbooks on Islamic philosophy, Bidāyat al-Ḥikmah and Nihāyat al-Ḥikmah. Each text contains twelve chapters, the first eleven of each cover 'general metaphysics' (ilāhīyyāt bil-maʿna al-ʿāmm), namely the general rules of existence, and conclude with a chapter concerning 'specific metaphysics' (ilāhīyyāt bil-maʿna al-akhaṣṣ) or philosophical theology, namely proving the existence and attributes of God from an exclusively rational point of view. In the Shi'a teaching institutions Bidāyat al-Ḥikmah is carefully read by beginner students of philosophy, Nihāyat al-Ḥikmah is intended for intermediate students, and advanced students read parts of Ṣadr al-Din al-Shīrāzī's al-Ḥikmat al-Mutaʿāliyyah fi al-Asfār al-ʿAqliyyāt al-Arbaʿah (popularly known as the Asfār).

The proof of the veracious was first put forth by the polymath Ibn Sīnā (d. 428 ah/1037). It was later reformulated by the Safavid era philosopher Ṣadr al-Din al-Shīrāzī (d. 1050 ah/1640), popularly known as Mullā Ṣadrā, and then re-articulated by the Qajar era sage, Hādī Sabziwārī (d. 1289 ah/1872). Therefore, the proof has different versions (taqrīrāt) but all share their focus on existence itself (wujūd) as the most direct means to affirm the existence of God. Although one scholar has enumerated some twenty versions of the proof,² here I will examine the three versions Ṭabāṭabāʾī has presented in Nihāyah. I have chosen to focus on Ṭabāṭabāʾī's presentation in Nihāyah for a variety of reasons. First, Ṭabāṭabāʾī himself is perhaps the most outstanding Muslim philosopher of the last century, and many of his students are prominent philosophers. Secondly, since their publication in the 1970s Ṭabāṭabāʾī's two textbooks have widely been considered a standard for Islamic philosophy, particularly in the Shi'a religious school. His presentation is considered in general a correct presentation of Ṣadrian philosophy and if there are any disputes it is usually over relatively minor issues of a technical nature; perhaps the [End Page 48] most important dispute regarding ʿAllāma's presentation of the proofs for God's existence is whether Ibn Sinā's proof is a version of burhān al-ṣiddīqīn or not. I have chosen to present ʿAllāma's more advanced text of Nihāyah over the relatively more basic text of Bidāyah since the discussions of Nihāyah are more detailed, especially regarding the philosophical proofs for God's existence.³ For example, while Bidāyah only has one short section containing two proofs for God's existence, Nihāyah has two comparatively long sections, the first of which consists of three versions of burhān al-ṣiddīqīn.

The Aim of the Proof

Before examining ʿAllāma's presentation of some versions of the proof it is important to bear in mind what it is trying to prove. The proof is not exactly trying to prove God as we usually understand, namely the creator of the universe, but more specifically what the philosophers call 'the Existent which Necessarily Exists by Itself', or more simply 'the Necessary Existent' (wājib al-wujūd bil-dhāt). What they mean by this term is that in existence there must be at least one existent whose non-existence is impossible, at least one existent who is completely independent and self-sufficient. Therefore, we should neither expect the proof by itself to prove God in the sense of the Necessary Existent who also possesses all the attributes of perfection (knowledge, power, life, etc.), nor should we expect that it would prove his unity (which is not only an attribute of perfection but also the most important one in the Islamic worldview). However, I will use the word God here interchangeably with the Necessary Existent because from the philosophers' point of view the very necessity of such an existent and the absoluteness of its being implies that it possesses all attributes of perfection.

Two Types of Knowledge

Also, it should be kept in mind that from the point of view of the Muslim philosophers we can look at the issue of knowing God from two angles. ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī divides knowledge into two types, immediate knowledge (ʿilm ḥuḍūrī, literally 'knowledge by presence') and mediated knowledge (ʿilm ḥuṣūlī, literally 'acquired knowledge').⁴ Although ʿAllāma's explanation of these types of knowledge would itself require a separate [End Page 49] discussion, in brief what is meant by immediate knowledge is knowledge of the existent itself without any conceptual intermediaries. For example, when we know our individual existence, we do so without reflecting on any concept of 'I', and this immediate intuition also applies to our emotions and feelings, so when we are in pain, we know so without reflecting on any mental concept of pain. This type of knowledge is immediate and has direct effects, so for example when we are in pain the pain is with us directly and we act accordingly to cure it. But when we go to the doctor and explain that we are in pain the doctor can understand what we mean by pain but not experience our pain. The doctor has a concept in his mind of pain that does not produce the same immediate effects of our experienced pain. This conceptual knowledge which does not have any effect on the knower (except the dispelling of his ignorance of what is pain) is called mediated knowledge. To put it another way immediate knowledge is experiencing something up close by way of existence while mediated knowledge is perceiving from a distance by way of quiddity.

When approaching the issue of knowing God, we can do so from these two ways of knowing. Immediate or intuitive knowledge of God is available to all and is shown by every human's innate desire for perfection, not any limited perfected but unlimited perfection. This desire for absolute perfection which arises from the immediate knowledge that we are full of needs and deficiencies is called innate nature (fiṭrah) in the Qur'an and Hadith. Deep inside every human there is a small God-given light which sometimes we are aware of and sometimes not. The more we turn away from vesting hope in the material causes and turn towards the Absolute Perfection the more that inner light shines and we become aware of it, whereas the more we turn away from that true Perfection towards the material causes the more we are heedless of it, except when the material causes are of no avail. This is an argument used by the Qur'an when it says,

When they board the ship, they invoke Allah putting exclusive faith in Him, but when He delivers them to land, behold, they ascribe partners [to Him] (Surat al-ʿAnkabūt, 65).

In other words, when the veil of the relative causes of the material world is lifted the human being instinctively turns directly to the Absolute Cause for support. However, the proof of the veracious is looking at the issue of knowing God as something acquired and not as something [End Page 50] immediate. Although immediate knowledge of God is available to all in a basic way, and in general the Qur'an assumes that His existence is a given,⁵ it is rarely sufficient by itself. Innate knowledge can give us a vague intuition that there is a perfect being beyond the material world, but it does not give us the details of its nature nor the best way to reach that perfection. Without proper guidance a person will always seek perfection but may suppose that true perfection is only found in material things. Furthermore, simple innate knowledge is like a seed which needs nurturing and care to grow and bear fruit, if it is left by itself, it will remain buried by the competing tendency to depend on material causes. Therefore, it is necessary to have rational proofs to remind ourselves and others of the reality of the Absolute Being, and accordingly the Muslim scholars have offered proofs which by their nature are based on concepts, namely mediated knowledge. In Qur'anic terms immediate knowledge of God is an affair of the heart and mediated knowledge is a matter of the intellect, and the Qur'an actively calls to the use of both heart and intellect.

ʿAllāma sees the proof as 'the most reliable and firm' since by it we 'know Him by Him, not by other than Him'.⁶ This is an allusion to the many Hadiths narrated from the Infallible Imams of the Family of the Prophet to the effect of 'know God by God'.⁷ One way to look at this is that proofs for God can be divided into three ways. First are those proofs where the prover (mustaʾdill), the path, and the goal are all separate. Examples of this are the well-known proofs from design, motion, and contingency. The second type of proofs are those where the prover and the path are one, but the goal is separate, an example of this is the proof from the human soul. The third category is where the path and the goal are identical, but the prover is separate, and this is the proof of the veracious. The path and goal are identical because the path is existence, and the goal is the Necessary Existent. The Qur'an alludes to all three types of proofs in the verse,

Soon We shall show them Our signs in the horizons and in their own souls until it becomes clear to them that He is the Real. Is it not sufficient that your Lord is witnessed in everything?'

(Surat Fuṣṣilat, 53),

where the 'signs in the horizons' represents the first type of proof, the 'signs in souls' the second type, and 'God is witnessed in everything' the third type.'⁸ [End Page 51]

The philosophers have offered various reasons why the proof is attributed to the veracious. Ṣiddīq means one who is extremely truthful and not tainted by any falsehood. This truthfulness can either manifest itself in act, meaning that the person's acts are purely for God without any showing off for others (riyāʾ), or, as in this case, truthfulness can manifest itself in thought, in so far as the person's intellectual path to God is not 'tainted' by relying on others. As Sabziwārī puts it in his annotations (ḥawāshī) on the Asfār, those who do not hold onto the reality of existence, which is the most clear and manifest reality as well as the most primary and evident concept and hold onto other things (such as coming into being, contingency, or motion) will not be free from deviation and missing the mark regarding the truth.⁹

Sabziwārī's First Version

The first and most concise version of the proof which ʿAllāma offers is that of Hādī Sabziwārī: 'the reality of existence is either necessary [by itself] or its concomitant' (ḥaqīqat al-wujūd immī wājibah wa immā tastalzimuhu).¹⁰ In order to unravel this dense statement three preliminary principles which have been discussed in earlier parts of Nihāyah are required. First is the axiom that there is some objective reality external to our minds and that we have a way to know something about that reality. This principle is not provable as such and for the Muslim philosophers is the dividing line between philosophy and sophism; any philosophy must start with the given that external reality is not a complete illusion, and any attempt to say that it is, is considered an implicit acceptance of that principle.

The second and most important preliminary principle for the proof is Ṣadr al-Din's key theory of the principality of existence. In brief, Ṣadrian philosophy (known as al-ḥikmat al-mutaʿāliyyah, literally 'transcendent wisdom') is based on two pillars, 'principality of existence' (aṣālat al-wujūd) and 'gradated unity of existence' (waḥdat al-wujūd al-tashkikiyyah). The Muslim philosophers say that we can mentally consider everything from two angles, namely that which distinguishes it from other things (its quiddity, for example man has a separate 'what is it' than from horse), and that which it shares with all other things, namely its existence. According to Ṣadrian philosophy external reality is identical with existence (ʿayniyyāt al-wujūd) and existence is the source [End Page 52] of every perfection, there is no other or second to existence. Quiddities are mental considerations (iʿtibāriyyāt) or 'limits of existence'; they are not a complete fiction but nonetheless possess only a shadowy existence. Furthermore, existence is not one level but possesses many degrees of intensity and weakness, as will be explained below.

The third principle is based on Ṣadr al-Din's interpretation of the nature of causality which in turn is based on principality of existence. The nature of contingent existents is that need resides in their very being, they are not independently existing things to which we ascribe need, like a poor person whose material poverty is separate from his or her actual existence. Contingent existents are mere relations (rawābit) which exist only through another and are pure dependency, in the words of the Qur'an:

O mankind! You are the ones who stand in need of Allah; and Allah is He who is the All-sufficient, the All-laudable' (Surat Fatir, 15).

To explain further before Mullā Ṣadrā the Muslim philosophers defined contingent beings as that which is 'equidistant between existence and non-existence'. Everything which neither has existence nor non-existence as part of its essence needs a cause to bring it out of this equilibrium into existence. However, based on principality of existence there are no separate quiddities awaiting existence, there are only levels of existence. Based on this understanding, outside of mental consideration it does not make sense to say that something is equidistant between existence and non-existence, there are only existents that are either dependent or independent. In this way Ṣadrā made an important shift from contingency in quiddity (imkān maḥawī) to a radical contingency in existence (imkān wujūdī, also called contingency of poverty, imkān faqrī) which Sabziwārī takes full advantage of in this version of the proof.

Based on these premises Sabziwārī makes a reductio ad absurdum argument that if we consider the 'reality of the existence', namely the entirety of existence,¹¹ it is either necessary or not. If we say that it is necessary we have proven our point, but if we say it is not necessary, namely contingent, then we have also proven the point. That is because based on the principality of existence and contingency in existence the very reality of contingent beings is that they are dependent and in need of something else, and there is no other than existence. In other words, to say that existence consists only of contingent beings in the sense of [End Page 53] beings in need of another is meaningless, since we then must ask what is that other, they are in need of. If it is existence, we have proven our point since only a necessary existent has no need for another. We cannot say it is something other than existence since there is nothing other than existence; we cannot say it is non-existence, which is sheer vacuity, nor quiddity, which is not something existing by itself, but is mentally derived from existence.

We can compare this situation to two types of words in language, function words and content words.¹² Content words are those nouns, verbs and adjectives which we can think of out of context since their meaning is sufficient by themselves. In opposition to content words are function words which in and of themselves have no such independent meaning and only gain meaning in context, for example prepositions like 'in'. We cannot think of these words independently and if we suppose we can we are thinking unconsciously of a content word. In the same way contingent beings cannot be conceived of by themselves, rather they demand an independent existent to fill in their completely dependent existence. Just as it is inconceivable to have a sentence of only empty function words, so too it is impossible for existence to be a string of completely dependent beings without an independent being. Therefore, the reality of existence must either be necessary or something which presumes a necessary existence.

Sabziwārī's Second Version

Sabziwārī's second version also starts with the same premises as the first version.¹³ In fact Ṭabāṭabāʾī prefaces this version with the words 'and of the same meaning [as the first proof]' to indicate that the proof is essentially the same as the first in content. 'The reality of existence (which is the supreme concrete existent and is equivalent to objective reality) is an unbound reality of which it is impossible to predicate non-existence.' Here Sabziwārī again starts with the principality of existence which means that existence is the whole of reality which has neither other nor second. The key difference from the first version is that Sabziwārī calls this reality (the totality of existence) an unbound or non-delimited reality (ḥaqiqah mursalah) which cannot become non-existent. And since the reality of existence is neither limited nor bound by itself, it is a necessarily existing existent by itself, which is what we are trying to prove. [End Page 54]

What Sabziwārī intends by saying that reality is unbound is that it is absolute, that is to say it is infinite and not limited by any conditions. We can prove that existence is non-delimited by invalidating the opposite premise, that it is limited or conditioned. If existence were limited it would have a quiddity, and contingency is an inseparable property of quiddity, and a contingent being needs another to maintain it. However, since there is no other than existence, we cannot say that existence is limited or supported by another. In other words, if existence were limited it would need a cause outside of it to maintain it, while existence is self-contained and has nothing outside of it. In this sense existence, without looking at any particular existent, necessarily exists by itself.

However, it should be kept in mind that when Sabziwārī says that existence as a totality necessarily exists by itself, he is not saying that there is only the Necessary Existent and that all else is illusion. Sabziwārī is affirming only that existence contains a Necessary Existent; his proof is silent about other existents. We would need another proof to show whether others (contingent beings) exist and what is their relationship to the Necessary Existent. However, in the final version of the proof of the veracious which ʿAllāma presents in Nihāyah the issue of unity and multiplicity in existence is brought centre stage.

Ṣadr al-Din's Version

After presenting Sabziwārī's two versions ʿAllāma quotes verbatim, and without comment, Ṣadr al-Din's version from volume six of the Asfār. Based on his previous discussions in the Asfār, Ṣadr al-Din argues that existence is,

A single, simple, objective reality. There is no difference in the essences of its individuals, but only in perfection and imperfection and in intensity or weakness, or in other matters [not related to existence itself], for example, that between the whatnesses of the same species.¹⁴

Here several premises are put forth, first the principality of existence (that existence is identical with objective reality), and second that existence is both one and many. One of the ancient philosophical tensions which Mullā Ṣadra sought to resolve was the issue of unity and multiplicity in existence. Before Mullā Ṣadra there were two prevalent interpretations [End Page 55] of unity and multiplicity of existence amongst Muslim thinkers. First was the Peripatetic view that only multiplicity was real, there is no real unity outside of mental consideration. For example, if we say man is one species we mean that only figuratively, for there are many separate men without anything uniting them; this view is called the heterogeneous multiplicity of existence (kathrat al-wujūd al-tabayunīyyah).

In direct opposition to this view is the monism or monorealism associated with theoretical Sufism that there is only one Real, namely God, and that multiplicity exists only figuratively (majāzī); this view, attributed to Muḥy al-Din ibn ʿArabi and his students, is called the hypostatic unity of existence (waḥdat al-wujūd al-shakhṣīyyah). Also of note is the view of Shihāb al-Din al-Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191) and his followers, the illuminationalist philosophers (al-ishrāqiyyiūn). They say that reality is like light in so far as it possesses many degrees and terminates in God, the Light of lights. However, while influential in certain issues, illuminationist philosophy overall has never been as prominent in Islamic thought as peripateticism or Sufism.

Ṣadr al-Din, building on the illuminationist philosophy of light, tried to reconcile the two extreme views of the Peripatetics and Sufis through the theory of gradated unity of existence (waḥdat al-wujūd al-tashkīkīyyah) which states that existence is one simple reality possessing multiple degrees.¹⁵ Existence is one simple reality since it encompasses all things, it has neither other nor second. But existence is also multiple because there is an obvious difference between cause and effect or actuality and potentiality. In the above quoted passage Mullā Ṣadra points out two ways that one level of existence can be distinct from another. The first and more important is what we might call vertical distinction, which is real and intrinsic to existence itself. There is a relationship of causality between the various levels such that a higher level (the cause) is more intense or perfect than a lower level (the effect). Another way to envisage the difference is by the various quiddities, in which case there is no relationship of causality. We could call this horizontal distinction, although in Ṣadrian philosophy this type of difference is mentally posited (iʿtibārī) meaning it is not intrinsic to existence itself and derives from its limits. In Mullā Ṣadra's proof only vertical distinction, not horizontal distinction, plays a role.¹⁶

After this pivotal second premise, that existence is one gradated reality, which is to say one level is distinguished from another by its intensity or [End Page 56] weakness, one level is complete and a cause and another is deficient and an effect, Ṣadr al-Din posits the final premise: 'The ultimate perfection for which there is nothing greater is that which does not depend on anything else, and nothing greater than it can be imagined….'. Not only is the ultimate perfection the most perfect and complete, but it is also so in conception. If we could conceive a higher level than the level, we assumed to be the most complete, it would be imperfect and limited vis-à-vis the putative higher level and would be sustained by it, just as an effect is sustained by a cause. Mullā Ṣadra concludes from these premises that in existence there are two types of existents. One is the Necessary Existent 'which is Pure Existence than which nothing is more complete, and It is unmixed with non-existence and imperfection'. The other is contingent or imperfect existents, which are the Necessary Existent's acts and effects.

Ibn Sinā's Version

With Ṣadr al-Din's proof, Ṭabāṭabāʾī concludes the first section of the final chapter of Nihāyat al-Ḥikmah. While this section is entitled 'Concerning the affirmation of the Necessary Existent', it should really be called 'Concerning the affirmation of the Necessary Existent by means of the proof of the veracious' since at the outset ʿAllāma affirms that this proof is the most firm and all three versions which he presents start with the reality of existence.¹⁷ Curiously, ʿAllāma does not put Ibn Sinā's famous version of the proof in this first section, although he had the highest regard for Ibn Sinā as a philosopher.¹⁸ Instead, in the second section ('Concerning some other proofs which have been provided for the existence of the Necessary') Ṭabāṭabāʾī starts with the well-known version of the Peripatetic master. This version starts with any existent (mawjūdan ma) and moves to it either being necessity in itself or not. If it is not necessary, it is contingent in itself and every contingent needs something to bring preponderance to its existence (tarajjuh wujūduhū). This giver of existence must either be a necessity cause or end in one, since according to all the Muslim philosophers an actual infinite regress in existence giving causes is impossible. Since the second section consists solely of proofs which do not start with the reality of existence but with various examples of contingency (motion and coming into being) it could be surmised that ʿAllāma did not regard Ibn Sinā's version as an instance [End Page 57] of the proof of the veracious. In this view Ṭabāṭabāʾī is supported by both Mullā Ṣadra and Sabziwārī. For example, the former says, 'this path [Ibn Sinā's proof] is the closest path to the way of the veracious but is not exactly that one, [contrary to what] has been asserted.'¹⁹

Various reasons have been put forth as to why these eminent philosophers did not regard Ibn Sinā's version as an example of the proof of the veracious, although on scrutiny none of them seems wholly convincing. For example, Ibn Sinā's proof uses the extra premise of the invalidity of circularity and infinite regress in cause, and it is also claimed he is looking at the concept of existence, not its reality. However, the mere fact that Ibn Sinā's version contains an extra premise need not disqualify it as an example of the proof of the veracious, and there is no indication that Ibn Sinā is looking only at the concept of existence in his proof. It could certainly be argued that Ibn Sinā's version, as he himself claims, is an example of the proof of the veracious since his starting point is any existent, namely that there is an objective reality regardless of whether it is contingent or necessary, and this starting point is the criteria for burhān al-ṣiddīqīn. In other words, his version starts with existence itself and ends in its necessity rather than staring with contingent beings and ending in a necessary being.

On a technical note, the proof of the veracious is not a demonstration through cause (burhān limmī), since as the Muslim philosophers point out that we are trying to prove (the Necessary Existent) by nature is causeless. Instead, we move from one concept (existence) to a concomitant concept (necessity) both of which are the same thing in external reality, although neither is the cause of the other. ʿAllāma says that this kind of demonstrative proof (which he calls mulāzamāt ʿāmmah, 'general concomitants') provides certainty and was accepted by Ibn Sinā.²⁰

Conclusion

In sum, all three versions of the proof of the veracious which Ṭabāṭabāʾī presents in Nihāyat al-Ḥikmah start from the most basic intuition of the reality of existence and after its analysis conclude that it contains a necessary existent. However, each version has a different nuance in explaining how to move from existence to necessity. Sabziwārī's first proof hinges on the existential poverty of contingent beings, such that as pure need and relation it is inconceivable that they be the reality of existence. [End Page 58] His second proof focuses on how the reality of existence is unbound or absolute, meaning it is not bound by any outside cause and must be necessary by itself. Mullā Ṣadra's proof pivots on his understanding of existence as both one and many, one simple reality with many levels of intensity or weakness which must terminate in an absolute level.

Although, as presented by Ṭabāṭabāʾī, the proof of the veracious is a demonstrative proof in so far as it starts with an analysis of objective reality and concludes that it must be necessary, there is another way to look at what the proof provides. One of Ṭabāṭabāʾī's most prominent students, Ayatollah Javādī-Āmulī, has pointed out that the proof is not trying to prove something to us in the sense of taking known premises and giving us a conclusion that was previously unknown. While Javādī-Āmulī accepts burhān al-ṣiddīqīn as a firm or even the firmest route to affirm the existence of the Necessary existent, he points out that what it provides is something more basic than a proof. As formulated in its most succinct versions, such as those of Sabziwārī, what it points out is the eternal necessity of objective reality, the axiom that reality can never be denied without contradiction. Once we ponder this reality, we become alert to its necessity and that the material world cannot be the referent of this eternal necessity since it is in constant flux. Thus we become heedful of knowledge which we were previously heedless, but not ignorant.²¹ ʿAllāma himself has indicated the possibility of viewing burhān al-ṣiddīqīn this way in his annotations on the Asfār when he says that arguments for the existence of the Necessary draw attention (tanbīh) to a primary proposition (the eternal necessity of the reality of existence).²² Viewed from this perspective the proof of the veracious functions as a meditation on the most basic intuition of existence which begins with philosophical analysis and ends in religious gnosis. [End Page 59]