Monatshefte

I

In Heinrich Mann's novel Der Untertan, completed in July 1914 and published in 1918, Old Buck exclaims:

Die Macht! Die Macht läßt sich nicht wenig auf Bajonetten davontragen wie eine aufgespießte Wurst. Die einzige reale Macht ist heute der Friede. Spielt euch die Komödie der Gewalt vor! Prahlt gegen eingebildete Feinde . . .! Taten, glücklicherweise, sind euch nicht erlaubt!¹

The sentimental Herr Buck may be reflecting the near half-century (43 years) of relative peace and security ingrained in the European mind and so elo-quently if elegiacally captured in Stefan Zweig's Die Welt von Gestern (1934–1942):

In diesen Jahren hat jeder einzelne von uns Kraft aus dem allgemeinen Aufschwung der Zeit in sich gesogen und seine persönliche Zuversicht gesteigert aus der kollektiven. Vielleicht haben wir, undankbar wie wir Menschen sind, damals nicht gewußt, wie stark, wie sicher uns die Welle trug.²

Yet, within weeks of the completion of Mann's novel, deeds of a most catastrophic kind were allowed to disrupt the security, and the supposed power of peace dissipated rapidly. I say "allowed" not only to echo Mann's word choice, but also to introduce (or perhaps re-introduce) the resolute, radical pacifist Alfred Hermann Fried (November 11, 1864–May 5, 1921) who believed categorically that war results from a conscious decision to go to war. It is indeed allowed to happen, for in his view, war is not, as its champions sometimes argue, "ein Naturgesetz, ein unvermeidbares Schicksal."³ Rather, it is a choice: "Es sind Menschenhände, die die Menschenhände in Bewegung setzen." (II, 11 March 1916) Or to speak with Michael Howard in his The Invention of Peace: "War . . . starts in the minds of men."⁴ [End Page 44]

The centennial of World War I has produced a virtual endless stream of accounts of the war. Yet Alfred Fried gets no mention in some of the major summations. Margaret MacMillan's The War that Ended Peace. The Road to 1914 makes no reference to Alfred Fried, although she does discuss such prominent pacifists as Bertha von Suttner, Ivan Bloch, Norman Angell, Romain Rolland, William Jennings Bryan, August Bebel, Jean Jaurès, and Keir Hardie.⁵ Nor does Christopher Clark reference Fried or the pacifist movement in The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914.⁶ Even Adam Hochschild's To End All Wars: A Story of Loyalty and Rebellion, 1914–1918 omits Fried from his account of largely but not exclusively British pacifists of the period.⁷ Alfred Fried was one of Germany's and Austria-Hungary's most significant pacifists; he vigorously opposed this senselessly celebrated "Interregnum des Wahnsinns" or "Völkerpsychose" (I, 15 January 1915),⁸ the impact of which is still felt today. Of course, scholars have their own intellectual interests, and no single scholar should be held accountable for rendering an all-encompassing interpretation of the war. This present essay seeks to illuminate Fried's pacifistic perspective, his "scientific pacifism" as he labelled it, by examining the way its major themes are reproduced in his little-studied war diary.

While Fried's initial interest in peace stems from a visit to an exhibition of the horrific war paintings of Vassily Vereshchagin in Vienna in 1881,⁹ by the time the forty-nine-year-old, Vienna-born Fried started his war diary on August 7, 1914, the day after Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia, and Serbia declared war on Germany, and roughly six weeks after Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie were assassinated in Sarajevo,¹⁰ he had already established himself as a prominent pacifist: he had been indispensable in the founding of the Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft in 1892, had edited its major publication, Monatliche Friedens-Korrespondenz from 1894 to 1899, had started the journal Die Waffen Nieder! (named after the famous anti-war novel by Bertha von Suttner with whom he worked closely for many years), and he had refashioned this still-published journal in 1899 as Die FriedensWarte.¹¹ Fried was also in the process of organizing the ultimately cancelled Weltfrieden-Kongress that was to be held in Vienna in September 1914. His efforts on behalf of peace culminated in his being named a co-recipient (with Tobias Asser, a Dutch lawyer and legal scholar) of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1911, thus providing him with some long-desired financial security.¹²

An autodidact, who never attended university but was later awarded an honorary doctorate from the University at Leiden, the occasionally cantankerous Fried first articulated his "scientific" pacifism in his Handbuch der Friedensbewegung (1905, 1911, 1913) and his Die Grundlagen des revolutionären Pacifismus (1908). He had argued, as had others, that, just as the "modern" world had internationalized transportation, communication, commerce, science and culture, so too could one presume the further growth of [End Page 45] international law and international institutions (including a reduction in tariff protections), thus diminishing the possibility of war.¹³ Among the concrete signs pointing to an abandonment of force as a means of conflict resolution were the conferences at The Hague in 1899 and 1907, which had produced the Permanent Court of Arbitration and had proscribed the use of poisonous gases, the killing of surrendered enemy forces, and attacks on undefended towns. Fried dedicated his life to affirming efforts to abolish war in a rigorous and systematic way. Both the Handbuch and the Grundlagen were written with this philosophical and pedagogical aim in mind. Of Fried's success in providing the theoretical underpinnings for the pacifist movement, Walter Göhring observes: "Fried ist der erste, dem es gelingt, einen eigenständigen Ansatz zur Wissenschaftlichkeit des Pazifismus für den deutschsprachigen Raum zu schaffen."¹⁴ As will be seen, the Kriegs-Tagebuch continues Fried's dual objectives.

Like the "scientific socialism" of Karl Marx, Fried's "scientific pacifism" was intended to distinguish utopian, sentimentalist reform, which he dubbed the "'ewigen Frieden'-Duselei" (I, 27 August 1914) and which relied on morality, good will, religion, and the socio-political status quo, from his own more material pacifism. Besides invoking associations with Kant's Zum ewigen Frieden, the term "'ewigen Frieden'-Duselei" also suggests a connection to "Humanitätsduselei," a word employed in Fried's time to ridicule what we may call today "do-gooders."¹⁵ To further distance himself from the subjective, ethical approach of the "empfindsame Seelen," (I, 19 January 1915) often represented by a dove, an olive branch, and peace-angels, Fried chose as his emblem the "Zahnrad" and as his motto "Organisiert die Welt!" Fried meant his motto literally: the world needed to be reorganized. The objective materiality of his pacifism, which seeks to understand the way industry, technology and politics impact society, may be summarized in his early statement—"Die Logik der Dinge ist unsere Rettung." (I, 8 August 1914)—which he saw as a counterweight to subjective and unreliable human logic. Salvation, i.e., the prevention or abolition of war, was to be found in the material, manageable world, not in the world of inestimable personal opinion and feelings. Of his own notion of peace Fried writes expressly: "Der Friede, den wir brauchen, den wir erstreben, ist fern jeder Romantik und Sentimentalität. Er kann nicht in Gedichten gefeiert werden, sondern nur in Zahlen. Wir sind keine Schwärmer und keine Apostel. Wir sind einfache Techniker des Friedens . . ." (I, 24 May 1915) That is to say that Fried believed that one needed to address the material roots of war, which David Cortright locates in "the economic self-interest and dominant political influence of giant industries and government bureaucracies"¹⁶ and which Fried understands to be expressed in international anarchy.

While it has been said that Fried, a Social Democrat, resembles Marx (with the inexorable march toward peace corresponding to the inevitable triumph [End Page 46] of the working class), Fried does not offer an endorsement of Marx's revolutionary action. More importantly, in contrast to Marxian inevitability, Fried's diary actually shows very little belief in the certainty of his desired outcome. Commenting of the notion of peace in Fried's early ideological writings, Chickering observes: "The logic of Fried's arguments seemed to demand a passive acceptance of the forces at work in society, which would, entirely unaided by human volition, bring the end of warfare." (Chickering 105) While one may find some support for such a reading of Fried's theoretical writings, my reading of the war diaries shows that Fried, an astute observer of the military and political events of the war, offers the combative parties a self-fashioned way out of the morass of aggression. The prewar Fried is optimistic that peace can be achieved, but he is not convinced of its inevitability. In the diaries he generally remains hopeful in this regard—but is not without periods of near despair, as when he speaks of the oppressive terms of the peace treaty proposed by the Entente powers at the end of the war. But even in his Handbuch, written before the diaries, Fried noted:

Die Friedensbewegung will die Erkenntnis eines durch die Naturgesetze bedingten Organisationsvorganges der Gesellschaft erwecken, um durch die bewusste Mitwirkung der Menschheit in der Richtung der natürlichen Entwicklung, sie möglichst schnell zum möglichst höchsten Ertrag ihrer Arbeit gelangen zu lassen."¹⁷

This statement seems to leave room for the necessity of human intervention. Perhaps one should speak not of the inevitability of the end of warfare but rather of Fried's belief in the indestructability of human reason to strive for that end. Fried says as much in his diary:

Gestern ist Goldscheid nach langer Abwesenheit zurückgekehrt. Ich freue mich, jetzt einen in meiner Nähe zu wissen, mit dem ich mich über die Ereignisse verständigen kann. Als ich ihn kurz am Telephon sprach, rief er mir zu: 'La raison continue.' Darin behält er auch recht. Ich hege die gleiche Ansicht, wenn ich meine Weltanschauung und meine Hoffnungen auf die "Logik der Dinge" richte. Rückschläge und Katastrophen gab es immer auf der Bahn des Fortschritts. Aber: La raison continue. Dem Satz "Es irrt der Mensch so lang er strebt" kann man den Satz entgegenhalten "Die Menschheit irrt nicht." Die Entgleisungen der Einzelnen korrigiert der Weg der Gesamtheit.

(I, 9 September 1914)

Given the uncertainty of politics in his day, Fried's "scientific" pacifism transcends political allegiance, perhaps because he saw that bourgeois opposition to the war had gathered itself more quickly than did the social democratic opponents of war. As the European Social Democrats and the German Social Democrats debated the extent to which they could remain nationalists in support of their country's war effort and thus abandon the international call for the unity of the workers to oppose capitalist, war-time economics, [End Page 47] Fried came to view political parties as barriers to peace, arguing that no one group had a monopoly on the advancement of peace. Their respective programs left little or no room for a scientific, systematic study of peace:

Wie oft habe ich betont, daß der Pazifismus an sich weder bürgerlich noch sozialistisch, sondern Wissenschaft ist, ein Zweig der Soziologie, daß es jedoch verschiedene Propagandaarten, Betätigungsmethoden der pazifistischen Erkenntnis in der politischen Praxis gebe. Erst hier beginne die Unterscheidung zwischen bürgerlich und sozialistisch. Dies nicht unterschieden zu haben ist ein Fehler der bisherigen Sozialdemokratie gewesen. Denn es stimmt, daß der Pazifismus vor dem Krieg nur eine kleine Schar von Anhängern bildete und die disziplinierten Massen der Sozialdemokratie ihm verschlossen waren infolge der Achtung, die ihm die Partei zuteil werden ließ. Wir hatten die Segel aufgespannt, die offizielle Sozialdemokratie sperrte uns aber vom Wind ab.

(II, 20 July 1916)

II

But why look at Fried's diary or diaries at all, those frequently denigrated, overly subjective pieces of life writing that often communicate information about one's health, housework, and other mundane topics? According to Langford and Russell,

The diary, as an uncertain genre uneasily balanced between literary and historical writing, between the spontaneity of reportage and the reflectiveness of the crafted text, between selfhood and events, between subjectivity and objectivity, between the private and the public, constantly disturbs attempts to summarise its characteristics within formalised boundaries. The diary is a misfit form of writing, inhabiting the frontiers between many neighboring or opposed domains, often belonging simultaneously to several 'genres' or 'species' and thus being condemned to exclusion from both at once. This formal marginality is often directly linked with political, racial or gender marginality . . .¹⁸

As a wartime pacifist, Fried was indeed writing from the margins of society, but his Tagebuch was no typical, inward-looking diary. Hovering between "reportage" and "reflectiveness," Fried's diary suggests less interest in exploring or unraveling the author's subjectivity than in continuing his Aufklärungsarbeit. It is an attempt to foster understanding between peoples and to examine his own conscience. It also aims to provide a blueprint for the organization of the national states after the war. From the start, his diary was a social-historical document. Ultimately published between 1918 and 1920 in four individual volumes of roughly two thousand total pages, some entries appeared separately during the war (in censored form) in various journals, including Die Friedens-Warte, and found both positive and negative reception.

Stylistically, like many diary entries and indeed much pedagogical writing, Fried's diary is accessible, both syntactically and lexically, even if he on [End Page 48] occasion presumes a rather educated readership. But while the entries include numerous literary references and allusions, e.g., to Goethe, Schiller, Heine, Kant, C. F. Meyer, there seems to be no pretense to literariness or erudition. The entries do, however, reveal the author's talent for vivid description and passionate argumentation as well as his fiery nature, his profound compassion and his critical rationality, all in the service of popularizing the claims of pacifism, a daunting challenge in the militaristic, undemocratic Prussian empire. Fried's diary, a public, objective document that nevertheless includes expressions of intimacy and deep emotion, is not merely a ". . . Kriegschronik, [eine] lückenlose Wiedergabe einer Folge von Ereignissen," (I, ix) As "a significant indicator of the contemporary cultural climate" (Langford and West 7), it provides a thorough documentation of the most significant aspects of World War I and a compendium of analyses of relevant newspaper articles, books, sermons and protest actions.

Since his diary was among the last of his many publications, it may be seen as the culmination of his thinking. At the very least, it puts his lifelong belief that peace is possible to its most severe test. The war was a traumatic, transformative event in Fried's life, forcing him to emigrate to Switzerland. It is an appropriate text of which to ask: Does his experience of war, albeit not as a participant, alter his theoretical speculations and proferred practical solutions? Could he maintain the same fervor for "scientific" pacifism once war hit home, so to speak?

III

In the preface to his Kriegs-Tagebuch, Fried notes that he consciously sought to remain immune to the public celebration of the war and, from his isolation in Switzerland, to point the way to peace from a pacifistic point of view: "Die Ereignisse wollte ich festhalten, sie vom pazifistischen Gesichtspunkt aus erörtern, am Krankheitsverlauf des fiebernden Europas die Fehler der Vergangenheit klarlegen und den Weg zur Genesung weisen." (I, viii) Given the widely diverging views of pacifism in Germany at the outset of the war, Fried finds it especially important to clarify who counts as a pacifist: "Augenblicklich teilen sich die Ideen der Pazifisten in drei Gruppen: Diejenigen, die die Schuld an dem Krieg festzustellen suchen. Diejenigen, die den Krieg beendigen wollen. Diejenigen, die den künftigen Frieden zu einem, in pazifistischem Sinne wahren Frieden gestalten wollen." (I, 25 October 1914) Fried then denies that those who want to assign blame for starting the war are really pacifists. The same is said of those who merely want to end the war, such as Pastor Traube and the protesting French public.¹⁹ The true pacifist, according to Fried, is not content to put out the current brush fires of national aggression: "Wir sind keine Feuerwehr, die man ruft, um einen Brand zu löschen. Wir sind lediglich die Anpreiser eines Imprägnierungsmittels, das bei rechtzeitiger [End Page 49] Anwendung den Brand verhüten kann." (I, 16 January 1915) Fried's pacifist is committed to the longer, broader view, to a notion of peace that demands an international social re-ordering, one that reduces the possibility of conflict. Arguing that only those, like himself, who want to arrange a peace that truly eliminates war, are pacifists, he writes:

Zunächst hat der Pazifismus mit Friedenswunsch, d.h., mit der Beendigung dieses Kriegs, nichts zu tun. Der Pazifismus als Lehre von der Organisation der Staaten zum Zweck der Vermeidung gewaltsamer Erledigung zwischenstaatlicher Streitfälle will die Zukunft zimmern [ . . . ] Er ist Prophylaxis, nicht Therapie.

(III, 2 November 1916)

The pacifist seeks to convince the population of warring countries of the mutual benefits of internationally-minded, peaceful behavior. In his words, pacifism is "eine internationale [Angelegenheit], die in den andern Ländern jene Ideen fördert, die dann dem eigenen Lande von Vorteil sind." (I, 7 September 1914) Fried's pacifists are teachers, and World War I forms a "pazifistischen Anschauungsunterricht" (I, 27 August 1914); it is his hope "dass dieser Krieg der große Lehrmeister sein wird, der von dem deutschen Volk die verderbliche Anschauung über die Heiligkeit des Kriegs wegnehmen wird." (I, 25 April 1915) As a result, he sees two alternatives: "Friede mit der Hoffnung auf einen neuen Krieg, oder Friede mit den Ansätzen eines Staatensystems. Kurz: 'Nicht-Friede' oder wahrer Friede." (I, 29 March 1915) And the fact that war persists despite the best efforts of the pacifists does not show the futility or superfluousness of their efforts: "Der Krieg ist nicht ein Beweis ihrer Überflüssigkeit, sondern ihrer Notwendigkeit." (I, 10 December 1914) The eradication of war is a hard nut to crack, but its necessity cannot be overestimated. What is finally tragic about war, according to Fried, is: ". . . dass das durch die Hingabe des Lebens dargebrachte Opfer in keinem Verhältnis steht zu dem damit Erreichten." (III, 15 December 1916)

How does scientific pacifism hope to attain its prophylactic end, which may—or may not—seem like commonsense today but was a very peripheral position in the Germany of his day as Sandi E. Cooper has noted: "To be a pacifist in the political culture of Wilhelminian Germany was akin to professing Communism in Cold War America"?²⁰ Perhaps the contemporary comparator would be the critic of neoliberal capitalism. Like Fried's critique of war in his time, a critique of capitalism today seems virtually beyond the realm of feasibility in today's globally-connected, commercial society. Knowing the perilousness of the pacifist position, Fried encourages steadfastness in the face of adversity: "Die Hauptsache für uns Pazifisten ist das felsenfeste Vertrauen in das Ziel . . . Nicht verzweifeln; was auch kommen mag. Unser Werk kann beschädigt aber nicht mehr vernichtet werden." (I, 11 August 1914)²¹ Despite being subject to threats of arrest, frequent surveillance, and an inquiry for high treason under Ministerpräsident Karl Graf von Stürgh, [End Page 50] which was ended only after the Kaiser's death and von Stürgh's assassination, Fried himself remained a committed and practical (but not pragmatic) optimist, always conscious of the enormity of the loss of individual humanity that accompanies war. If others still maintain that a return to the illusory bankrupt ways of the past is possible after two years of fighting, Fried expresses his fear that a future based on the past can only lead to the more devastating "Seelenbankrott des Daseins." (II, 28 July 1916)

Clearly, neither scientific nor ethical pacifism was able to avert World War I. Conventional explanations for the outbreak of World War I typically include the arms race, excessive nationalism, colonial envy, economic competition, militarism or a belligerent mentality, inflexible military plans, staid alliances, and Germany's fear of encirclement.²² Fried understands all of these reasons but subsumes them under a still broader notion, namely "der Zustand der internationalen Anarchie" (I, 20 September 1915), also referred to as the "System des militärischen Friedens." (I, 30 November 1915)

Writing of this institutionalized, international lawlessness, which knows only limited restraint, Fried observes: "Es ist wirklich etwas Unhaltbares, dieses System, das alle Staaten gegen ihren Willen zu einer Handlung treibt, die von so entsetzlichen Folgen begleitet ist." (I, 30 November 1915) Such a system is not conducive to peace. And so World War I is ". . . nur die logische Folge des Friedens, den wir besassen. Wir lebten eben nicht im Frieden, sondern im Nicht-Krieg—im Zustand der Anarchie." (I, 19 April 1915) Fried's distinction between true peace and 'non-war' brings to mind William James's comment: "Every up-to-date dictionary should say that "peace" and "war" mean the same thing, now in posse, now in actu."²³ In short, international anarchy, the system by which individual states operate autonomously and with impunity, without regard to common concerns, drives the nationalist war machinery: "Das Nationalprinzip ist die Quelle aller Kriege der letzten Jahrzehnte, auch des gegenwärtigen. Der Irrwahn, daß alle zerstreuten Nationensplitter zu einem Staate vereinigt werden müssen, hat die Menschen auf die Schlachtfelder getrieben." (I, 14 April 1915) Moreover, the prevailing international anarchy constricts culture's ability to limit national aggression: ". . . Die tierische Natur des Menschen hat sich nicht geändert. Sie ist durch die Kultur in ihren Äußerungen gehemmt worden. Fallen diese Hemmungen weg, dann zeigt sich der Urzustand der Bestie . . ." (I, 18 August 1914).

To counter this ongoing nationalistically-rooted anarchy, Fried's scientific pacifism sought the formation of an international community whose common interests arise from necessary, fundamental needs and which can be governed by international and commercial law. Schönemann-Behrens also sees such an organization as Fried's primary goal, writing: "Die Hauptaufgabe des revolutionären Pazifismus sieht Fried in allem, was zur Förderung der internationalen Organisation beitragen kann." (Schönemann-Behrens 182) Göhring calls Fried a "Vorreiter und Zugpferd zur Schaffung einer internationalen [End Page 51] Organisation." (Göhring 129) For Fried, only when the organization of states is in place, can one expect a court of appeals to be an effective alternative to war. It is noteworthy that Fried continued to advocate for such a community during the war. As an alternative to international anarchy, he has in mind an organization akin to the Pan-American movement, which could be built upon mutually accepted precedents. In place of the "principle of nationalism" Fried proposes a "principle of justice:" "An die Stelle des Nationalitätenprinzips müsste eben das Gerechtigkeitsprinzip treten, das der Menschheit mehr Vorteile, Sicherheit, mehr ideelle Befriedigung bringen würde, als das den Krieg fördende Nationalitätenprinzip, das Europa in Blut getaucht hat." (I, 14 April 1915) But it is not nationalism per se that Fried challenges; rather it is a nationalism that suppresses justice and is uncoupled from a democratic form of government: "Der Nationalismus ist gar nicht der gefährliche Kriegsantrieb, als der er uns dargestellt wird. Der Mangel einer demokratischen Regierungsform macht ihn erst dazu." (I, 19 March 1915) Fried's emphasis on the necessity of justice for peace, not unique in its time, is supported by the recent research of Duane Cady who writes: "[T]he historical overview shows increasing recognition that peace is secured by justice, that war is prevented by fostering conditions of internal, cooperative order more than by threatened or forced domination."²⁴ (Cady 15) In short, Fried's diary repeatedly argued that a supranational organization could guarantee national security and establish a more permanent, international peace:

Denn ein Friede, der nicht den Keim neuer Kriege in sich tragen soll, darf nicht der aufgezwungene Friede eines Siegers sein, darf kein Volk verletzen, keinen Anlaß zu Racheplänen geben und muß eine Organisation einsetzen, die einem jeden Sicherheit bietet und solche Vorteile, daß die damit verbundenen Einschränkungen reichlich aufgewogen werden.

(II, 7 April 1916)

Nor would such an organization necessitate the dismantlement of either Europe or Germany; it would, however, require that states voluntarily renounce their conflicting claims or submit them to impartial arbitration, one of the goals achieved at the first Hague Convention in 1899: "Bei der zu errichtenden Organisation bedeutet Einmischung in die inneren Angelegenheiten eines Staates sobald diese das Interesse der Gemeinschaft berühren, einen freiwilligen Verzicht und gleichzeitig einen Schutz des durch die Einmischung betroffenen Staates . . ." (IV, 1 September 1917)

In contrast to the German minister who called for the "ausgewählte" German people to employ "Blut und Eisen" in order to achieve their "weltpolitische Bestimmung," Fried counters that the German people must cooperate with other, equally valued cultures:

[the German people] muss vielmehr in Gemeinschaft mit den andern gleichberechtigten Kulturvölkern durch die Mittel der Zusammenwirkung und des [End Page 52] Ausgleichs zu einer Organisation zwischen den Staaten gelangen und ohne das teure Blut seiner Kinder und ohne das kalt brutale Eisen zum höchsten Glück emporschreiten.

(II, 20 January 1916).²⁵

The goal then is not the false peace of hegemonic, military conquest, like that at Brest-Litovsk imposed by the German military on Russia: "ein diktierter Friede mit Landabtrennungen unter dem Druck der Gewalt und unter Protest der Vergewaltigten. Das ist der Friede, den wir Pazifisten nicht meinten, der Friede, der keiner ist . . ." (III, 4 March 1918) Fried's solution to the problem of international anarchy is an umbrella organization of equally valued states, a modification of the remnants of the European Concert, the Congress of Berlin in 1878, and the Berlin Congo Conference of 1885.

Fried lays the responsibility for the absence of such an international organization at the feet of a country's leaders. If the pre-war pacifist Fried referred to those in leadership in largely uncritical terms, the Fried of the war diaries seeks to hold leaders accountable for their decision to have taken their nation to war. Fried, a one-time supporter of Kaiser Wilhelm (as expressed in a New York Times opinion piece on 8 June 1913), reserves his harshest comments for the despotic leaders who had deliberately sought war. Anticipating Heinz Fischer's thesis that Germany did not just stumble into the war but desired it, Fried minces no words: "Man hat bei uns den Krieg gewollt." (I, 7 May 1915) He mocks the Kaiser's claim that the German people had wanted the war, claiming:

Gewiss ist das deutsche Volk das friedliebendste auf der Erde, aber in ihm wirkten Kräfte–Menschen und Ideen–die den Frieden der andern störten und schliesslich dieses friedliebende Volk, das in den Schutzmassnahmen der andern Völker gegen jene Menschen und Ideen eine Bedrohung erblickte, mit in den Weltkrieg hinein rissen.

(I, 10 December 1914)

While one cannot deny that there was great enthusiasm for the war, Fried's view of a peace-loving German population is supported to some extent by the research finding of Roger Chickering who notes: "It would in all events overtax the evidence from the street to conclude that [the people's] enthusiasm reflected long-standing, deep-seated, or universal attitudes about the probability or desirability of war."²⁶ With passion and verve and even creative sarcasm, Fried writes, late in the war, in language that would be the envy of many an author, of the failure of the German political class:

daß verschrobene, liebedienerische engbehirnte Zwerge die Entgleisung der Welt gleichsam aus Amtsdisziplin und Höflichkeit gegen die Träger des militärischen Geistes und die nach Ruhm, Betätigung und Profit Hungernden herbeigeführt haben in der ahnungslosen Befangenheit, es könne nicht allzu schlimm werden und man werde sich durch Grimassen bluffen lassen. [End Page 53]

(IV, 14 April 1918)

It was they, the leaders, viewing war as a kind of sport,²⁷ not the people,²⁸ who refused to negotiate a settlement with Serbia, who are guilty of a "Verbrechen" (II, 11 March 1916) by allowing the war:

Es sind kalt lächelnde Diplomaten in Klubstühlen, die die Kolben auf die krachenden Schädel niedersausen lassen und die im Sommer 1914 spröde taten, mit sich nicht reden lassen wollten über die Möglichkeit der Vermeidung dieses Krieges und es mit ihrem 'Prestige' nicht vereinbar fanden, den Konflikt einer Vernunftlösung zuzuführen.

(II, 11 March 1916)²⁹

Fried cites other instances in which leaders had engaged in negotiation to avert military conflict. World War I was, in his view, eminently preventable; it was not the result of an assassination, nor of an unfortunate collection of circumstances.³⁰ In regard to the failure of the German diplomats, one is reminded of the initially private "Denkschrift" (1916) of Prince Lichnowsky, the highly regarded Imperial German Ambassador to the Court of St. James from 1912–14, in which he criticized the German diplomatic corps for their belligerent mindset in the months leading up to the outbreak of the war. Similarly, the 1916 memorandum of Wilhelm Muehlon, who had been a board member of the Krupp Industries and had had conversations with high-ranking members of the German Foreign Office in July 1914, contains his outrage at the politicians' seeming interest in goading Austria-Hungary into war. From Fried's point of view, the war was not averted because not one good diplomat among the "Schar der Pygmäen" (I, 28 July 1915) could be found to pursue peace.³¹ If the pacifists had been allowed to participate in the resolution of the Serbian crisis, the war would not have taken place:

Wäre in Deutschland und Oesterreich die Friedensbewegung von den Regierungen so unterstützt worden, wie die Flottenvereine und die Wehrvereine, dann hätten sie eine solche Kraft erhalten, dass sie unweigerlich auf die Stärkung der Friedensparteien in dem jetzt feindlichen Ausland Einfluss gewonnen hätten. Dann wäre der Krieg vermieden worden. Das wäre positive Friedenspolitik gewesen.

(I, 25 May 1915)

But even when peace talks did come about in December 1917, no pacifists or civilians were invited to the discussion.³² When the war appeared all but lost in July 1918, Fried unleashes his perhaps most scathing remarks about failed leadership:

Was wollen sie noch, die deutschen Macht-Idioten, die Gewalt-Helden, die Siegs-Irrsinnigen? Sie treiben Spielerpolitik. Sie häufen zu dem Verlust des Besitzes den Verlust des Erborgten. Die Hauptsache ist ihnen: nur nicht aufhören. Nur weiter im Rausch bleiben, nicht den letzten Hoffnungsschimmer verlöschen und nicht die Ernüchterung eintreten lassen. Spielerpolitik. Verzweifelte, die sich und den andern Zukunft vorgaukeln und doch den Hahn des Revolvers bereits gespannt haben, um sich ins Nichts zu verflüchtigen. [End Page 54]

(IV, 28 July 1918)

In assessing what to do with these ineffective leaders, Fried asks caustically: "Wenn hier ein armes Weib ihre Verbrechen gegen das keimende Leben mit zwei Jahren Zuchthaus büssen muss, welche Strafen verdienen jene, die den Tod von hunderttausenden, blühenden Kraftmenschen verschuldet haben?" (I, 22 June 1915) His answer: "Fort mit ihnen! Ob schuldig oder unschuldig: Kein einziger von den führenden Personen, dessen Name mit diesem Kulturverrat irgendwie verbunden ist, der, gezwungen oder freiwillig, als Pflichtmensch oder als Verbrecher–einerlei–damit etwas zu tun gehabt hat, soll in seinem Amt bleiben." (II, 11 March 1916)

It was, however, not only the failure of political leadership that caused war, but also the pervasive militarism, which was no doubt fostered by such leadership. Militarism, according to Fried, is not only the privileged social position of the military (in addition to the readiness to employ force) but also ". . . eine Geistesrichtung, die sich allerdings vorwiegend auf militärische Kraft stützt." (I, 10 November 1914) Fried characterizes the militaristic spirit as "die Anschauung, die die Macht über das Gesetz stellt." It is the equivalent of "die Aufhebung alles Gesetzes, die Verneinung aller Gerechtigkeit" (I, 25 April 1915) or "die Unterordnung der Politik unter rein militärische Gesichtspunkte . . ." (II, 24 May 1916) Not opposed to all uses of the military, Fried understands militarism as the negation of the appropriate relationship between the military and society: "Die Armeen waren nicht mehr da, um dem Vaterland zu dienen. Das Vaterland wurde in den Dienst der Armeen gestellt." (I, 15 January 1915) Militarism thus impedes "den Ausbau dieser vernünftigen Weltordnung, deren Grundlagen durch international verquickten wirtschaftlichen, sozialen und geistigen Beziehungen bereits gegeben ist." (I, 20 September 1914) This militarism, which Fried ascribes in part to Germany's delayed development as a nation (the result of the Thirty Years' War),³³ permeates the civil government, the universities, as well as other social institutions, and finds expression in the "die VerTreitschkesierung der Politik" (Fried's own word, seemingly) and the "Nietzschesierung der Philosophie" (I, 9 December 1914).³⁴ In his diary Fried repeatedly attempts to refute the militaristic notions that war is a higher idea,³⁵ that it can be a kind of pedagogical elixir,³⁶ that it makes us "vollwertige Menschen" (I, 7 September 1914)³⁷ or that it is a necessary part of the Darwinian natural order of things.³⁸ He concludes that if an aggressive "Utopie des Krieges" (I, 26 November 1914) dominates a people, then, quoting David Starr Jordan, war can indeed appear inevitable: "Beherrscht eine solche Denkungsart ein Volk, so ist der Krieg unvermeidlich." (I, 25 April 1915) At a fundamental level, Fried himself of course denies the inevitability of war, but he does admit that one can talk oneself into believing that it is inevitable:

Im letzten Grund wurde das Unheil dieses Kriegs deshalb entfesselt, weil gewisse Kreise von der fixen Idee beherrscht waren, dass der Krieg kommen müsse. Unter dem Einfluss dieser Idee erlahmte der Widerstand gegen die gefährliche [End Page 55] Wendungen der Krise. Man holte nicht das Letzte heraus, um die Gefahr abzuwenden, weil sich die Psyche der entscheidenden Persönlichkeiten mit der angeblichen Unabwendbarkeit des Ereignisses schon abgefunden hatte, und die Erwägung immer obenan stand, ob–da es nun schon einmal sein muss–der gegebene Augenblick nicht die günstigsten Chancen bot. Von der Überzeugung von der Unvermeidbarkeit des Kriegs bis zum Präventivkrieg führt eine an sich logische Ideenverbindung. Nur die Prämisse war falsch. Der Krieg hätte vermieden werden können, wenn man ihn in seiner Bedeutung für unser Zeitalter, in seiner zu erwartenden Ausartung begriffen hätte und wenn man demgemäss bestrebt gewesen wäre, die pazifistischen Sicherungen, denen man sich jetzt zuzuneigen versucht, statt zu verlachen anzuwenden. Der Krieg war vermeidbar.

(III, 19 November 1917)

While a full examination of the causes of World War I, which according to the French sociologist Jacques Novicow (whom Fried translated) was mainly the result of "mangelnde[s] Vorstellungsvermögen" (I, 26 August 1914), would take us far afield,³⁹ Fried, even early in the war, ascribes significant blame to the German states: "Der Krieg war kein Überfall auf Deutschland und Österreich-Ungarn, sondern ein Vorstoß dieser beiden Staaten gegen Europa." (I, 1 January 1915) In her book, Patriotic Pacifism, Sandi Cooper maintains that German pacifists tended to be more patriotic than pacifistic, especially regarding Alsace-Lorraine. But Fried's assertion of German and Austria-Hungarian culpability, which finds repeated expression in his diary, suggests that he was quite willing to publicly assign blame to Germany (and Austria-Hungary) for their unwillingness to negotiate about the contested areas. Perhaps the brush that paints German pacifists as latent nationalists needs further differentiation. It is worth noting that in his postwar defense of German pacifists to Professor Théodore Ruyssen, a French pacifist who had expressed reluctance at further cooperation with German and Austrian pacifists, Fried vigorously defended his German compatriots: "Der größte Teil der führenden deutschen Pazifisten hat von allem Anfang an, oder in den ersten Monaten nach Ausbruch des Krieges die Schuld Deutschlands am Krieg erkannt und, soweit dies unter dem Druck der militärischen Ausnahmegesetze möglich war, auch offen zugegeben."⁴⁰ He then notes the specific hardships suffered by the leading pacifists, such as Jannasch, Wehberg, Schücking, Quidde, Hoesch-Ernst, Lammasch, Grelling, Muehlon, Foerster and others.⁴¹ That said, one also finds in Fried's diary remarks indicating that Germany and Austria-Hungary were not solely at fault: "Die Ursache für diesen Krieg lag daher nicht allein in Deutschland, sondern in dem militaristischen System Europas."⁴² (I, 1 January 1915) In the final analysis, Fried suggests that the militaristic culture, a kind of romanticized, technologically advanced politics (I, 25 November 1914), can only be overcome, again quoting from a letter from David Starr Jordan, ". . . wenn sich die Staaten, ob nun groß oder klein, als gleichberechtigt annehmen . . . Jedes Volk muss also aus sich selbst heraus den eignen Militarismus überwinden." (I, 25 April 1915) [End Page 56]

"Scientific" pacifism likewise requires that the arms industry with its bankrupt motto, "Si vis pacem, para bellum,"⁴³ (I, 17 July 1915) be eliminated or at least nationalized.⁴⁴ Fried rejects the view that millions need to be spent as a "Versicherungsprämie gegen den Krieg," (I, 21 March 1915) in as much as this preventative measure has been ineffective. Believing that disarmament must be multilateral, i.e., not only the defeated nation must disarm, he agrees with the noted British political scientist and philosopher G. L. (Goldsworthy Lowes) Dickinson in the latter's claim: "Der Militarismus muss nicht nur in Deutschland, sondern überall vernichtet werden. Eine Einschränkung der Rüstungen muss allgemein sein, nicht nur den Besiegten von den Siegern auferlegt, die selbst im Sinn haben, die volle Rüstung zu behalten." (I, 22 June 1915) Fried does not equate militarism with the acquisition of any or all armaments: ". . . die Rüstung [ist] an sich noch nicht der Militarismus." (I, 10 December 1914) And he does not deny that a country must maintain a military force. He does, however, believe that other nations can perceive a neighbor's excessive military build-up as a threat and respond irrationally. It is further clear to him that a true reduction in arms can only occur as a result of a secure and legally binding international organization: ". . . eine Rüstungsverminderung, die gleichzeitig eine völlige Veränderung des Wesens der Rüstungen mit sich bringt, ist erst möglich als Ergebnis einer gesicherten Rechtsordnung." (IV, 22 September 1917) Perhaps even more disastrous to Fried's mind is the fact that an arms race fosters an imbalance in the development of human capacities. Attention to technological developments can overwhelm our ability to think critically:

Dieser Krieg ist möglich geworden, weil das Denken sich nicht in gleichem Maß entwickelt hatte wie das technische Können. Die Entwicklung der Menschheit war einseitig. Die geistige blieb hinter der technischen zurück . . . Statt zur höchsten Vollendung des Menschentums führte diese Ungleichmäßigkeit der Entwicklung zum Selbstmord.

(III, 28 July 1917)

In his own reflections about the arms build-up, Fried was particularly influenced by Ivan Bloch's six-volume opus on war and technology, which drew on the prevailing thinking in economics, statistics, and engineering, and portrayed the much-relied-on cavalry as ineffective. A translation from the Russian of volume one, Der Krieg in seiner technischen, volkswirtschaftlichen und politischen Bedeutung, appeared in 1899. Bloch, a Russian banker who earned his money in railroad construction, had correctly predicted the use of tanks, poisonous gas,⁴⁵ machine guns, air raids, submarines, and trench warfare; he had argued that new developments in technology would produce a change in tactics giving an advantage to the defensive side and making a quick victory virtually impossible. An extended war would necessarily precipitate a widespread economic meltdown resulting in mass hunger, foreshadowing what transpired in Germany during the latter stages of the war. [End Page 57] Such developments would further decimate social and cultural life rendering the containment of aggressive urges impossible. Bloch had hoped, futilely as it turned out, that his analysis, which concluded that war brings about no discernible societal advantages, would discourage leaders from engaging in war.⁴⁶

"Scientific" pacifism also demands a re-evaluation of the economic argument for war. Besides drawing attention to the inconveniences brought about by the war, e.g., unpaid salaries and pensions; irregular foodstuffs; and interrupted mail delivery and transportation, Fried observes early on that the war represents a potentially calamitous economic situation: "Wer in diesem Krieg unterliegt, ist finanziell ruiniert . . . Verlieren wir, so sind wir arm." (I, 22 August 1914) But perhaps more serious and dangerous than the inconveniences and the continuing, mindboggling war credits are the simpleminded economists who convince the population that war stimulates the economy: "Einfältige Wirtschaftspolitiker werden alsdann dem Volk einreden, dass der Krieg die Wirtschaft befruchtet." (I, 2 March 1914) In support of his argument, Fried again quotes approvingly G. L. Dickinson who had written of the futility of war for economic gain. According to Fried, Dickinson observes:

Die deutschen Imperialisten haben es offenbar für der Mühe wert gehalten, Krieg mit uns zu führen, um Kolonien zu erwerben . . . Haben sie je die Kriegskosten gegen die voraussichtlichen Handelsvorteile abgewogen? . . . Was wirtschaftlich im Krieg gewonnen oder verloren werden kann, ich glaube, alle sachverständigen Beurteiler sind darin einig, dass der Verlust größer sei als der Gewinn... In den Krieg ziehen, um Reichtümer zu erwerben, sogar wenn man sie erwerben könnte, ist dasselbe wie einen Menschen ermorden, um seine Taschen zu leeren.

(I, 22 June 1915)

To underscore his claim that war produces no substantial, communal economic advantage, Fried also cites Goethe's well-known assessment of the economics of war: "Krieg ist in Wahrheit eine Krankheit, wo die Säfte, die zur Gesundheit und Erhaltung dienen, nur verwendet werden, um ein Fremdes, der Natur Ungemässes, zu ernähren." (I, 18 April 1815) In other words, Fried understands that the monies needed for war are better expended elsewhere: "Und doch liegt darin die ganze Grauenhaftigkeit der Sache Krieg. Dieselben Kräfte, dieselben Geldopfer für die Kultur gebracht, könnten die Erde zum Paradies gestalten." (III, 20 May 1917) He also explicitly disputes the claims put forth by Werner Sombart, one of Germany's leading economists and sociologists, in his book Händler und Helden (1915). Sombart had applauded the war as an opportunity to contrast the heroic culture of the Germanic "Heldengeist" and the sacrificial nature of their "Volksgemeinschaft" with British commercialism and internationalism, i.e., "Händlergeist", and its celebration of individualism. Referring to Sombart's pro-war, anti-English treatise [End Page 58] as ". . . ein trauriges Denkmal einer trüben Zeit, eine Schädigung des deutschen Ansehens in der Welt, eine Verleugnung wahrer Größe und wahrer deutscher Kultur," (I, 18 April 1915) Fried reproves Sombart's celebration of war—"ein Heiliges, 'als das Heiligste auf Erden'"—as a sad denigration of Kant's 'Ewigen Frieden'." (I, 18 April 1915)

As the scientist is heavily dependent on observation for the success of his experiment, Fried likewise affirms that scientific pacifism requires the ability to see the world accurately, if differently: "Der Pazifismus ist ein Problem der geistigen Optik." (I, 19 August 1914) He argues, forcefully and repeatedly, that pacifism's goals have been portrayed in an unfavorable, misleading light and are consequently not well understood. Fried believes it is imperative to counter these misperceptions, which he attributes, at least in part, to the media's imprecise and limited reporting on military operations. Of one particular military engagement, Fried writes: "Es wird uns von dieser Aktion genau berichtet, was sie eingebracht, aber nicht, was sie gekostet hat." (II, 4 June 1916) The single-lensed reporting produces a uniformity of the public opinion that remains impervious to perspectives that fall outside of the official view: "Die gesamte Presse in Deutschland und Österreich-Ungarn ist auf einen Ton gestimmt, dem sich fast keiner zu entziehen vermag." (I, 11 October 1914) Moreover, the media have been duping the public for a long time, essentially closing out public discussion all together: "In Wirklichkeit hat man die öffentliche Meinung nicht gewandelt man hat sie beseitigt. Wir haben gar keine öffentliche Meinung mehr." (II, 28 January 1916) But Fried can peek behind the media's curtain and determine the falseness of their chauvinistic, xenophobic claims: "Ich habe die Überzeugung gewonnen, daß die Völker nicht so aussehen wie die Zeitungen sie schildern, und daß hinter deren Grimasen wahre Menschen stecken, die den Krieg hassen, sich dieses Verbrechens wohl bewußt sind und in der Zukunft daran mitarbeiten wollen, ihn zu überwinden." (II, 27 October 1915)

Not only do the men of the media shirk their responsibility to report accurately and thoroughly on the war and its opponents, they also actively thwart the advancement of truth. Fried's diary expresses frequent criticism of the prevalence of censorship vis-á-vis democracy and pacifism. In contrast, he finds less restriction of opinion in England. His own book, Europäische Wiederherstellung, cannot be reviewed in Germany:

Helmut von Gerlach schreibt mir (unterm 28. Juni), dass er über mein Buch Europäische Wiederherstellung in der Welt am Montag gern einen Artikel veröffentlicht hätte, die Berliner Presse aber vor einigen Tagen die Weisung erhalten habe, nichts mehr zu veröffentlichen, was irgendwie mit dem Frieden zusammenhängt, ohne es vorher der Zensur vorzulegen.

(I, 8 July 1915)

One issue of his journal Der Friedens-Warte of December 1914 was cut from 80 pages to 8. (I, 19 December 1915) Even very late in the war, Fried refers [End Page 59] to the censorship that perpetuates the lies needed to maintain the war: "Vom militärischen Standpunkt ist die Zensur nur Wirksamkeit des Selbsterhaltungstriebes. Der Krieg und der Militarismus könnten keine drei Monate mehr leben in dieser Welt, wenn man die Zensur abschaffte." (IV, 8 June 1918)

Besides striking hard at the complicity of the press in managing the perception of the war and pacifism, Fried is also deeply critical of the intellectuals who have failed to assert their leadership at a time when it may count most:

Angesichts einer derartig unerhörten Verdrehung der Tatsachen, die nur den Zweck hat, das arme deutsche Volk zu benebeln, kann man nur mit tiefstem Schmerz, mit ernstester Besorgnis in die Zukunft blicken. Wo sind denn die deutschen Gelehrten, die Wissenden, die die Lüge klar erkennen, die in solcher Behauptung liegt? Warum schweigen sie, statt sich das–heute allerdings dornige–Verdienst zu erwerben, der Lüge entgegenzutreten, aus patriotischen Beweggründen entgegenzutreten?⁴⁷

(IV, 8 October 1917)

On the role of the Protestant clergy during the war, Hartmut Lehmann has written:

No one had expected a conflict of this magnitude, and everyone was shocked that peace could not be preserved; but Protestant clergy and the members of the protestant churches in particular, with few exceptions, accepted the war as if it had been sent by God, and they asked God for peace but above all for victory as each side believed that its own cause was just.⁴⁸

Fried, who was born into a liberal, essentially non-practicing Jewish family of Hungarian descent, expands Lehmann's point to include ample evidence of the culpability of all faiths in the destruction of human life: he examines and rejects the alleged pedagogical benefits of war contained in the essay "Der Krieg als Erzieher" by the well-known Benedictine monk Graf von Galen. He refutes the justification for the war offered by Bishop Faulhaber who had written ". . . mit dem Rufe: 'Die Waffen nieder!' hat jedoch das Evangelium nichts zu tun, denn es lässt der Obrigkeit das Recht, an das Schwert zu appellieren." (I, 27 March 1915) And he rejects Rabbi Werner's claim in his talk "Der Weltkrieg und das alte Testament" on May 5, 1915, which praised the war—"Deutschland hat den Krieg geheiligt, denn es kämpfte um seine Freiheit, und sein Kaiser wollte mit der Friedenskrone geschmückt sein!" (I, 18 May 1915) Only late in the war does Fried perceive a churchly interest in peace. (IV, 8 October 1917) In summary, he observes that one may pray for peace but not actively seek to promote it: "Für den Frieden beten ist gestattet. Für den Frieden arbeiten wird als Verrat ausgelegt."⁴⁹ (I, 21 April 1915)

In Fried's view, the poets too have failed to present a countervision: "Auch unsere Dichter haben vergessen, dass auch die Gegner Menschen sind, und dass über der Nation die Menschheit steht." (I, 2 September 1914) Fried [End Page 60] specifically refers to the hatred of the English depicted in Carl Hauptmann's play Der Krieg (I, 2 October 1914) and writes of the current trend in literature: "Seltsam ist der Stil und der Ton der Kriegsliteratur. Sie hat so etwas Mystisches, Feierliches an sich, so etwas Weltabgewandtes, das einem bei vorheriger Überlegung unfasslich erscheint." (I, 22 September 1914) Elsewhere Fried speaks of the destructive impact of the so-called "Aufruf an die Menschheit" or the "Manifest der 93," published in October 1914, in which Ludwig Fulda among some 93 scholars, artists, and writers contested the claims of the opponents of the German war effort in Belgium, equated German militarism with German culture, and called for solidarity. For Fried, German "Wissenschaft," so respected in the world, failed to capitalize on its prestige and in fact made matters worse:

Viel Unheil richten die deutschen Gelehrten und Schriftsteller, wie die Künstler, die sich–entgegen ihrer Gewohnheit–sichtlich mit dem Bestreben, ihrem Vaterland zu dienen, an der Hetze beteiligen. Der 'Aufruf an die Menschheit', den ungefähr 100 deutsche Gelehrte und Künstler erlassen haben, hat im Ausland viel böses Blut gemacht.

(I, 25 October 1914)

Arguments based on self-exceptionalism, seen as "Ritterromantik,"⁵⁰ and on the portrayal of an inhuman enemy occlude what can overcome the institution of war, namely, feelings of empathy. On the shameful, morally anaesthesizing expansion of submarine warfare, Fried writes: "Es ist dies der Beweis des völlig mangelnden Verständnisses für die Psyche der andern, für die Unmöglichkeit des Hineindenkens in deren Lage und Empfindungen . . ." (III, 24 March 1917) Embracing the cultural mediation espoused by Romain Rolland in his Jean-Christophe-novels, Fried believes that the job of the pacifist is to dismantle the hateful perceptions, which can lead even well-meaning people to do atrocious things: "Ich sehe die grosse Aufgabe der Pazifisten darin, nach dem Kriege diese Hasserscheinungen gegen Deutschland forträumen zu helfen." (I, 1 October 1914) Instead of viewing the enemy as an odious opponent, Fried urges that we see him as an unfortunate collaborator in his own annihilation: "Im Kriege gibt es gar keine Gegner, sondern nur Mitarbeiter an der Vernichtung. Harmonisch Mitwirkende an der großen Disharmonie des Geschehens. Harmonisch Zusammenwirkende an der Symphonie des Wahnsinns." (I, 28 October 1914)

While opportunities for resistance to the widespread militarism in Germany and Austria-Hungary proved few and far between once the war had begun, Fried's diary nevertheless continued to call for such opposition. Fried cites individuals or groups as exemplars of his brand of pacifism. Their actions, like his own, were intended to advance the cause of peace at some cost to themselves. Fried praises the women who gathered at Den Haag in late April 1915 to protest the war: "Die Auflehnung der Frauen gegen die Vernichtung des Lebens ist eine weltgeschichtliche Tat." (I, 6 May 1915) He [End Page 61] lauds Karl Liebknecht as a consistent opponent of the war: "Liebknecht mag in der Art seiner Betätigung viele abstoßen, sein Mut muß anerkannt und seine Ehrlichkeit darf nicht bezweifelt werden. Er ist Gegner des Kriegs und dieses Kriegs. Seine Äußerungen entsprechen seiner Überzeugung." (II, 1 May 1916) Even Friedrich Adler, the assassin of Minister President Graf Stürgkh, is considered, despite his crime, "ein Held" for having acted freely "im Interesse seines Landes."⁵¹ (III, 21 May 1917) Fried is also encouraged by Walther Schücking's article "Der Weltkrieg und der Pazifismus." (I, 2 October 1914) Seeing his contemporary pacifists as equally committed to the idea of peace as the apostles were to Jesus, Schücking argues that pacifists, as "Anhänger des Humanitätsideals," demand that "jedes Menschenantlitz schlechterdings jedem Menschen etwas Heiliges sei."⁵² Even his outrage over the execution of Edith Cavell, "eine Patriotin," (II, 3 November 1915) on 12 October 1915, is intended to encourage action for peace. Of the British nurse who helped numerous allied soldiers escape German-occupied Belgium, he writes: "Sie wurde zum Tode verurteilt, weil sie in großem Umfang belgische, französische und englische Dienstpflichtige, die später in den feindlichen Armeen Dienste nahmen, außer Landes befördert haben soll. Nach gefälltem Urteil wurde sie unverzüglich erschossen." (II, 3 November 1915) Fried likewise admires Wilhelm Muehlon's indexed diary Die Verheerung Europas: Aufzeichnungen aus den ersten Kriegsmonaten (May, 1918), which recounts his impressions of the first year of the war, earning him the reputation as the first or highest European. Fried had met with Muehlon before the latter's diary was published. Drawing on his highly placed sources in the Foreign Office, Muehlon offers a scathing attack on the machinations surrounding the Austrian memorandum to Serbia. Like Fried, Muehlon also writes of the uniformity of the press, the blind obedience of the ravaging German soldiers in Belgium, his intense opposition to the campaign there, the ineptness of the German Foreign Office, the desire for war by a small clique of Germans, the placement of politics and nationalism above morality and humanity, xenophobia, the absence of conscience among the soldiers, the hypocrisy and narrow-mindedness of the leadership, the failure of the poets, and the international isolation of the Germans. Given the correspondence of their views, it is not surprising that Fried considers Muehlon's diary ". . . die Morgenröte eines neuen Deutschlands." (IV, 31 May 1918)

Finally, Fried's pacifism entails an intense embrace of democracy: "In der Errichtung der Demokratie erblicken wir daher die realen Garantien des dauernden Friedens." (II, 12 December 1915) Fried, like Ludwig Quidde, perhaps the most revered proponent of pacifist democracy of his time, affirms an inextricable link between pacifism and democracy. Indeed, Fried writes of "Pazidemokratie" and "Pacidemokratie" and argues that democracy, his German critics notwithstanding, is fully compatible with German culture. A truly democratic government, one that does not merely put a few social democrats in office while allowing the power to remain with the "Staatsoberhaupt," can [End Page 62] check the military's influence on the political decision-making process, thereby decreasing the chances of aggressive action. (IV, 10 August 1918) Thus, democratization is seen as a bulwark against militarism and war: "[Democracy] ist es, sie allein, die den Militärismus überwinden wird." (I, 15 October 1915). In his view, democracy also restricts "Geheimdiplomatie" promoting greater governmental transparency and accountability, thus containing aggression. Fried expresses his agreement with President Woodrow Wilson's goals for postwar Europe in the latter's message of 22 January 1917, namely, "Feste Begründung der Demokratie, Abkehr von aller Eroberung, Anerkennung und Freiheit der Nationalität, das sind die Grundlagen der europäischen Wiederherstellung." (IV, 22 April 1917) Fried referred to the message as "das wichtigste Dokument der Durchdringung der pazifistischen Lehre." (III, 24 January 1917) Departing from the "European method" of resolving conflict, i.e., one that is guided by "romantische Prestigedogmen," (I, 12 July 1915) Wilson, like Fried, hopes that a "Verständigungsfriede," as opposed to a "Siegfriede," might yet be realized.⁵³ In short, democratic countries, according to Fried, show greater restraint vis-à-vis war: "In demokratisch regierten Ländern erscheint die Scheu vor dem Krieg doch etwas fester zu sitzen, als in den alten Monarchien Europas." (I, 14 Mai 1915)

Fried is, however, also cognizant of the problematic nature of democracy. He is no wide-eyed idealist. For even if the democratic governments emerge victorious from the war, that still represents a victory for military force: "Aber der Erfolg der Heeresgewalt, wenn auch seitens der Demokratie, ist keine Niederlage des Gewaltsystems. Diese wäre allein erreichbar durch einen unentschiedenen Krieg, durch ein Versagen der Militärgewalt als Mittel. Immerhin–der Sieg der Entente würde den Irrtum des 'para bellum' beweisen."⁵⁴ (IV, 18 September 1918) Moreover, the push for democratic selfdetermination has propelled some ethnic groups to pursue a tribalistic national self-rule at the expense of a European identity. He also expresses skepticism that some Germans may not be able to effect democratic principles: "Die Vertreter des demokratischen Geistes in Deutschland haben nicht die nötige Knochenstärke." (IV, 15 September 1917) Additionally, even if a democratic form of government were to be realized, the war-exhausted population may still remain susceptible to the possibility of deception by its future leaders (a foreshadowing of things to come):

Das deutsche Volk ist zu naiv; es kann immer wieder das Opfer von Leuten werden, die mit seinem Idealismus spekulieren. Ein Volk, das im vierten Jahr des Kriegs den Taschenspielern der Vaterlandspartei nach Millionen Folge leistete, kann immer wieder der Ausbeutung geschickter Macher anheimfallen. Dann muß die Demokratie institutionell festgelegt werden. Unverrückbar festgelegt werden.

(IV, 13 October 1918)

Nevertheless, Fried specifically warns against a return to the undemocratic, social configuration before the war, as desired by many including the Wiener [End Page 63] Kreuzzeitung which desired ". . . daß unser Volk sich wieder zum religiösen Glauben zurückwendet." (II, 23 July 1916)

What may most distinguish Fried from his fellow pacifists (including Quidde) is his belief that the Germans must acknowledge their crimes even before the war is officially ended and certainly before the historians can examine the archival records of 1914:

Gebt Entschädigungen für eure Verbrechen, akzeptiert den Völkerbund offen und ehrlich, die Abrüstung und den internationalen Rechtszustand. Dann kann Deutschland sich wieder erholen. Sonst nicht! Sonst kommt ein Friede, der das deutsche Volk zu Zinssklaven macht für ein Jahrhundert.

(IV, 19 October 1918)

Fried believed that the admission of guilt would demonstrate that the German people had clearly separated themselves from their leaders, and in particular from the emperor, "Der Hauptschuldige des Kriegs," (IV, 9 November 1918) who ultimately abdicated on November 9, 1918.⁵⁵ But when he hears of the potential reparations in December of some 500 billion marks, he despairs that a true peace can be attained: "Niemals kann dieser Friede ein wirklicher Friede werden." (IV, 14 December 1918) With the further development of the peace treaties, he grows more and more convinced that the people of Germany and Austria will be unduly punished for the decisions of their leaders even as he maintains some hope that the new government, which still contains remnants of militarism, will benefit their respective countries. Like many others, Fried remains troubled by the demands of the peace treaty, especially the demand to disarm, in as much as it bodes poorly for a stable peace:

Wir wollen ein Staatensystem, das die Rüstungen aller überflüssig macht, das vor allem die allgemeine Wehrpflicht überall abschafft; die zwangsweise Entwaffnung eines Millionenvolkes wollen wir nicht, weil dies dadurch gezwungen wird, auf Befreiung und Rache zu sinnen, und damit zum Zentrum jener Unruhe und Bedrohung werden muß, die wir gerade abschaffen wollen. Deutschland wird diese Erniedrigung nur so lange ertragen, als es sich nicht helfen kann. Aber man kann sicher sein, daß es den Augenblick vorbereiten wird, um sich von diesen Bestimmungen frei zu machen. So wird dieser Friedensschluß jene militärischen Kreise, die die Revolution überwunden hat, neu beleben und ihren völligen Untergang verhindern.

(IV, 19 March 1919)

In Fried's view, the "Sadismus in Versailles" (IV, 19 March 1919) will never bring the desired peace. When the treaty is finally signed on June 28, 1919, Fried does not participate in the celebration, writing:

Es war ein großer Tag. Oh, wär' er nur einer gewesen! Was hätte dieser Tag sein können, wenn an ihm die Menschheit wirklich Frieden geschlossen hätte! Wie berechtigt wäre der Jubel der Massen gewesen, wie berechtigt die äußere Feststimmung, wenn an diesem Tag die wahren Vertreter der Völker sich vereinigt hätten, nicht die Vertreter der siegenden und besiegten Regierungen, [End Page 64] nicht die Diplomaten alter und ältester Schulen, nicht die goldstrotzenden Militärs, und wenn diese den Pakt des allgemeinen Weltfriedens, der allgemeinen Abrüstung, der Weltorganisation und der Magna Charta des Rechtes unterzeichnet hätten. So hätten wir es in den schweren Prüfungsstunden dieser Kriegsjahre erkannt. Einen Friedensschluß erhofften wir, der nur einen Besiegten kennt, den Krieg und mit ihm jene Schichten, die mit ihm ihr Dasein rechtfertigen.

(IV, 30 June 1919)

Fried closes his diary with a final "Fluch gegen jene ..., die im Sommer 1914 frivol und unbekümmert, ebenso unverständig wie gewissenlos diesen Krieg ausgelöst haben." (IV, 30 June 1919)

IV

This brief analysis of Fried's Kriegstagebuch confirms Petra Schönemann-Behrens' estimation of Alfred Fried as one of the leading ". . . pazifistischen Theoretiker der Kaiserzeit." (Schönemann-Behrens 183) Urging the formation of an international assembly of nations as the foundation of the establishment of a more permanent peace, his diary attests to his unapologetic pacifistic zeal. Fried himself underscored the importance of his diary to his overall thinking. In a letter to David Starr Jordan, the ever-educative Fried observes:

Es ist dies das Werk, in das ich meinen ganzen Kampf gegen den Wahnsinn des Krieges konzentriert habe. Der Weltkrieg hat eigentlich damit wenig zu tun. Er war nur Demonstrationsobjekt, die Leiche an der ich Anatomie docierte.⁵⁶

Fried's comment here is likely best read not as a dismissal of the importance of World War I but rather as an expression of his desire to instruct humanity, perhaps even lecture humanity, on the virtually unimaginable impact that war and this war in particular have had on human life. His diary may be equated with the pathologist's autopsy in as much each seek to learn and to inform about the cause of death and of war respectively. Fried's embrace of a rigorous pacifism, one that denied that war could be humanized,⁵⁷ was not an easy path to take. He was of course vilified by the nationalistic "Alldeutschen" and their "gefährliche Mystik" (II, 21 January 1916), and he also suffered the loss of friendship of many of his fellow pacifists either because they were able to reconcile their pacifism with their own Vaterlandsliebe or because Fried's own pacifism was too severe for them. We recall that Fried thought that World War I was in part the result of the pacifists' own failed efforts to contain the desire for war. Fried was even critical of the selection of the Geneva Red Cross as the recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1917, for, in his view, the actions of the Red Cross did not further the creation of the mental outlook [End Page 65] that peace requires: "Man spreche mir nicht vom 'Roten Kreuz'. Das ist nicht Menschenschutz, sondern nur Schutz der zufällig Übriggebliebenen. Menschenschutz ist allein Kriegsabschaffung!"⁵⁸ (I, 27 June 1915) The noble efforts of the Red Cross cannot protect humanity from war; at best, they provide support, medical and emotional, to those who remain alive following the fighting. The Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye did not establish the peace that Fried worked for: "Nun haben sie in Wien den 'Frieden', jenen 'Frieden', der mit dem Tod identisch ist." (IV, 4 November 1918)⁵⁹ If we return to the opening image of this essay, namely, the delusion that bayonets can secure the peace, we will find Fried, even at the end of the war, still opposing such delusional thinking: "Eine Beendigung dieses gigantischen Weltringens, das die Weltordnung nicht errichtet und alles wieder auf Bajonnetten aufbaut, ist nur die Fortsetzung des heute akuten in latenter Form." (31 March 1918) If Old Buck asserted that a stabile peace is something that exists despite the presence of bayonets, Alfred Fried really did believe that until the bayonets could be limited by an international organization true peace could not be established.