SAIS Review of International Affairs

Introduction

Hardly a day goes by without a headline about Russia, be it about the Mueller investigation, Trump's incendiary tweets directed at Russia before ordering missile strikes on three Syrian chemical weapons facilities, or the possible poisoning of a former Russian spy in Great Britain. Has this constant stream of news impacted American views of Russia? Surveys show that it may have, but not necessarily in conventional ways.

Despite prior expectations of improved relations under President Trump, a December 2017 survey conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that American views of Russia remain at lows not seen since the Cold War, much as they have since Russia annexed Crimea in 2014.¹ Moreover, a majority of Americans believe Russia tries to interfere in the domestic affairs of the United States, tried to influence the outcome of the 2016 presidential election, and is actively working to undermine US international influence and power. While overall majorities express these views, there are signs that US [End Page 17] attitudes toward Russia are becoming a partisan issue. Although Congress has been solidly unified and bipartisan in its actions to sanction Russia—even prohibiting Donald Trump from having singular authority to relax the sanctions—the American electorate is quite divided, breaking with past trends.

In surveys as recent as 2015, self-described Democrats have been more open than Republicans to cooperating with rather than trying to contain Russia. Since Donald Trump has been elected president, however, this pattern has reversed. The survey data show that it is Democrats who are now more distrustful than Republicans of Russia's intentions, rooted in their understanding that Russia tried to sway the 2016 presidential elections. A majority of Republicans, however, are not convinced of Russia's interference, suggesting Trump is more influential in this regard than other Republican leaders.

Reactions to the Election

US intelligence agencies initially revealed that Russia orchestrated the hacking of the Democratic National Committee and other political organizations in October 2016.² In December, the Obama administration responded to Russia's interference with new sanctions, the expulsion of diplomats, and the seizure of two diplomatic compounds. By January 2017, the Director of National Intelligence released a declassified report making Russia's intent to harm the Hillary Clinton campaign during the 2016 elections public.³

Once President Trump took office, the US Congress placed additional sanctions on Russia. Initially, the Trump administration did little to punish Russia for its actions in 2016: Trump signed the law passed by Congress because his veto would likely be overturned, but his administration implemented the law slowly and ineffectually. However, after a former Russian spy and his daughter were poisoned in the United Kingdom with a nerve agent unique to Russia, the United States expelled 60 Russian diplomats, ordered the closure of the Russian consulate in Seattle, and sanctioned 17 Russian entities with close ties to Putin.⁴ All the while, the FBI continued an investigation to determine whether there were any links between Trump campaign associates and individuals associated with Russia's interference in the 2016 elections—first under former FBI Director James Comey and currently by special counsel Robert Mueller. The Mueller investigation has filed charges against Trump's former campaign manager and indicted thirteen Russian individuals and three Russian companies associated with "troll farms" that churned out disinformation aimed to disrupt the 2016 US presidential election.⁵

Congress, intelligence agencies, and a majority of the US public have expressed consensus that Russia attempted to influence the US election, but there is a critical exception to this consensus: President Trump. Despite agreement from Republicans in Congress and officials appointed by the President [End Page 18] himself, Trump's frequently voiced doubts about Russian interference seem to have resonated among many Republican constituents.

A December 2017 Chicago Council survey found that a majority of Americans think that Russia generally tries to interfere in the domestic affairs of the United States (70%) and—more specifically—that Russia interfered in the 2016 elections (61%). However, a Council survey found that while a majority of Democrats (88%) and independents (57%) think that Russia tried to influence the 2016 presidential election, just one-third of Republicans agreed (34%).⁶ Further, just twelve percent of Republicans think that Russia tries to influence US domestic affairs a great deal (see Table 1).⁷ In a separate question, 65 percent of Democrats said that Russian influence on American elections poses a critical threat to the United States, compared to only 19 percent of Republicans and 40 percent of independents.⁸

US intelligence agencies have stated that Russian attempts to influence elections in the United States will continue through the 2018 midterm elections and perhaps beyond, but on average, Americans are less concerned.⁹ In a February 2018 Marist poll, a slim majority of Americans (53%) think it is unlikely that Russia will interfere in the 2018 midterm elections (see Table 1) though a sizable 41 percent think it likely. Democrats are most alarmed that there will be Russian influence in November's mid-term election (60% very or somewhat likely). But only 17 percent of Republicans and 40 percent of independents feel similarly.¹⁰

These polls capture at best a naïveté about Russia that is atypical of Republicans. Traditionally, Republican politicians have presented Russia as a threat when campaigning. Just four years prior to Trump's election, Mitt Romney called Russia the greatest geopolitical adversary of the United States, for which he was mocked by many Democrats.¹¹ Ronald Reagan famously coined the phrase "Evil Empire" in 1983 to describe the Soviet Union. And in Chicago Council on Global Affairs surveys conducted from 2008-2012, Republicans were less favorable in their "feelings" toward Russia than Democrats (see Table 2).

A more cynical assessment is that Republicans cared more about winning the 2016 election than this particular instance of foreign interference. Not only do they not think that Russia tried to influence the 2016 election, but they find it very unlikely that Russia will interfere in the next US election, despite evidence to the contrary in US elections as well as elections abroad.¹²

Further, there are large partisan differences in American support for the use of sanctions to respond to Russia's role in the 2016 election and the annexation of Crimea. In 2017, Democrats were more likely to say the United States should increase the sanctions placed on Russia (58% Democrat, 17% Republican, 35% independent). This does not mean that Republicans supported [End Page 19] easing or removing sanctions; the majority of Republicans (and the plurality of independents) preferred maintaining the sanctions as they are (55% Republican, 29% Democrat, 40% independent).¹³

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Table 1.

Views of Russian Influence on US Affairs

* Source: Chicago Council on Global Affairs

** Source: Marist Poll

*** Due to rounding, totals may not add up to 100%

It is remarkable that a foreign government's involvement in a US election is a partisan issue amongst the general public given the consensus amongst intelligence agencies and Congress. Trump's regular denouncement of the evidence of Russian interference appears to have greatly impacted the views of most Republicans. What is more, it has clearly impacted how Republicans view the continued threat of Russian attempts to interfere in US domestic politics. The Republican party—characterized by its relative hawkishness compared to Democratic dovishness—has been historically mistrustful of Moscow, but apparently this does not extend to their constituents in the aftermath of Trump's election. [End Page 20]

Changing Public Preferences for Dealing with Russia

As the 2016 Republican candidate, Trump deviated from the GOP norm by musing "Wouldn't it be nice if we actually got along, as an example, with Russia?"¹⁴ President Trump's talk of improving relations with Russia on the campaign trail seems to have had a modest impact on increased Republican support for cooperation and engagement with Russia. But more significantly, in the aftermath of the election and Russian interference, Democrats have swapped positions on the preferred tenor of US-Russian relations. In 2016, just four months before the election, Americans of all party affiliations—and especially Democrats—favored undertaking friendly cooperation and engagement with Russia (56% overall) over actively working to limit Russia's power (39% overall; see Table 2). In 2017, a narrow majority of Americans favored the containment option (53%) over friendly cooperation (43%). Today, a strong majority of Democrats favor actively working to limit Russia's power (70% up from 34% in 2016), while an increased majority of Republicans (56% in 2017, up from 50% in 2016) and a decreased majority of independents (50%, down from 55%) favored friendly cooperation.¹⁵

In a similar vein, Democrats are now much more likely than Republicans to consider Russia a threat to US security, compared to only limited variation in partisan attitudes towards Russia as a threat in the past. About a third of Americans across party lines thought that Russia's military power represented a critical threat in 1990 and 1998 (a little higher for Democrats), and this fell to an even smaller minority in 2002. But in the aftermath of the 2016 election, Democrats are significantly more fearful and less trusting of Russia than are Republicans. A summer 2017 Chicago Council survey's results show that half of Democrats (50%) now consider Russia's military power to be a critical threat, compared to 32 percent of Republicans and 40 percent of independents. The following December, another Chicago Council survey asked which countries out of a list posed the greatest threat to US security, and the majority of Americans named North Korea (59%). However, the second most frequently mentioned response was Russia (18%). Over a quarter of Democrats named Russia (27%), while just 9 percent of Republicans said the same.¹⁶

Even before the 2016 election, Americans suspected that Russia was aiming to diminish US international influence. The summer before the vote, Republicans and Democrats were nearly equally likely to say that they thought Russia was actively working to undermine US international power and influence (75% Republican, 72% Democrat, 67% independent). In one year, however, Democrats and independents had grown even more convinced (82% Democrat, 73% independent in 2017), while Republicans grew somewhat less convinced (64% in 2017). [End Page 21]

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Table 2.

Public Preference on US Relations with Russia

Source: Chicago Council on Global Affairs

It remains to be seen whether the 2016 election will have a lasting impact on how Democrats view Russia. Large opinion changes—a change of twenty percentage points or more—are very rare.¹⁷ That 36 percent more Democrats in 2017 than in 2016 wanted the United States to actively work to limit Russia's power indicates that, currently, Democrats do not think bilateral cooperation between the two states is beneficial. However, it remains unknown if this reversal of opinion will be long lasting or a short-term consequence of the 2016 election.

Moreover, Republicans' recent shifts in favor of cooperation with Russia seem to have more to do with the elections and Trump's cues than actual policy shifts. Republican thinking on a variety of policies Trump challenged while campaigning remains unchanged. In 2017, a Council survey found that majorities of Republicans still wanted to see the United States play an active role in the world (65%), viewed US military superiority as very important (63%), said NATO is still essential for US security (60%), and were more likely than in the previous surveys to support using US troops to defend a NATO ally if Russia invaded (55% 2017, 45% 2015).

Overall Opinion of Russia Remains Low

Since 1978 the Council has asked Americans to rate their feelings towards the Soviet Union, and later Russia, on a temperature scale from 0 degrees, being very cold or unfavorable, to 100 degrees, being very warm or favorable. Between 1982 and 1998, there was little distinction in these favorability ratings among Democrats, Republicans, and independents, which jumped to new highs after the fall of the Soviet Union (59° overall, 59° Republican, 60° Democrat, 58° independent). [End Page 22]

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Figure 1.

American Views of Russia by Party

Source: Chicago Council on Global Affairs

For most of the 2000s until 2014, overall average temperature ratings of Russia hovered around 50 degrees. Just months after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, American opinion towards Russia returned to Cold War levels, with the overall US public rating Russia an average of 36 degrees, a 12 degree drop from 2010. Polls conducted before and after the 2016 election show that Democrats' rating of Russia declined most sharply. The temperature rating among Democrats for Russia dropped from 40 degrees in June 2016 to an average of 28 degrees in December 2016. The average temperature drops among independents (42° June 2016, 35° December 2016) and Republicans (38° June 2016, 35° December 2016) were much slighter.

The most recent 2018 survey saw a much wider gap in temperature ratings for Russia between Democrats and Republicans (32° overall, 39° Republican, 33° independent, 25° Democrat). In the 40 years that the Council has asked this question, this is the largest difference—14 degrees—in how Democrats and Republicans rated their feelings towards Russia. While Republican sentiment towards Russia still remains low—39 degrees is still fairly unfavorable—Russia's actions in 2016 clearly impacted Democrats' general view of Russia. [End Page 23]

Similarly, the American public as a whole is not confident in Russia as an international actor, and opinions of Russian President Vladimir Putin remain low. Last year the Council found that only 28 percent of Americans expressed confidence in Russia's ability to deal responsibly with world problems, and only 18 percent had a favorable view of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Democrats have grown somewhat less confident in Russia as a world leader (from 31% in 2015 to 26% in 2017) are the least likely to express a favorable view of Putin (9%). Independents' confidence in Russia's role in the world has not changed over two years (27% in both 2015 and 2017), and 19 percent of independents express a favorable view of Putin.

While Republicans have grown slightly more confident in Russia's ability to deal responsibly with world problems (from 22% in 2015 to 34% in 2017), this is a far cry from a full embrace of Russia as an international partner. Those who can be considered "core Trump supporters," meaning those who express a very favorable view of Donald Trump, are most confident in Russia's ability to solve world problems (44%), but even among this group more individuals lack rather than have confidence in Russia. As for Putin, 30 percent of Republicans and 41 percent of core Trump supporters express a favorable view: higher than average, but again, not majorities.

Conclusion

Taken together, these findings paint a grim picture for hopes to repair US-Russia relations in the near future. Democrats are clearly convinced that Russia infringed on a US election and as a result, view Russia as a greater threat, eschew bilateral cooperation, and would like to see an even tougher response than the current sanctions. While Republicans do not think that Russia interfered in the 2016 election, they still believe Russia should be sanctioned by the US government and generally lack confidence in Russia to help solve the world's problems.

Although some of the changes in how Democrats view Russia are dramatic, they may not have lasting consequences on the US-Russian relationship. Polling over the year and a half captures well Democrats' current mood, but it simply cannot indicate if this will be lasting.

These results are more worrying from a domestic perspective, in that they reveal the self-interested nature of partisan politics in the United States. It is disconcerting that there has not been a unified response among the American public to Russia's actions in 2016. Trump's rhetoric has clearly impacted how Republicans view Russia's role in the election. Furthermore, even though other [End Page 24] Republican primary candidates were targeted by the Russian government, Republicans remain skeptical. This is starkly different from the response to Russia's renewed international aggression. For example, Moscow's annexation of Crimea in 2014 saw a bipartisan response among the public (Russia's temperature rating dropped 14 degrees amongst Democrats and 13 degrees amongst Republicans). Conversely, last year, less than one fifth of Republicans thought that Russian influence in US elections posed a critical threat.

Last January, then-CIA Director Mike Pompeo said he had every expectation that Russia will try to interfere in the 2018 election.¹⁸ If that is the case, it is likely Republicans as well as Democrats will be targeted, as was the case in the 2016 primaries, particularly since Republicans in Congress have been more critical of Russia. Republicans may regret overlooking the fact that Russian interference in the 2016 targeted Republicans, too—especially if their party is negatively affected in future elections.