Journal of Korean Studies

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE KOREA STUDIES IN CHINA

Despite their being geographical neighbors Korea and China have had discontinuous diplomatic relations. For thousands of years, there were robust cultural, political, and social exchanges between the two, leading Koreans to often claim they are the “people who know China best in the world,” a point that can well be contested. Discontinuity set in during the Cold War when South Korea and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) became adversaries. After the fall of the Soviet Union and against the backdrop of the global loosening of ideological confrontations, South Korea and the PRC reestablished a diplomatic relationship in 1992. The forty-some-year hiatus in relations has introduced a significant change of heart in the way South Koreans view China: simply put, they do not look up to China as they used to do in the past.

Contemporary Korean Studies in China coincided with the 1992 establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and Republic of Korea, which also allowed regular academic exchanges to occur. Chinese academic interests in Korea studies significantly expanded in the late 1990s when the South Korean popular culture of the so-called Hallyu (the Korean Wave) went viral and Chinese interest in South Korea soared. Chinese scholars call it the “first Renaissance period” for Korean studies in China. It reached its zenith under South Korean president Roh Moo-hyun (2003–8). Roh’s seeming pro-China orientation was widely seen as contributing to the upsurge. The ensuing period of the Lee Myung-bak administration (2008–13) was, on the other hand, regarded as “a setback period,” as Lee was a staunch pro-American politician. Whether South Korea’s relationship with China and its relationship with the United States are mutually exclusive should be duly examined, but the South Korean media nevertheless commonly portrays it that way.

When South Korea’s current president Park Geun-hye (Pak Kŭnhye, 2013 to the present) was elected, she sent her emissaries to China first. It was a reversal of the previous practice of a South Korean president-elect sending goodwill envoys first to the United States, Seoul’s staunch military ally since World War II. Park projected herself as a person who has a cultural affinity with China when she publicly mentioned she was fond of Chinese philosopher Feng Youlan. Park is widely seen as a “pro-China” figure in China. She and China’s president, Xi [End Page 266] Jinping, have held six summits in just the first three years of their respective inaugurations. Deepening economic interdependence is also an important factor that has strengthened the Sino-Korean relationship. As of today, South Korea’s trade volume with China is larger than that of its trade with the United States and Japan combined. With that, Hallyu is back, too. Many Chinese scholars believe that Korean studies in China has now entered its “second Renaissance period.”

ISSUES AND CHALLENGES OF THE KOREAN STUDIES IN CHINA

The popularity of the Korean language major in China has also undergone its ups and downs in the meantime. In the late 1990s, many colleges and universities in China launched Korean language programs. However, as the number of Chinese college graduates with Korean language majors rapidly increased, the job market shrank. This was a warning sign. Since then, Chinese colleges have stopped quantitative expansion of the major and focused more on the qualitative upgrade of education for their Korean-language major students.

The needs of Chinese scholars in the Korea studies field have also changed over time. In the past, their main needs revolved around securing financial support from the South Korean government such as research grants. Today, the issue of funding is not as much of a priority as it used to be. Nowadays, thanks to China’s economic growth, Chinese academics have more access to funding sources through their own institutions. Chinese scholars in Korean studies are instead increasingly eyeing academic exchange opportunities with overseas scholars—not just Korean scholars but also with foreign scholars in other countries, especially English-language speaking countries. The reason for this is that Chinese universities increasingly promote globalization of education and value those who have overseas educational experience. As Chinese universities have become more conscious of global educational experiences, this also means that there are more funding opportunities that encourage Chinese scholars to seek overseas exchange occasions. Chinese academics also want to use the overseas scholarly exchanges to ratchet up their research profile. Finally, in today’s China an increasing number of new academic positions go to those who have overseas degrees. With that, those with domestic degrees feel increasingly pressured to find research cooperation opportunities with overseas institutions.

There is also one prominent challenge facing Chinese academics in Korean studies—namely, the overwhelming academic orientation and prestige in China toward Western higher education institutions. This comes despite the official Chinese media’s rebuking of Western values and institutions. One unfortunate consequence is that while many Chinese universities acknowledge academic articles listed in English-language journals and count them toward the faculty promotion criteria, those listed in other languages, including Korean, often go [End Page 267] unacknowledged. This becomes a discouraging factor for Chinese academics who specialize in Korean studies.

THE HISTORICAL DISCONNECT

While South Koreans openly express cultural admiration for China, they tend to mean it in a general sense. Chinese are more reserved and specific. One of the most striking elements of Chinese scholars’ views on South Korea is that they rather tersely acknowledge that Chinese understanding of contemporary South Korea was patchy and incomplete due to the Cold War that prevented contact between the two nations. When Chinese writer Guo Moruo (1892–1978) visited North Korea in 1958 and saw the tomb of Chŏng Mong-ju, a famous Korean Confucian scholar, Guo was not sure whether Chŏng was Chinese or Korean and had to ask North Korea’s vice premier Hong Myŏng-hŭi about it.

South Korea’s attitudes toward China, of course, should be seen in the context of their cultural affinity for traditional Chinese culture, the epic novel Sanguo yanyi (Romance of the Three Kingdoms), the “Analects,” Li Po’s poems, the Confucian tradition of ancestor worship, and so on. Yet, their knowledge and understanding of the “New China” since 1949 under Communist Party leadership is less deep. This is well illuminated in South Korean newspaper columns. Korean intellectuals often borrow words and episodes from classical Chinese texts to analyze the contemporary Chinese society under Communist Party rule, or reflect upon social ills in today’s South Korean society with China’s past as reference. Simply put, South Koreans dwell upon China’s past.

On the other hand, Chinese contemporary interest in South Korea has largely focused on the latter’s economic development in the 1970s to 1990s as China was looking for an economic development model using South Korea’s industrial development as a reference point. The Chinese academic community’s predominant interest in South Korea’s economic development also has to do with the availability of information. For instance, many Chinese scholars privately confess that they only belatedly heard about South Korea’s democratic transition and student demonstrations against the military dictatorship in the pre-1987 era as that information had not been available in China.

Against the backdrop, the publication of Gong Keyu’s Yanjin yu chaoyue: Dangdai hanguo zhengzhi (Evolution and beyond: Contemporary Korean politics) has much to offer to the rising Chinese scholarly interest in South Korea as well as those outside scholars who are interested in knowing the Chinese perspective on Sino–South Korea relations. The book is the first-ever comprehensive Chinese treatment of South Korean politics covering the chronology of the relevant events—including case studies. The book also becomes a natural critique of South Korea’s often malfunctioning political institutions. For example, it delineates how South Korea is a democracy yet the president, once elected, wields [End Page 268] an inordinate amount of power, comparable to that of an authoritarian state’s leader.¹ Despite the fact that there are checks and balances, South Korean daily politics is pretty much run by a handful of influential political figures who rely on interest groups and crony networks. Although this phenomenon of collusion between politics and the economy may not be unique to South Korean politics, it is still freshly interesting to hear that perspective from the Communist state’s scholar. Gong also makes a substantive statement:

While authoritarianism may be the choice for Asian countries’ economic development experience, it should not serve to justify their rejection of adopting a democratic political system.

(Gong, p. 21)

It is notable how Chinese academics can afford to be so unrestrained when they talk about politics in other countries, while they would withhold from making such comments on China. Gong’s comment may be seen as a coded criticism, targeting none other than China itself, whose reforms have been predominantly on the economic front, while political reforms are lagging far behind. Gong observes:

After Asian countries use authoritarianism to promote economic development and national prosperity, the ruling elite should be accustomed to the fact that the public will have more sophisticated understanding of democracy and the ruling elite should reform themselves to adjust themselves to the changed environment, and should be willing to forgo vested interests and embrace the political reforms and launch democratic governance and strive to perfect it.

(Gong, p. 21)

Gong may have been using the South Korean context to warn China. Gong, a female scholar, is also notable in that she takes special interest in women’s participation in politics in South Korea. And this aspect has drawn keen interest in China where women’s roles in politics have been relatively limited. Gong also correctly concludes that women’s status in South Korea, including their political participation, has room for improvement compared to Western standards. Gong deems South Korea to have achieved “economic modernization but not modernization of the overall social consciousness” (Gong, p. 271), citing Chinese Confucian influence on Korea as the culprit! While many aspects of the book may not be unfamiliar to Western scholars of South Korea, this book has a due place in the scholarly community as the first-ever comprehensive treatment of contemporary South Korea politics from a female Chinese scholar’s perspective.

Hanguoren xinmu zhong de zhognguo xingxiang [South Korean images of China] by Dong Xiangrong, Wang Xiaoling, and Li Yongchun is a book that has garnered a good reception in both China and South Korea. The three authors conducted field research and administered surveys on how South Koreans feel about China. These researchers represent China’s new generation of emerging scholars. [End Page 269] They found that “China is a country that is rapidly developing, a country that makes others uneasy, a country full of fake commodity products” (Dong, Wang, and Li, p. 186). The results are not surprising to the Chinese themselves as this is also largely the self-image of the Chinese as well, representations that are often reported in the Chinese domestic media. The research data, backed by statistical analysis, has been cited numerous times by other Chinese academic papers covering Sino–South Korea relations. South Korean Images of China can serve as a useful reference to Western scholars who are interested in Sino–South Korea ties and who find the various quantitative data useful in the areas of society, politics, military, culture, diplomacy, and economics. The authors’ research approach also deserves attention. It has three aspects. One is textual analysis of some of South Korea’s academic sources and media texts, including the Tonga ilbo, secondary school history textbooks, modern and contemporary South Korean history, world history, and “society” textbooks, all of which are either directly published by the South Korean government or approved by the government to be used in schools. The second part details the survey undertaken with South Korean citizens. The authors conducted expert-panel discussions to come up with a set of questions. Then they entrusted a South Korean polling company to conduct the survey on their behalf. Eventually, they collected 1,000 respondents’ answers. They then conducted in-depth interviews with opinion leaders in South Korea.

SOUTH KOREANS HAVE CONFLICTING IMAGES ABOUT CHINA

According to the Chinese survey, South Koreans have a “conflicted image” of China. China can be characterized as “developing,” “full of uncertainty,” “a country that we don’t like,” or “a socialist country that cannot be trusted.” South Koreans also see China as an “economic partner” yet “a politically alien country,” which therefore poses a “threat” to South Korea (Dong, Wang, and Li, p. 177). China represents to South Koreans a country that is rapidly developing, yet backward, and uncertain of its future trajectory. The concept of da guo (大国, big country), which both Chinese people and the South Korean media use, has different meanings in the minds of South Koreans. Namely, China is a “big country,” which means that it is a country that has a large landmass and a huge population. In its extension, this term also means China’s growing sphere of influence in terms of economic and international politics and the military realm. However, China is no longer a “country to look up to” (上国 shang guo). In the past it was a powerful and highly civilized nation that smaller neighboring countries admired. This involved a historical mentality of respect that Koreans attached in reverence to a big and powerful country. The Chinese authors conclude: “For South Koreans today’s shang guo is the United States, not China” (Dong, Wang, and Li, p. 179). [End Page 270]

The survey also shows two key words South Koreans use when referring to China: “a security threat,” and “poor quality products.” Seventy-three percent of South Korean respondents said China’s military buildup posed a security threat to South Korea and thereby reminded them of China’s “invasion and oppression” (侵略压迫) and reflected their fear over China’s growing clout. This is the case despite the fact that South Koreans have positive cultural orientations toward China as well; South Koreans feel natural affinity to the Chinese culture, recognize China’s spectacular economic expansion, and respect China’s hosting the Six-Party Talks—a consortium of six nations convened to persuade North Korea to curb its nuclear ambition. The authors believe that South Korean perception of China has been particularly shaped by the post–Cold War influence of the United States to which South Korea has been a major military ally. Simply put, the Chinese bemoan that South Korea, a former tributary, looks at China through the American prism and thus has a negative view toward today’s Communist China. This alleged mindset of cultural and political subjugation will be further examined.

THE SOURCE OF SOUTH KOREAN’S AMBIVALENCE TOWARD CHINA

Dong Xiangrong, Wang Xiaoling, and Li Yongchun argue that China’s towering economic development is, in fact, an important source for the rise of the anti-China sentiment among South Koreans. As China’s economy develops rapidly, China has changed from a coarse “imitator” of products to an economic “super-power.” South Korea increasingly depends on China economically, which, in turn, make South Koreans feel “off-balance.” China’s outstripping South Korea economically, coupled with a checkered history, as well as China’s Communist Party rule, all make South Koreans feel ambivalent about China and doubt its strategic intentions toward the Korean peninsula. “Therefore, until the time when China completely establishes its superiority to South Korea, the image South Koreans have about China will not likely have a fundamental shift.” (Dong, Wang, and Li, pp. 186–87). Since the authors did not elaborate on it further, there is no way to know what they meant by “establishing superiority to South Korea.” This could mean that China would need to upgrade its soft power leverage toward South Korea. This could also indicate China’s determination to outstrip South Korea in all areas of economic and political and cultural prowess, a position that would make South Koreans feel overwhelmed, like in the old days. Or, it may refer to its willingness to not spare any available means to subjugate South Korea, including physical means. The interpretation is open, debatable, and includes uncertainty. The same is true for South Korea’s uneasiness toward China’s future policy trajectory. As mentioned before, South Korean images of China has drawn a good deal of attention thanks to the fact that this is a rare Chinese book [End Page 271] that deals with China–South Korea relations from the Chinese perspective and provides much quantitative data on areas that Chinese scholars are interested in. For those who are familiar with incidents of China–South Korea bilateral disputes such as the “garlic incident,” the Kangnŭng Tanoje Festival (C. Duanwujie), or the historical tributary system (朝贡 chao gong) and want more context and references, this book will certainly be of service.

South Korean images of China can also be read in the context of China’s increasing attention to its international perception because “image sovereignty” (Dong, Wang, and Li, p. 5) was one of the drivers behind the research, especially in China’s increasing soft-power competition with the United States. The authors also critically examine the Chinese people’s “self-serving bias,” in which they tend to assess themselves in a much loftier manner than other nationals would think so. For instance, many Chinese assume that Koreans would feel thankful to the Chinese tributary system through which the Chinese culture spread to neighboring regions and contributed to their civilization. Tang Degang even compared the Chaogong system to the “modern day United Nations system” (Dong, Wang, and Li, p. 41). That certainly did not square with the Korean perception. “When the Chinese found out about such perception gap, they become quite disappointed. … In reality, Koreans have a vivid memory of being invaded and oppressed under the unfair tributary system imposed by China,” it notes (Dong, Wang, and Li, p. 8). Overall, the book reads very much like a self-conscious image-journal of China, looking at its shadow of old imperial glory, thrown upon on its former tributary that does not revere the Middle Kingdom emperor anymore.

THE “LITTLE CHINA” SYNDROME OF KOREA

The “Little China” (小中国) theme runs deep in all of these books, all written by the Chinese authors, including the text written by Wang Yuanzhou, Xiaozhongghua yishi de shanbian: Jindai zhonghan guanxi de sixiangshi yanjiu (The evolution of Korea’s consciousness as “Little China”: Study on China–South Korean relations’ history; p. 19). This is also the aspect the Chinese authors often revisit and dwell upon, as if reminiscing how Korea, which prided itself as “Little China,” has changed so much, and how it increasingly lost much of the historical affinity it proudly attached to China. Authors describe how China’s status as shang guo has been undermined since Western powers at the turn of the twentieth century haplessly exploited China (Wang, p. 20). It is impossible not to avoid the feeling that China misses and wants to recover the old glory as the Asian hegemon and reestablish the shang guo status when it was once looked upon highly by neighboring countries. Relevant to this, one of the most interesting aspects, according to the Chinese authors, is that South Koreans’ affinity toward China is much lower than that toward the United States and even lower than their attitude toward Japan. However, one notable discovery, as the authors note, South Koreans [End Page 272] who identified themselves as “pro-American” do not necessarily do so at the expense of their views on China. That is, an increasing pro-American tendency does not directly correspond to an increasing anti-China tendency. In fact, the two are not mutually exclusive (Wang, p. 25). If true, this is significant with implications on contemporary regional diplomacy where South Korea is often portrayed as being stuck between Washington and Beijing. The Chinese researchers carried out in-depth interviews with opinion leaders of thirty-four people and had them engage in discussions by dividing them into different groups for focus research. (Dong, Wang, and Li, p. 25). The authors also conducted Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews (CATI) with 1,000 South Koreans. Such research by Chinese scholars in a foreign country is rare.

Dongbeiya hezuo yu zhonghan guanxi (East Asian cooperation and China–South Korean relations) by Men Honghua and Shin Zhengseung examined economic, political, and human exchanges, as well as bilateral challenges identified by leading experts from both countries. The text includes a few South Korean scholars’ chapter contributions but was published only in China. It put forward that China–South Korea relations have just entered “adulthood” (Men and Shin, p. 243). At a time when there are some views that South Korea may “again” be inching closer toward China in its new geopolitical strategic calculus and loosening its ties with Washington, it may be more than just a coincidence that a book on South Korea’s “Little China” syndrome is penned by a Chinese scholar. Although the term may not be the key concept to unlock the contemporary South Korean intellectual orientation, it is still a relevant angle to probe in terms of examining South Korean intellectuals’ worldviews, particularly from a historical sense. In “Little China,” Wang argues that South Koreans got away from the Sinocentric worldview mainly due to external factors—that is, Western influence, as well as ensuing nationalism (Wang, pp. 97–98). Wang argues that South Koreans under the China-centric mindset, desired to become more Chinese than Chinese people themselves (Wang, p. 101), a sentiment that can be debated. Like the other books we examined, Wang’s examination also reveals that South Koreans and Chinese, surprisingly, do not know each other very well in reality, contrary to long-running perceptions. Despite being close neighbors, their mutual understanding has been “quite limited” (Wang, p. 259). That was the case even during the period when Korea was a Chinese tributary. For instance, the Chinese envoys’ contacts with local Korean people and intellectuals during the Qing Dynasty were often kept to a minimum by the Korean side for fear that such occasions would be used for Chinese spying activities on Korea. Another factor was Koreans’ tendency to look at the Qing Dynasty (ruled by Manchus, not Hans) as not the “bona fide China” and therefore be reluctant to engage in exchanges compared to the previous Song Dynasty ruled by the Hans (Wang, p. 90). This was particularly pronounced during the early period of the Qing Dynasty. “With the increasing consciousness of Little China mentality, Korean envoys visiting China during the early period of Qing Dynasty, were reluctant to engage in informal relations with [End Page 273] their Chinese counterparts, on the pretext that a subject does not have the right to engage in diplomatic activities” (Wang, p. 149). Furthermore, most mutual knowledge at that time was “secondary knowledge,” because travel abroad was beyond luxury and strictly limited to envoys and a small select group of licensed merchants. Most Koreans’ knowledge about China was also taught by Koreans, not by Chinese. The case was the same from the Chinese side as well. Although geographical neighbors, most Koreans and Chinese often relied on secondhand knowledge and imagination to understand the others. The Evolution of Korea’s Consciousness as “Little China” illustrates many such aspects and debunks the widespread sentiment the Chinese and Koreans attach to each other as “familiar” neighbors. They may have been geographically close neighbors, but not familiar.

Men and Shin’s work covers contemporary China–South Korea relations and what implications it has had on the international relations of East Asia. It describes how the Obama administration’s strategy of “Rebalancing to Asia” has brought “a number of challenges” (Men and Shin, p. 38) and increased uncertainty in the region. And yet overall, a direct confrontation between Washington and Beijing is unlikely, it notes. At the same time, the dual nature of cooperation and competition between the two is going to be the dominant trend in the future (Men and Shin, p. 38). East Asian Cooperation and China–South Korean Relations positively portrays the projection of South Korea’s industrial competitiveness against Japan, predicting that some of South Korea’s cutting-edge technology may surpass that of Japan (Men and Shin, p. 51), while it also makes the obvious prediction that as time passes by, some of China’s products will also directly compete with South Korea’s. The book points out a few potential major conflict areas between China and South Korea: historical disputes, North Korea’s nuclear issue, the US–South Korean alliance, and maritime disputes. China defines the purpose of an alliance to serve a state’s “survival” and “security.” But the development trend of the US–South Korea alliance has gone further, from the Chinese understanding of an alliance, thus “posing a major challenge to China–South Korea strategic relations” (Men and Shin, p. 87). There are worries about South Korea, which once belonged to the Sinitic cultural sphere of influence, drifting away from the orbit. The fact that the tenor of the book faithfully represents that of the Communist Party comes as both a strength and a weakness: strength in that it helps the readers to understand the intention and mandate of the state; weakness in that there is not that much in the way of independent scholarly musings. For instance, the authors state that East Asia is the only place in the world where the Cold War has not ended yet (Men and Shin, p. 130); Japan will use the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance to check the rise of China, and Washington cannot realize its rebalancing in East Asia without Japan (Men and Shin, p. 158). Overall, China believes that the Washington-Beijing “big power coordination” can safeguard the peace and security of East Asia. It is notable that Japan is seen here as an axillary factor, not a major factor, and is simply not on equal footing with China. “Big power coordination only requires the United States to bear its due regional [End Page 275] responsibility, it is not asking the United States to leave the region, it does not [mean to] undermine its core interest” (Men and Shin, p. 175), it argues. Men and Shin prescribe that South Korea’s strategic choice should be “consistent with Korea’s own logic,” under which South Korea’s key task is to find a balance between its military alliance with the United States and its regional big power, China. In addition, they call for scaling down of the US–South Korea alliance (Men and Shin, p. 175). China will not acknowledge American hegemony in East Asia and at the same time will not compete for hegemony with the United States (Men and Shin, p. 187). The authors claim that there is an “expectation gap” (Men and Shin, p. 230) between China and South Korea, generating misconceptions such as the “China threat theory” (Men and Shin, p. 231), which was engineered by the West. “We believe South Korea should overcome its passive strategy of developing its relationship with China under the rubric of the US–South Korea framework, but acknowledge the changed power of the rise of China, perfect a new concept for mutual relationship China and South Korea can change US policy on North Korea and reduce the feeling of insecurity North Korea has (Men and Shin, p. 235). Perhaps this very expectation is the product of another “expectation gap” from China’s side in misjudging contemporary South Korean intellectuals.