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I WANT TO BEGIN BY SUGGESTING that much of what we call cultural studies today situates itself squarely, if only implicitly, upon a fundamental repression that underlies most ethical and political discourse: a repression of the possibility of non-human subjectivity, a taking for granted that the subject is always already human. What this means, to put a finer point on it, is that debates in the humanities and social sciences between critics of racism, sexism, and classism often remain locked within an unexamined framework of *speciesism*—a framework that involves, like its cognates, systematic discrimination against an other solely on the basis of its species.[1] But in light of developments in cognitive science, ethology, and other fields over the past twenty years, it seems clear that there is no longer any good reason, in discussing questions of ethics, politics, and even culture, to assume that the problematic of subjectivity is coterminous with the species distinction between *homo sapiens* and everything else. The fact that my assertion might seem rather rash or even quaintly lunatic fringe to readers of a journal such as this only points out what we might call the "linguacentrism" of most critics in the humanities who remain humanists to the core even as they engage in work under the "cultural studies" umbrella that claims an epistemological break with humanism itself. This may seem like a harsh verdict until we remember that nearly every other wing of social knowledge production has been addressing this question head-on for some time now; even *Time*, *Newsweek*, and *U.S. News and*

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World Report have gotten the point, running multiple cover stories over the past several years on new developments in cognitive ethology which would seem to demonstrate rather conclusively that the humanist habit of making even the *possibility* of subjectivity coterminous with the species barrier is deeply problematic, if not already clearly untenable.[2] And these new developments are practically unavoidable on public and cable television, which have made standard fare out of study after study which convincingly demonstrates that the traditionally distinctive marks of the human (first it was having a soul, then it was "reason," then it was tool use, then it was tool *making*, then it was language, then the production of linguistic *novelty*, and so on) have been found flourishing beyond the species barrier.[3]

These developments, and their implications for the critical practice of people who work with texts, have been registered largely, if at all, in the "Literature and Science" wing of cultural studies.[4] As Donna Haraway puts it in perhaps the central theoretical statement of this recently established field, her famous "Cyborg Manifesto,"

> By the late twentieth century in United States scientific culture, the boundary between human and animal is thoroughly breached. The last beachheads of uniqueness have been polluted, if not turned into amusement parks—language, tool use, social behavior, mental events. Nothing really convincingly settles the separation of human and animal. . . . Movements for animal rights are not irrational denials of human uniqueness; they are clear-sighted recognition of connection across the discredited breach of nature and culture.[5]

My point in what follows is not to harrangue you about animal rights, but rather to remind you of the pervasiveness of the discourse and, more forcefully, the *institution* of speciesism—an institution that is fundamental, as George Bataille, Jacques Derrida and others have reminded us, to Western subjectivity and sociality as such, and relies upon the tacit agreement that the transcendence of that fantasy figure called the "human" requires the sacrifice of the "animal" and the animalistic, which in turn makes possible a symbolic economy in which we can engage in a "non-criminal putting to death" (as Derrida puts it) of other *humans* as well by marking *them* as animal.[6] To talk about the "discourse" of species, then, is to focus our attention, as Bataille and Der-

rida do, upon a systematic logic that operates in the same way as its cognates, racism and sexism. But to broach the question of the *institution* of speciesism, as Derrida has done with particular force in his more recent work ("Eating Well," for example), is to insist that we pay attention to the asymmetrical material effects of these discourses upon particular groups; just as the discourse of sexism affects women disproportionately (even though it may theoretically be applied to any social other of whatever gender), so the violent effects of the discourse of speciesism fall overwhelmingly, in institutional terms, on non-human others.

The effectiveness of the discourse of species when applied to social others of whatever sort relies, then, upon a prior taking for granted of the institution of speciesism—that is, of the ethical acceptability of the systmatic killing of non-human others solely by virtue of their species. And because the discourse of speciesism, once anchored in this material, institutional base, can be used to mark *any* social other, we need to understand that the urgency of the twin ethical and philosophical priorities of confronting the institution of speciesism and theorizing non-human subjectivity *does not depend upon whether or not you like animals.* The discourse and institution of speciesism involves stakes for us all, human and non-human alike, and they are by no means limited to their overwhelmingly direct and disproportionate effects upon non-humans. Indeed, as Gayatri Spivak puts it,

> the great doctrines of identity of the ethical universal, in terms of which liberalism thought out its ethical programmes, played history false, because the identity was disengaged in terms of who was and who was not human. That's why all of these projects, the justification of slavery, as well as the justification of Christianization, seemed to be alright; because, after all, these people had not graduated into humanhood, as it were.[7]

It is understandable, of course, that traditionally marginalized peoples would be skeptical about calls by academic intellectuals to surrender the idea of humanist subjectivity, with all of its privileges, at just the historical moment when they are poised to "graduate" into it. But the larger point I wish to stress here is that as long as this humanist and speciesist *structure* of subjectivation remains intact, and as long as it is institutionally assumed that it is alright to systematically exploit and kill non-human animals simply because of their species, then the dis-

course of speciesism will always be available for use by some humans against other humans as well, to countenance violence against the social other of *whatever* species—or gender, or race, or class.[8]

That point has recently been made quite forcefully and graphically in ecological feminism, in texts like Carol Adams' flawed but important study, *The Sexual Politics of Meat*, which demonstrates that the species system makes possible not only the systematic killing of many billions of animals a year for food, product testing, and research, but also provides a ready-made symbolic economy which overdetermines the representation of women by transcoding the *edible* bodies of animals and the *sexualized* bodies of women within an overarching "logic of domination"—all of which is compressed in Derrida's latest revision of his famous one-word diagnosis of Western philosophy: "*carno*-phallogocentrism."[9]

We have available to us a number of ways into the discourse of species, none more well-known and powerful than Freud's in *Civilization and Its Discontents*. There, the origin of the human is located in an act of "organic repression" whereby the human begins to walk upright and rises above life on the ground among the blood and feces, which formerly exercised a sexually exciting effect but now, with "the diminution of the olfactory stimuli," seem disgusting, leading in turn to what Freud calls a "cultural trend toward cleanliness" and creating the "sexual repression" which leads to "the founding of the family and so to the threshold of human civilization"—all of which is accompanied by a shift of privilege in the sensorium from smell to sight, the nose to the eye, whose relative separation from the physical environment thus paves the way for the ascendency of sight as the sense associated with aesthetic, contemplative distance and sensibility.[10] The fundamental aporia in Freud's codification of the discourse of species, then, is that the human being who only becomes human through an act of "organic repression" has to *already* know, before it is human, that the organic needs to be repressed, and so the Freudian "human" is caught in a chain of infinite supplementarity, as Derrida would put it, which can never come to rest at an origin that would constitute a break with animality. What this means, of course, is that the figure of the human in Freud, despite itself, is riven and constituted by difference. Or, to put it in

post-Darwinian rather than post-Freudian terms, the subject of humanism is constituted by a temporal and evolutionary stratification or asynchronicity in which supposedly "atavistic" or "primitive" determinations inherited from our evolutionary past—our boundedness to circadian rhythms, say, or the various physiological chinks and frailties that foreground the body as profoundly other and physically determined by a fundamentally a-human universe of interactions—coexist uneasily in a second-order relation of relations, which the phantasmatic "human" surfs or manages with varying degrees of success.

Freud's valorization of the human who sees at the expense of the animal who smells is sustained (even if transvalued) in the rendering of the visual that runs from Sartre's discourse on the Look in *Being and Nothingness* through Foucault's anatomy of panopticism in *Discipline and Punish*. This critical genealogy tells us that the figure of vision is indeed ineluctably tied to the specifically human, with the Look in Sartre serving to objectify the subject and foreclose his freedom, and the panoptical gaze in Foucault signalling power's omnipresence. By these lights, it is indeed tempting to abandon the figure of vision altogether. But I am sympathetic with attempts, such as Haraway's, to reorient it toward what she calls "situated knowledges," and away from its traditional phallic associations with "a leap out of the marked body and into a conquering gaze from nowhere," a gaze with "the power to see and not be seen, to represent while escaping representation."[11] Here again, confronting the problem of non-human others would seem to be especially instructive. For if the "carno-phallogocentric" Look purchases the transcendence of the human only at the expense of repressing the other senses—and more broadly the material and the bodily as such with which they are traditionally associated—then one way to recast the figure of vision (and therefore the human) is to resitutate it as only one sense among many in a more general—and not exclusively human—bodily sensorium.

As Thomas Nagel long ago realized in framing his famous essay "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?," these phenomenological differences make the problem of the animal other a privileged site for exploring the philosophical challenges of difference and otherness more generally.[12] In her wonderful (if sometimes infuriating) book *Adam's Task*, Vicki Hearne—a master horse and dog trainer as well as poet and student of philosophy—provides two useful examples of such difference: the dog's

sense of smell and the horse's sense of touch. As Hearne points out, following Stanley Cavell's early work, "What skepticism largely broods about is whether or not we can believe our eyes. The other senses are mostly ancillary; we do not know how we might go about either doubting or believing our noses." But, "for dogs, scenting is believing. Dogs' noses are to ours as a map of the surface of our brains is to a map of the surface of an egg."[13] And so, as you sit in your garden with your dog, he sees what you see, but "what he *believes* are the scents of the garden behind us," the cat moving slowly through it, the bird hopping about and hunting for insects, and so on. "We can show *that* Fido is alert to the kitty, but not *how*, for our picture-making modes of thought interfere too easily with falsifyingly literal representations of the cat and the garden and their modes of being hidden from or revealed to us" (80–81).

Similarly, the kinsesthetic sensibility of horses is so exquisite that, when handled by an inexperienced rider, "Every muscle twitch of the rider will be like a loud symphony to the horse, but it will be a newfangled sort of symphony, one that calls into question the whole idea of symphonies, and the horse will not only not know what it means, s/he will be unable to know whether it has any meaning or not" (108). And thus, both horse and rider find themselves squarely within the frame of what Cavell calls the "skeptical terror of the independent existence of other minds" (qtd. Hearne 264), in which both parties, as Hearne puts it, "know for sure about the other . . . that each is a creature with an independent existence, an independent consciousness and thus the ability to think and take action in a way that might not be welcome (meaningful or creature-enhancing) to the other" (108–9). More importantly—and this is crucial for properly decentering the human and the visual from its privileged place as transcendental signifier to which all other phenomenological differences are referred for their meaning—"The asymmetry in their situations is that the horse cannot escape knowledge of a certain sort of the rider, albeit a knowledge that mostly makes no sense, and the rider cannot escape knowing that the horse knows the rider in ways the rider cannot fathom" (109). As Hearne puts it, if the horse could speak, she might say, "I still don't know people, but I can't help but fathom them" (109).

Now as Cavell's early work suggests, the traditional subject of humanism—all the while waxing about free and open communication, about how otherness needs to be respected, and so on—finds this pros-

pect of the animal other knowing us in ways *we* cannot know *simply unnerving*. And in response to that "skeptical terror," the humanist subject has mobilized a whole array of prophylactics: the reinscription of the animal other within the institution and symbolic economy of the pet, which, as Deleuze and Guattari have argued, is essentially Oedipal and narcissistic;[14] the treatment of animals (familiar since Descartes) as mere unfeeling brutes, as stimulus-response mechanisms or, more recently, genetically programmed routines and subroutines; or the demonization of the animal as the mysterious "Outsider," the figure who, as Cavell puts it, "allegorizes the escape from human nature" by "obeying his nature as he always does, must"—that is, as the one who can't really be a subject at all. Musing on the cultural folklore of the dog who can "smell" fear and danger, Cavell observes, "it is important that we do not regard the dog as honest; merely as without decision in the matter" (qtd. Hearne 215).

All of which Cavell sums up in a truly remarkable letter to Hearne,

> There is something specific about our unwillingness to let our knowledge come to an end with respect to horses, with respect to what they know of us. . . . The unwillingness . . . is to make room for their capacity to feel our presence incomparably beyond our ability to feel theirs. . . .
>
> The horse, as it stands, is a rebuke to our unreadiness to be understood, our will to remain obscure. . . . And the more beautiful the horse's stance, the more painful the rebuke. Theirs is our best picture of a readiness to understand. Our stand, our stance, is of denial. . . . We feel our refusals are unrevealed because we keep, we think, our fences invisible. But the horse takes cognizance of them, who does not care about invisibility. (qtd. Hearne 115)

Are *we* ready, Cavell asks us in so many words, to "under-stand" the non-human other—to "under-know" him, as it were—by surrendering the dream of mastery figured as vision? Can *we* handle the skeptical terror of "letting our knowledge come to an end"? In posing these questions, Cavell helps to disclose how *our* stance toward the non-human other is an index for how we regard otherness and difference generally, and in some ways it is the most reliable index, the "hardest case" of our readiness to be vulnerable to other knowledges in our very embodiment

of our own, an embodiment that arrives at the site of the other before we do, like our scent which reaches the dog's nose before we round the corner, telling a story we can never wholly script to a present we have not yet reached.

Perhaps the most obvious question raised by the foregoing is whether or not we are thereby committed to an endorsement of what is popularly known as "animal rights." The answer for the moment, I believe, is yes and no. As I have already suggested in my quotation of Haraway above, the animal rights movement is in one sense simply a call to retool critical and ethical thought in light of what we already know about the mental, emotional, and social lives of many non-human animals. But in the case of animal rights *philosophy*, that call has mostly outpaced the philosophical apparatus used to articulate it.

The core contention of the animal rights argument as presented by its two leading philosophers, Peter Singer and Tom Regan, is this: "Whatever the test we propose as a means of separating human from non-human animals"—whether it is language use, or demonstrated reasoning ability, tool use, or a more nuanced set of phenomenological and social dynamics—"it is plain that if all non-human animals are going to fail it, some humans will fail as well."[15] It is clear, for example, that a fully developed gorilla or chimpanzee is more fully a "person" (as we usually use the term) than a six-month-old human infant, yet the latter is treated with ethical considerations, enforced by law, which take into account its interests and rights, while the former may be subjected to all sorts of abusive and exploitive treatment (including killing), solely because of his or her species.

The animal rights position essentially argues that a being's interests—in avoiding pain and distress, in showing systematic preferences and dislikes for one type of treatment or environment over another—should be assessed clearheadedly and given equal weight *regardless of species*. As Regan puts it, beings of whatever species who meet the criteria of "subjects of a life" possess "an individual welfare that has importance to us whatever our usefulness to others. We want and prefer things, believe and feel things, recall and expect things. And all these dimensions of our life, including our pleasure and pain, our enjoyment and suffering, our satisfaction and frustration, our continued existence

and untimely death—all make a difference to the quality of our life as lived."[16] These fundamental *interests*, in turn, form the philosophical and ethical foundation for the legal *rights* which should protect them. This does not mean, as opponents of animal rights often like to caricature the position, that non-human animals have the *same* rights as humans. As Singer points out, if I took all the cows in Albany county and confined them within the borders of the county for a week and provided them food, water and shelter, I probably would not—given what we know about cows and their behavior (that is, about their interests) be violating their rights. If I did the same to all the human inhabitants of the same county, I probably would be violating their rights, based on what we know about what humans need for their physical and psychological wellbeing ("Prologue" 6).[17]

The animal rights argument, then, does *not* say that human and non-human animals should have the *same* rights; nor does it say, for that matter (as Mary Midgley perceptively notes), that all *non-human* animals should necessarily have the same rights. After all, an adult chimpanzee probably has more in common with us (and vice versa) than with a tufted titmouse, and each of us will have specific behavioral needs and interests that are probably not that relevant to the others.[18] What the rights position *does* say, however, is that *all* beings with demonstrable interests (Singer) or "inherent value" (Regan) have *basic* interests and *basic* rights that should be respected regardless of species. At which point, the subject of debate usually becomes where to draw the line; cats and elephants and dolphins would clearly seem to have standing, but do fish? How you answer that question depends, of course, on your criteria; is the capacity to suffer enough, or do we need more to grant rights? In any case, as one animal rights philosopher has pointed out, "in legal or moral discourse we are virtually never able to draw clear lines," but that does not mean "that drawing a line anywhere, arbitrarily, is as good as drawing one anywhere else."[19]

Defenders of speciesism will typically respond at this juncture by pointing to the human infant's *potential* to grow into the "full" form of human subjectivity, one based upon the possession of variously construed faculties which will, in time, separate it *not only in degree but in kind* from non-human others. The problem with this retort, however, is that the same cannot be said, as Singer points out, of many *human* beings—the severely handicapped, say, or the encephalitic child. Yet these

latter nevertheless retain, as most of us would insist they should, the very basic rights denied to non-human animals, despite the often quite impressive and in some cases superior demonstrated capacities of the "lower" species.[20]

While I find the animal rights response to the "potential" argument compelling—not least of all because it ferrets out the elitism which such a position harbors (how "intelligent" is intelligent enough to be counted a subject with rights?)—it nevertheless points to some reservations we should have about the adequacy of the philosophical framework relied upon by animal rights philosophy for making good on the need to rethink the complexities of our stance toward non-human others. The primary symptom of the inadequacy of the current rights framework is, as several commentators have noted, its constant recourse to the "lowest common denominator"—usually in the form of human infants or retarded people—as a means to secure, through parallelism, ethical consideration for non-humans.[21] As Deborah Slicer has pointed out, the rights model (in either the Singer or Regan version) partakes of an essentialism endemic to the "justice tradition" in moral philosophy, insofar as it proposes a "single capacity" (e.g., "interests," however construed) which entitles the holder to moral consideration, thereby excluding from ethical relevance everything *other* than the specific criterion for the "interests" in question: a being's specific history and location, say, or its gender, ecological role, and so on.

More damagingly, as Slicer puts it, rights theories "reduce individuals to that atomistic bundle of interests that the justice tradition recognizes as the basis for moral considerableness. In effect, animals are represented as beings with the *kind of capacity* that human beings most fully possess and deem valuable for living a full *human* life."[22] The essentialism of the rights model, in this view, leads it to accord moral consideration to the adult gorilla not because of the animal's specific attributes and differences, but because it is—as reasoner, tool user, or pain sufferer—a diminished version of ourselves, much like the human infant or retarded person often aligned with it in animal rights argumentation. Steven Zak sums up the problem particularly well:

> Lives don't have to be qualitatively the same to be worthy of equal respect. One's perception that another life has value comes as much from an appreciation of its uniqueness as from the recognition that it has characteristics that are shared by

> one's own life. (Who would compare the life of a whale to that of a marginal human being?) . . . The orangutan cannot be redescribed as the octopus minus, or plus, this or that mental characteristic; conceptually, nothing could be added to or taken from the octopus that would make it the equivalent of the oriole. Likewise, animals are not simply rudimentary human beings, God's false steps, before He finally got it right with us. (70)

What such reservations suggest, then, is that the animal rights framework, by *extending* and *expanding* the categories of *human* subjectivity to cover all forms of phenomenological and ethical difference, ironically effaces rather than recognizes the otherness of the non-human subject which it sought to respect in the first place.

What this means—to shift theoretical registers once more—is that the animal rights position as currently conceived by Singer and Regan remains tied to the theoretical *topos* of the Mirror, the Look, and as such orients the question of subjectivity away from embodiment, materiality, and multiplicity and toward, once again, Identity and the figure of the Human.[23] What is needed, then, is a framework for thinking about the problem of subjectivity and species difference in terms of embodiment and *multiplicity* rather than abstract interests and identity. That case is made powerfully—and quite self-consciously *in extremis*—in the experimental philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus*.[24] Deleuze and Guattari would see the rights view as firmly circumscribing animal difference within an Oedipal scenario, one in which all forms of subjectivity must sooner or later be referred for their validation and legitimacy, not so much to the Father (to invoke the crucial Lacanian distinction which Deleuze and Guattari will eventually challenge themselves) as to the "name of the father." In the fascinating sections on animality in *A Thousand Plateaus*, what Deleuze and Guattari call "becoming-animal" "always involves a pack, a band, a population, a peopling, in short, a multiplicity" (239). "We must distinguish between three kinds of animals," they continue:

> First, individuated animals, family pets, sentimental, Oedipal animals each with its own petty history, "my" cat, "my" dog. These animals invite us to regress, draw us into a narcissistic contemplation, and they are the only kind of animal psychoanalysis understands, the better to discover a daddy, a

> mommy, a little brother behind them. . . . And then there is a second kind: animals with characteristics or attributes; genus, classification, or State animals; animals as they are treated in the great divine myths. . . . Finally, there are more demonic animals, pack or affect animals that form a multiplicity, a becoming, a population. . . . (240–41)

What Deleuze and Guattari's distinctions aim to underscore is that the animal, properly understood, is a privileged figure for the problem of difference-in-subjectivity generally, because it foregrounds how the subject is always already a multiplicity. Or as Haraway puts it in a complimentary passage, "One cannot 'be' either a cell or molecule—or a woman, colonized person, labourer, and so on. . . . We are not immediately present to ourselves" (*Simians* 192). "The topography of subjectivity," she writes, "is multi-dimensional; so, therefore is vision. The knowing self is partial in all its guises, never finished, whole, simply there and original" (193). The subject, then—for Haraway as for Deleuze and Guattari—is not a being, not the Freudian "self-satiated eye of the master subject" (192), but a "becoming," not a human *being*, we might say, but rather a human *animal*.[25]

The mistake in assuming that an animal's ethical standing is to be equated with its singularity, its inhabitation of the space of Identity, is diagnosed with particular energy in Deleuze and Guattari's treatment of Freud's interpretation of the famous case of the Wolf-Man. "Comparing a sock to a vagina is OK, it's done all the time," Deleuze and Guattari tell us, "but you'd have to be insane to compare a pure aggregate of stitches to a field of vaginas; that's what Freud says." "This represents an important clinical discovery," they continue,

> a whole difference in style between neurosis and psychosis. For example, Salvador Dali, in attempting to reproduce his delusions, may go on at length about THE rhinoceros horn; he has not for all of that left neurotic discourse behind. But when he starts comparing goosebumps to a field of tiny rhinoceros horns, we get the feeling that the atmosphere has changed and that we are now in the presence of madness. Is it still a question of a comparison at all? It is, rather, a pure multiplicity that changes elements, or *becomes*. On the micrological level, the little bumps "become" horns, and the horns, little penises.

> No sooner does Freud discover the greatest art of the unconscious, this art of molecular multiplicities, than we find him tirelessly at work bringing back molar unities, reverting to his familiar themes of *the* father, *the* penis, *the* vagina, Castration with a capital C. (27)

It is *Freud*, then (and for Deleuze and Guattari psychoanalysis as such), who is engaged in repression—in this case, repression of the "important clinical discovery" that the unconscious is first and foremost a power of multiplicity and becoming—a power whose truth the bourgeois, patriarchal Freud must disavow by misreading the Wolf-Man's psychosis as mere neurosis. "The reductive procedure of the 1915 article is quite interesting," they continue, for Freud holds that "the comparisons and identifications of the neurotic are guided by representations of things, whereas all the psychotic has left are representations of words. . . . Thus, when there is no unity in the thing, there is at least unity and identity in the word" (27–28). But Freud's patient, who inhabits the psychotic universe of multiplicity, knows better. He knows, as Deleuze and Guattari put it, that

> The only thing Freud understood was what a dog is, and a dog's tail. It wasn't enough. It wouldn't be enough. . . . [The Wolf-Man] knew that he was in the process of acquiring a veritable proper name, the Wolf-Man, a name more properly his than his own, since it attained the highest degree of singularity in the instantaneous apprehension of a generic multiplicity: wolves. He knew that this new and true proper name would be disfigured and misspelled, retranscribed as a patronymic. (26–27)

As we are about to see, the retranscription of animal multiplicity by the patronymic turns out to be an especially effective strategy for tethering the category of subjectivity to the neocolonial project, even when—*especially* when—the transcriber is a non-human animal.

The relation of language, identity, and species is at center stage in Michael Crichton's novel *Congo*, orignally published in 1980 and re-issued nearly a decade and a half later in conjunction with the box-office

flop of the same name. Crichton's novel is a beguiling jumble of factoids assembled within the frame of "an old-fashioned thriller-diller" (as one of the jacket blurbs puts it), and it is made all the more inscrutable by its affective flatness, its characteristic postmodern depthlessness (to borrow Fredric Jameson's characterization) which gives us a novel made up of little *other* than plot and information, a novel with precious little time for the psychological depth of character usually associated with the genre in its earlier forms.[26] But I am less interested in Crichton's text on formal and aesthetic grounds than with its exemplification of the discourse of species within postmodern culture and, within that, the imperatives of neocolonialism. Crichton's novel would seem to provide a resolutely "progressive" engagement—one squarely within the mainstream of American mass culture—with the ethical challenge of the problem of non-human subjectivity. Despite its heavy debt to the paradigm established for modernism by Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* (and later for American mass culture by Francis Ford Coppola's *Apocalypse Now*) *Congo*, in its staging of non-human subjectivity, immediately promises something different.

That promise is carried largely if not solely by the central character of the novel, a mountain gorilla named Amy, who has been raised in a language lab at the University of California at Berkeley by one Dr. Peter Elliot. Amy has prodigious linguistic abilities beyond even those of real-world apes like Koko and Washo; she has a 620-item Ameslan sign vocabulary and even (like the real-life bonobo, Kanzi, at Georgia State University) understands some spoken English. As the plot unfolds, Amy—who has been having dreams and making fingerpaintings of what is later revealed to be the Lost City of Zinj (which she remembers from her infancy)—accompanies Elliot and an expedition from Earth Resources Technology Services (ERTS), which has been funding Elliot's research, to Zaire to search for rare, superconductive "blue" diamonds of particular usefulness for future, post–silicon-chip information technologies. Led by Dr. Karen Ross, a ruthlessly competitive and analytical twenty-three-year-old mathematical whiz who thus far has merely supervised field parties by satellite link from home base in Houston, the expedition must succeed where a previous one failed. For as the book opens, we discover that the first ERTS party sent to look for the diamonds has been violently murdered, their skulls mysteriously crushed with a force that surpasses the abilities of even the strongest human.

And so Ross's expedition—skirting cannibals and political unrest, the machinations of a competing expedition from a European-Japanese consortium, and led by an unscrupulous but essentially honorable former great white hunter and mercenary named Munro—makes its way into the deepest rain forest jungle of the Congo, to discover that the mythical "Lost City of Zinj" does indeed exist, and that an unimaginably rich load of blue diamonds is indeed deposited there, at the foot of the volcanic Mt. Mukenko. What they *also* discover, however, is that the entire area is patrolled by a previously unknown species of gray gorilla which, as Elliot observes, has "been single-mindedly bred to be the primate equivalent of Doberman pinschers—guard animals, attack animals, trained for cunning and viciousness" (252).[27] It is these creatures who have guarded the blue diamond mines at Zinj for 500 years, handing down their own culture and behavior—most importantly, "a language system far more sophisticated than the pure sign language of laboratory apes in the twentieth century" (258), one which combines a "wheezing" type of vocalization with a gestural repertoire "rather like Thai dancers" (258). The gray gorillas also have the ability to make and use stone tools—specifically, the crescent-shaped stone paddles that they use as skull-crushing weapons against all intruders. It is these creatures, of course, who are responsible for the gruesome fate of the first ERTS expedition. And it is these creatures who threaten to wipe out the second ERTS expedition until fellow gorilla Amy translates enough of their vocabulary to enable the expedition to broadcast into the jungle a set of simple messages recorded by Amy—"GO AWAY, NO COME, BAD HERE"—that makes the gorillas halt their final, highly coordinated assault just in the nick of time (276–81). As the novel ends, the threat of the gray gorillas is removed once and for all as Mount Mukenko suffers a massive eruption and the ERTS expedition escapes a final attack—this time by the cannibalistic Kigani tribesmen—through the *deus ex machina* of a hot air balloon left behind at the planecrash site of the ill-fated Euro-Japanese consortium.

As the the heavily-freighted literary and cultural inheritance of the novel's title more than suggests, it is nearly impossible *not* to read Crichton's novel as a kind of racial allegory which uses the discourse of species to recode deeply held fantasies of racial identity alive and well at the dawn of the Reagan era, when the novel was published. From this view, the novel may be seen as firmly circumscribed within what

Toni Morrison characterizes as a very familiar discourse of "Africanism, deployed as rawness and savagery" that is crucial to the white American literary imagination by serving for it "duties of exorcism and reification and mirroring."[28] Read in this way, the novel provides a cautionary tale to white, technocratic, upwardly mobile America in the early '80s about the dangers of believing that "blackness" can be domesticated and made productive. In this light, the moral of the gray gorillas and their rebellion against their masters would be that even if you "whiten" them up a little from black to gray with language and learning, they will, in the end, only use it to rebel against you. Like their twins the cannibalistic Kigani, they will kill you the first chance they get, so better to leave them in deepest, darkest Africa. In other words, vintage early '80s *laissez-faire*. And the eruption of Mt. Mukenko at the end of the novel would seem an emphatic piece of punctuation for the point: no matter how good your technology and intentions, better to understand that blackness is an-other country, which is why even Amy can't be finally domesticated. In the end, she too must return to the jungle whence she came.[29]

It is no doubt useful—and in a much longer treatment, imperative—to read Crichton's novel as an allegory of racial fantasy in the United States of the early '80s. But I want to focus here instead on how the discourse of species serves to organize and enable the novel and its ideological project, not only because of the pressing need to rethink cultural criticism in light of speciesism and its current reassessment in the broader culture, but also because Crichton's novel puts squarely on the table, as few texts do, questions of non-human subjectivity, intelligence, language, and culture. And it makes a point of ballasting its systematic questioning of speciesist assumptions about all of these categories and attributes with references (both real and imagined) to the literature on ape language experiments (32–33), field studies of animal societies (178) and tool use (250), and human beings' more general "complacent egotism with regard to other animals" (253).[30] Elliot's musings in the following passage are in the dominant key of the novel's handling of the problem of non-human subjectivity:

> Over the years, he had come to feel acutely the prejudices that human beings showed toward apes, considering chimpanzees to be cute children, orangs to be wise old men, and gorillas to be hulking, dangerous brutes. . . .

> Elliot had witnessed repeatedly the human prejudice against gorillas, and had come to recognize its effect on Amy. Amy could not help the fact that she was huge and black and heavy-browed and squash-faced. Behind the face people considered so repulsive was an intelligent and sensitive consciousness, sympathetic to the people around her. It pained her when people ran away, or screamed in fear, of made cruel remarks. (113)

Crichton's novel is absolutely chocked full of passages like this, and thus immediately confronts us with the problem of how to relate this apparent decentering of the human to the other star of the show in Crichton's universe: an immense technoscientific apparatus driven to dizzying accomplishments (so the drift of the novel goes) under the spur of free market global capitalism—all of which would seem to immediately *re*center the figure of the human via the (quite conventional) privileging of *homo sapiens*' tool-using, technological accomplishments.

The most direct way to begin to address this dilemma is to understand—as we will see below—that as the novel unfolds, each half of the constitutive dichotomy of the discourse of speciesism ("human/animal") undergoes a systematic bifurcation: between Amy and the gray gorillas on the "animal" side, and between the ERTS party and their primitive "others," the cannibalistic Kigani, on the side of the "human." The novel will then reconstitute these elements not along the lines of *actual* species, but rather in terms of a double articulation: first, according to the logic of the *discourse* of species, and second, according to the place of each character or group in terms of its serviceability to the imperatives of neocolonialism. As for the bifurcation within the category of animality itself, it is governed by terms very close to those deployed by Deleuze and Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus*. Amy, as the homophonic echoes in her name suggest (e.g., "a me," "hey, me," as if to remind us hypogrammatically, "hey, it's me I see when I look at her"), is thoroughly inscribed within the singular, individuated, and finally Oedipalized regime of subjectivity; she is clearly a diminished form of the human, a "narcissistic" reflection who has something very close to the status of a pet for Elliot. Like a good Freudian subject who evinces "the cultural trend toward cleanliness" that "originates in an urge to get rid of the excreta," Amy finds "bodily excretions suitable terms to express denigration and anger" (*Civilization and Its Discontents* 52), and more than once when she is angry signs "*Peter shitty*" (174).

She loves to be tickled, enjoys an occasional cigarette, and rejects jungle bananas because they are slightly sour (in fact, she prefers milk and cookies) (231). And when she wanders off from the expedition in the rain forest, she tells Elliot that she left because she was jealous of Karen Ross ("*Peter like woman no like Amy*" [229])—an Oedipal triangulation reinforced in a conversation between the guide Munro (who, "Instead of patting her on the head and treating her like a child, as most people did," "instinctively treated her like a female" [152]) and a group of pygmies, which Munro recounts to Elliot:

> They wanted to know if the gorilla was yours, and I said yes. They wanted to know if the gorilla was female, and I said yes. They wanted to know if you had relations with the gorilla: I said no. They said that was good, that you should not become too attached to the gorilla, because that would cause you pain.
>
> Why pain?
>
> They said when the gorilla grows up, she will either run away into the forest and break your heart or kill you. (166–67)

We can add to this Oedpalization Amy's reproduction of the speciesist "linguacentrism" I mentioned at the outset. She refers to normal forest gorillas as "*dumb*" because they "*no talk*" (230), and in this, she is like the languaging chimpanzee referred to earlier in the book, who calls non-languaging chimps "black things" and who, when asked to sort photographs of chimps and humans, "sorted them correctly except that both times he put his own picture in the stack with the people" (45). And, later in the story, Amy calls the gray gorillas "*dumb things*" (267) because they fall for her masquerade as Elliot's mother—a ploy that narrowly saves his life when he falls down a slope and finds himself surrounded by the strange and dangerous animals. Most telling, perhaps, in fixing Amy's status as a dimished form of the human, is that she dreams, but her dreams need no interpretation; they turn out to be iconically transparent representations of the jungle home she remembers from her childhood, not manifest symbolic transformations of a latent dream text legible only through interpretive work. Like us, Amy dreams; unlike us, her dreams are simple.[31]

The Freudian dimension of the novel's species discourse is symbolically mapped quite well in two key moments early on. As the novel opens, we witness the character Kruger, a member of the ill-fated first

ERTS expedition, prepare for the daily video link to Houston, musing as he works about "the way Americans always put on a fresh shirt and combed their hair before stepping in front of the camera. Just like television reporters." Then suddenly,

> Something struck him lightly in the chest . . . a fleshy bit of red fruit rolled down his shirt to the muddy ground. The damned monkeys were throwing berries. He bent over to pick it up. And then he realized that it was not a piece of fruit at all. It was a human eyeball, crushed and slippery in his fingers, pinkish white with a shred of white optic nerve still attached at the back. (5)

He looks for his companion Misulu, who has suddenly vanished, "And then he heard the wheezing sound again" (5). Moments later, after discovering the body of Misulu with its crushed skull, Kruger himself, of course, is attacked by the gray gorillas.

This passage establishes from the outset the coordinates of the discourse of species that we have been discussing thus far. For what strikes Kruger in the chest is nothing other than the privileged sensory apparatus of the Freudian "human" as it is forcibly ejected from the skull of Misulu when his head is crushed by the stone paddles used by the gray gorillas in their attacks. And the Freudian eye is doubled here by the eye of the video camera, before which such subjects display definitive species-specific behaviors (the fresh shirt, the combed hair) as they preen in aesthetic contemplation of themselves. All of which is well-glossed by Olivier Richon's observation that, in the Freudian scheme, "The aesthetic runs counter to the instinctual. The aesthetic involves vision and therefore separation. The aesthetic, unlike the instinctual, erects a barrier between species; it puts emphasis upon the object of desire, rather than desire itself."[32] In this light, the fact that the gray gorillas use stone tools in their attacks is less a questioning of the species barrier than a confirmation of it as theorized by Bataille. For the tool, as Bataille writes, is not a reliable sign of the distinctly human, because the meaning of the tool remains subordinated to "utility," and thus remains tied to the world of the object, the world of "immediacy" and "continuity" in which the animal remains locked, and from which the human distances itself via its ability to create purely abstract, symbolic, and non-utilitarian meaning in art and ritual (36).

The Freudian scheme is only confirmed, as it were, by the savage attack of the gray gorillas, who (as befits their "animalistic" status) reduce humanism's privileged sensory organ to a mere glob of tissue easily mistaken for vegetable matter, all of which is punctuated, in effect, by Kruger's discovery. The difference between the Freudian symbolic eye and its rewriting—perhaps we should say *un*writing—by the gray gorillas is further reinforced by the gorillas most epithetical attribute: their "soft wheezing," which Kruger at first hearing mistakes for a big cat with "respiratory trouble." This in turn secures ever more firmly the association of the gray gorillas with the domain of what Slavoj Žižek, following Lacan (and beyond that, Kant) calls "the Thing," *das ding*, "'the flesh from which everything exudes,' the life substance in its mucous palpitation" all but literalized in Kruger's initial misperception of the sound as gurgling mucous. "The very notion of life," Žižek reminds us, "is alien to the symbolic order"—and, need we add, to its privileged expression in this novel, technoscience.[33]

My invocation of Žižek and Lacan should not be taken to imply, however, that an anatomy of the discourse of species in *Congo* need depend upon a psychoanalytic reading alone. Indeed, the stridently anti-psychoanalytic analysis of Deleuze and Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus* provides an equally powerful tool for laying bare the discursive work of species in the novel. For them, as we have already noted, the category of the animal is read less in terms of its status as the traumatic "Thing" and more in light of "becoming" and "multiplicity"—a reading that extends to "schizophrenic" extremes the well-known critique by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*) of the domination of nature by the Enlightenment subject (and even more pointedly, by Enlightenment science). As Adorno writes in a passage from *Aesthetic Theory* which condenses many of the key themes of the work with Horkheimer, "Nature, whose imago art aspires to be, does not yet exist; what is true in art is a non-existent. It comes to coincide with art within that Other, which a reason fixated on identities and bent on reducing it to sheer materiality calls Nature. *That other is, however, neither a unity nor a single concept, but rather the multiple.*"[34] It is that "multiple" which Deleuze and Guattari aim to unleash in their attempt to move not only beyond the Enlightenment which renders the other as an undifferentiated mass whose name is *das ding* or "Nature," but also beyond the dialectic (as Adorno himself strained to do in his "negative

dialectics"). As they put it in *A Thousand Plateaus*, the concept of multiplicity "was created precisely in order to escape the abstract opposition between the multiple and the one, to escape dialectics, to succeed in conceiving the multiple in the pure state, to cease treating it as a numerical fragment of a lost Unity or Totality or as the organic element of a Unity or Totality yet to come" (32).

It is the concept of the animal as "multiplicity" which is crucial to understanding that in Crichton's novel the gray gorillas represent not only a monstrous return of the repressed of Enlightenment subjectivity (or of "the Thing" as glossed by Lacan and Žižek), but also a more specifically Deleuzo/Guattarian disturbance of the symbolic field, one which cannot be *located* and *fixed* as merely the other or negative moment of an identity term (whether psychoanalytic or dialectical). The novel prepares us for such a reading early on, when the image of one of the gray gorillas responsible for the massacre of the first ERTS party cannot quite be made out on the Houston tape of the video feed. At first we are told, "they could see the outline of the shadow now. It was a man" (13); then we get reservations: "It did not look to her like a limping man; something was wrong. She couldn't put her finger on what it was" (14). Finally, after repeated attempts at "data salvage" by complex computer image-enhancement processes, "the image 'popped,' coming up bright and clean. . . . Frozen on the screen was the face of a male gorilla" (20). Here, we witness the power of those prosthetic extensions of the humanist eye glossed by Haraway, those imaging technologies—like the satellite and computer networks which sustain the expedition and map the planet—associated with the "unregulated gluttony" of phallic vision, in which "all perspective gives way to infinitely mobile vision, which no longer seems just mythically about the god-trick of seeing everything from nowhere, but to have put the myth into ordinary practice" (189).

But no sooner does the singular face of the gorilla emerge from the computer image field than it threatens to vanish into the buzzing forest of information space:

> In the highly sophisticated data-processing world of ERTS, there was a constant danger that extracted information would begin to "float"—that the images would cut loose from reality, like a ship cut loose from its moorings. This was true particu-

> larly when the database was put through multiple manipulations—when you were rotating 10^6 pixels in computer-generated hyperspace. (23–24)

And even when ERTS finally "buys" the image as a picture of a gorilla, its meaning still cannot be fixed—not even when primatologist Elliot comes on board:

> Elliot was not so sure. He reran the last three seconds of videotape a final time, staring at the gorilla head. The image was fleeting, leaving a ghostly trail, but something was wrong with it. He couldn't quite identify what. . . .
>
> Elliot was sure this creature was too light to be a mountain gorilla. Either way they were seeing a new race of animal, or *a new species*. (75)

This disquieting non-identity of the gray gorillas erupts later in the novel into full-blown, "demonic" Deleuzo-Guattarian multiplicity as the second ERTS expedition settles into camp near the Lost City. During the penultimate battle, "The gorillas attacked from all directions; six of them simultaneously hit the fence and were repelled. . . . Still more charged, throwing themselves on the flimsy perimeter mesh. . . . And then he saw gorillas in the trees overhanging the campsite. . . . Elliot turned and saw more gorillas tearing at the fence . . ." (241). And the seething multiplicity of the gray gorilla troop is registered even more forcefully as the expedition tries to plot a line of flight the next day. As they move into the forest to scout a route, "Munro was disturbed by what he saw; some trees held twenty or thirty nests, suggesting a large population of animals." Then, "He looked off and 'had the shock of my bloody life. Up the slope was another group, perhaps ten or twelve animals—and then I saw another group—and another—and another still. There must have been three hundred or more. The hillside was *crawling* with gray gorillas'" (258). Munro's vision makes the animals even more "demonic" in their insect-like multiplicity, their "population" (to use Deleuze and Guattari's characterization), when we are immediately told, in a vintage Crichton factoid, that "The largest gorilla group ever sighted in the wild had been thirty-one individuals, in Kabara in 1971" (258). The expedition tries to plot another route out of the forest, away from the City, but it's no use: "He checked his watch: they had been

gone ten minutes. And then he heard the sighing sound. It seemed to come from all directions. He saw the foliage moving before him, shifting as if blown by a wind. Only there was no wind. He heard the sighing grow louder" (261).

Here and elsewhere, what is clear is that the gray gorillas represent not the individualized and Oedipalized half of the bifurcated category of animality inhabited by Amy, but rather the demonic multiplicity of Deleuze and Guattari's "pack" animality. From this vantage, it is a Deleuzean irony perfectly fitting the symbolic significance of the gray gorillas that Elliot will in the end be denied his one obsession: "he found he was bored by the prospect of further exploration of Zinj; he had no interest in diamonds, or Amy's dreams; he wished only to return home with a skeleton of the new ape, which would astonish colleagues around the world" (247). But it is not to be; the multiplicity of the gray gorillas is not to be reduced to the patronymic of the scientific latin nomenclature—the singular specimen, the representative example—for the eruption of Mukenko buries the unknown species in ash, wiping them out entirely.

The central problem for the novel, then, is how this "multiplicity" of the animal other will be managed, a problem that would seem to be all the more acute within a discursive context that has already, at least on the face of it—through the character of Amy and through the various ethological factoids—called into question the traditional containment strategies of the Freudian and Enlightenment discourse of animality. Here again, the Frankfurt School can be of use, especially in revisionist accounts such as Michael Taussig's work on the problem of *mimesis*. For once the familiar Enlightenment discourse of speciesism is destabilized, as it conspicuously is in *Congo*, the problem we are immediately confronted with is what Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe calls the "primal status and undivided rule of mimetic confusion"[35]—a problem readily thematized throughout the novel by the cross-species presence of language and culture. Who or what is "like" and who is "same," who the original and who the copy, who the human and who the animal?

This confusion (which for Lacoue-Labarthe is, strictly speaking, a product of the inescapability of representation as such from Greek civilization to the present) is of particular moment in Taussig's reading of

Walter Benjamin's analysis of mimesis. "Nature creates similarities," Benjamin writes in "On the Mimetic Faculty":

> One need only think of mimicry. The highest capacity for producing similarities, however, is man's. His gift of seeing resemblances is nothing other than a rudiment of the powerful compulsion in former times to become and behave like something else. Perhaps there is none of his higher functions in which his mimetic faculty does not play a decisive role.[36]

What this means, as Taussig puts it, is that the mimetic faculty is "the nature that culture uses to create second nature" (xiii). "The ability to mime, and mime well, in other words, is the capacity to Other" (19), and for Taussig as for Lacoue-Labarthe, the mimetic is thus *always* a site for potential confusion of like and same.

But for Taussig, the mimetic also has a special historical status specific to the postcolonial era. Mimetic confusion—or what Taussig calls "mimetic excess"—is generated at an historically unprecedented level when, for example, Cuna women integrate "mousetraps, lunar modules, and baseball games into the traditional scheme of their appliqued shirtfronts—the famous *molas*, international sign of Cuna identity" (132). When this "mimesis of mimesis" begins to be globally generalized, we suddenly find ourselves, Taussig argues, in a dizzying but potentially liberating state of affairs:

> History would seem to now allow for an appreciation of mimesis as an end in itself that takes one into the magical power of the signifier to act as if it were indeed the real, to live in a different way with the understanding that artifice is indeed natural, no less than nature is historicized. Mimetic excess as a form of human capacity potentiated by post-coloniality provides a welcome opportunity to live subjunctively as neither subject nor object of history but as both, at one and the same time. (255)

What Taussig characterizes as the reversability of power relations made possible by mimetic excess is a central concern as well of Homi Bhabha's recent work on what he calls the "ambivalence" of "colonial mimicry," in which the colonizing power attempts to produce the colonized as a mimetic reproduction of itself, even as a specifically "native"

content must be maintained in that negotiation, if only to justify the necessity of the "civilizing" work of the colonizer. What we find in colonial mimicry, Bhabha writes, is "the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, *as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite*. Which is to say, that the discourse of mimicry is constructed around an *ambivalence*; in order to be effective, mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its difference."[37]

Colonial mimicry is "therefore stricken by an indeterminacy" (86), and, as in Taussig's reading, this indeterminacy cuts both ways. On the one hand, it "fixes the colonial subject as a 'partial' presence," "incomplete" and "virtual" (86), a "*metonymy of presence*" (89) whose form is: "almost the same, but not quite." On the other hand, the colonized, by engaging in Taussig's "mimesis of mimesis," can, as Bhabha puts it, "make the signifiers of authority enigmatic in a way that is 'less than one and double.' They change their conditions of recognition while maintaining their visibility; they introduce a lack that is then represented as a doubling of mimicry. This mode of discursive disturbance," Bhabha continues,

> is a sharp practice, rather like that of the perfidious barbers in the bazaars of Bombay who do not mug their customers with the blunt Lacanian *vel*, "Your money or your life," leaving them with nothing. No, these wily oriental thieves, with far greater skill, pick their clients' pockets and cry out, "How the master's face shines!" and then, in a whisper, "But he's lost his mettle!" (119)

In this way, the colonized sets up "another specifically colonial space of the negotiations of cultural authority" (119). And what this means, then, is that the site of the production of colonial discourse is "a space of *separation*—less than one and double—which has been systematically denied by both colonialists and nationalists who have sought authority in the authenticity of 'origins.' It is precisely as a separation from origins and essences that this colonial space is constructed" (120).

Taken together with Taussig's reading, Bhabha's analysis helps to underscore both the precise character of this space inhabited and reproduced by Crichton's novel and, at the same time, the potential power of mimetic reversability and excess within that space. What is especially striking about *Congo* in this light, however, is that mimetic excess and

all that it signifies in these postcolonial critiques is never really a threat to the novel's ideological universe. There *is* mimetic confusion aplenty in *Congo*, to be sure, but the novel deploys an especially effective strategy for managing it—and in so doing, for managing the potential eruption of the "multiplicity" which the animal other signifies. Here is where the category of the animal and the discourse of species is crucial to the novel's efforts at ideological recontainment, and why the discourse of species must therefore be viewed in *Congo* not merely as a counter for issues of race or nation, but as irreducible. For in Crichton's novel, mimetic confusion is strategically quarantined within the category of the animal *only*, as a problem to be negotiated between the First World gorilla Amy and the Third World gray gorillas. Indeed, one might even say that in this book, mimetic confusion is a problem *for* animals only. Here, mimetic excess and confusion do not open an interrogation of the category of the human (and, within that, the colonizer), but rather get displaced onto the question: What counts as a *real* gorilla?

The novel therefore seems to radically question the discourse of speciesism, while at the same time leaving the category of the human itself (which turns out to be a rather historically specific sort of creature after all), and its privileged forms of accomplishment and representation in the novel (technoscience and neocolonialism), completely intact. Indeed, these are simply presented in the novel as the more or less "natural" outcome of an evolutionary process governing both nature and geopolitics. As Munro puts it at one point—in a passage that could serve as the novel's *credo*:

> The purpose of life is to stay alive. Watch any animal in nature—all it tries to do is stay alive. It doesn't care about beliefs or philosophy. Whenever any animal's behavior puts it out of touch with the realities of its existence, it becomes extinct. The Kigani haven't seen that times have changed and their belief don't work. And they're going to be extinct. (150)

Munro understands the law of the jungle—which is to say, in the ideological space of *Congo*, he understands the law of second nature, of capitalism's global market.

One of the more interesting negotiations of the threat of mimetic confusion in the novel occurs when the ERTS party discovers at the Lost

City a massive statue of a gorilla with arms outstretched, stone paddles in hand (237). They think at first that they have discovered an ancient "cult of the gorilla," replete with a priestly caste, and Ross offers "an elaborate explanation" (248) of a culture that might be based on this totemic cross-species identification. As it turns out, though, they have it "all backward"; what they have discovered (as frescoes in the building confirm) is in fact a training facility where the gray gorillas were raised and drilled as ruthless guards of the diamond mines. This process depends, of course, on the highly developed mimetic faculties of the apes themselves; but what is most important here is how the prospect of cross-species mimetic confusion, and the possible disruption of the hierarchical relationship between self and other, human and animal, is immediately foreclosed and overwritten by what we discover is, in essence, a relationship of master and slave—a relationship that doesn't just preserve the old hierarchy but in fact intensifies it.

Even more striking is how the most significant single instance of mimesis in the book—the taped playback of Amy's wheezing imitation of the gray gorillas' language ("GO AWAY, NO COME, BAD HERE") that makes the gorillas halt their attack—takes with one hand from the category of the animal what it appears to give with the other. The significance of this moment is perhaps best understood in terms of its rather uncanny re-enactment of the relationship between human, machine, and animal recounted in Taussig's analysis of the famous RCA Victor logo of the dog listening to the phonograph, entitled "His Master's Voice." As Taussig puts it, "the power of this world-class logo lies in the way it exploits the alleged primitivism of the mimetic faculty. Everything, of course, turns on the double meaning of fidelity (being *accurate* and being *loyal*), and on what is considered to be a mimetically astute being—in this case not Darwin's Fuegians but a dog" (213). Moreover, Taussig continues, "there is the curious mimetic gestus of the dog, its body as well as its face miming the human notion of quizzicality. This dog is testing for fidelity and is also a little mystified. What could be more 'human' (or at least anthropomorphic) than this. . . ? Where politics most directly enters is in the image's attempt to combine fidelity of mimetic reproduction with fidelity to His Master's Voice" (223, emphasis mine).

The full force of the novel's climactic mimetic moment may now be felt:

> He saw the gorilla bearing down on him. He tensed his body. Six feet away, the charging gorilla stopped so abruptly that he literally skidded in the mud and fell backward. He sat there surprised, cocking his head, listening. . . .
>
> Elliot saw another gorilla stop to listen—then another—and another—and another. The compound took on the quality of a frozen tableau, as the gorillas stood silent in the mist.
>
> They were listening to the broadcast sounds. (280)

Like the RCA dog, the gray gorillas are here reinscribed under the sign of a "fidelity" whose ambiguity is (as Taussig is at pains to emphasize) entirely to the political point. In this "frozen tableau," "fidelity" names not only the gray gorillas' powerful mimetic faculties, and not only Amy's accomplished mimesis of mimesis that now siezes and controls the flow of mimetic power, but also the gray gorillas' trainability, their automaton-like loyalty to the command issued by "His Master's Voice." In thus circumscribing and redirecting the mimetic situation, what we might call "the Name of the Trainer" recontains the potentially threatening multiplicity of the gray gorilla band under the sign of the Freudian—that is to say human and Oedpial—patronymic. As in Freud's interpretation of the case of the Wolf Man, the word, the signifier, "the semiotic capital S," makes multiplicity yield to identity, becoming to being, body to law. As Deleuze and Guattari put it, "Freud counted on the word to reestablish a unity no longer found in things. Are we not witnessing the first stirrings of a subsequent adventure, that of *the* Signifier, the devious despotic agency that substitutes itself for asignifying proper names and replaces multiplicities with the dismal unity of an object declared lost?" (28).

Such is the resonance, I think, of the "humanizing" elements of the "frozen tableau," the gorillas comically falling on their rumps in the mud, cocking their heads quizzically like the pet Dalmatian in RCA's logo. Here too, the animal other is accorded impressive and potentially threatening mimetic prowess, only to have it immediately put to the services of an almost mechanical obedience. The point here is not exactly that the gray gorillas are easily fooled, but rather that their mimetic prowess does not produce reversability, excess, and the destabilization of categories they can initiate. Mimetic excess, as Taussig puts it, liberates the original from its authoritative status as origin, "drawing

attention to the exuberance with which it permits the freedom to live reality as really made up," thus providing "a welcome opportunity to live subjunctively as neither subject nor object of history but as both, at one and the same time" (255). But in *this* instance, mimetic power is immediately recontained as obedience, and the trajectory of mimetic productivity—so ambivalent at the site of the colonial, as Bhabha points out—is seized and redirected by the First World primates (both ape and human): a reversal aptly symbolized, as Taussig points out, by the "blossoming ear-trumpet of the phonograph" (223) in the RCA logo which mimics the organ of mimetic *reception* but in fact carefully orchestrates mimetic *production* so that it is always already "fidelity."

As the novel moves towards its climax, Elliot speculates, in a moment apparently unaware of its own irony:

> To them we are just animals, he thought. An alien species, for which they have no feeling. We are just pests to be eliminated.
>
> These gorillas did not care why human beings were there, or what reasons had brought them to the Congo. They were not killing for food, or defense, or protection of their young. They were killing because they were trained to kill. (279)

What is so striking and so ideologically symptomatic about *Congo*—and part of what marks it as a mainstream American cultural product of the early 1980s—is that it makes no connection *at all* between the sentiments expressed by Elliot in the foregoing passage and the phenomenon of neocolonialism. And it is here, I think, that we can locate the discourse of species in the novel within the larger problematic of neocolonialism identified by Bhabha and Taussig. For when we try to sort out the potential mimetic confusion broached as nowhere else in the novel in the relation of Amy to the gray gorillas, what we discover is that Crichton's text manages potential mimetic confusion through what Taussig, following Horkheimer and Adorno, calls the "organized control of mimesis" (215), that "essential component of socialization and discipline" (219). In this light, Amy's mimetic abilities are to be distinguished from those of the gray gorillas insofar as they have become Westernized—that is to say, insofar as they take their place as simply another circuit in the "Command-Control Communications and Intelligence" (C_3I) network of mimetic control at the disposal of the expe-

dition and, beyond that, of corporations like ERTS. In fact (as my references to Deleuze and Guattari already suggest) language as such in the novel is not a mechanism for the dissemination of difference, but is instead chiefly a "patronymic" mimetic technology which must be distributed and "maximized" while managing the risk of mimetic confusion and reversability that accompanies it.

From this vantage, it is clear then (as Bhabha's analysis helps to underscore) that the central question in the novel is not who has mimetic ability and who doesn't, but rather whose mimetic abilities can control the directionality of symbolic, economic, and political reproduction in the services of the neocolonial project, whose have been *maximized* and *managed*. Crichton's neocolonial Congo continues to be a "heart of darkness" which offers up its proverbial cautionary tale about the limits of the "organization of mimesis"—but (as Bhabha might say) with a difference. For those limits turn out to be not about the traumatic encounter with the primitive which threatens to activate the animal in all of us (as in modernism proper), but instead are recast as "post-ideological" problems of "research and development" which are internal to a more properly postmodern and neocolonial world system, one in which, as Haraway puts it, the reproduction of capitalist social relations depends upon not the *repression* of the mimetic so much as its management by "an engineering science of automated technological devices, in which the model of scientific intervention is technical and 'systematic,' . . . the nature of analysis is technological functionalism, and ideological appeals are to alleviation of stress and other signs of human obsolescence."[38]

Nowhere is this borne out more clearly, of course, than in the figure of Amy herself, who is linked in nearly cyborgian fashion to the tape recorders, VTRS, satellite systems and software banks back in Houston in the group effort to decode the language of the gray gorillas. And Amy takes her place in the reproduction of capitalist social relations as well. Elliot speculates about Amy's visit to the Congo as the first test of "the Pearl thesis," in which "we can imagine language-skilled primates acting as interpreters or perhaps even ambassadors for mankind, in contact with wild creatures" (65). Such a vision may seem nearly revolutionary in its imagining of a proverbial "first encounter" between First and Third World subjects who are not human, but Elliot has his doubts, because as one fictional critic points out, "we are producing an educated

animal elite which demonstrates [toward its wild counterparts] the same snobbish aloofness that a Ph.D. shows toward a truck driver" (66). Here, the capitalist social relations remarked by Haraway are reproduced within the category of animality itself, and the point, of course, is that Amy—as emergent, upwardly mobile professional who deals in symbolic knowledge (as a Robert Reich or Alvin Toffler might say)—has much more in common with fellow educated yuppies Ross and Elliot than with any wild ape—as she herself, we presume, would be the first to argue (after first asking for another cigarette, that is!).

What this suggests is that the discourse of species in *Congo* is rearticulated upon the more fundamental ur-discourse of the "organization of mimesis" by the world system of global capitalism in its postmodern moment, in which, as Fredric Jameson puts it, decolonization goes hand in hand with neocolonialism, and we find, "symbolically, something like the replacement of the British Empire by the International Monetary Fund"[39]—a system which uses third wave technoscience to extend its knowledge-for-profit of the colonized other (whether "nature," "primitive" civilizations, indigenous peoples, or native animals) to ever more capillary levels. The central ideological symptom of Crichton's novel, then, is the jarring disjunction between its seemingly progressive discourse of species (in which we are apparently disabused of many of our speciesist attitudes) and its thorough taking for granted of neocolonialism, in which one senses nostalgia for the good old days of outright imperialism, when "Nairobi was a fast-living place indeed," "The men were hard-drinking and rough, the women beautiful and loose, and the pattern of life no more predictable than the fox hunts that ranged over the rugged countryside each weekend" (109).

From this vantage, then, we can see that the deepest logic at work in the novel is a cunning one indeed: each half of the fundamental dichotomy of the discourse of species (human/animal) bifurcates in the novel, *but not along species lines*. For in the end it is the cannibalistic Kigani tribesmen—not Amy and not, certainly, the ERTS party—who are most clearly paired with the gray gorillas. Like chimpanzees, they throw feces at their adversaries (308); like the gray gorillas, they will wait until night to attack en masse, only to improbably break off their assault at the very moment of victory because of the ERTS expedition's control of mimetic power—in this case, the killing of the Kigani's *angawa* sorcerer who leads the attack. (Kill him, Munro tells us, and the

Kigani—in response to this apparently fateful message from the gods—will break off their attack, no matter the prospect of success [308].) Just as Amy, the First World ape, is able to mimetically master the Third World gray gorillas, so it is with the ERTS party's mimetic power over the Kigani. Hence, mimetic doubling and its potential reversability in the novel is thoroughly recontained within, and in fact reproduces, the discursive site of colonialism itself. It becomes, as it were, an affair for "humans"—that is, for colonizers—only.

If this last characterization seems a catachresis with regard to Amy, it is, as we have seen, entirely to the point, for what we find is that in the end the novel does its ideological work by a double articulation. The first-order problem of mimetic confusion is initially displaced onto the category of the animal only (as a site of interchange between Amy and the gray gorillas), and then, that confusion is "remedied" by a second-order sorting according to "the organization of mimesis" by the neocolonial project. In this way, we can readily imagine a semiotic square organized according to a logic in which "human" means "colonizing mimetic primate," and "animal" means "colonized mimetic primate." On one side we find the humanized humans of the ERTS party and the humanized animal, Amy, and on the other side, the animalized humans, the Kigani, and the animalized animals, the gray gorillas. What is so revealing about this, of course (especially in a novelist known for his technophilia and staging of the power of big science) is how "unscientific"—one is tempted to say, precisely in the old Marxist sense, how "ideological"—such a procedure is. But as we have seen (and as Horkheimer and Adorno themselves realized) Marxist language is not enough here,[40] for what such a procedure *also* shows us is the value of a Deleuzo-Guattarian skepticism toward the issuing of ethical warrants on the basis of identity rather than multiplicity and difference, an identity that in Crichton's novel is purchased at a political price levied in another part of the field—or, as the case may be, in another part of the forest—as Amy's upwardly mobile transcendence of speciesism is paid for by the Kigani's descent into animality.

I want to end by suggesting, however, that if *Congo* rearticulates the problem of species upon the more fundamental discursive site of neocolonialism, this does not mean that theoretical and ethical problems raised by the discourse of species are always simply *reducible* to the problematics of race or nationality. That is the point, after all, of my insis-

tence at the outset on focusing our attention on the *institution*, not simply the discourse, of speciesism. In this light, it is not clear that the sort of postcolonial critique we find in Bhabha's work, for example, is of much help in the larger critical project of confronting the problem of species—despite its immense value in helping us to complexify our understanding of how the discourses of speciesism and colonialism interact in sometimes unexpected ways. For Bhabha's work remains captivated, in the end, by the figure of the human, and suggests that a proper sorting of the subjects in Crichton's *Congo* would procede rather conventionally along speciesist lines, restoring the properly "ambivalent" dialectical link between the ERTS party and the Kigani on the one hand, while Amy and the gray gorillas would be relegated, whatever their powers or attributes, to the silence they inhabit in the very Enlightenment discourse so forcefully critiqued by Bhabha himself. As I have already suggested in my quotation of Gayatri Spivak at the outset, this strikes me as an important lacuna in any critique of colonialism, particularly when we remind ourselves how the discourse of species and animality has been used historically in the services of colonialist and racist oppression.

The chief example of this residual humanism in Bhabha's work is the crucial role played by what he calls "the performativity of [cultural] translation as the staging of cultural difference" (227), a process of negotiation between the discourse of the colonizer and the colonized in which "the differential systems of social and cultural signification" produce "the foreign element in the midst of the performance of cultural translation" (227). For Bhabha, it is this process of "cultural translation" that "opens up an interruptive time-lag in the 'progressive' myth of modernity, and enables the diasporic and the postcolonial to be represented. But this makes it all the more crucial," he continues, "to specify the discursive and historical temporality that interrupts the enunciative 'present' in which the self-inventions of modernity take place" (240). The aim, Bhabha writes, is "to establish a *sign of the present*, of modernity, that is not that 'now' of transparent immediacy" familiar to us from the Enlightenment myth of progress and its synchronous vision of historical time. This "Time-lag," as Bhabha puts it, "is not a circulation of nullity, the endless slippage of the signifier or the theoretical anarchy of aporia"; rather, "it is the problem of the not-one, the minus in the origin and repetition of cultural signs in a doubling that will not be

sublated into a similitude. What is *in* modernity *more* than modernity is this signifying 'cut' or temporal break" (245). "This transvaluation of the symbolic structure of the cultural sign," Bhabha concludes, "is absolutely necessary so that in the renaming of modernity there may ensue that process of the active agency of translation—the moment of 'making a name for oneself'" (242).

The question raised by the primacy of "cultural translation" in Bhabha's work is whether or not such a model can do justice to the ethical challenge raised by non-human others, whose unquestioned status as object and other has traditionally ballasted the discourse of species and underwritten its use against human as well as non-human victims. The question, then, is whether the silence of non-human others under the model of "cultural translation" is equated with an absence of subjectivity and a lack of agency *tout court*. And if so, how do we take account of the place of the non-human subject—Sue Savage-Rumbaugh's Kanzi, say—for whom "making a name for oneself" in Bhabha's sense would seem to be utterly beside the patronymic point (or so Deleuze and Guattari would insist)? For once we have rewritten the figure of the human in Bhabha's terms, it is *still* necessary to understand that if the colonized opens up a "time-lag" in relation to the colonizer's modernity, then the non-human other *is even slower than that*, as it were, in relation to *both* those forms of the human, insofar as a radically different form of temporality is introduced by it—and with a "foreignness" and difference that make Bhabha's colonial negotiations look like a rather in-house affair by comparison.

To put it another way, it is not clear how it would be wrong to say of Bhabha's work that it elides, under the figure of the "human," the right not to be colonized with the ability to engage in "cultural translation." And insofar as this assessment is accurate, it would seem that Bhabha's work reinstates the Enlightenment discourse of speciesism (if only by implication) to produce an image of the colonized precisely as the colonizer imagines him—as one who is mute, whose mimetic ability produces not excess and ambivalence, but rather fidelity to the origin. Only here, of course, the colonized other is not, in the end, the Kigani but rather non-human others like Amy and the gray gorillas. In the end, then, it would be too pointed, perhaps, but not exactly wrong, to say that Bhabha's work stands in relation to the gorilla as Crichton's

does to the Kigani. This is not to suggest that Bhabha is wrong, but rather that he is only half right.

SUNY-Albany

NOTES

1. See, for the definitive introduction of the term in the animal rights literature, Peter Singer, *Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals* (New York: Avon Books, 1975), 7. Further references are in the text.

2. See, for example, Eugene Linden, "Can Animals Think?," *Time*, 22 March 1993, 54–61; Jerry Adler, "The Secret World of Dogs" and Sharon Begley and Joshua C. Ramo, "Not Just a Pretty Face," *Newsweek*, 1 November, 1993, 58–61, 63–67; and Stephen Budiansky, "What Animals Say to Each Other," *U.S. News and World Report*, 5 June, 1995, 50–56.

3. See, for a useful overview, *The Great Ape Project: Equality Beyond Humanity*, ed. Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993); Marian Stamp Dawkins, *Through Our Eyes Only?: The Search for Animal Consciousness* (Oxford: W. H. Freeman/Spektrum, 1993), the most recent work by one of the most important researchers in establishing the scientific foundation for understanding animal suffering; and Donald R. Griffin, *Animal Minds*, which updates the work of, in effect, the founder of the field of contemporary cognitive ethology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). See, in a more scholarly vein, the essays collected in *Interpretation and Explanation in the Study of Animal Behavior*, vol. 1, ed. Marc Bekoff and Dale Jamieson (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990).

4. But not solely there, as the impressive body of work on the problem of animality—some of which I will reference here—by Stanley Cavell, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Jacques Derrida, and Slavoj Žižek, testifies.

5. Donna J. Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature* (New York: Routledge, 1991), 151–52. Further references are in the text.

6. See George Bataille, *Theory of Religion*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Zone Books, 1992), esp. 17–61; "'Eating Well,' or the Calculation of the Subject: An Interview with Jacques Derrida," in *Who Comes After the Subject?*, ed. Eduardo Cadava, Peter Conner, and Jean-Luc Nancy (New York: Routledge, 1991), 96–119; Jacques Derrida, "Force of Law," *Cardozo Law Review* 11 (1990): 921–1045. For a fuller discussion of these specific issues, see Cary Wolfe and Jonathan Elmer, "Subject to Sacrifice: Ideology, Psychoanalysis, and the Discourse of Species in Jonathan Demme's *The Silence of the Lambs*," *boundary 2* 22.3 (1995): 141–70.

7. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Remembering the Limits: Difference, Identity and Practice," in *Socialism and the Limits of Liberalism*, ed. Peter Osborne (London: Verso, 1991), 229.

8. It is entirely to the point, in other words, that the first chapter of the book that is said to have founded the animal rights movement, Peter Singer's *Animal Lib-*

eration, is entitled "All Animals Are Equal, or why supporters of liberation for Blacks and Women should support Animal Liberation too" (1).

9. Carol J. Adams, *The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory* (New York: Continuum, 1990). The phrase "logic of domination" is from Karen J. Warren, "Feminism and Ecology: Making Connections," *Environmental Ethics* 9 (1987): 6, qtd. in Carol J. Adams, "Ecoterminism and the Eating of Animals," *Hypatia* 6.1 (1991): 128; Derrida, "Eating Well," 113.

10. Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, trans. and ed. James Strachey (New York: Norton, 1961), 51–52, n. 1.

11. Donna J. Haraway, "Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective," *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature* (New York: Routledge, 1991), 188.

12. Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?," *Philosophical Review* 83 (1974): 435–50. As Nagel observes, "Bats, although more closely related to us than those other species, nevertheless present a range of activity and sensory apparatus so different from ours that the problem I want to pose is exceptionally vivid"—namely that bats "perceive the external world primarily by sonar, or echolocation," which, "though clearly a form of perception, is not similar in its operation to any sense that we possess" (438). For instructive and sometimes amusing responses to Nagel's essay, see Kathleen Akins, "Science and Our Inner Lives: Birds of Prey, Bats, and the Common (Featherless) Bi-ped," in Bekoff and Jamieson [note 3]; Douglas Hofstadter, "Reflections," in *The Mind's I*, ed. Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel C. Dennett, (New York: Basic Books, 1981), 427–38; and Daniel Dennett, *Consciousness Explained* (Boston: Little-Brown, 1991), 441–55.

13. Vicki Hearne, *Adam's Task: Calling Animals By Name* (New York: Knopf, 1987), 79. Further references are in the text.

14. As they put it, "These animals invite us to regress, draw us into a narcissistic contemplation, and they are the only kind of animal psychoanalysis understands, the better to discover a daddy, a mommy, a little brother behind them." *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 240. Further references are in the text.

15. "Prologue: Ethics and the New Animal Liberation Movement," in *In Defense of Animals*, ed. Peter Singer (New York: Harper and Row, 1985), 5.

16. Tom Regan, "The Case for Animal Rights," in *In Defense of Animals*, 22. Regan's essay provides an overview of the argument presented in great scholarly detail in his book *The Case for Animal Rights* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

17. As Luc Ferry has pointed out in *The New Ecological Order*, there is a danger here of lapsing into an ethical "naturalism" which aims to derive ethical principles from scientific observation of nature. We should surely agree, I think, that "it is still the *ideas*," as he puts it, "and not the object as such, that are the basis for value judgments *which only men are capable of formulating: ethical, political or legal* ends never 'reside in nature'" (141). As I have argued elsewhere, however, if one adopts a pragmatist rather than naturalistic ethical frame, then it is perfectly possible to ar-

gue that taking into account the ethical ramifications of work by people such as Jane Goodall does not necessarily require regression to naturalism. From the pragmatist point of view, all it means is that in the discourse or language-game called "ethics," we are obliged—precisely *because* ethics cannot so ground itself in the object—*to apply consistently, and without prejudice toward species or anything else, the rules we deploy for determining ethically relevant traits, behaviors, and categories.* But this is precisely what Ferry's humanism is unwilling to do. See Ferry, *The New Ecological Order*, trans. Carol Volk (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), and my "Old Orders for New: Ecology, Animal Rights, and the Poverty of Humanism," *diacritics* 28.2 (1998): 21–40.

18. See Mary Midgley, "The Significance of Species," in *The Animal Rights/Environmental Ethics Debate: The Environmental Perspective*, ed. Eugene C. Hargrove (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), 121–36.

19. Steven Zak, "Ethics and Animals," *Atlantic Monthly*, March 1989, 71. See also Mary Midgley, "Persons and Non-Persons," in Singer [note 15].

20. See Singer, "Prologue," in *In Defense of Animals*, 6.

21. The point was originally made by John Rodman in response to the publication of Singer's *Animal Liberation*, in "The Liberation of Nature?," *Inquiry* 20 (1977): 83–145.

22. Deborah Slicer, "Your Daughter or Your Dog? A Feminist Assessment of the Animal Research Issue," *Hypatia* 6.1 (1991): 111.

23. *Even if* we agree in the short run—as I think we should—that if the reinscription of the animal other under the figure of the human is required to secure the ethical consideration it deserves, then so be it. This is essentially the strategy of the well-known "Great Ape Project." See Singer and Cavalieri [note 3].

24. It is a critique that, in its extremity, raises the question of whether *even* the figure of the "stand" or "stance" as I have been using it remains too tied to identity and the gaze of the human to be of much use. See their critique of the regime of "faciality" in *A Thousand Plateaus*, a regime which is foundationally antecendent to the regime of the Look (171). As Brian Massumi characterizes it, "The 'face' in question . . . is less a particular body part than the abstract outline of a libidinally invested categorical grid applied to bodies (it is the 'diagram' of the mother's breast and/or face abstracted from the maternal body without organs and set to work by the socius toward patriarchal ends)" (172, n. 54). "Faciality" thus refers essentially to a fetishized localization of desire whose aim is fixity and identity, and whose apotheosis is the Oedipal regime. This is why "the form of subjectivity," as Deleuze and Guattari put it, "whether consciousness or passion, would remain absolutely empty if faces did not form loci of resonance that select the sensed or mental reality and make it conform in advance to a dominant reality. The face itself is a redundancy" (168). This explains, in their words, "if human beings have a destiny, it is rather to escape the face, to dismantle the face and facializations, to become imperceptible, to become clandestine, not by returning to animality, nor even by returning to the head, but by quite spiritual and special becomings-animal . . . that make *faciality traits* themselves finally elude the organization of the face—freckles

dashing toward the horizon, hair carried off by the wind . . . (171). In Brian Massumi, *A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleuze and Guattari* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992).

25. A question raised by Deleuze and Guattari's reorientation of our discussion of animality in the direction of multiplicity is raised even more forcefully in Haraway's work: as for the ethical status of non-human others, do *animal* non-human others have priority? Not according to Haraway, whose cyborg would take its place alongside the chimpanzees of animal rights philosophy and the wolf packs of *A Thousand Plateaus*. Those who find Haraway's assertion counter-intuitive or implausible should consult the wonderful episode of *Star Trek: The Next Generation*, in which the android Commander Data argues successfully in court for his right not to be disassembled. Whether this explains or mercilessly ironizes the fact that Data is the crew's leading anthrophile, we will have to leave for another discussion!

26. See Jameson's well-known characterization in *Postmodernism or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), 1–54.

27. Michael Crichton, *Congo* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1980).

28. Toni Morrison, *Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination* (New York: Random House, 1992), 45, 39.

29. I appreciate comments on this discussion by my colleague Joanne Wood on an earlier draft of this essay.

30. This makes the novel's caricature of the animal rights movement and its attacks on "Elliot and his Nazi staff" (38) early in the story all the more curious.

31. This is the point that is missed, I think, in the recent reception of the novel in a prominent animal rights publication, *Animal People*. "The hero of *Congo* is Amy," the reviewer writes, "[who] seems to be the only character possessing sensitivity, wit, insight, and any true link to her surroundings. . . . Amy alone can feel the sense of the jungle, its nature, and its agenda." This reading of Amy—which is correct, as far as it goes—misses two crucial points: first, within the discourse that governs the universe of the novel, this is not necessarily good news. Yes, one is tempted to say, she does *exactly like a child*. Second, as much might be said, after all, of Amy's other in the bifurcated animal category, the gray gorillas, who are best described in the diametrically opposed terms of Deleuze and Guattari's notion of "multiplicity" and the "pack" (or in this case, the troop). See Pamela June Kemp, review of *Congo*, *Animal People* 4.8 (1995): 22.

32. Olivier Richon, "The Hunt," *Public Culture* 6 (1992): 89.

33. Slavoj Žižek, *Enjoy Your Syptom!: Jacques Lacan in Hollywood and Out* (New York: Routledge, 1992), 22.

34. Quoted in Fredric Jameson, *Late Marxism: Adorno, or, The Persistence of the Dialectic* (London: Verso: 1990), 214, emphasis mine. Žižek's assertion that the idea of life is alien to the symbolic order is a strong echo of Horkheimer and Adorno's critique of "administered society" and its view of nature as merely a fungible resource for calculated control and exploitation. Likewise, the "multiplicity" invoked by Deleuze and Guattari is a strong echo of Adorno's assertion that the aim of non-identity theory or negative dialectics is to restore the other—whether the social other or nature in relation to society—to its proper status as "the preponderance of

the object" which has been subsumed, in Enlightenment, under identity, the concept, and reification. For amplification of this latter point, see Jameson's masterful discussion in *Late Marxism*, esp. 94–110, 212–19.

35. Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe, "Typography," in *Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 116. See also the discussion of this material in Wolfe and Elmer [note 6].

36. Qtd. in Michael Taussig, *Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 19. Further references to Taussig are in the text.

37. Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994), 86. Further references are given parenthetically in the text.

38. Donna Haraway, "The Biological Enterprise: Sex, Mind and Profit from Human Engineering to Sociobiology," in *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women*, 44.

39. Fredric Jameson, "Periodizing the '60s," in *The Ideologies of Theory, Essays 1971–1986, Vol. 2: Syntax of History* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 184.

40. I am thinking of Horkheimer and Adorno's well-known critique of Marxism as itself representative of the Enlightenment *episteme* which would, as Adorno put it, "turn all of Nature into a giant workhouse," treating Nature and the object as mere fungible resource for exploitation and control. This is directly related, of course, to Adorno's critique of dialectic and its fetishization of identity and the concept, and its consequent failure to account for the "preponderance of the object." See, for a fuller discussion, my "Nature as Critical Concept: Kenneth Burke, the Frankfurt School, and 'Metabiology," *Cultural Critique* 18 (1991): 65–96.