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Robert D. Crews, *For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia.* viii + 463 pp. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006. ISBN 0674021649. $29.95.

Mikhail Dmitrievich Dolbilov and Aleksei Il′ich Miller, *Zapadnye okrainy Rossiiskoi imperii* [The Western Borderlands of the Russian Empire]. 608 pp. Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2006. ISBN 586793425X.

These days, one of the most active research fields in modern Russian history is borderlands history: that is, the history of non-Russian peoples living on the empire's peripheries, understood either in isolation from the Great Russian heartland or in dynamic relationship to it.[1] Because this subject encompasses a central dimension of Eurasian history—Russia's status as a multinational, multi-confessional polity—the intellectual attractiveness of studying it is self-evident. Since as little as 20 years ago one could not confidently have predicted that scholarship would move so vigorously in this direction, we should ask why so many scholars both in post-Soviet Russia and the West have now opted to write on the borderlands.

In the Soviet Union, of course, writing the history of non-Russian peoples was a serious enterprise from the very beginning of Soviet power, but much of the scholarship that appeared in the early Soviet period was attuned to party doctrine and thus not inclined to investigate important questions such

My thanks to Professors Samuel Ramer, Semion Lyandres, and Terence Emmons for reading and commenting on the initial draft of this essay.

[1] On the importance of borderlands history for imperial Russian and Soviet history, with a convenient bibliography of recent literature, see "The Imperial Turn," *Kritika* 7, 4 (2006): 705–12.

as the place of religious affiliation in nationality politics.[2] Moreover, certain issues like Russian–Jewish relations were so sensitive that, at times, they were virtually off-limits to scholars.[3] In addition, borderlands scholarship occasionally became the virtual preserve of academics who either belonged to one of the non-Russian nationalities or lived in one of the non-Russian republics; meanwhile, the "commanding heights" of the historical profession were occupied by historians who wrote the history of the heartland.[4] This professional constellation began to disintegrate in the Gorbachev and post-Soviet periods, but its breakdown did not immediately lead to a concentration on borderlands history. Indeed, if we imagine scholarship proceeding in waves, the

[2] On the historiography of nationalities, see Lowell Tillett, *The Great Friendship: Soviet Historians on the Non-Russian Nationalities* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969).

[3] An example of the way the taboo operated was the attempt by Petr Andreevich Zaionchkovskii to include in his book on the internal politics of the counter-reforms precise information on the Jewish educational quotas imposed by the government under Alexander II. The footnote was censored after the book had been printed in galleys. See Zaionchkovskii, *Rossiiskoe samoderzhavie v kontse XIX stoletiia: Politicheskaia reaktsiia 80-kh–nachala 90-kh godov* (Moscow: Mysl′, 1970). During the 1970s and early 1980s, Western historians pursuing topics in Jewish history found admission to archives in Moscow and Leningrad very difficult.

[4] By no means all historians of the Russian heartland were Great Russians. Indeed, it sometimes happened that talented historians from non-Great Russian backgrounds came to occupy prominent positions in the Soviet historical establishment. Take, for example, Larisa Georgievna Zakharova, the successor to Zaionchkovskii at Moscow State University, a woman of Georgian–Armenian background; or two historians of the Russian revolutionary movement, Natal′ia Mikhailovna Pirumova and Natan Iakovlevich Eidel′man, the former of mixed Russian and Armenian descent, the second a Jew; or the Leningrad/Petersburg historian Rafail Sholomovich Ganelin. All these historians spent the bulk of their careers researching classical questions of Russian political or intellectual history, with few references to nationalities problems or borderlands history. As I have shown elsewhere, Eidel′man understood himself to be a Jew but did not dare speak as one until late in his life. See G. M. Hamburg, "Writing History and the End of the Soviet Era: The Secret Lives of Natan Eidel′man," *Kritika* 7, 1 (2006): 71–109. Zakharova was acutely aware of her status as a non-Russian in the *kafedra* of Russian history at Moscow State University. In a conversation with me in 1986, she praised Georgian traditions of hospitality and pointedly criticized the destruction of native (Great) Russian traditions: "The Russian people have forgotten their traditions, even how to bury their dead." Yet until her recent edition of Dmitrii Andreevich Miliutin's memoirs, Zakharova took little professional interest in the history of the Caucasus. Ganelin, like the others, occupied himself with Russian diplomatic and political history, but recently, with the changing in atmosphere, he has taken up various questions in borderlands history. See, for example, the set of documents he helped edit on the Beilis trial: G. M. Reznik, ed., *Delo Mendelia Beilisa: Materialy Chrezvychainoi sledstvennoi komissii Vremennogo pravitel′stva o sudebnom protsesse 1913 g. po obvineniiu v ritual′nom ubiistve* (St. Petersburg: DB, 1999). A more complex case is that of Isaak Izrailevich Mints, the historian of the Russian Revolution and Civil War. As a major figure among party historians, Mints served as responsible editor for a large number of books dealing with nationality problems in the late tsarist/early Soviet period.

first wave, lasting from the late 1980s through the early 1990s, issued from a fascination with liberalism and reform in imperial Russia; the second wave, beginning in the early 1990s and still continuing at present, arose from a revival in Russian conservatism and a concomitant interest in the relative durability of the Russian empire compared with the Soviet Union. Borderlands history is the third wave of scholarship since the late 1980s. Its numerous sources include: the shattering of old taboos that hindered research on the subject; the realization that the Russian empire managed its national minorities for 300 years without experiencing the kind of "meltdown" that occurred in the last years of Soviet power; the knowledge that post-Soviet Russia, being a "post-imperial empire," must also attend to nationality problems of various kinds, many of them inherited from the Soviet system or from the Russian empire; the opening of archives in former borderlands regions that were once difficult to access, even for Russians; Western scholarly research in borderlands history that reinforces Russian interest in the subject; and the revival of certain classical problems in international relations—namely, tensions between Poland and Russia over the Western border zone, and tensions between Russia and Islamic states over the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Western scholarly interest in the imperial borderlands developed in a slightly different fashion. In Britain, for example, historians have long paid attention to the non-Russians along the southern rim of the Russian empire, probably because these peoples have been near neighbors of Britain's own empire.[5] Moreover, the desire to compare the operation of competing empires has animated many British scholars, from imperial taxonomists like Arnold Toynbee and Niall Ferguson to Russian specialists like Dominic Lieven.[6] In France, which has had its own empire located partly in Muslim societies, there has been a long-standing fascination with Russia's Islamic subjects in the Caucasus, in Tatar regions, and in Central Asia.[7] Moreover, French

[5] John F. Baddeley's books on the history of the Caucasus, full of ethnographic detail, remain classics. See Baddeley, *The Rugged Flanks of the Caucasus*, 2 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1940); and Baddeley, *The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus* (London: Longmans, Green, 1908).

[6] See Arnold Joseph Toynbee, *A Study of History*, 12 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1934–61); and Niall Ferguson, *Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2003). Both Toynbee and Ferguson view empire as a basic historical unit; for Ferguson, empire is the main form of political organization in history, far superseding the nation-state. Toynbee's *A Study of History* was a prolonged comparative meditation on the differences and similarities among empires. For Lieven's lively essay on comparative history, see D. C. B. Lieven, *Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals* (London: John Murray, 2000).

[7] I have in mind the work of Alexandre Bennigsen, dealing with Muslims in Russian imperial history and early Soviet history. See, for example, Alexandre Bennigsen, ed., *Le Khanat de Crimée dans les Archives du Musée du Palais de Topkapi* (Paris: Mouton, 1978); Bennigsen, *La presse et le mouvement national chez les musulmans de Russie avant 1920* (Paris: Mouton,

scholarship on the multinational composition of the Russian empire has deep roots: we need only think of Paul Charles Levesque's history of Russia's subject peoples or Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu's *Empire des tsars et les Russes* as cases in point.[8] German scholarship about Russia may also be an instance where old traditions of inquiry have had an impact on a late 20th-century trend. For example, during the German Enlightenment Johann Gottlieb Georgi and Johann Gottfried Herder showed special interest in the multinational composition of the Russian empire.[9] The contemporary leader in writing the national history of the empire, Andreas Kappeler, has cited Georgi as a pioneer of the subject.[10] Still, in Britain, France, and Germany, the focus on Russian borderlands history has intensified of late, perhaps in response to political circumstances in the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia.

Meanwhile, the intensity of American interest in Russia's imperial borderlands stems from several factors: widespread surprise over the disintegration of the Soviet Union along national republican lines and an embarrassed realization that previous scholarship on the Russian empire had underestimated or even missed the importance of nationality problems; the opening to U.S. scholars of archives both in Russia proper and in Soviet successor states;[11] institutional support from IREX, American universities, and private foundations for research on borderlands history; a parallel process of reduced support for research in Russia itself that produced a temporary "emptying out" of scholarship on Russia proper;[12] scholarly attempts to redefine the study of Russia by casting it as part of Eurasia rather than part of Europe;[13] and, lately, the emergence in Russia of a strong impetus toward reassessing borderlands history. There was also a sense, particularly acute in the younger

1964); and Bennigsen and Chantal Quelquejay, *Les mouvements nationaux chez les musulmans de Russie* (Paris: Mouton, 1960).

[8] See Paul Charles Levesque, *Histoire des différents peuples soumis à la domination des Russes ou suite de l'histoire de Russie*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1783); and Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, *Empire des tsars et les Russes*, 3 vols. (Paris: Hachette, 1881–89), both with emphasis on the multinational, multi-confessional nature of the empire.

[9] See Johann Gottlieb Georgi, *Russland: Beschreibung aller Nationen des russischen Reiches, ihrer Lebensart, Religion, Gebrauche, Wohnungen, Kleidungen und übrigen Merkwürdikeiten*, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Dykishce Buchhandlung, 1783); and Johann Gottfried Herder, *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit*, 4 vols. (Carlsruhe: C. G. Schmieder, 1790–92).

[10] See Andreas Kappeler, *The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History,* trans. Alfred Clayton (Essex: Longman, 2001), 8.

[11] Crews makes the point in the acknowledgments to his book that his history could not have been written without access to previously closed archives in Russia and Central Asia (449–50).

[12] When I asked Terence Emmons how he might account for the "imperial turn" of Russian history, the first factor he mentioned was a decision by IREX to support scholarship in the successor states of the Soviet Union and the resultant "emptying" of the center.

[13] Mark von Hagen, "Empires, Borderlands, and Diasporas: Eurasia as Anti-Paradigm for the Post-Soviet Era," *American Historical Review* 109, 2 (2004): 445–68.

generation of Slavists, that other fashionable topics in imperial history—workers' history, peasants' history, the social history of Russia overall—had been "done." Among senior scholars in the United States there were not a few historians who felt dissatisfied with models of imperial history inherited from their Russo-centric mentors and from senior Soviet scholars. One historian recently formulated his irritation with the "generation of the fathers" by observing: "The history of the empire can be written, because Martin Malia's history is finally dead."[14]

Intellectually, the widespread engagement with borderlands history was surely related to a "quantum leap in the general theory of nationalism and ethnicity in the human sciences," as the editors of *Kritika* recently noted,[15] but it was also related in complicated ways to the widespread currency of debates on colonialism and post-colonialism among historians of South Asia bearing on historical subjectivity and agency, to the allure of Edward Said's critique of Orientalism, and to the diffusion of Michel Foucault's thinking about language as a repository of power. It should also be said that interest in Russia's southern peripheries was partly a function of the general significance attached in the 1990s to Islamic history, for with the end of the Soviet Union, it became possible to conceive of the Caucasus and Central Asia as constituent parts of the Islamic world.

In Dolbilov's and Miller's sprawling book, *Zapadnye okrainy Rossiiskoi imperii,* the reader finds a narrative history of Russia's western peripheries from the mid-17th century to the revolutions of 1917, along with six appendices (historiographical essays on the Russian empire and Poles in recent Polish historiography, on Ukraine and Russia in recent Ukrainian scholarship, on Russia and Belorussia in contemporary Belorussian scholarship, and on Russian imperial politics and Lithuania in Lithuanian scholarship; statistical tables on population, confessional allegiances, education, military recruitment, marriage rates, birth and death rates, and ethnicity; and a list of imperial viceroys and governors-general in the region).[16] Although the editors modestly describe their book as a "step toward reconstruction of a fuller picture of the past" (15), their large ambition is to analyze the interaction

[14] This remark was made to me after a panel on borderlands history at the AAASS annual convention by a senior scholar, whose early career dealt with Russian intellectual history but whose interests shifted a decade or so ago to the southern periphery.

[15] "The Imperial Turn," 705.

[16] The authors' collective includes Liliia Aleksandrovna Berezhnaia, Oleg Vital′evich Budnitskii, Mikhail Dolbilov, Aleksandr Vasil′evich Makushin, Aleksei Miller, Ekaterina Anatol′evna Pravilova, Rustem Arkad′evich Tsiunchuk, and Tat′iana Gennadievna Iakovleva.

between imperial subjects on the western peripheries and the Russian empire itself—meaning here the imperial statesmen and officials who were responsible for formulating policy on the borderlands. By design, the book's eight authors map the "arena of battle" between the Polish independence movement and the Russian empire and between the mutually irreconcilable Polish and Russian projects of nation-building. They also study the development of Ukrainian, Lithuanian, and Belorussian nationalisms, and they devote a special chapter to the Jewish question from the Polish partitions to 1917. The result is an important contribution to imperial historiography that is likely to shape future scholarship in the field and to generate considerable controversy.

In the first full chapter, dealing with the Cossack hetmanate and its incorporation into the Russian empire, the authors define the hetmanate not as a "Ukrainian state" or even a "Cossack state" but rather as a "Cossack political community," a *politeia* too immature to be considered a genuine state (35). They understand the Cossack leader Bohdan Khmel´nyts´kyi's original goals to have been the "recovery of Cossack freedoms" and defense of the Orthodox Church against Catholics and Uniates (38). They interpret Khmel´nyts´kyi's decision to seek an alliance with Muscovy in 1654 not as the end of the first sovereign Ukrainian state but as a deal in which the hetman accepted certain limitations on his community's autonomy in return for Muscovite military assistance against Poland. According to the authors, it was not until 1659 that Khmel´nyts´kyi forfeited most of his power, foreign and domestic. Even then, the Cossacks' hope for a better power arrangement persisted until the early 18th-century showdown between Hetman Ivan Mazepa and Peter the Great. In analyzing Mazepa's politics between 1707 and 1708, the authors refuse to repeat the accusation that Mazepa "betrayed" Peter by siding with Swedish forces at the decisive moment in the Great Northern War; instead, they express surprise, in view of Peter's plan to place large portions of the hetmanate under Russian administration, that Mazepa did not break with the tsar earlier (52). In their opinion, Mazepa's opposition to Peter had "essentially no negative consequences for Russia" (53). Indeed, Peter used the occasion of Mazepa's break to liquidate Cossack autonomy: Ivan Skoropads´kyi, Mazepa's successor, was only a figurehead, real power having passed to Petrine officials in the Little Russian collegium. By Catherine II's reign, the Russian administration had begun to introduce into the region other elements of centralized power, including control over Cossack military units, the regulation of Orthodox religious practices, and the legal definition of Cossack farmers as state peasants. As a *quid pro quo* for the acceptance of Russian absolutist authority, the regime offered to local elites the possibility of government service and even rhetorical approbation for Cossacks' purported "loyalty" to the crown (59).

The narrative strategy of the first full chapter, which recognizes the hetmanate's goal of political autonomy while underlining Moscow's effort to frustrate and destroy that autonomy, is an excellent illustration of what the authors mean when they speak of the "interaction" between the imperial state and peoples of the western borderlands. Although the authors steer clear of nationalist positions on the Pereiaslavskaia rada of 1654 and on the Mazepa–Peter dispute of 1708, they do not hide from the reader the enormous discrepancy in power between the hetmanate and the nascent Russian empire. In this narrative, while there are neither tears for the vanquished Ukrainians nor cheers for the victorious Russian state—a fact that may disappoint Ukrainian nationalist historians and Great Russian patriots alike—there is also no effort to speculate about what a strong Cossack or Ukrainian state might have meant for inhabitants of the region. If Khmel´nyts´kyi had had a free hand, would he have suppressed the Uniate Church? What of the fate of the region's Jews, thousands of whom were killed in Khmel´nyts´kyi's 1648 uprising (a fact that goes unmentioned in the book!)? But then, what if Khmel´nyts´kyi had been vanquished by his Polish adversaries? How would the absence of a Cossack political community have affected Poland's subsequent evolution and Russo-Polish relations? Throughout the narrative, the authors assume the strategic import of the Cossack *politeia* without attempting to demonstrate it in rigorous fashion.

The second full chapter is a short account of Polish history from the partitions to the Congress Kingdom. In it the authors emphasize the weakness of the Polish state. They note that, in 1767, Catherine II was recognized by the Sejm as guarantor of Poles' "fundamental rights," and that, in 1768, Russian troops saved many members of the Polish gentry from slaughter by Cossacks. The authors even depict the first partition of Poland as a "failure" of Russian policy, since Petersburg had regarded Poland as a "controllable ally whose territory they would have preferred to expand rather than diminish" (67). In analyzing the second partition, the authors point to the Polish Constitution of 3 May 1791 as a provocative act, which, along with Stanisław Augustus's 1791 declaration at Pinsk announcing Poland's independence from the Russian Orthodox Church and stating his intention to found an Orthodox hierarchy under the jurisdiction of the ecumenical patriarch, gave Russia ample justification for intervention in Poland as a defender of conservative social arrangements and of Orthodoxy. The authors discount the view of those Polish nationalist historians who have characterized the second partition as criminal aggression against Poland by Russia (71). The authors also interpret the Kosciusko rebellion of 1794, especially the rebels' killing of sympathizers with Russia, as a "decisive blow" against those Russian statesmen who sought a political alternative to further partitions of Poland. In effect, Poland's political weakness and Polish ingratitude toward their Russian "protectors" forced

Petersburg to help Prussia and Austria dismantle Poland's sovereignty. Once the Russian empire had absorbed eastern Poland, Russian policymakers had to decide how to treat the Polish gentry. The initial tactic was to support the gentry's domination over Polish peasants and to offer Polish gentry the prospect of entering Russian state service on favorable terms—this in return for the gentry's political loyalty to Russia. The authors point out that certain Polish aristocrats such as Adam Czartoryski and Seweryn and Stanisław Potocki eagerly took advantage of this offer. Meanwhile, Russia took no steps to persecute Polish Catholics or Uniates, and it even adopted a "relatively benign" posture toward Poland's Jews (78). The authors do not exclude the possibility that Russian co-optation of Poles might have worked smoothly on the model of co-optation of the Baltic Germans, had not the Napoleonic invasion and the rise of romantic nationalism occurred. In this chapter, like the first, the authors describe Polish and Russian interactions in such a way as to underline the disparity of power between the peoples of the Western region and Petersburg. The difference is that the Cossacks appear in a more sympathetic light in the first chapter than do the Poles in the second.

The heart of the book consists of five chapters covering Poland and the western borderlands from the founding of the Congress Kingdom in 1815 to the end of the 19th century. The authors portray the Congress Kingdom as a favorable arrangement for the Poles, who retained their army and a large measure of their financial sovereignty in addition to enjoying the benefits of a constitutional government and of dynastic unity with Russia. Until 1821, the authors argue, Alexander I pursued a policy of "flirtation" with the Polish gentry, perhaps because he hoped that the Polish "experiment" would prove the viability of constitutional monarchy for Russia itself. The authors remind us that Nikolai Nikolaevich Novosil′tsev's liberal "State Charter for the Russian Empire" was drafted in Warsaw, at the tsar's express request. In the early 1820s, however, the Polish experiment went wrong at both ends. In 1822, the Polish officer corps, long disturbed over the petty despotism of Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich, hatched a conspiracy against him; meanwhile, between 1820 and 1825 Alexander I refused to call the Sejm into session. Under Nicholas I, relations between the kingdoms were mixed. The new tsar demanded that Konstantin Pavlovich moderate the enforcement of discipline in the army. In 1829, Nicholas visited Warsaw to receive the Polish crown, a visit he conceived as a positive gesture toward the Poles. However, Nicholas was outraged by the Sejm's 1828 decision to impose a light sentence on subversives in the Polish Patriotic Society.

In the authors' opinion, the negative interactions between Petersburg and the Polish elites did not constitute sufficient explanation for the Polish uprising of 1830–31. They rather see this event as a product of Polish romantic nationalism, which was embodied in the conspiracy of November 1830 to

assassinate Konstantin Pavlovich and in the quixotic decision by the Patriotic Society in January 1831 to dethrone Nicholas as Polish king. Once the rebellion had been crushed, the tsar moved quickly to punish the Poles. In 1832, he signed the Organic Statute, which abolished the Sejm, eliminated the practice of dual coronation, and juridically incorporated Poland into the Russian empire. Under the terms of the statute, Poland gradually lost much of its financial sovereignty and most of its special privileges. If Nicholas had had his way, Polish affairs would eventually have been settled by the relevant ministries in Petersburg, and all traces of Polish autonomy would finally have been effaced. That neither of these potentially dire consequences ensued was the result of the local administrative system established by the viceroy in Poland, General Pavel Pashkevich, who saw himself as competing with Petersburg ministers for royal influence and who relied heavily on ethnic Poles to staff the Warsaw government. The irony that the very official responsible for suppressing the insurrection had also salvaged the last remnants of Polish autonomy was a general sign of the contradictions in Petersburg's imperial policy.

In the Northwestern region (the Lithuanian and Belorussian provinces) and Southwestern region (Kiev, Volyniia, and Podoliia) the repression of dissent was even harsher than in Poland itself. As many as 40 percent of the local gentry lost their noble status after the insurrection; and in 1840, with the abolition of the Lithuanian Statute, general imperial laws were applied across the Northwest and Southwest. Here as in Poland, however, the imperial regime foundered on its own contradictions. On the one hand, Petersburg sought to "reeducate" the Polish gentry by opening the way first into the provincial, then into central administration (105). On the other hand, the regime tried to curry favor with the local peasantry. The authors suggest that Pavel Dmitrievich Kiselev's inventory reform of land use may have been intended to weaken peasant loyalty toward Polish landowners in the western peripheries. By making exceptions to its repressive policies, Petersburg both failed to undermine the area's semi-autonomous status and sowed the seeds of future difficulties.

The authors note that after the Polish insurrection Petersburg attacked the Uniate Church. In 1831, it closed Bazilian monasteries for supporting the rebels. In 1839, it promulgated the Act of Unity, permitting Uniate clergy to enter communion with Russian Orthodoxy. The Act of Unity, engineered by Lithuanian Metropolitan Iosif Semashko, led to the legal conversion to Orthodoxy of 1.5 million Uniates. The government apparently conceived of this policy as a defense of Russian Orthodoxy against Catholicism, rather than as a defense of the "Russian" peasantry against Polonism. It was precisely during this period, however, that the historians Nikolai Gerasimovich Ustrialov and Mikhail Petrovich Pogodin began to write about the ethnic

Russian identity of peasants in the Western region—an idea that after 1863 became an axiom of the government's Russification policies. The tendency of the Russian government in the late 19th century to conflate Orthodox confessional affiliation with Great Russian ethnicity was one of the unfortunate legacies of the Nikolaevan era.

Taken as a whole, the authors' treatment of the Congress Kingdom recognizes some of the mistaken policies pursued by Petersburg but also softens the impact of those policies by underlining the government's "favorable" treatment of the Poles. This approach comes uncomfortably close to blaming the Poles for the 1830–31 uprising, or at least to blaming those Poles who were too ungrateful to realize their good fortune under Russian aegis. In this connection, the authors quote Czartoryski's famous reproach to radical Polish nationalists in the Sejm: "You have doomed Poland!" (98). But if romantic nationalism contributed to the Polish insurrection, it was not the only cause. After all, Polish political culture had developed in part under the so-called "republic of the gentry," which guaranteed the Polish gentry personal immunity from arrest and inviolability of private property, a functioning parliamentary system, checks on royal power, extraordinary freedom of speech, and religious toleration. Although the republic of the gentry had collapsed under pressure from Russia and other Great Powers, in the early 19th century many Polish nobles remained attached to the principle of the rule of law. Their attempted "revolution" against Russia in 1830–31 was a protest against Russian violations of the Polish Constitution and of the Vienna settlement. Furthermore, the radical wing of the Polish insurrection, led by Adam Gurowski and others, was animated by a desire for social change in Poland but also by the hope for Russia's liberation from tyranny. Witness Gurowski's part in the Patriotic Society's commemoration of the five slain Decembrists in 1831. These features of the Polish insurrection escape the authors' attention.

Political relations between Russia and Poland slowly changed after Nicholas I's death in 1855 and after the death of the imperial viceroy Pashkevich in 1856. In short order, Petersburg amnestied many participants in the 1830–31 insurrection and granted permission for the establishment of a Medical-Surgical Academy in Warsaw where Polish was to be the language of instruction; Petersburg also licensed the formation in Warsaw of a Polish Agricultural Society under the chairmanship of Czartoryski's nephew, Andrzej Zamoyski. The deeper questions of Russo-Polish relations remained unresolved, however, since Alexander II opposed Polish autonomy and excluded the possibility of reunifying the former Congress Kingdom with its former provinces in the western periphery. The authors rightly observe that Petersburg had no intention of allowing the Polish gentry to take the initiative on the issue of peasant emancipation. Indeed, until the insurrection

of 1863, Petersburg was caught in a dilemma: how to please the Polish peasants without further alienating the Polish gentry (131). The authors show that the new Russian governor-general in the Northwestern region, Vladimir Ivanovich Nazimov, convinced the local Polish gentry to advocate peasant emancipation by delicately hinting that emancipation might be accompanied by concessions from Petersburg on problems of importance to them. Given the chance to express their actual preference, however, the Northwestern gentry called for a landless emancipation of the peasantry—a fact that made the architect of the Russian peasant reforms, Nikolai Alekseevich Miliutin, suspect that gentry greed masked Polish political designs for superiority in the region (135–37). In those areas of the western peripheries affected by the 1861 peasant emancipation, the gentry were not generally pleased by the terms of the statute; nevertheless, the authors note, the government's announcement of serfdom's abolition in the Russian language befuddled the local peasantry, thus depriving Petersburg of any political credit that might have accrued among the peasants from its stand against serfdom.

Between 1855 and 1862, the authors contend, the Polish and Ukrainian nationalist movements pressured Petersburg officials to accept new demands. In Warsaw, Andrzej Zamoyski and Aleksander Wielopolski called for Russia to grant Poland political autonomy, Zamoyski through an ill-defined "moral revolution" against social injustice, Wielopolski through gradual reforms that entailed cooperation with Russian authorities. Although the government strongly opposed Zamoyski, particularly after the anti-Russian Warsaw street demonstration of 1861, it was divided over how to respond to Wielopolski. Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich, who in the spring of 1862 was appointed viceroy to Poland, was disposed to collaborate with Wielopolski; however, War Minister Dmitrii Alekseevich Miliutin opposed collaboration because he feared Wielopolski was trying "to consolidate the sovereignty of the Polish aristocracy and the deleterious influence of the Catholic clergy" (151). Meanwhile, Ukrainian nationalists from the old Brotherhood of Cyril and Methodius, from the student circle Hromada, and from the university professoriate demanded from Petersburg official recognition of the Ukrainian language. In response to this pressure, some Petersburg officials facilitated publication of Ukrainian journals and books, probably out of the hope that their Ukrainophilia would prove a counterweight to Polish cultural influence in the West; other officials, fearing the spread of Ukrainian separatism, opposed any assistance to the Ukrainian movement. In general, the authors believe, in the western provinces Petersburg inclined more toward an anti-Polish posture than toward a pro-Ukrainian stance.

The 1863–64 Polish insurrection caught many Russian officials in Petersburg and Warsaw by surprise. The geographical scope of the insurrection, which encompassed most of the former Polish Commonwealth,

was sobering, but the participation of Polish commoners in an uprising that Petersburg had first attributed to the gentry was alarming. The government's short-term responses to the insurrection were predictable: the use of brutal military force against the insurrection, and the implementation in affected western provinces of pro-peasant agrarian reforms designed to win peasant affections for Russia. More difficult for Russian officials was to arrive at a consensus on the long-term resolution of the question how to govern a border region where most of the elites had set themselves squarely against the Russian presence. The government decided to curtail the number of Catholic monasteries in Poland, to secularize church land, and to drop hundreds of ethnic Poles from civil service positions. It also contemplated the introduction of the Cyrillic alphabet in Polish primary schools as a step to break the domination of the Catholic Church and the gentry over the peasantry. The authors insist that the goal of these policies was not to destroy the Polish identity of the region's peasants but to remake it: to fashion out of Polish peasants future "friends of Russia." They compare Russian policy toward Polish peasants to that of the French government toward peasants under the Second Empire. They also point out that this policy was bound to fail without the guidance of a charismatic statesman like Nikolai Miliutin.

In the western provinces, which Petersburg saw as a zone of battle between the Polish and Russian peoples, the government aimed at de-Polonification. Roughly 850 estates on which the insurrection had occurred were sequestered by the government, and all landowners in the region were fined for their participation in or sympathy with the insurrection. The printing and sale of Polish books were banned, and people of Polish descent were forbidden to buy landed property. Meanwhile, the government hindered the printing of Ukrainian books, partly out of the suspicion that Poles were somehow behind the development of Ukrainian literature. Between 1864 and 1869, only 25 Ukrainian-language books were published in the Russian empire. In the years after the Polish insurrection, the Petersburg government sponsored a campaign of mass conversion of Catholic peasants to Russian Orthodoxy. It also replaced Polish-language instruction in theology at local high schools with teaching in Russian. With these steps, the government set off on a perilous course of Russifying the western peripheries by manipulating confessional and linguistic preferences of the local populations. The authors conclude that, during these years, the government made little progress in Russifying the region, but they concede that Petersburg "effectively undermined the possibility of Polish nation-building in the western provinces of the Russian empire" (252).

The chapters on the origins and impact of the 1863–64 insurrection are the best in the book. They achieve more nearly than do other chapters the balanced perspective the authors promise in their effort to explore the

interaction between the empire and its subjects. The assessments of government policy contradictions and of statesmen like Nikolai Miliutin are convincing. So, too, is the discussion of de-Polonification and Russification, two programs between which the authors are wise to distinguish. The authors are also right to foreground the disparity of power between Russians and Poles: they admit that throughout the 19th century Russians "experienced serious difficulties of administrative control of Polish territories," but they stress that, in a military confrontation between Russians and Poles, "the balance of forces was obviously unequal and the outcome of battle predictable" (146). The authors are less convincing in their comparison of Russian policy toward Polish peasants with French peasant policy in the Second Empire for two reasons: first, the cultural and ethnic differences between Russians and Poles ran deeper than those between Parisians and, say, Bretons; and second, since 1848, male peasants in France had enjoyed the right of suffrage, and many of them had voted for Louis-Napoleon before the *coup d'état* that inaugurated the empire. Because, in France, the peasants' investment in the national political arrangement was objectively more profound than was the investment by Polish peasants in imperial Russia, the pro-peasant policies of Louis-Napoleon had a different valence from Petersburg's pro-peasant policies in the western borderlands: what was a natural political alliance in France was in Russia a one-sided courtship at best.

The authors treat the last third of the 19th century as a kind of anticlimax: although Alexander III's policies toward the western peripheries were in some respects harsher than those of his predecessor, the authors contend that during his reign "in essence, no principally new conceptions of integration of the Western region with the center arose" (261). Alexander III did not hope to persuade Poles to abandon their dream of national independence: he even admitted that, if he had been born Polish, he would "probably be in the ranks of the protestors" (262). He therefore pursued an anti-Polish line without striving to keep ethnic Poles out of the lower levels of the tsarist government and without intensifying the pressure for Russification in Poland itself. In the western peripheries Alexander III tightened laws against Polish (and Jewish!) purchasers of land, and in 1893 he mandated new inheritance laws that aimed to break up large Polish-owned estates. In the 1890s, the government moved to forbid Catholic peasants from owning more than 60 *desiatiny* of land—a step that signaled the end of its universal pro-peasant policy in the West. From then on, the government thought the only good peasant a Russian Orthodox one. The authors see government policy at the turn of the century as anti-Polish by inertia—that is, they believe the specter of the Polish enemy was being invoked by Petersburg officials mostly as an element of "bureaucratic routine" (296). At the same time, the authors argue, the sting of the government's anti-Polish policies was to some extent neutralized

by those officials "who in practice softened the prohibitions, especially in linguistic and religious measures, by paying respect to Poles, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Jews" (296). The authors think these practical limitations on bureaucratic nationalism may be connected to an interest in "new models of regulating interethnic relations that might have been observed, for example, in the Habsburg empire" (296).

The authors' analysis of the late 19th century is strongly revisionist in that they lay the main blame for the government's harsh nationalities policy in the West not on Alexander III but on the more "liberal" Alexander II. Perhaps the most interesting observation made in this section is a passing remark on the realization of certain officials that economic development, especially the building of railroads, might be a more effective means of uniting the diverse peoples of the empire than were nationality policies (284–85). This suggestion points to the need for a fuller scholarly investigation of the role played by political factors in the routing of Russian railroads, especially the positioning of lines to facilitate contact between the center and the disparate national communities in the western borderlands.

After considering Petersburg's management of the Poles, Ukrainians, and Lithuanians in the western borderlands, the authors turn to the Jews between 1772 and 1917. They begin their discussion with the *bon mot* "The Jews 'moved' to Russia without leaving home" (303). The point is to link the origins of Russia's "Jewish question" with the incorporation of Polish territories under the terms of the three partitions. Later the authors argue "the Jewish question was part of the broad, complicated process of evolution of identities and loyalties in the western peripheries" (316). There is much to recommend this approach, which reminds us that for Petersburg officials the Jewish problem was in some ways a variant of the challenge facing the empire across the western area: how to encourage disparate subjects to accept Petersburg's control and, in the long run, either to acculturate themselves to Russian institutions or even to assimilate into the Russian ethnos. Of course, if the authors really believe the Jewish problem is only a variation of a general theme, then why discuss the Jews in a separate chapter? Why not integrate them into the broader narrative? Moreover, one is tempted to ask, didn't the Russians have a Jewish question before Russia became home to a third of the world's Jews? How else can one explain, for example, the theological and social anti-Judaism of 16th-century Muscovy?

At any rate, the authors move crisply through the history of Russian–Jewish relations. They point out that, on the one hand, Catherine II designed a system that simultaneously "protected" the Jews from their Christian neighbors while protecting those neighbors from the Jews. The decision to limit Jewish residence to the Pale of Settlement was a case in point. So, too, was the decision to maintain separate Jewish quarters (ghettoes) in western cities,

for, as the authors note, "ghetto walls were built from both sides" (309). The government even tolerated the Hassidic movement, in spite of denunciations accusing leading Hassidim of endangering the Russian state. On the other hand, the government used the *kahal* to collect taxes, to enforce military recruitment levies, to control flight from debts, and to maintain social peace in the Jewish community. The government's long-term strategies, according to the authors, were to "correct" the Jews, to de-Judify them by emancipating them from their "fanatical" religious practices, and to integrate them into imperial society (308).

For the Jews, Nicholas I's reign was a mixed blessing. The tsar abolished the *kahal* system and established a new system of state-supported schools for the Jews. He was determined to break the control of Jewish traditionalists over the education of Jews, and his schools succeeded in training the first generation of the Russian-Jewish intelligentsia. In 1851, the tsar also imposed on the Jews a double liability for military service similar to that he had imposed on the Poles a decade earlier. The authors fail to mention that Nicholas died before the most insidious of his special legislation on the Jews—their classification as either "useful" or "useless" subjects—could take effect. Under Alexander II, the Jews were excluded from the ranks of those eligible to purchase state-owned lands and private estates in the western peripheries. Also under Alexander, Iakov Brafman's notorious *Book of the Kahal* (1869) "became virtually a reference book for [imperial] administrators" (325). The authors observe that Brafman's book helped undermine one of the positive developments of Alexander's reign: an open discussion begun in Vil′nius about the terms of a genuine "emancipation" of Jews in the empire.

The authors compress the dizzying developments in Russian–Jewish relations from 1881 to 1917 into a handful of pages. They note that with each decade ever higher percentages of Jews were involved in the revolutionary movement (329–30). They mention the role of Lev Pinsker's *Autoemancipation* (1881) in promoting Jewish interest in Zionism. They refer in passing to the pogroms of 1903 and 1905 and to the 1913 trial of Mendel Beilis on charges of ritual murder. They close the chapter with the deportation of Jews from the German front in 1914–15—an act that led, as other scholars have noted, the government to liquidate the Pale of Settlement in August 1915. The closing paragraph of the chapter offers us this magisterial understatement: "Violence toward the Jews [and] the inept persecutions of the Jewish language outraged the Jewish masses who already were not overflowing with love for the government" (324).

In the final section of the narrative, devoted to the western peripheries from 1900 to 1917, the authors concentrate on the failure of the Duma system to solve the Polish problem. They show that Poles from the western peripheries, especially urban dwellers, were underrepresented in the State

Dumas, and they mention that Polish Catholic clergy were banned from membership in the State Council. With each successive Duma, the number of representatives from the western borderlands declined; in response, Poles, Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Jews within the Dumas had to make common cause in their efforts to eliminate discriminatory laws. The national minorities did not succeed in winning an end to ethnic discrimination, partly because the government under Prime Minister Petr Arkad′evich Stolypin's leadership styled itself an ethnically Russian regime and partly because there was opposition to legal equity coming from Russian nationalists in the Duma itself. Still, according to the authors, the debates over nationality politics in the first two Dumas "opened the government's eyes" to the problems generated by "official Slavophilism" (366). The authors give much attention to Roman Dmowski's campaign against national discrimination in the first two Dumas; indeed, Dmowski even emerges in the narrative as a kind of hero. The showdown in the Third Duma over Stolypin's western zemstvo bill, with its heavy weighting of votes in favor of ethnic Russians and its promise to keep the Western region "Russian forever," was a sad moment in Russian imperial history, because it illustrated so well the official blindness of the past century. The authors point out that, by the Fourth Duma, nationalist sentiments among peoples of the western borderlands had become so deeply rooted that even the prospect of a liberal regime in the empire would no longer have satisfied Polish or Ukrainian leaders. Centrifugal tendencies contributed significantly to the disintegration of the Russian empire in 1917.

Strangely enough, the authors say almost nothing about Soviet attempts to knit together the diverse peoples of the western borderlands on new terms. Instead, they concentrate on the Russo-Polish war and its outcome—namely, the struggle of the interwar period "to influence the Ukrainian and Belorussian populace from the 'other side' of the border" (422). The narrative ends with a lament over the exchange of populations between Poland and the USSR in 1947–48, an exchange that "completed the tragic process of transforming the multi-ethnic regions of the Romanovs' and Habsburgs' empire into relatively ethnically homogeneous states that the idea of the national state demanded" (428). With this verdict the authors' perspective finally comes clear: they write out of respect for multinational empires, and perhaps out of nostalgia for the imperial experiment in Russia. This perspective may explain their relatively favorable treatment of Russia's Polish policy in the 18th century and their kind words for Russian policies toward the Congress Kingdom. It may also account for the preference they accord the pliable Wielopolski over the more assertive Zamoyski and to Dmowski over Piłsudski, since Wielopolski and Dmowski both sought to achieve Polish autonomy without first destroying the Russian empire. The authors seem sympathetic toward the Ukrainian, Lithuanian, and Belorussian nationalist movements, yet these movements posed no serious

threat to the integrity of the empire until the very last decade of the old regime. The authors even seem to imply that the Jewish question might have been handled successfully, especially if Alexander II had not been tempted by the prospect of the Jews' Russification. The authors explore imperial language policy, and they analyze official debates about the cultural and religious assimilation of non-Russian peoples. Generally, they believe Petersburg officials lacked the patience and imagination but also the sheer willpower to implement such programs successfully. Although the authors nowhere object in principle to such policies, their preference for preserving the multinational character of the Russian empire suggests that they must regard such policies as wrongheaded. The authors' antipathy toward Polonism appears to be the corollary of their hostility toward any kind of homogenizing nationalism. That antipathy may also represent an indirect acknowledgment that relations between contemporary Poland and Russia are less than cordial. For Russian historians, the "Polish question" did not perish but has risen again. Indeed, in the consciousness of this cadre of historians the Polish problem may have a peculiar, talismanic significance.

Whatever caveats we may attach to the book, Dolbilov and Miller's *Zapadnye okrainy Rossiiskoi imperii* is a marvelous work of scholarship, perhaps the best multi-authored book to appear in Russia since the Leningrad collective's study of tsarist internal politics, published in the mid-1980s.[17] It rests on a wide, if uneven, knowledge of primary and secondary sources in Russian, Polish, Ukrainian, German, and English; and it cites important unexploited archival sources from the mid- to the late 19th century. Cognoscenti of borderlands history will note the authors' debts to John Le Donne's work on frontier history, to Edward Thaden's and Theodore Weeks's work on the western periphery, to Norman Davies's and Piotr Wandycz's books on Poland, and to John Klier's and Benjamin Nathans's books on Jewish history, among many others. The authors' intellectual friendliness toward a multinational empire that accommodated the legitimate concerns of national subjects is, in the present Russian context, not only inoffensive but also civic-minded, given the alternative implications of an integral nationalism based on the Great Russian ethnos. The authors' effort to understand the complex strands of Petersburg's imperial policy—ethnic, linguistic, social, and religious—and to trace their changing interconnections deserves wide acclaim.

Robert Crews's *For Prophet and Tsar* is an ambitious, erudite, sprawling, but also superficial and deeply flawed book on Islam and empire in southern

[17] Akademiia nauk SSSR, Institut istorii SSSR, Leningradskoe otdelenie, *Krizis samoderzhaviia v Rossii 1895–1917* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1984).

Russia and Central Asia. The book's central arguments are that Catherine II and her successors "devised a policy of toleration to make faiths such as Islam the basic building blocks of the empire"; that, consequently, "Muslims came to accept the empire as the 'House of Islam' "; and that Russia itself "became a Muslim power" (2–3). Crews thinks that, by and large, Islam came to be a source of social stability in the Russian empire. Although he alludes to episodes of violence between Muslims and Russians, he rejects the tendency in previous scholarship to highlight these confrontations.

The book's first chapter tries to establish that Catherine "transformed the imperial regime into a patron of Islam" (32) by introducing "a church-like organization" among Muslims in the Orenburg territory. Her key policy move was the establishment in 1788 of the *Dukhovnoe sobranie Magometanskogo zakona,* an institution whose title Crews translates as "Ecclesiastical Assembly of the Muhammedan Creed" because he wants to emphasize the Russian image of Islam as a Church, externally resembling Orthodoxy, replete with a clerical hierarchy and "parishioners." The trouble with this argumentative translation is threefold: it obscures the primary sense of the word *dukhovnoe* ("spiritual" or "religious" and only secondarily "ecclesiastical") and renders the word *zakon* (law) as "creed"; it fails to convey the main functions of the *sobranie* or "assembly," which acted in fact as a licensing body for Muslim clerics seeking state recognition but also as a court to adjudicate disputed cases under Islamic law; finally, it misleads Crews himself, who follows Russian official discourse by referring often to common Muslims as "parishioners." In this application of the term Crews may have the excuse of following Petersburg bureaucratic practice, but the label is nevertheless a mistake, since there was no real "ecclesiastical" jurisdiction cognate to Christian parishes either in Russia or elsewhere in the Islamic world. Muslims in Russia and elsewhere had their law courts, and they surely paid heed to those life-long scholars of Islam whose holiness and knowledge of sacred traditions merited respect, but in Islam there was never an ecclesiastical hierarchy organized in the fashion of the Orthodox Christian hierarchy and never a "Church" in the Christian sense. Indeed, the absence of such structures is a logical consequence of Islamic theology with its radical emphasis on believers' equality before God; it is also a key component of Islam's adaptability, its capacity to evolve "from the edge."

At any rate, Crews claims that, by 1800, the small staff of the assembly was in the business of examining and licensing mullahs and prayer-callers; it also supervised opening and sealing of mosques and tried to punish Sufi preachers who appeared to challenge the new religious-bureaucratic regime. In 1829, the assembly even sanctioned a tsarist law declaring a three-day waiting period between a believer's death and burial—this in obvious violation of Islamic law requiring swift burial. By the end of Nicholas I's reign,

Crews says, the Orenburg assembly had become an appendage of the Russian state implicated in a general policy of support for the crown.

In chapter 2 Crews admits that the assembly never managed to control the Muslim "clergy": itinerant Sufi preachers, "unofficial" mullahs, women offering private religious instruction to Muslim girls—all proliferated outside state jurisdiction (100–2). The best the government could do in response was to reiterate its support for licensed preachers. In 1850, it extended to licensed mullahs and imams personal exemption from army conscription and corporal punishment. To the end of the tsarist regime, however, the government refused to give Muslim clerics the legal privileges it offered Orthodox priests. On occasion, the Orenburg assembly heard accusations of "false preaching" in certain communities, accusations sometimes accompanied by denunciations of the preacher for political disloyalty. But not infrequently these accusations were dismissed by the assembly as groundless. Crews sees in such accusations attempts by Muslims to force the Russian state to enforce locally sanctioned interpretations of Islam, to "entangle" the regime in Islamic affairs, and he apparently regards decisions by the Orenburg Muslim assembly as *prima facie* evidence of such entanglement. From this reviewer's perspective, the direct involvement of Petersburg officials in Muslim legal wrangling seems relatively minimal. The Orenburg assembly was a convenience enabling Petersburg to manage Muslim affairs from a distance, by proxy, through co-opted Muslim elites; in the early 19th century there was little stomach in Petersburg for the more rigorous kind of centralism that, say, Dmitrii Andreevich Tolstoi tried later to implement in the Russian countryside with his counter-reforms.

Probably the most interesting chapter in Crews's book deals with family law. Here he shows that the Orenburg assembly began to regulate marriages among Muslims by insisting that marriages occur under the jurisdiction of licensed clerics. The assembly also attempted to prohibit bride abductions and secret marriages. In 1821, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, in collaboration with the Orenburg assembly, introduced a formal mechanism for mediation of family disputes (155–57). In 1841, the Orenburg Mufti Gabdulvakhid Suleimanov introduced a code of marriage based on aspects of *shari'a* law. Since some aspects of marriage were also regulated by the empire's civil law code, however, certain complaints, such as husbands' cruel treatment of their wives, fell under both religious and civil jurisdictions. The overlapping laws created juridical confusion, but Crews claims they also fostered opportunities for Muslim women to liberate themselves from abusive husbands by appealing to the protections of the Russian law code against the Muslim one. Moreover, since the Russian civil law forbade the killing of adulterous women, Muslim communities under Russian civil law were not entitled to punish women adulterers in traditional fashion. Crews insists that, starting

in the 1850s, the Petersburg government tried to replace certain traditional readings of *shari'a* law being employed by indigenous Muslims in Orenburg with interpretations of *shari'a* law worked out by Oriental scholars like Mirza Kazem-Bek. Crews thinks the new conceptualizations of *shari'a*, based on Hanafi jurisprudence, may have been more restrictive for women than local understandings had been. How the cross-cutting codes of law—Muslim traditionalist, imperial Hanafi, and imperial civil law—actually functioned across the region is not a subject explored in much detail by Crews, but it is an issue that demands further investigation. Curiously, Crews also describes the expert-designed, Hanafi-based law code as "Orientalist" and anticlerical, inasmuch as the Petersburg government now seemed to repose more confidence in its hand-picked experts on Islam than in the clerics who had administered the old code. Whatever the impact of the new interpretations, Crews calculates that in 1857 more than one of every nine Muslim marriages in the Orenburg territory ended in divorce (171). Whether one should read the high rate of divorce as evidence of more benign or less benign conditions for Muslim women remains unclear.

Crews devotes two chapters to Muslims outside Orenburg: one to the Kazakhs, the other to Muslims in Turkestan. He says that Russian administrators relied on Kazakh customary law and on clan elders rather than on *shari'a* law or on a Muslim "Church" à la Orenburg to govern the Kazakhs. The reasons behind this special approach included the suspicion, fueled by the writer Chokan Valikhanov, that Islam had not really been accepted by the Kazakhs, who, Valikhanov claimed, remained pagans at heart (210–19). One of the main consequences of this imperial policy, Crews contends, was a weak state presence among the Kazakhs. In Turkestan, Russian occupiers agreed in 1865 to permit Muslims to live according to the *shari'a*. In major towns they granted tax exemptions to senior "clerics" and granted official recognition to the decisions of indigenous Muslim courts. They did not, however, repeat Catherine II's "mistake" of creating a Muslim court to regulate the entire region; instead they permitted Muslims themselves to elect judicial officials. The Russian involvement with the area's Muslims nevertheless entangled imperial officials with local society in ways that were profoundly resented by some Sufi Muslims such as Dukchi Ishan, leader of the Andizhan uprising of 1898. Crews admits that the Andizhan uprising aimed to drive Russians from the region, but he says the protestors mainly targeted "indigenous actors who mediated between Muslim communities and the state" (260)—a fact that was cold comfort to Russian officials. The Andizhan rebellion itself is more alluded to than described or analyzed, in keeping with Crews's decision to shift attention from violent conflicts. Crews's chapter on Turkestan ends with an early 20th-century petition to restore the "old order" of unelected Muslim judges and of genuine *shari'a* law. Crews sees this petition as

an acknowledgment by Turkestani Muslims of Russian power, but it is just as easy to read it as a repudiation of Petersburg's bungling policies.

The book's last chapter, "Heretics, Citizens, and Revolutionaries," looks at Russia's Muslim community in the final decades of the empire. It concedes that Russian nationalists and Pan-Slavs sharply attacked the "shared moral universe" that had grown up between Russian officials and Muslims since Catherine's time. Such attacks should probably have led Crews to wonder whether, or to what degree, there had been a shared moral universe at all in the intervening century. At any rate, in the 1880s and 1890s the Russian crown opted for the Russification of non-Russian peoples of the empire. The right-wing press and Russian nationalism, combined with reformist movements within Islam like jadidism, had the effect of unnerving conservative Muslims. In 1888, Muslims launched a well-coordinated petition campaign opposing a language law that had demanded mullahs learn Russian (313–15). They also complained bitterly at the government's decision to close certain mosques, such as the Trekh Boltaevo mosque in Simbirsk province. Crews notes, however, that traditionalist Muslims continued to use the imperial state to enforce their doctrinal beliefs, as when they successfully called on the police to suppress God's Regiment of Muslim Old Believers in 1882 (318–20), or to put an end to Wahhabism within the empire or to Sufi "innovations" such as counting prayers on beads. Crews admits that some Muslims worried about their community's moral corruption under Christian rule, as evidenced by family breakdowns and prostitution—problems these Muslims proposed to address by re-imposing *shari'a* law. Yet he reads their newspaper articles as proof they were part of "an imperial Muslim community," rather than as evidence of fundamental disaffection with the empire. He interprets the 1904–5 Muslim campaign for civil equality and for an end to religious discrimination as an expression of "deep divides" over the future direction of the community. Still, he thinks these divisions did not significantly diminish Muslim loyalty to the empire. For example, he points out that, for Muslim clergymen, the demand for "equal rights" was not untypically a call for equality of privileges with Orthodox priests. He says this demand was often accompanied by the demand that the Russian state assist Muslims in ending conversions from Islam to Christianity. In 1913, Crews stresses, prominent Muslims celebrated their loyalty to the Romanov dynasty, thereby signaling their essential acceptance of the confessional system imposed by the state in Catherine's time.

Crews's epilogue notes that the Bolshevik regime "revived many of imperial Russia's Islamic institutions, even staffing them with old personnel" (365). He suspects that today, in Western Europe, governments may be tempted to adopt imperial strategies to regulate and police their domestic Muslim communities. Although his entire book has pointed to the positive effects of such policies in Russia, he thinks such policies "ill-suited for democratic states

that value democracy and human rights" (370). The puzzled reader, taking that sentiment to heart, may be forgiven for wondering whether such policies, which seem to contemporary eyes undemocratic and inhumane, were as benign in Russia as Crews suggests in his long book.

For Prophet and Tsar is a bold attempt to describe Russian imperial policies toward Muslims between the 18th and 20th centuries and to analyze Muslims' responses to those policies. It puts in circulation archival materials from central Russian repositories but also from Orenburg, Kazan, Tashkent, and Ufa. Crews has read widely in the historical literature in Russian and English, but he also occasionally cites materials in German, French, and other languages. Probably the most valuable parts of the book include quotations from or paraphrases of petitions written by common Muslims seeking redress of family problems, complaining about "clerical" corruption or, more rarely, false preaching. As a result, the book deserves wide readership.

Crews's book has its flaws, however, several of them severe. Passing references to imperial ethnographers notwithstanding, the book is innocent of sociology and anthropology. For example, Crews does not carefully distinguish between urban-dwelling, town-dwelling, and rural Muslims. His description of the Kazakhs as "nomads" of rather vague religious allegiance is superficial, and he makes virtually no attempt to understand the peculiarities of Turkestani Muslims. In discussing petitions from Muslims, Crews generally fails to provide a numerical context: except in rare cases, we do not know how many petitions of what sort were presented to the Orenburg assembly in a given year or decade. Crews's strategy for interpreting petitions—to label them as attempts to entangle the state in Muslim affairs and to use its resources to effect locally desired outcomes—is almost tautological in its simplicity. Even if we grant his premises that Muslims in southern Russia lived mostly at peace with the empire and that their elites tended to align themselves publicly with the regime, we cannot tell, based on the evidence of his book, how widely shared was this satisfaction with the regime or how deep it went. Here and there, Crews mentions the non-licensed preachers, the itinerant Sufis, or the women running private religious schools who troubled the Muslim establishment. He notes, without emphasis, the hostilities in the Andizhan region toward religious intermediaries with Russian officials.[18] One wants to know whether such hostility was not felt in other regions as well, especially given the participation of some Muslims in the anti-tsarist violence of 1917.

In general, one may question Crews's decision to de-emphasize episodes of conflict between Muslims and imperial authorities, to underestimate the role of force or the threat of force in enforcing the government's regime of

[18] Between the early 1990s and May 2005, the Andizhan region was the site of recurrent religious violence between fundamental Muslims and the government of Uzbekistan.

Russian–Muslim "toleration." Muslims in Tatarstan, Orenburg, the Kazakh steppes, Turkestan, and the Caucasus had this in common—that their communities had been conquered or strategically assimilated by the Russian state at some point between the late 16th and the mid-19th centuries. The acts of conquest had been more or less bloody—an indication that Muslim communities, if and when they did submit to Russian power, did so reluctantly, bowing, so to speak, to the inevitable. The co-optation of Muslim elites that followed military conquest seems to have involved its share of petty ambitions on the collaborators' part; and probably, over time, Muslims' heads were turned toward Petersburg as the locus of state power and source of material benefits. However, to imagine, as Crews does, that a large number of educated Muslims regarded Russia as "*the* House of Islam" (3) rather than just *a part* of the House of Islam, or—better—as a colonizing imperial authority, is to go far beyond the evidence presented in the book. Indeed, the evidence suggests that many unofficial preachers and Sufi masters never reconciled themselves to their Russian masters' desire to "license" the practice of Islam. The restiveness of the 1890s and of the 1905 period and the presence of "heretics" and "revolutionaries" in the Muslim community point to a submerged resentment of the Orthodox Christian realm that could surface powerfully when external conditions permitted. All these phenomena might be explained more satisfactorily by positing that the *Pax Rossica* was sustained from beginning to end by Russian guile but also by Russian force and the threat of force holding a portion of the Muslim elites in line with Petersburg's will. Where Russian state power proved insufficient—in Circassia, Daghestan, Chechnya, Avaria, Andizhan—Muslim elites challenged the empire by military means. In other words, Crews's book tells an important part of Muslim history in the Russian empire but not the whole history, and perhaps not even the central tale.

What do these two timely books tell us about the current scholarly moment in Russian borderlands history? First, in both Russia and the West scholars have been making progress at understanding the interactions between the imperial center and its peripheries. In Russia, as evidenced by Dolbilov and Miller, there may still be a keener interest in and grasp of the permutations of Petersburg policies than an appreciation of the perspectives of subject peoples, yet the story of the Russian empire is now understood to be even more multidimensional than previous scholars assumed it to be. Historians in Russia have begun to reassess national circumstances in Poland and the western peripheries. The old taboo on discussing Jewish history in balanced terms is gone, although it remains unclear to what degree Jewish history

will now be fully integrated into the rest of the imperial narrative. In the United States, as evidenced by Crews, there is a determination not only to understand the terms under which national and religious minorities lived in Russia but also to describe the political strategies that, initiated from above and below, led to durable social arrangements there. Crews's fascination with religion as a mechanism productive of social harmony—a fascination now ever more widely shared in the historical profession—draws new attention to the ways that believing communities presented themselves to Petersburg and accepted, willingly or unwillingly, Petersburg's jurisdiction. This salutary interest in religion is a welcome contrast with the historiographical dispensation of the 1960s and 1970s, when religion as a factor in imperial life was grossly underestimated or ignored altogether by most Western historians.

Second, the two books suggest that historians have now arrived at a point where the international or cosmopolitan dimension of scholarship may be taken for granted and where rich possibilities for comparative work may soon emerge. By the "cosmopolitan" element in scholarship, I mean that most scholars now grasp that their contributions to borderland scholarship will not make a major mark on the field unless they are based on consultation of secondary literature in other languages. This feature of the new scholarly terrain may seem axiomatic to younger scholars, but only 40 years ago it was the practice of senior Soviet scholars like Militsa Vasil′evna Nechkina to refuse to cite even those Western authors with whom they were familiar, or to allude to them glancingly, or only by referring to generic reviews of non-Marxist scholarship.[19]

From the two books under review, we may hope for a kind of positive cross-fertilization. Perhaps Dolbilov, Miller, and company will eventually look harder at the purely religious elements of Petersburg's policy in the Western borderlands; perhaps Crews and others will one day examine with greater attention the national and social dimensions of life in the imperial South. For a while, perhaps, methodological focus on ethnos, language, and religion will take precedence over the older methodological focus on class and gender in analyzing imperial history.

Third, these two books point to an important but perhaps little recognized fault line in borderlands history having to do with the exercise of political power. Dolbilov, Miller, and company—who have lived in a state with a government that has been sometimes weak but more often assertive,

[19] The narrowly Sovieto-centric scholarly atmosphere of the mid-century was, in part, a by-product of Stalinism and party control of historical research, but it was also perhaps related to the lack of good language training among historians of Russia. Among the most prominent scholars of imperial Russia working in the period from 1950 to 1970, it would be easy to name several who read no French, English, or Polish. German was not universally known but was more commonly understood, partly because of the war and partly because of the emphasis on German languages in the prewar universities.

authoritarian, or worse—have an intuitive sense that, in imperial relations, the power of the central government must always be reckoned with. While they comprehend that Petersburg officials could experience terrible frustrations in governing the peripheries, they also see that the central government enjoyed such a preponderance of military force that "negotiations" between center and periphery were virtually always asymmetrical. Crews and many other American scholars of empire, in contrast, would rather displace force and conflict from the forefront of our attention. When the state appears in their narratives, it is often described as a weak, distant actor, and not infrequently it is made to appear in local costume. For example, Crews writes: "The regime instrumentalized Muslims, but Muslims captured the state, applying its instruments of coercion to the daily interpretive disputes that divided Muslim men and women" (10). Such a domesticated vision of Russian power would not have made much sense to Polish insurrectionists in 1863–64, nor would it have been easily apprehensible to the Caucasus mountaineers who from 1829 to 1859 encountered Petersburg authority in the form of rifles, artilleries, and axes. Somehow, historians of the empire need to hold in tension the dual realities of local agency and central power.

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