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HUSSEIN'S CONSTRAINTS, JORDAN'S DILEMMA

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FOR JORDAN, THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS is more than a foreign-policy preoccupation; it deals with issues that lie at the heart of the country's domestic life. The line between external and internal issues is in any case a thin one for the kingdom, given its vulnerability to outside events and pressures. Where the Palestinian issue is concerned the line virtually disappears. Since 1948 the country has been an integral part of the Palestinian question. Even in East Bank Jordan itself, leaving aside the Israeli-occupied West Bank, Palestinians today constitute a majority of the population. In addition, Jordan still has responsibilities in and for the Palestinian territory of the West Bank, whose residents are also Jordanian citizens. The unfolding of the Palestinian problem will continue to affect domestic relationships and the future of the Jordanian regime. In this area, King Hussein must play foreign and domestic policies carefully against one another, balancing crosscutting pressures from inside and outside his country.

Beyond the practical considerations of policy, the Palestinian question stirs personal and dynastic responses that may be an equally important influence on Hussein's participation in the peace process. During World War II, his Hashemite great-grandfather, Hussein, King of the Hejaz, Grand Sharif, Ruler of Mecca and Guardian of the Holy Places, entertained the vision of an independent Arab world ruled by the Hashemites. This vision faded, but in the early 1920s Hashemites nonetheless governed the Hejaz, with the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and

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the entities of Iraq and Transjordan, which were created under the post-World War I British Mandates. Before long the Hejaz was lost to the Saudis, but in 1948 the acquisition by Transjordan of parts of Palestine, including the holy city of Jerusalem, nourished the sense of family destiny. Today Iraq and Jerusalem have been lost, and all that remains of the Hashemite vision is East Bank Jordan. It is clear that Hussein feels this diminution keenly and is sensible of a personal responsibility to his Hashemite forebears to play the part in Arab affairs that appeared to be predestined for the family. In particular, he seems oppressed by an obligation to redress his loss of Jerusalem, won for the Hashemites by Abdullah, King Hussein's grandfather, at the cost of his life.

For all these reasons, Jordan cannot escape a major role in the Palestinian issue and efforts to resolve it. Jordan's relationship to the issue, however, has changed in important ways over the years as the Palestinian national movement has evolved.

Jordan was founded, in a sense, by being excluded from Britain's Palestine Mandate. Nevertheless, its first ruler, Emir and later king Abdullah, always eager to expand his realm, came to covet the territory of Mandate Palestine. When British intentions to relinquish the Mandate became clear in 1947, and the partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish sections was in the wind, he set out to acquire whatever portion fell to the Arabs. With the end of the first Arab-Israeli war in 1949, accordingly, he annexed the West Bank and Jerusalem.

In taking these territories, Abdullah established two patterns that have persisted ever since. First, he incorporated the regional Palestinian problem into Jordan's domestic life. And second, he set Jordan at odds with the indigenous Palestinian leadership—at that time represented by the Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin Husseini—that sought to rule Palestine itself and bitterly resented Jordanian interference. The claim of the Palestinian leadership to self-rule was also supported by the leading Arab governments.

The effect of Abdullah's move on Jordan's internal structure was overwhelming. More than 850,000 Palestinians were added to a Jordanian population of a little over 400,000.[1] A very reluctant West Bank—politically and economically more advanced than pre-1948 Jordan—was made part of the new nation. Though Israel occupied the West Bank in 1967, the territory has continued to be represented in the Jordanian parliament, its residents continue to be Jordanian citizens, and Amman continues to pay the salaries of civil servants, mainly teachers, who stayed on in their West Bank jobs. So many Palestinians have crossed the Jordan

1. Peter Gusber, *Jordan: Crossroads of Middle Eastern Events* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983), 12.

River to the East Bank, especially in 1948 and 1967, that even East Bank Jordan now has a Palestinian majority, generally estimated at more than 1.4 million out of a 2.7 million total.[2]

The conflict with the Palestinian leadership led to Abdullah's assassination in 1951, which was witnessed by his grandson Hussein. After Abdullah's death, with the Mufti in exile in Cairo, the conflict subsided. During the 1950s and 1960s Jordan achieved some acceptance as the representative of the Palestinians. United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967, which established a framework for settling the Arab-Israeli conflict as it was left after the 1967 war, tacitly assumed that Jordan would retrieve the West Bank in a settlement, for example. In the late 1960s the struggle revived as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) gained strength and prominence after the June war. By 1970 elements of the PLO were challenging Hashemite rule in Jordan itself, leading to the outbreak of open warfare between the Jordanian army and PLO militias in September of that year. In 1974 the Arab League Council, meeting in Rabat, designated the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians. With this decision it was no longer possible for Hussein to negotiate peace without a PLO representative by his side unless the Palestinians themselves authorized him to do so or put forward other representatives to act instead of the PLO. The Rabat decision formalized the coming of age of the Palestinian national movement and fundamentally changed Jordan's role in the peace process.

As King Hussein structures Jordanian policy in the more complex environment reflected by the Rabat decision, he must take into account three main sets of pressures: the still unresolved relationship between the Palestinian majority of his population and the Jordanian monarchy and government; the reluctance of the East Banker minority—his firmest base of support—to see the Jordanian state risked in the resolution of the Palestinian problem; and Jordan's economic, political, and security vulnerabilities to more powerful Arab neighbors, who themselves have an interest in how Jordan pursues the Palestinian issue. The Islamic movement, widespread in Jordan, contributes an additional, though less immediate, element of uncertainty and possible risk.

THE PROBLEM POSED BY THE PALESTINIAN JORDANIANS is especially hard to assess. They are the reluctant immigrants who came to Jordan because of the creation of Israel in 1948. Those who came from Palestine before 1948 are presumed to have come of their own volition and are

2. Total population figure is a 1984 estimate given in *The World Almanac and Book of Facts, 1986* (New York: Newspaper Enterprise Association, Inc., 1986). No official statistics are kept on the origin of Jordanian citizens. Estimates of the Palestinian portion by scholars range from just over half to two-thirds of the total.

generally lumped in with East Bankers. The first major influx of the new immigrants occurred in 1947-48, after the British withdrawal from Palestine, the creation of Israel, and the subsequent war. Most of the members of this group became fairly well integrated during the next three decades. With their greater education and sophistication they became the bulk of the urban middle class in a modernizing Jordan. Only those less able to compete—the rural villagers and urban poor from Palestine—remained in refugee camps, embittered and largely isolated from Jordanian life.

The second wave of immigrants came from Jerusalem and the West Bank after the 1967 war. Many of these refugees were fleeing the Israelis for the second time and were even more bitter than the 1948 refugees had been. Moreover, their experience during what most saw as nineteen years of Jordanian occupation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem had not bred affection for the Hashemite regime. Finally, and most important, in the months and years after the 1967 war, when the new arrivals might have begun to assimilate, the rapid growth of the Palestinian national movement increased their sense of Palestinian, as distinct from Jordanian, identity. The 1948 Palestinians were also affected during this period by the emergence of a clearly defined Palestinian nationality, exemplified not only by the PLO but also by the founding of Palestinian institutions, such as the Palestinian Red Crescent Society, the Muslim equivalent of the Red Cross. Their integration into a common Jordanian society was set back. The 1970 war between the Jordanian army and the PLO militias and the 1974 designation of the PLO as the sole Palestinian representative deepened this separation.

Tensions between Palestinians and East Bankers lessened in succeeding years. Most Palestinians have become well established economically, dominating the professions, the media, and commerce. The oil boom of the late 1970s and early 1980s brought an increase in jobs and largely eliminated economic competition between the two groups. There has also been considerable intermarriage, and military conscription and education have drawn the younger generations closer together than their parents.

However, the Palestinians remain a distinct and separate element and are regarded as such by both groups. Despite the fact that they are a majority in Jordan, they feel themselves in a sense to be in someone else's country. They believe—correctly—that the security services watch them more closely. Though Palestinians are a majority of the population, the government and the key military posts are largely staffed by East Bankers (some ministries, such as Foreign Affairs, are heavily Palestinian). As a Palestinian lawyer remarked, the lawyers are Palestinians but the judges are East Bankers.[3]

3. Personal communication.

The political consequences of this bifurcation are unclear and are the subject of speculation by Jordanians and outside observers. Two things, however, do seem evident: the Palestinian Jordanians do not constitute a political pressure group, urging certain policies on the government, and they do not aspire as a group to take over the government and create a Palestinian state. On the whole, the Palestinians in Jordan seem relatively apolitical. There are no organizations and no spokesmen that represent them. Since the turbulent 1950s and 1960s, when Palestinians were in the forefront of efforts fomented by Cairo and Damascus to bring down the monarchy or at least turn it more actively against Israel, Palestinians have seemed mainly concerned with making money and pursuing their professions. The Jordanian leadership, of course, has actively discouraged popular participation in politics. But Palestinians seem no more prominent or better represented than East Bankers among those seeking to reopen political life by, for example, legalizing political parties.

Similarly, one has the impression that middle class Palestinians are content to let Hussein run the country. They appear satisfied with a tacit social contract by which the king ensures an environment of security and economic opportunity in which they can work and prosper.

It is equally evident, though, that Palestinian Jordanians still identify to varying degrees with the Palestinian national movement and that they care about the future course of the Palestinian issue. Well off though many are in Jordan, content though they may be to remain there indefinitely as Jordanians, they would like to see their future resolved. They want to be fully accepted as Jordanians, but they do not want to surrender their Palestinian identity. They feel the unresolved Palestinian issue is keeping their lives in a state of suspension. As a leading Palestinian sociologist in Jordan put it: "Solve the Palestinian problem and you solve everything; don't solve it and nothing is solved."[4]

The pressure that the Palestinian presence exerts on policy does not, therefore, come from their active promotion of their special interests as Palestinians. The Jordanian leadership is responding rather to the entanglement of the kingdom in the problem as a whole, which the Palestinian presence continues to represent. The future of the country is unresolved so long as the Palestinian question remains an open one. Moreover, other problems the country faces are made more unsettling and more complicated by the dynamics of this unresolved issue at the center of the society. Unemployment, for example, becomes not just an economic issue but a political one as well. The whole issue of greater democratization, urged by some as a necessary step toward strengthening the state for the future, is clouded by the fear that the country will be

4. Personal communication.

torn by political conflict revolving around the Palestinian question. National elections bring with them the difficulty that the residents of the Israeli-occupied West Bank, though Jordanian citizens, cannot vote.

This is not to say that a regional solution of the Palestinian problem would necessarily make Jordan's demographic situation easier to deal with. Some solutions would accentuate it in the short term. The union of Jordan and the West Bank, for example, would increase to more than two-to-one the ratio between Palestinians and East Bankers in Jordan. Some argue that Jordan, in fact, is better-off with the current Jordanian-West Bank-Israeli modus vivendi than it would be if it confronted the risks of negotiations and of such solutions.

Weighed against the possibly problematic outcomes that a peace settlement could bring, however, is one potential consequence of a continued stalemate that has come to seem especially real to the king and many of his advisers, namely, the forced exodus of tens or hundreds of thousands of West Bank Palestinians from the West Bank to Jordan. Some prominent Israelis openly advocate such forced removals as a solution to Israel's growing demographic problem, and even though they are among the more extreme voices in Israel, they have gained enough support and influence to cause serious concern within Jordan.

THE EAST BANKERS, FOR THEIR PART, are wary of Jordanian peace efforts, and they constitute a bloc to which the king must pay careful attention. They provided the support that carried him through the lean early years of his monarchy, and they are still the trusted bedrock of his rule.

The East Bankers are a diverse group, numbering today somewhat more than a million. At their core are the descendants of the approximately 300,000 people who lived in the area when it became the Emirate of Transjordan in 1921. Nearly half of these were nomads at that time, and the rest were townspeople, villagers, and semi-nomads. Abdullah based his authority primarily on the tribesmen of the south, who shared his Hejazi origins, but he was less popular with the more sophisticated townsmen of the north, a distinction that has persisted. He himself brought a small number of followers with him from Mecca. Other newcomers came shortly afterwards from Syria, when the French occupied Damascus. During the period up to 1948, immigration continued at a low level from Palestine and elsewhere.

By contrast with the largely urban, educated Palestinians, the East Bankers in 1948 were provincial, conservative, and poorly educated. Much of this has changed since then, especially the education level of East Bankers, which now equals that of Palestinians. But the conservatism, and in a sense the provincialism, remain characteristic of East Bankers.

A prominent and very conservative East Banker remarked that "Palestinians have a talent for making money that East Bankers do not have. They are traders and merchants like the Lebanese. If we had to rely on our business skills we'd starve."[5]

The East Bankers have only one loyalty—to Jordan—and tend to see themselves as the real Jordanians. This sense of Jordanian identity was underdeveloped in 1948, when the Palestinians arrived, and this made it easier for the indigenous Jordanians to accept the newcomers. Exposure over the years to the Palestinians, however, with their stronger feelings of national identity, has led East Bankers to become more conscious of their own distinctiveness and their own separate interests.

As Arabs, the East Bankers have been angered and dismayed by Israel's establishment and expansion. Their concern, however, has tended primarily to focus on preserving Jordan's security in the face of this assault rather than on righting the wrongs done to the Palestinians. They appreciate Jordan's limitations as a small, not very rich state, and they are reluctant to put it at risk for a cause they do not see as their own. Most do not share the king's sense of a larger Hashemite destiny; what seems to him a noble obligation appears to most of them as risky adventurism. The more conservative among them, in fact, have at times actively resisted the idea of reincorporating the West Bank into Jordan, arguing that the country already has too many Palestinians.

After the Rabat decision naming the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians, there was a sharp reaction in conservative East Bank circles. Some East Bankers believed their sacrifices on behalf of the Palestinians were ignored and rejected by the Arab world and the Palestinians themselves. They felt the time had come to cut the cord. They spoke of putting Jordan's own East Bank house in order, of Jordan for the Jordanians, of obliging the Palestinians to choose—in effect, Jordan, love it or leave it—and to end their dual identity. The "Little Jordan" school of thought grew in acceptance. Some advocated discontinuing the salaries Jordan pays to civil servants on the Israeli-occupied West Bank. The government made some concessions to this sentiment, cutting back the number of Palestinians in the cabinet, for example, and turning many Palestinians out of government departments, but Hussein and his prime minister at the time, Zeid Rifai, realized that any serious efforts to "Jordanize" the country would tear it apart. In time the sense of outrage abated. Hussein's rapprochement with PLO chief Yasir Arafat in 1979 eased tensions between Palestinians and East Bankers, but the underlying divergences of outlook of the two groups still remain.

5. Personal communication.

The East Bankers are crucial to the monarchy precisely because they are thought to be unquestionably loyal. For this reason they hold the key positions in the army and the security service. Both these institutions are in a position to exercise a conservative influence, and do so, but it has been the army that has been the principal keeper of the conservative flame.

The Jordanian army, known until 1956 as the Arab Legion, has traditionally had a tribal base. In its early years the officer positions were allotted to the main loyal bedouin tribes, which in turn were responsible for supplying a flow of enlisted men. Though the tribal structure in the country has broken down considerably under the impact of modernization, the old tribal families are still represented in command positions. Many of the enlisted men also come from families that have served for several generations. Somewhat more than a third of the regular army is Palestinian, but East Bankers continue to make up the strike forces, particularly the armored units that are essential to internal security.

With the exception of a brief period in the 1950s the army has kept out of politics. It has not been a breeding ground for ambitious younger officers bent on ending corruption and inequities and modernizing the country, as has been the pattern in so many Third World nations. Corruption, inequity, and modernization have not been such serious issues in Jordan. The kingdom has until recently been without great contrasts of wealth; by Third World standards corruption has been modest; and the king has himself actively promoted modernization. He has, moreover, maintained the respect of the military by his bravery and through his demonstrated concern for them. His two main problems have been obtaining sufficient advanced weaponry—important to military morale and continued support—from the United States and finding the funds for overdue pay raises, but these strains have so far been kept within tolerable bounds.

The king has had to be, and has been, sensitive to the views of the military. He keeps in close touch with officers and enlisted men alike. Moreover, the army commander, General Zeid ben Shaker, is a longtime associate of the king; his father came to Jordan with Abdullah. Ben Shaker belongs to the informal set of advisers the king counts on to help him make policy. He manifests the deep suspicion of Palestinians that is characteristic of East Bank army officers. Close though he is to Hussein, however, Shaker does not share the king's sense of mission and responsibility for the West Bank and Jerusalem.

WHEN JORDANIANS TALK ABOUT THE RISKS OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, they are thinking in the first instance about Jordan's dependence on, and vulnerability to, the Arab world, a world that has not hesitated in the

past to punish the kingdom for departing from the Arab consensus on Arab-Israeli relations. The most obvious vulnerability concerns the country's security. Here Syria has been the principal problem. The Syrian border is only forty miles north of Amman and across that border are military forces that Jordan cannot match in numbers or weaponry. Twice in the last sixteen years these forces have moved against Jordan, in 1970 and 1980. The 1970 episode, an outright attack (in 1980 Syria massed forces on the border but did not cross it), was an especially important lesson, since Damascus was then acting to support the PLO in its struggle with the Jordanian army.

More worrisome, though, is the campaign of subversion, terror, and assassination that Syria has conducted against Jordan, and against the king personally, during much of the past three decades. Jordanian security forces are capable and not many of these operations succeed within Jordan. The country's diplomats are attacked abroad, however, and occasionally a bomb goes off or an assassination attempt succeeds inside Jordan itself.

The second major Jordanian vulnerability is economic. At one level this involves trade and travel. Syrian airspace is important to Jordan for movement in and out of the region. Syrian trade is also important, though not critical. But both have been cut off by the Syrians in the past as retaliation for Jordanian moves on the Palestinian issue, and they could be again.

More important, Jordan is highly dependent on outside financial support. Throughout its history Jordan has had three major economic gaps: balance of payments, budget, and savings and investment. In 1984, for example, Jordan's balance of trade included imports of 1,071.3 million Jordanian dinars but exports of only 261.0 million dinars, or four times as much imported as exported.[6] On the budget side, taxation has generally been entirely inadequate to finance the government and especially the military forces. Until 1956 these shortfalls were made up in large part by British subsidies. When Hussein broke the close tie with Britain in 1956, the United States moved in to fill the gap. Ultimately, beginning after the 1967 war with the "Khartoum subsidies," the wealthier Arab governments took over the main financial burden. There was and is a political price tag attached to this support, however. Kuwait, for example, canceled its subsidy when Hussein expelled the PLO in 1970–71 and did not restore it until Jordanian forces were sent to help the Syrians defend against Israeli counterattacks on the Golan Heights in October 1973. The $1.25 billion in subsidies agreed on at the Baghdad Arab League Council Summit in 1978 was a reaction against the Camp David accords and was based on the assumption that Jordan would reject any role in negotiations over the West Bank and Gaza foreseen in those accords.[7]

6. Central Bank of Jordan, *Monthly Statistical Bulletin,* 21:7 (July 1985).
7. *Financial Times,* 26 September 1983.

Arab subsidies have declined steadily since the oil boom ended in the early 1980s, but they are still important, covering almost all of Jordan's oil imports. Another major source of support for the economy has held up better, namely the more than $1.1 billion in remittances from Jordanians working in the Gulf states.[8] Ultimately these are also at the mercy of Gulf state governments if Jordan falls from favor, but the workers involved serve the interests of the host countries as well as those of Jordan and would be difficult to replace over the short run.

WITH RESPECT TO JORDAN'S PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACE PROCESS, East Banker concerns are expressed in a number of specific ways. Two are of special importance: first, that if Jordan is to become involved in negotiations at all, it should not negotiate with Israel on behalf of the Palestinians; and, second, that Jordan should have broad Arab support for any moves it makes in the peace process.

The king and his advisers, particularly the more conservative among them, realize that if Jordan decides to negotiate on Palestinian issues, Hussein will be blamed for any concessions he must make to obtain an agreement. This would be especially true in relation to the boundaries of any Palestinian entity to be created from lands now occupied by Israel. They also know that, given the balance of power in the area, some concessions would be inevitable. They have learned the hard way that the Palestinians will insist on their maximum demands, that they will avoid responsibility for accepting anything less, and that their discontent with any concessions will be fanned by much of the Arab world. East Banker advisers argue that only the Palestinians themselves can make the concessions that would be necessary. They therefore advocate a negotiating partnership with Palestinian representatives, who would bargain separately for the creation of a Palestinian entity and on other issues of concern to the Palestinians while Jordan deals with bilateral Jordanian-Israeli questions, such as the two nations' common border.

This cautious position, of course, opens up for Hussein a complex diplomatic front with dangers of its own. The question of which Palestinians can be regarded as sufficiently representative arises at once. In the first instance the answer is obvious. The mainline PLO under Arafat's leadership is considered by the majority of Palestinians in Jordan, the West Bank, and Gaza to be their legitimate representative, and its designation as such at Rabat ensures the acceptance of a good part of the Arab world. Hussein accordingly tried in 1985, as he had three years before, to work out a partnership with Arafat. Both these attempts failed. After

8. Ibid. This 1982 figure represents funds remitted through official banking facilities. The actual amount was estimated at between 50 and 100 percent higher.

the second failure, however, the question of possible alternatives arose. In the wake of the split with Arafat in February 1986, the king and some less conservative advisers entertained the hope that moderate West Bank leaders could be persuaded to come forward and participate in negotiations. For their part, however, the West Bankers, though they would like to see a settlement that would rid them of Israeli occupation, do not feel themselves to be in a strong enough position to take on the task of representing the Palestinians in the face of opposition from the PLO and much of the Arab world, opposition that they must assume would include physical attacks against them. Efforts by the Jordanians to develop a more cooperative attitude among West Bank leaders has led during the past year to a kind of power struggle between Amman and the PLO for the support and loyalty of West Bankers. These are treacherous waters for the king, since he risks being again at odds with the Palestinian national movement and the Arab consensus.

The concept of a partnership with the PLO has a negative side that has caused considerable concern among East Bankers and certainly tempered any regret they might have felt when the initiative fell through. Arafat and his supporters were anxious to rebuild an infrastructure in Amman, all the more so as they had been driven out of Beirut by the 1982 Israeli invasion. The army leadership—remembering the 1970 conflict with the PLO as well as the years of punishing Israeli reprisals for PLO raids launched from Jordanian territory—was strongly opposed to allowing the organization a foothold. During 1985 some PLO offices were opened in Amman but a tight rein was kept on them. Arafat was not allowed a residence in the city. "Let him use the royal guest house all he wants," commented one Jordanian in the king's circle.[9] After the breakdown of the partnership effort in early 1986, some PLO offices in Amman were closed by the Jordanians and their staffs expelled.

Broad support in the Arab world was a second major imperative in Jordan's 1985 efforts to revive the peace negotiations. Saudi backing was considered most important, and at one time Amman thought it had a commitment from the Saudis to support the project in Arab councils, a commitment that failed to materialize. Moreover, an international conference was built into the king's proposal as a context for any negotiations so that Jordan's responsibilities would be widely shared. The Jordanians hoped, too, that an international conference, with Soviet participation, would forestall efforts by Moscow to prevent the talks and would moderate Syrian opposition. The king also saw American support as vital, not only to make the initiative work but also to help reduce Jordan's political exposure.

9. Personal communication.

The relationship with Syria was a particular point of focus in pursuing the 1985 initiative, and it revealed some of the differences in priorities among the king's advisers. Syrian opposition to the initiative was taken for granted by some and the initiative was designed to insulate Jordan against its worst effects. However, Zeid Rifai, an adviser known for his view that good relations with Damascus were a near-imperative for Jordan, was brought in as prime minister in early 1985. Rifai was less willing than others to risk a confrontation with Syria, however well buttressed Jordan might have been for such an eventuality. As the effort to secure PLO cooperation began to fray in mid-1985, he moved to improve the Amman-Damascus relationship. By the end of the year, through Saudi intercession, Hussein visited Damascus, and a visit by Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad to Amman followed soon after. Whatever may come of this nascent rapprochement, it represents for Jordan a deemphasis of the risky peace process in favor of a Jordan-centered regional policy that seeks better relations with other Arab states, particularly Syria.

IN HIS HANDLING OF THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION, HUSSEIN MUST contend with another, less easily understood constituency, the Islamic fundamentalists. They fall into two rough categories. The Muslim Brotherhood is an organized group that goes back more than thirty years in Jordan and is well known to the monarchy. It has been coopted over the years by official subsidies and support and backed the king against threats to his rule in the 1950s and 1960s. The brotherhood has become less tractable in recent years, however, and Hussein moved to limit the group's activities in early 1986. The crackdown was undertaken partly to appease Syria—the brotherhood had supported opposition activities by its Syrian associates—but also because it had been getting overly involved in political activities at home.

The second category, the new, populist Islamic revival of the last ten years, is not well understood. The revival is widespread in Jordan, attracting people from all classes but especially strong among students and the less well-to-do. As elsewhere in the Arab world, it is anti-Western and calls for a pure Islamic society. Jordanian fundamentalists oppose a compromise negotiated peace with Israel, maintaining that only by reforming itself and casting out Western ways will Islam be strong enough to confront the Zionists. Whether they basically oppose the monarchy is less clear; some at least profess not to, while regretting its Western orientation and policies. The movement is especially unnerving because it appears to be waiting in the wings, without a distinct program or leadership above the local level. Some observers fear that a crisis or a marked failure by the Jordanian leadership could spur it into action, leading to unpredictable consequences. Its potential for causing trouble was

demonstrated in the outburst of violence at Yarmouk University in northern Jordan in May 1986. The fundamentalists cooperated with communist groups to transform a protest about local university issues into a major riot in which a number of people were hurt. For the moment, however, it seems largely politically passive and inchoate. There is little to suggest that its presence has affected Jordanian participation in the peace process except, perhaps, to heighten the king's general sense of caution.

IN SUMMING UP THE COMPLEX JORDANIAN POLITICAL EQUATION, the focus must be on King Hussein himself. His is a working monarchy, and he is indisputably Jordan's leader. Moved by personal and dynastic sentiment as well as by the cold imperatives of political survival, he is strongly inclined to remain engaged in the peace process. In calculating the advantages and risks of alternative policies, he is to some extent trapped by his situation. If he does not succeed in negotiating a peace settlement, he will continue to live with the volatile Palestinian problem, over which he has little control but which ultimately may determine the fate of his kingdom. The Palestinian Jordanians of his East Bank Jordan state are inevitably affected by the freewheeling dynamics of the issue, and there are an equal number of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza whose destiny, almost entirely beyond Hussein's control in the absence of peace, will certainly have a major impact on Jordan. He has to be concerned that a great many of the Palestinians under Israeli occupation may one day be forced to cross into Jordan by Israeli pressure. On the other hand, most peace settlements would leave him with a much enlarged Palestinian majority within Jordan or closely associated with it, putting the future of the monarchy in some question.

Hussein is damned if he does and damned if he doesn't, which is to say that however he plays his hand, the Palestinian problem will continue to pose a serious threat for him and his kingdom. All he can hope to do is maximize his control over events, and keeping the peace process in motion, and participating in it, accomplishes this. Even if the peace efforts are unsuccessful, as they seem likely to be, Jordan's engagement brings greater control than Hussein would otherwise have.

Engagement in a peace process brings risks of its own, of course. One set of risks is external, in the form of a fraternity of Arab states that has long distrusted the Jordanian role in the Palestinian question and has the leverage to exact a painful retribution. The other is internal; the king must carry with him his crucial East Banker minority that fears Jordan's entanglement with the Palestinians and knows that it tends to put their country at odds with powerful currents in the Arab world. There is no easy way out. For the king, a certain nimbleness and a good deal of fortitude have always been prerequisites for survival in a dangerous world.