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Abstract: This article uses Michael Rothberg's (2009) Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization *to question whether or not Charles Patterson (2002) is justified in his comparison of the Holocaust with animal cruelty in* Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust. *It considers whether the comparison adheres to a competitive model of ethics (animal cruelty is worse than the Holocaust because it is "eternal") or a multidirectional model (there is an implicit connection between our treatment of humans and animals, which implies that the Holocaust is eternally mirrored in such acts of violence as animal cruelty).*

Key words: animal studies, Holocaust, testimony, creatureliness, multidirectional memory

INTRODUCTION

Michael Rothberg (2009) posits that competitive memory, or the attitude that one atrocity is worse, more important, or more deserving of recognition than others, should be abandoned in favor of multidirectional memory: loosely defined, memory that draws upon similarities between events in order to memorialize them simultaneously. Rothberg's subtitle, *Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization*, shows how this concept can be applied to the Holocaust and colonization, but he encourages the act of multidirectional remembrance more widely. As animal exploitation is not something that is limited to the past, and because animals have no collective memories of which we can speak, it is important to consider whether or not including animal cruelty in this web of memorialization is ethically appropriate or even possible.

Indeed, many activists for animal rights and authors in animal studies have already explored this comparison. These authors of philosophy, literary criticism, or works of fiction include, but are not limited to, Jacques Derrida, Karen Davis, J. M. Coetzee, and Isaac Bashevis Singer. In most cases, the authors are aware that such a comparison

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is cause for ethical concern. In *Elizabeth Costello*, for example, the protagonist gives a lecture arguing that factory farming is comparable to the Holocaust and receives a letter from an audience member who argues that her comparison is intolerable (Coetzee, 2003, p. 94). Fictional literature is a popular space to consider this comparison from either a competitive or multidirectional perspective, given an author's prerogative to invent characters whose opinions may differ from common belief.

Therefore, it is unsurprising that *Eternal Treblinka* by Patterson (2002) is inspired by and dedicated to Isaac Bashevis Singer, a Jewish novelist and animal activist, who wrote in his short story "The Letter Writer" that our treatment of animals equates to an "eternal Treblinka" (Singer, 2011, p. 271). Singer's family was uprooted and, in the case of some relatives, murdered by the Holocaust, and this is a lens through which his stories are written. As an animal lover and activist, many of his stories also feature animals prominently. Stories including "The Letter Writer" combine these themes, leading to the comparison Patterson borrows to name his text. I believe that Singer considers these themes interdependently and agree with biographer, Janet Hadda (1997), that "most likely, [Singer's own] determination not to eat flesh was connected to post-Holocaust feelings of revulsion against human cruelty, misuse of power, and disregard for life" (p. 142).

This feeling of empathy, toward animals and through suffering, is repeatedly explored within *Eternal Treblinka*. Here, Patterson (2002) uproots these ideas from works of fiction ("The Letter Writer," but also Upton Sinclair's, 1906 *The Jungle*) and considers them in light of real animal cruelty, such as that which occurs within slaughterhouses. More so than authors of fiction, who may use their artistic license to explore this contentious comparison, Patterson's argument risks being judged as ethically inappropriate. Certainly this would be the case if he made a competitive comparison between animal cruelty and the Holocaust. However, I posit that Patterson makes a multidirectional, and therefore ethically sound, comparison between the Holocaust and animal cruelty.

ETERNAL MIRRORING

"You say you lost six million. We question that but . . . we lost 600 million," says "notorious black racist" Kalid Muhammad, in response to visiting the Holocaust Memorial Museum (as cited in Rothberg, 2009, p. 1). This forms part of the opening quotation in Michael Rothberg's (2009) introduction to *Multidirectional Memory*, and it helps to clarify the subheading under which it appears: *Beyond Competitive Memory*. In this context, competitive memory is the opinion that one atrocity surpasses another, and, moreover, it promotes what Rothberg (2009) describes as a "real-estate" mindset with regard to memorializing these events (p. 2). In other words, Muhammad does not only hold the opinion that slavery is worse than the Holocaust, but suggests that remembering the Holocaust comes at the expense of remembering the "black holocaust." The Holocaust Museum physically gets in the way of a museum that could memorialize slavery, but, more importantly, he suggests that there is not enough space in the public's collective memory to remember both: We must choose, competitive memory insists, and therefore

we must compete with other atrocities to prove how ours was the most atrocious, caused the most deaths, or lasted the longest amount of time.

It could be argued that Charles Patterson (2002) seems to commit to this model in *Eternal Treblinka*, where the title, quoted from Singer's (2011) short story "The Letter Writer," implies that our treatment of animals is worse than the fate of the Jewish people during the Holocaust. Whereas Treblinka was an active extermination camp for 15 months, we continue to kill animals in vast numbers today, with no sign of stopping. Indeed, like Muhammad, Patterson includes death statistics that outnumber those associated with the Holocaust. For example, Patterson describes how, from the time they opened in 1865 until 1900, the Union Stock Yards in Chicago slaughtered 400 million animals. He adds: "That number is a drop in the water compared to what's going on now. Today, American slaughterhouses kill that number of animals in less than two weeks" (Patterson, 2002, p. 58). In a text that draws heavily on the murder of approximately 6 million Jews, the fact that Patterson refers to the deaths of 400 million creatures as "a drop in the water" is provocative: It is unclear whether or not, by merit of the events being compared throughout the text, Patterson considers the death toll of the Holocaust "a drop in the water" compared to the staggering statistics that come from American slaughterhouses. If so, this suggests that the model of competitive memory as outlined by Rothberg (2009) fits Patterson's writing. At this point, Patterson's comparison could seem to be as such: Animal suffering is like the Holocaust, except that it goes on forever and the death statistics are immeasurably higher.

However, there is already one key difference between Muhammad and Patterson (2002): Whereas the former forges his collective identity in a history of slavery—"*we* lost 600 million", he asserts—Patterson does not identify with animals on the same level. In fact, Patterson initially approached the question of animal suffering through a more personal connection with the Holocaust. His father died fighting the Nazis and, as Patterson (2003) admits in an interview with Biman Basu, "My intense interest in World War II and the Holocaust may have been my way of looking for my dead father and feeling connected to him." Furthermore, his first published book was entitled *Anti-Semitism: The Road to the Holocaust and Beyond* and came out of his desire as a history teacher to introduce his students to the background and causes of the Holocaust. This title bears obvious similarities to Chapter 3 in *Eternal Treblinka* (2002), entitled "The Industrialization of Slaughter: The Road to Auschwitz Through America." Where one text focuses on how anti-Semitism led to the Holocaust, the other considers how modern industry such as the production line produced both the machinery and attitudes that allowed the Holocaust to happen. There is nothing in *Eternal Treblinka* to suggest that Patterson changed his mind about which of these paved the way to the Holocaust; rather, he posits that both anti-Semitism and the industrialization of slaughter simultaneously played key roles in the developments that led to genocide. Michael Rothberg (2009) asks: "What happens when different histories confront each other in the public sphere? Does the remembrance of one history erase others from view?" (p. 2). A competitive model of memory such as Muhammad's would suggest that one history takes predominance over

another, but multidirectional memory allows for more than one history to assert its claim over the present. Moreover, the multidirectional model allows for crossovers between these histories that serve to highlight and even build upon one another. In the case of the roads leading to the Holocaust, Patterson shows how anti-Semitism and industrialization are not altogether separate.

The figure whom Patterson (2002) shows to exemplify this crossover between anti-Semitism and industrialization is Henry Ford. Here, Patterson explains how Ford applied the industrialization of animal slaughter to manufacturing automobiles, which in turn influenced the Nazis' methods of extermination:

> In his autobiography, Ford revealed that his inspiration for assembly-line production came from a visit he made as a young man to a Chicago slaughterhouse. "I believe that this was the first moving line ever installed," he wrote. "The idea [of the assembly line] first came in a general way from the overhead trolley that the Chicago packers use in dressing beef." . . . Ford, who was so impressed by the efficient way meat packers killed animals in Chicago, made his own special contribution to the slaughter of people in Europe. Not only did he develop the assembly-line method the Germans used to kill Jews, but he launched a vicious anti-Semitic campaign that helped the Holocaust happen. (Ford, 1922, p. 81; as cited in Patterson, 2002)

Following this, Patterson (2002) documents Ford's anti-Semitic propaganda and explains how it added to the growing hatred of Jews in Germany. Not only did Ford publish 91 articles based on the anti-Semitic text *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, but he also published anti-Semitic brochures and a now notorious compilation of articles entitled *The International Jew* (a text that heavily influenced Art Spiegelman (2003) to represent Jewish people as mice in *Maus*, after Ford's text compared the Jewish race to vermin). This text also reached huge acclaim in Germany, where it was rebranded as *The Eternal Jew*.

Although Rothberg's (2009) concept of multidirectional memory focuses on how past events are remembered in the present, Patterson's (2002) awareness and analysis of the different paths that led to the Holocaust can also be considered multidirectional. For example, Patterson considers both Ford's influential anti-Semitism and how he was influenced by slaughterhouses to revolutionize production-line industry.[1] One could compare which of these had the most influence on the Holocaust (or, at least, which was the more symptomatic of the attitudes that led to the Holocaust), or one could analyze what these two causes have in common. This is not simply to say that the Holocaust had more than one cause—this is an undeniable fact—but it is to interrogate the causes for any links between them, which may produce further insight into both. Indeed, Rothberg (2009) agrees that memory can be reformed through a deeper understanding of histories that previously may not have been explored alongside one's own:

> What looks at first like my own property often turns out to be a borrowing or adaptation from a history that initially might seem foreign or distant. Memory's anachronistic quality—its bringing together of now and then, here and there—is actually the source of its powerful creativity, its ability to build new worlds out of the materials of older ones. (p. 5)

By exploring the victimization of animals alongside anti-Semitism, Patterson (2002) attempts not only to shed light on both histories, but to build identities out of these seemingly disparate histories.

This Patterson (2002) achieves chiefly in two sections of *Eternal Treblinka*: In Chapter 3 where, in his analysis of Upton Sinclair's (1906) *The Jungle*, he explores the shared identities of factory workers and the animals they process, and in Chapter 6 where he includes the testimonies from animal advocates whose desire to help vulnerable creatures stem from their identification with (and in some cases, as) victims of anti-Semitism. In *The Jungle*, the comparison made is not between Jews and animals, but between animals and factory workers at the beginning of the 20th century. Nonetheless, it introduces the idea of a shared history between oppressed groups of people and animals, an idea that Patterson then builds into his discussion of Henry Ford's influence leading up to the Holocaust. Sinclair wrote *The Jungle* to propagate his socialist beliefs and encourage a shift in the rights of factory workers, and especially immigrants, working in the United States. However, by referencing it in *Eternal Treblinka*, Patterson implies that a more fundamental shift in attitude toward both workers and animals is necessary to bring an end to these inhumane conditions.

Indeed, despite Sinclair's (1906) primarily socialist message, Rudkus (*The Jungle*'s protagonist who works in a slaughterhouse) depicts the hogs' rough treatment and even suggests that their bodily violation is no less obscene for their being animals:

> Once started upon that journey, the pig never came back; at the top of the wheel he was shunted off upon a trolley, and went sailing down the room. And meantime another was swung up, and then another, and another—until there was a double line of them, each dangling by a foot and kicking in a frenzy—and squealing. The uproar was appalling. . . . The most matter-of-fact person could not help thinking of the hogs, they were so innocent, they came so very trustingly; and they were so very human in their protests—and so perfectly within their rights!" (pp. 28–29)

In this passage, Rudkus shifts his attitude toward the hogs: at first he pities them, then he identifies with them ("they were so very human in their protests"); finally he seems to anthropomorphize them by bringing in the language of law: they were "so perfectly within their rights." Sinclair's (1906) wording is interesting: These animals are being shackled and hung; evidently, they have no rights. Yet, judicial language is evoked, perhaps in order to convey the injustice being served to these creatures.

Sinclair (1962) was disappointed that his readers focused on their own exploitation by being fed unhygienic meat, rather than the exploitation of the workers at the factories: "I aimed at the public's heart," he wrote in his autobiography, decrying the fact that his socialist message was largely ignored by the public "and by accident hit it in the stomach" (p. 126). However, he might have extended that disappointment to consider how the hogs were still not treated with a sense of justice, even after he unveiled the cruel acts of force committed by those at the top to those underneath, irrespective of species. Indeed, one might ask how much would have changed if the public had not thought only of them-

selves but also of the workers' conditions, if these sympathies had not also extended to the hogs. As Simone Weil (2001) recognizes when she analyses Marx's repudiation of religion, "when force changes hands, it still remains a relation of stronger to weaker, a relation of dominance. It can go on changing hands indefinitely, without a single term of the relation being eliminated" (p. 149). If Rudkus identifies that something inherently unjust is being enacted on the pigs, transferring power over to the masses under a socialist regime may mean that more people are treated justly, but it will not mean that the tyrannical force has disappeared, it merely will have shifted. Ostensibly, without a system in place that gestures toward the sacred ideals of justice for all creatures, there is still the possibility of atrocity. One of two quotations Patterson (2002) chooses to introduce Part II of *Eternal Treblinka* is attributed to Theodor Adorno and illustrates this point by showing where the acceptance of force, even against animals, can lead: "Auschwitz begins wherever someone looks at a slaughterhouse and thinks: they're only animals".[2] Even though *The Jungle* is a work of fiction written before the Holocaust in order to promote socialism, Patterson chooses to include it in *Eternal Treblinka* to highlight the ways in which those in power use force to strip creatures of their individuality and turn everyone into the same, creaturely subject: a process that Adorno also locates in Nazi extermination camps.

Moreover, *The Jungle* teaches us how slaughterhouses use force against their workers: a force that is not only mirrored in their use of animals, but intrinsically connected to it. Although this is a work of fiction, it is rooted in the real events Sinclair (1906) witnessed, and although the novel may now seem dated, it is evident that similar conditions continue in slaughterhouses today. Indeed, this is the subject of Charlie LeDuff's (2003) essay in *Zoontologies: The Question of the Animal*—a collection on animal studies edited by Cary Wolfe that includes contributions from academics who are working or have worked in the field, such as Wolfe himself and Jacques Derrida. The final chapter, comprising of LeDuff's essay, stands alone as the only one written by a nonacademic. Much like Sinclair's experience while writing *The Jungle*, LeDuff is a journalist who investigated conditions in a slaughterhouse. Also like Sinclair, LeDuff's investigation focuses less on the animals being processed and more on the human workers. Nonetheless, it is included as the final chapter in *Zoontologies* as if to end the book on an essay that reaches beyond species barriers. Despite Patterson's (2002) seemingly contentious comparison between the Holocaust and animal cruelty, both LeDuff's essay and Sinclair's socialist novel outline managers, overseers, and investors putting in place a system that discharges aggressive force from top to bottom, through workers and animals. In this sense, one cannot accuse Patterson of using a competitive model to compare animal cruelty to the Holocaust because he identifies that one is intrinsically linked to the other.

Moreover, this legacy of force—which can be traced through many atrocities—leaves in its wake a stream of creaturely bodies, all of which have been treated with injustice. The shackled hogs whom Rudkus believes are "perfectly within their rights" to protest their suffering may not actually have rights as we understand them in a court of law, but their bodies are still protesting their unethical treatment. Rothberg (2009) shows how multidirectionality is a key method for understanding ethics. He calls for

> a multidirectional ethics that combines the capacious open-endedness of the universal with the concrete, situational demands of the particular. An ethics of multidirectional memory involve creating fidelity (in the sense given that term by Alain Badiou's *Ethics*) with the multiple events and historical legacies that define any situation. A politics based on that ethical foundation will require a notion of transnational, comparative justice that can negotiate conflicting and sometimes mutually exclusive demands made on unstable and shifting terrain. (Rothberg, 2009, p. 22)

In *Ethics: On the Understanding of Evil*, Badiou (2001) attempts to impress on humans a sense of ethical responsibility, irrespective of the idea or promise of God. This sense of ethical responsibility comes to the fore during what Badiou terms an "event," which is a moment at which something happens that forces humans to make a decision by supplementing their typical, base lives with a deeper understanding of truth. Indeed, he writes that since this event "was excluded by all the regular laws of the situation [it] compels the subject to *invent* a new way of being and acting in the situation"; this event must be unprecedented, therefore it calls for a decision based solely on a deeper understanding of truth and justice, rather than a decision based on tried and tested methods or rights (Badiou, 2001, pp. 41–42). Badiou's idea of fidelity is based on this decision because, he argues, we must honor this decision by being truthful to it. That is, not only must we make an ethical decision based on truth, but we should treat this decision with fidelity and maintain it with the same urgency even after the event. He defines this notion of fidelity in the following way: "the decision to relate henceforth to the situation from the perspective of its evental [événementiel] supplement" (Badiou, 2001, p. 41). In other words, our ethical decision toward the unprecedented event makes us the subjects of truth, and we must henceforth regard that event from the perspective of the subject it caused us to become. Rothberg (2009) uses this definition of fidelity and applies it to his concept of a multidirectional ethics, whereby we must remain truthful to the decisions we make according to one event and apply that newfound sense of truthfulness and justice to events that need similar attention. He considers Badiou's concept of fidelity an "ethical foundation" that should be applied transnationally and anachronistically, so that we might retain the fidelity of our decision—made as it was in the spirit of truth and justice—by applying it to other events that demand an ethical response.

In *Eternal Treblinka*, Patterson (2002) promotes a similarly ethical foundation by comparing our treatment of animals to the Holocaust. A comparison that may seem hyperbolic and disrespectful when viewed in a competitive light, especially by implying that animal cruelty is worse than the Holocaust because it is "eternal," seems more reasonable under a multidirectional gaze, where we might recognize the shared vulnerability of all creatures and act accordingly in the common spirit of justice. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the final part of Patterson's text: "Holocaust Echoes," beginning with Chapter 6, "We Were Like That Too." Patterson (2002) describes the subject of this final part, where "the focus turns to bearers of opposed memories—Jewish and German—whose advocacy of animals has been influenced and in some cases shaped by the Holocaust" (p. 139). This is the Part of *Eternal Treblinka* to which Rothberg's (2009) *Multidirectional*

Memory is most applicable: It draws on the "opposed memories" of Jewish and German people who have personal ties to the Holocaust in order to promote justice for animals, and therefore promotes a multidirectional ethics based on empathy. Indeed, Rothberg (2009) insists that memory is "often a spur to unexpected acts of empathy and solidarity; indeed multidirectional memory is often the very grounds on which people construct and act upon visions of justice" (p. 19). Badiou's (2001) concept and Rothberg's application of fidelity is most relevant here, where those who have made ethical decisions based on the Holocaust (an unprecedented "event") remain true to those ethics by applying them elsewhere.

However, the Holocaust victims' animal activism is rarely a case of remaining truthful to actions made during the event: More often, victims recall their passivity during the Holocaust—their or their family's indecision and powerlessness—when they witness the powerlessness of other creatures. One such example is Marc Berkowitz, cited in Patterson (2002), who was forced to watch his family march into the gas chambers while he remained behind: a 12-year-old selected for Dr. Mengele's experiments. Mengele forced Berkowitz and his twin sister "to undergo experimental spinal surgery. Today Berkowitz strongly opposes forcing animals to undergo similar experiments." In Berkowitz's own words at a public meeting called together to defend Canada geese he said, "My mother doesn't have a grave, but if she did I would dedicate it to the geese. I was a goose too" (as cited in Patterson, 2002, p. 141). Here, Berkowitz commits to a multidirectional model of memory, where he not only recalls his own victimization in the victimization of the geese, but acts upon those feelings of empathy where previously he could not take action for himself.

This is further applicable to Rothberg's (2009) study, where he draws upon and discusses Freud's concept of "screen memory" in relation to multidirectionality. Rothberg (2009) begins his application of screen memory by defining the term according to Freud's original analysis:

> Freud tries to understand why some memories from childhood are preserved and others are not. . . . Freud determines that the banal memory of the everyday life is in fact a *screen memory*, "one that owes its value as a memory not to its intrinsic content, but to the relation obtaining between this content and some other, which has been suppressed. . . . The mechanism of screen memory thus illustrates concretely how a kind of forgetting accompanies acts of remembrance, but this kind of forgetting is subject to recall. (pp. 12–13)

For Freud, screen memory is a recourse that simultaneously allows one to remember and forget a certain event, by "screening off" the memory itself but recalling it through everyday life situations. For example, a child who was taken to the hospital in a taxi after falling over might screen off the memory of the accident in favor of the memory of the taxi journey. Nonetheless, she might find herself remembering the event whenever she rides in a taxi. Rothberg (2009) applies screen memory to multidirectionality because of its ability to recall an event by linking it with others that happen at different times or in different places:

> Screen memory is, in my terminology, multidirectional not only because it stands at the center of a potentially complex set of temporal relations, but also—and perhaps more importantly—because it both hides and reveals that which has been suppressed. (pp. 13–14)

Similarly, when Berkowitz considers animals used for experimentation, he recalls his childhood experiences during the Holocaust. However, instead of hiding this memory behind the geese, he reveals it, not only to himself but to others so that they might also situate the animals' victimization within a grander narrative of suffering. This shows that Berkowitz is not only aware of the similarities between the geese and himself, but that he is prepared to acknowledge a shared history of violence between them.

In this final part of *Eternal Treblinka*, Patterson (2002) also includes excerpts from an interview between Israeli psychologist Dan Bar-On and a former doctor at Auschwitz. When Bar-On asks the doctor about how his work at Auschwitz affected his life afterward, his reply not only shows clear evidence of someone who is screening the Holocaust behind banal moments in everyday life but also how—disturbingly—these "banal" experiences still include the selection and killing of creatures:

> It's not the actual horror, the terrible fate of the people, that's not it, you understand. It's strange, but you get used to that. No, it's the fact of the selection that I think of, like when I'm in the garden digging, and there are snails. Not that I can't kill the snails, that's no problem. But then there's one that I miss, that I see and have to kill, to dig up and kill the last one. That's what's so unpleasant. Take this one snail out especially, and it's such a disturbing, phobic experience. The notion that selection is continuing, going on. (Bar-On, 1989, p. 25; as cited in Patterson, 2002)

Rothberg (2009) focuses his study on comparisons between colonialism and the Holocaust and therefore deals with histories that are both traumatic. As such, when he applies screen memory to situations where one might compare colonialism to the Holocaust, he is aware that there is an obvious difference between Freud's conception and his use of the term:

> For Freud, screen memories stand in for and distract from something disturbing—either a traumatic event or an illicit, unacknowledged desire. . . . What is odd about Holocaust memory, however, is that such memory hardly seems innocent or comforting. (Rothberg, 2009, p. 16)

This is also the case in the doctor's experience of killing snails: Rather than hiding memories of selection behind a snail, killing the snail is itself a "disturbing, phobic experience." Therefore, multidirectional memory complicates our understanding of what is innocent or disturbing because it does not only function one way.

Rothberg (2009) gives another example to highlight this point: There was a development in the collective memory of the Holocaust when France used torture methods during the Algerian War. Later, France started remembering these events in light of the Holocaust comparison. This back-and-forth relationship between paralleled histories and our response to them is characteristic of multidirectional memory and often leads to some unexpected soul-searching, as Rothberg (2009) agrees: "These examples alert us to the

need for a form of comparative thinking that, like memory itself, is not afraid to traverse sacrosanct borders of ethnicity and era" (p. 17). From the responses offered by Berkowitz and the Nazi doctor, above—and certainly in light of a creaturely poetics—there is a case to argue that "species" might be added to this list of sacrosanct borders.

CONCLUSION

Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust may seem to suggest that Patterson (2002) adheres to a competitive model of ethics, whereby our treatment of animals is far worse than the treatment of Jewish people under the Nazi regime. However, instead of adhering to this competitive model of ethics, which would be contentious at best, Patterson focuses his content on the interconnected legacies of force that are discharged from humans to animals. Not only does he argue that animal cruelty can lead directly to genocide, as through Henry Ford, but also that Holocaust victims often turn to animal activism because they understand what it is to be treated like an animal, as if having their identity stripped down to its bare creatureliness is an excuse for further violence. Some survivors, such as Marc Berkowitz, stand up for animal rights because they empathize with victims of animal abuse and, as such, argue that their relative treatments are comparable to one another.

In *The Holocaust and the Henmaid's Tale*, Karen Davis (2005) also makes a case for comparing atrocities. Her argument generally fits Rothberg's (2009) model for multidirectional memory, whereby one event can be remembered in light of another:

> When the oppression of one group is used metaphorically to illuminate the oppression of another group, justice requires that the oppression that forms the basis of the comparison be comprehended in its own right. The originating oppression that generates the metaphor must not be treated as a mere figure of speech, a mere point of reference. It must not be treated illogically as a lesser matter than that which it is being used to draw attention to. (Davis, 2005, p. 4)

Davis's (2005) use of the term "justice" in this context encapsulates the tone of much of Patterson's (2002) text, where both humans and animals are shown to be treated cruelly albeit legally. In *The Jungle*, for instance, Rudkus is victimized by a capitalist society. He protests the injustice of his situation and compares himself to a hog at the killing plant, but those who abuse him do so within the scope of the law, just as the hogs are processed cruelly but legally. By including Sinclair's (1906) socialist text as a key reference point in *Eternal Treblinka*, Patterson seems to suggest that the originating oppression, in this case the slaughter of the hog in such dire conditions, not only mirrors but foregrounds the inhumane treatment of Rudkus. This is similar to Cary Wolfe's choice to include LeDuff's (2003) essay in *Zoontologies*, despite the fact that its focus is on racial segregation in the workhouse. In both texts, the implication is that a system of justice that starts at the bottom of the chain of oppression might discharge compassion, rather than force, further up.

Notes

1. These biographical details are supported in Vincent Curcio's (2013) study on Henry Ford, where he writes that "Ford was perhaps more influential than any other Antisemite outside of Nazi Germany" and suggests that "perhaps most influential of all [to the modern assembly line and Ford's development of it] was the meatpacking industry, which was like the assembly line in reverse, disassembling pigs into pork products" (pp. xiii, 70).

2. Although this quotation is commonly attributed to Adorno, such as in Patterson (2002, p. 51), it does not appear in Adorno's published works. The closest quotation to this can be found in *Minimal Moralia*, where Adorno (2005) writes:

> Perhaps the social schematiation of perception in anti-Semites is such that they do not see Jews as human beings at all. The constantly encountered assertion that savages, blacks, Japanese are like animals, monkeys for example, is the key to the pogrom. The possibility of pogroms is decided in the moment when the gaze of a fatally-wounded animal falls on a human being. The defiance with which he repels this gaze—"after all, it's only an animal"—reappears irresistibly in cruelties done to human beings, the perpetrators having again and again to reassure themselves that it is "only an animal," because they could never fully believe this even of animals. (pp.112–113)

Here, Adorno (2005) acknowledges that dehumanizing victims makes them easier to kill and traces that attitude to the gaze between a dying animal and a human. Although Patterson (2002) and others capture a similar message in the phrase "Auschwitz begins . . .," the original is less specific to the Holocaust and the meat industry.

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