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*The End of Satisfaction: Drama and Repentance in the Age of Shakespeare* by Heather Hirschfeld (review)

William Junker

Comparative Drama, Volume 49, Number 1, Spring 2015, pp. 110-115 (Review)

Published by Western Michigan University

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1353/cdr.2015.0010>



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are given in any of the tune's previous appearances or sources; the aim here has been to keep them simple enough to be accessible to players of varying levels of ability and practical for modern instruments such as the guitar" (277).

A related concern is Clegg and Skeaping's failure to explain up front that for the overwhelming majority of the jigs' ballads (all of the music in five jigs and part of it in another two) the music given is merely speculative—that is, the specific music is not known, so music selected by the authors is supplied. Even though the authors made excellent music choices, their doing so would have better been mentioned in the introduction, instead of not being apparent until the music is described for each jig. For example, regarding *Wooing of Nan*, they write, "No tunes are named: those offered here achieve a comfortable and convincing underlay for the singing, and provide a suitable type of dance for the characters" (83).

Although this reviewer would have preferred more historical attention to the music—at least commensurate to the attention paid to the text—that was not the authors' intention. In conclusion, they clarify,

It may be tempting to see this edition as a manual for how we might recreate an authentic jig, but it is not: that would be impractical and impossible if only for two reasons. Firstly, there is simply not enough surviving information to make this an achievable exercise, and, secondly, it is not possible to recreate a sixteenth- or seventeenth-century audience. With this in mind it will sometimes be the case that the texts given here, put into practice, should be (in fact, must be) approached with the spirit and freedom of invention rather than the restriction or enslavement of historical reconstruction. (288–89)

The authors' honest assessment of what the volume is able to do, and not able to do, is important, even though it would have been more appropriate for the introduction. Overall, *Singing Simpkin and Other Bawdy Jigs* remains a very valuable addition to the study of early modern dramatic literature. Clegg and Skeaping make it possible for readers, performers, and audience members to again experience early modern jigs in their multi-disciplinary forms as literature, dance, and music.

CATHERINE A. HENZE  
University of Wisconsin-Green Bay

**Heather Hirschfeld. *The End of Satisfaction: Drama and Repentance in the Age of Shakespeare*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014. Pp. xi + 239. \$55.00.**

In *The End of Satisfaction: Drama and Repentance in the Age of Shakespeare*, Heather Hirschfeld argues that the Reformation's rejection of the sacrament of penance problematized the meaning and availability of satisfaction, from *satis*

*facere*—to do or to make enough. Early modern theater engages this crisis in satisfaction in a way that is (on Hirschfeld's view) largely critical of the Reformed theology of repentance whence it originated. What was the Reformed theology of repentance, and why should it have occasioned such a crisis?

In the Council of Trent, the Roman Catholic Church specified that the sacrament of penance was composed of three parts: contrition, confession, and satisfaction. The penitent's sorrow for her sins was expressed in her confession of them to the priest, and was completed in her punishment of these same sins through works of satisfaction—usually almsgiving, fasting, and prayer. Although the penitent was absolved of the guilt (*culpa*) of her sins immediately after her confession, the temporal punishment (*poena*) due to them was still owed; in carrying out her assigned penance, then, the penitent cooperated with the grace made available by the sacrament and satisfied God's justice. Reformation anthropology, however, rejected human cooperation with the divine in this capacity, and consequently denied satisfactory value to penitential acts. At the same time, the English Reformers continued the practice of penance well after 1553, when it was last recognized as a sacrament, though they limited the work of "satisfaction" to Christ alone.

Hirschfeld is interested in what happens to satisfaction when it is removed from the ambit of human agency and appropriated by the divine. Because (she argues) the meaning of satisfaction originally involved "*a concrete principle of both exchange and contact between the individual and the divine*," its consolidation in Christ would seem to open an experiential gap on the side of the believer that doctrine by itself could not fill (29; italics in original). The Reformers' strategy was to balance the attribution of objective satisfaction to Christ with a new emphasis upon the subjective satisfaction felt by the believer: "having degraded and eliminated satisfaction as something humans do, Reformers replaced it as something humans feel" (36). Yet the Reformers' avoidance of works-righteousness—of doing enough—could easily result in the problem of feeling enough, as in Daniel Dyke's 1616 *Two Treatises*: "We must feede and nourish this sorrow, *never satisfie our selves*, but wish with the prophet, that *our heads were continuall, unemptiable fountaines of teares*" (36; italics in original). If it is true that "humans do not satisfy God," Hirschfeld astutely notes, it seems "they also do not satisfy—are not satisfied—themselves" (36).

*The End of Satisfaction* tracks the paradoxes of Reformed repentance across several plays that "work through a pursuit of satisfaction that arises precisely when and because it is declared 'impossible'" (10). In a chapter on Marlowe's *Doctor Faustus*, Hirschfeld argues that the play engages sixteenth-century controversies over Christ's descent into hell. Did Christ descend to "a real, localized hell," as the medieval tradition and Luther held, or was his descent "a particularly internal form of...torment," as Calvin taught (47)? Hirschfeld suggests that the "latent preoccupation" of the debate was the question of "what counted as 'enough' for

Christ to do to redeem mankind" (43). This approach complicates the standard view of *Doctor Faustus* as a (diabolical) imitation of the Harrowing of Hell pageants in earlier biblical drama. Hirschfeld helps us to see that, in Faustus's "*imitatio Christi*," Faustus himself seems "uncertain of exactly what he is imitating" (56).

The book's widest-ranging chapter, "Setting Things Right: The Satisfaction of Revenge," draws from the Reformed theology of repentance a novel account of revenge tragedy. Focusing on Kyd's *The Spanish Tragedy*, Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, and Middleton's *The Revenger's Tragedy*, Hirschfeld shows how the plays embody the "special reciprocity, even entanglement, between revenge and repentance" (65). The protagonist in revenge tragedy, she argues, reflects Protestantism's "sanctioning of penitential self-punishment alongside its refusal of penitential satisfaction" in two important ways (66): first, his "retribution against others incites him to turn his vengeful energies on himself" (71); and second, the violence he directs against others and himself is never enough, so that his desire for satisfactory retribution is always a desire for more of it. For Kyd's Hieronimo and Shakespeare's Hamlet, the pursuit of vengeance is also a confrontation with original sin and hence with their own implication in the crimes they would redress; for Middleton's Vindice, the unavailability of "confessional exculpation" transforms his own "self-disclosures" into compulsive and sadistic "delight" (89–91). In all three cases, the "conceptual vacuum" opened by Reformed theologies of repentance turns the "cherished mechanisms" of Catholic penitence into "forms of aggression" (93).

Chapters 4 and 5 explore the causal impact of Reformed repentance on the social practices of economic exchange and marriage. In these chapters, Hirschfeld is concerned to demonstrate that Reformed repentance is not just "structurally homologous" with these other aspects of social life but "organiz[es] or interven[es]" in them directly (11). (Hirschfeld suggests that the earlier chapter on revenge tragedy does the same work, though it is not clear that revenge constitutes a social practice in the same way that trade and matrimony do.) Chapter 4 argues that William Wager's *Enough is as Good as a Feast* and Shakespeare's *The Merchant of Venice* exploit the "semantic tension" between an "economic moralism that prescribed 'enough' as a social and affective goal, and a Christian penitential structure built around the rejection of making or feeling *satis*" (99). Wager's morality play stages the "conceptual disjunction" between the economic morality whereby "enough" is always better than "more," and the penitential economy whereby "enough was...*never* enough" (105, 104; emphasis in original). Shakespeare's *Merchant* analyzes the same disjunction from the standpoint of debt rather than gain. The Jew Shylock offers the Christian Antonio a "principle of calculation and proportionate adequation" that is missing from the Christian community itself, providing Antonio with "the possibility of a

penance [he] sees no other way of making" (111, 112). Portia's "dismantling" of this penance, moreover, is undertaken in bad faith; the "unconditional mercy" she purportedly celebrates is not extended to Shylock himself, whose punishment at the hands of the Christians evinces "the lingering attraction to and reliance on the economies of satisfaction in the face of their disavowal" (118).

Chapter 5 looks to Shakespeare's *Othello* and Beaumont and Fletcher's *Love's Pilgrimage* in arguing that matrimony and "marital satisfaction" were similarly affected by "the period's reconfiguration of penitential 'enough'" (120). *Othello*, Hirschfeld claims, is informed by the "pervasive" understanding of "marriage as an *object* of penitence" in early modern England (125; emphasis in original). Notwithstanding the many paeans to marriage in English Protestant writing, the very valorization of marriage as redeeming "a post-lapsarian condition of sin and misery" makes it vulnerable to the "various crises of 'making enough'" occasioned by the "theological problem of penitential satisfaction" (128). The unhappy marriage, then, "becomes its own kind of sorrowful—but inefficacious—suffering" (128). On this reading of the play, Othello's erotic anxiety is not, as Stephen Greenblatt has argued, a commentary on Catholic scruples so much as a sexualized version of the Reformed theology of satisfaction: "Othello... recognize[s] that 'enough' is unavailable for him to make or do for his partner or himself" (135). Fearing that he cannot satisfy the young Desdemona, Othello is unable to satisfy his own desire to repent of their marriage. The domestic tragedy of *Othello* thus "returns us...to the terrible irony embedded in the structure of revenge," as Othello's punishment of the (unsatisfied) Desdemona becomes also his (unsatisfying) self-punishment (136).

By contrast, the happy ending of Beaumont and Fletcher's *Love's Pilgrimage*, which revises Cervantes' novella in *Novelas Ejemplares* (1613), relies upon the achievement of satisfaction "in both [the] conjugal and penitential realms" (144). The Spanish Catholic setting of the play "licenses the playwrights to design a drama in which marriage and repentance are still sacraments and to reinforce satisfaction as a marital as well as penitential possibility" (145–46). Beaumont and Fletcher's "particular enthusiasm" for "penitential and marital *satis*," Hirschfeld concludes, "derives from a basic acknowledgment that it has been, for their world, fundamentally disabled" by the "Protestant theology of repentance" (146).

In the Postscript, Hirschfeld makes explicit the "performative connections between the stage and repentance," and suggests that the "mundane spectator" of the professional theater sought from the "pleasures of a play" something very like the "satisfaction" which had been "disallowed by Protestant theology" (148, 152). She concludes: "the stage reminds us that it has preserved for its audience what was displaced, over the course of the Reformation, from the relation between God and sinner" (152).

*The End of Satisfaction* makes a real contribution to our sense of how changing theologies of penitence were registered by the culture—and especially the drama—of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England. The book nicely complements Sara Beckwith's *Shakespeare and the Grammar of Forgiveness*, which stressed rather the recuperation of satisfaction by Shakespearean tragicomedies instead of the unsettling effects of its dismantling, and Hirschfeld's theological analysis of the genre of revenge tragedy will benefit and (I hope) influence future work on these plays. Yet the line of inquiry opened up by *The End of Satisfaction* will require some amount of modification if it is to prove finally persuasive. Let me suggest why this is so.

Hirschfeld does not emphasize enough that in Catholic theology the satisfaction undertaken by the penitent did not effect the remission of the sin itself, but rather its temporal punishment. She mentions this crucial distinction once, but misdates its origin to the "High Middle Ages" when it can already be found in Gregory the Great (21). I suspect this is due in part to her conflating the Council of Trent's declarations on penitential satisfaction with the Pelagianism of the *via moderna*. Glossing Gabriel Biel's dictum "*Facere quod in se est*," to do what is in oneself," Hirschfeld writes that "this efficient phrase crystallizes the prevailing logic of penitential satisfaction against which the Reformers...would take their stand" (25). But there are two problems with this claim. The first is that Biel's dictum encodes his understanding of the entire process of justification rather than the theology of penitential satisfaction itself, which dealt with the narrower question of the temporal remittance of forgiven sins. As noted above, penitential satisfaction did not "satisfy" God for the guilt (*culpa*) of sin itself—all parties agreed that only Christ did that—but for the temporal punishment (*poena*) that remained. The second problem is that Gabriel Biel's theology of justification is not "echoed in Counter-Reformation defenses of the sacrament [of penance]"—both because these are separate, albeit related, issues, and because Trent codified a strongly Augustinian theology of justification that was antithetical to Biel's (25). When Cajetan writes that "in so far as [our works] proceed from the divine grace that precedes, accompanies, and completes them, [they] are meritorious and consequently of satisfactory value," he intends to reject—not to echo—the basic premise of the *via moderna*, and is in any case speaking of the temporal punishment for sins, not their forgiveness (25).

Is this distinction between *culpa* and *poena* somehow operative in the complex temporality of revenge tragedy? Likewise, what of the vexed distinction between "contrition" and "attrition" in Scholastic thought? The sorrow of "contrition" is motivated by one's love for God, and was itself taken by Peter Lombard as a sign that one's sins (and their punishments) had *already* been forgiven, whereas the sorrow of "attrition" is motivated by one's fear of God, and

was thought to be devoid of actual grace. Hirschfeld notes the distinction, but she doesn't pursue its implications. If Catholic "contrition" is not all that different from Reformed "repentance," then can the confessional lens adopted by *The End of Satisfaction* offer a truly satisfying analysis of early modern English theater? Part of the book's achievement is that the questions it continually seems to elicit from the reader are as surprising as Hirschfeld's own argument is provocative.

WILLIAM JUNKER  
University of St. Thomas

**Tony Jason Stafford. *Shaw's Settings: Gardens and Libraries*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2013. Pp. xii + 169. \$74.95.**

**Matthew Yde. *Bernard Shaw and Totalitarianism: Longing for Utopia*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. Pp. x + 247. \$80.00.**

Two recent monographs indicate the robust ongoing critical conversation around Bernard Shaw's work. The authors are both astute and attentive readers of the plays, and both books admirably strive to forge new interpretive directions and shine light on areas that have vexed scholars and theater practitioners alike. Together, they rattle some sacred, garden-variety assumptions about Shaw.

Emily Dickinson conceptualized curiosity as "the Garden in the Brain," a formulation that might have delighted Shaw who, as Tony Jason Stafford details in *Shaw's Settings*, seems to have had gardens *on* the brain. Stafford's rich study proceeds from the assertion that, as unquestionably brilliant as Shaw's dialogue is, his copious paratextual material (verbose prefaces, literary stage direction) is far from irrelevant to the theatrical experience of the plays and essential not only to understanding their meaning but in revealing Shaw's visual artistry and dramaturgical prowess. In particular, Stafford traces the playwright's adept and varied deployment of two recurrent settings, the garden and the library, through nine major plays that span three decades, to demonstrate how meaningfully Shaw intertwines stage environment with the verbal pyrotechnics and discussion-based dramatic style for which he is so well known.

Stafford approaches the plays as both literary and performance texts and deftly illustrates how Shaw employs these two settings in his campaigns against (among other things) capitalism and romantic idealism, tracking their incarnations from *Widowers' Houses* to *Back to Methuselah*. As archetypes, gardens and libraries signify human advancement and achievement while at the same time being status symbols, indicating that level of British society that,