SAIS Review of International Affairs

Background and Context

Niger’s history of recurrent conflict and frequent political uprisings continues to cast a shadow over its development. Despite the pursuit of a more democratic and inclusive regime under the new president, Mahamadou Issofou, institutions remain weak and susceptible to further upheavals and seizures of power. While the country can be considered semi-stable at present, internal and external security concerns threaten to undermine its delicate balance.

Deteriorating conditions tend to obscure recent glimmers of progress. As evidence, Niger ranked nineteenth on the 2014 Fund for Peace (FFP) “fragile state index” and last out of 187 countries in the United Nations Human Development Index (a composite measure of life expectancy, education, and income). According to FFP research, social and economic trends include steep increases in internally displaced persons and refugees largely due to recent conflicts in neighboring states. This aggravates high demographic pressures, such as population growth and food scarcity. Along with its riparian neighbors, Mali and Nigeria, Niger is among the fastest growing populations in the region. Yet its economic growth is slow and increasingly uneven, concentrated among the urban areas while rural parts of the country (where 85 percent of [End Page 160] the population resides) remain underdeveloped.¹ To date, the government has failed to provide much of the country with access to basic services like health, education, and sanitation.²

The prospects for improvement are bleak. Analysis of recent political and military dynamics displays trends of rising elite factionalism, intervention by the international community, and use of force by non-state actors.³ Further destabilizing Niger are the rising conflicts, terrorist activity, dwindling resources, and massive displacement taking place in its immediate neighborhood. Recently, the Nigeria-based terrorist group Boko Haram launched a series of attacks on Niger’s border, signaling increased aggression and expansion.⁴

Taken in aggregate, these factors continue to test the strength of national, regional, and international institutions operating in the area. One example is the new security strategy President Issafou has implemented in partnership with the United States and France to secure its borders. Resources continue to flow to this effort as conditions in the region deteriorate. In September 2014, the US Department of Defense announced plans to erect a second surveillance hub in Niger, expanding its use of unarmed drones for intelligence gathering.⁵ France, meanwhile, committed an additional three thousand troops to support ground operations in the region.⁶ Niger has similarly increased its military expenditures. One risk of this collective increase in spending for counter-terrorism efforts, as articulated in a recent International Crisis Group report, is that it may come at the cost of “already weak social sectors.”⁷ In the long run, maintaining stability in Niger depends as much on the government’s ability to improve basic services, including water and sanitation, as it does on securing its borders.

The Case for Improved Water Infrastructure

Water scarcity in Niger, like much of the Sahel, functions as a “threat multiplier” for other drivers of conflict, such as poverty and the loss of traditional livelihoods.⁸ Faced with prolonged periods of drought and increased competition, investments in Niger’s water supply and sanitation are critical to improving political stability and economic growth.

There are a number of natural and technical barriers to improving water security in Niger. Part of the challenge is explained by the fact that the Niger River, which crosses the country’s southwest border for only 550 kilometers, is its sole permanent source of water. Relatedly, Niger’s water supply and sanitation infrastructure is incredibly underdeveloped. While recent improvements have been made to urban sanitation systems, 82 percent of the population still practices open defecation—the highest rate on the continent.⁹ For the most part, existing water infrastructure aligns with areas of higher population [End Page 161] density and natural resource concentration in the southwestern portion of the country.¹⁰

The lack of water infrastructure poses acute challenges for the mostly rural population relying on rain-fed agriculture for income. According to the World Bank, renewable water resources per capita are estimated at about 2,710 cubic meters (m³) per year, less than half the sub-Saharan African average of seven thousand cubic meters.¹¹ Regular droughts and perpetual scarcity have drastic implications for Niger’s economy, as 45 percent of GDP and 87 percent of employment come from agriculture.

Niger has significant, albeit unfulfilled, irrigation potential. As of 2008, the World Bank estimated that the country possessed seven of the twenty-three million hectares of land in sub-Saharan Africa that could be profitably irrigated under small-scale projects.¹² The rate of return on such projects would be upwards of two dollars for every dollar invested, expanding agricultural productivity and building resilience against extreme weather events.¹³

Despite the beneficial impact of such schemes, financing for water infrastructure in Niger has been insufficient. While current government spending on infrastructure amounts to $225 million per year—$66 million of which is dedicated to water supply and sanitation—a 2011 World Bank report estimated that $747 million per year is needed to address Niger’s broader infrastructure needs in the next decade.¹⁴ Unsurprisingly, this annual funding gap of $460 million is largely comprised of needs in the water supply and sanitation sector.¹⁵

International assistance, while helpful, has not been enough to fill this gap in Niger, let alone the broader region. For context, the US government contributed $370 million in 2010 to improve water supply and sanitation infrastructure in all of sub-Saharan Africa.¹⁶ While this may seem like a significant investment, it is comparable to what is needed in Niger alone. Furthermore, given the population of the region, this investment averaged out to an investment of just $0.43 per person.¹⁷

Improving basic water infrastructure is critical to preserving the health and stability in Niger. Yet, clearly, tackling this challenge necessitates more efficient, creative use of existing resources—from donors as well as host governments and private sector actors. The next section builds upon this discussion, outlining recommendations for the Nigerien government, in partnership with the US defense sector, to augment water infrastructure capacity and development through improved coordination of and investment in its security sector assets.

Proposed Model for Increased Defense Sector Collaboration

With technical expertise and resources from the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and US Africa Command (AFRICOM), the US Department of Defense (DOD) is uniquely positioned to assist Niger in transforming its security sectors assets to achieve shared security and development objectives. The United States, like most donor nations, has a foreign military training budget to build capacity for disaster management in other countries. If the United States were [End Page 162] to repurpose this training to include construction and maintenance of basic ecological infrastructure in Niger, it could proactively address the country’s water security problem in a way that improved the overall security environment and strengthened existing defense efforts. Working through AFRICOM, the US military could support the creation of specialized domestic military units capable of working on small-scale ecological infrastructure projects such as dams, storage areas for flood water, draining swamps, and sea walls—similar to the domestic role played by USACE in the United States. This military partnership would train and convert a portion of the host country’s existing military troops to have what will hereafter be referred to as “dual-use” capacity, whereby they contribute to basic infrastructure projects and fulfill traditional military responsibilities.¹⁸

Foreign military sales (FMS) represent a potential, but underutilized, means through which DOD could tackle water security issues within its existing budget. Overseen by the department’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the FMS program enables the United States to sell defense articles—US arms and defense equipment—and services such as military training, engineering, and construction to foreign governments as a means of promoting regional stability and shared security objectives.¹⁹ Interestingly, engineering assistance can be requested for non-defense projects under the umbrella of FMS.²⁰ This could be a source of opportunity for African governments seeking US support and expertise for water-related infrastructure projects. Instead of selling only military equipment, the United States could facilitate the sale of tractors and other machinery necessary to execute infrastructure projects. Alternatively, DOD could re-evaluate whether the concept of “military training” may be broadened to include environmental activities.

Strategic Outcomes and Benefits

Creating a dual-use military force through structural improvements to domestic troops would produce security and development benefits relevant to both US and Nigerien interests. The potential for individual and collective gains, in both a short-term and long-term timeframe, are presented below.

Considerations and Challenges

Overall, dual-use military forces have the potential to increase efficiency and effectiveness of existing US-African military partnerships to address water security. From a feasibility standpoint however, some countries may be better candidates for this type of model than others. A country’s water security challenges—and solutions—are highly context-dependent. To that end, DOD would need to consider various challenges when designing and implementing this program on a country-to-country basis.

First and foremost, understanding the existing and prior conflict dynamics is fundamental in determining what role, if any, domestic military forces should play in advancing water infrastructure projects. Building infrastructure to provide basic services for the public can strengthen the social contract between a government and its people, thereby serving as a strategic means of conflict prevention or post-conflict development. However, it is not feasible or safe to train and deploy dual-use military forces if the country is actively embroiled in civil conflict, even if the appointed military forces are available, which is unlikely. Projects will likely be damaged and lives put at risk.

Civil-military relations are another consideration tied to conflict dynamics. Many countries experience a high degree of public distrust towards the military as a result of conflict. However, civilian engagement would need to be a critical aspect of the program, as unilateral military control over water management decisions and project execution poses various risks from both a security and development perspective. These include but are not limited to: (1) shortsighted interventions that fail to include perspectives and address needs of all water users, (2) civilian perceptions that the government is rewarding security forces with additional opportunities and skills while other parts of the population remain disenfranchised, and (3) selective infrastructure improvements that exacerbate unequal development and fuel inter-group tensions. As a result, there is an obvious need for any military program of this nature to include local civilian oversight and engagement.

Conclusion

Through the case study of Niger and subsequent discussion, this paper has attempted to demonstrate the need for creative approaches to improve water security in fragile states. Through long-term, inter-governmental partnerships, defense forces from donor countries like the United States could lend valuable [End Page 165] technical expertise and resources to improve water infrastructure in Niger. The economic and peace dividends from such a partnership are promising for both parties.

While promising at a conceptual level, it is important to acknowledge that such an approach is intended as part of a broader national water resource management strategy. Ideally, the creation of dual-use military projects would align with a comprehensive, integrated water sector policy framework and domestic resource modeling. Together, these could alleviate domestic stress factors on water resources and optimize US security investment. Ultimately, the feasibility of such a program in Niger remains to be seen. Further study is necessary in several areas, including how best to integrate local community perspectives into decision-making concerning projects and their locations, and how to establish a process for prioritizing and communicating projects to the public.