Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972-1990 , and: *China and Japan in the Global Setting* (review)

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SAIS Review, Volume 14, Number 1, Winter-Spring 1994, pp. 190-193 (Review)

Published by Johns Hopkins University Press
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/sais.1994.0017

infrastructure problems that would have prompted the building of the Trans-Siberian railroad, had that decision been truly economic in nature.

This book makes few, if any, references to contemporary history, though it anticipates recent events, giving the reader an eerie sense that Russian history, in particular, is prone to repeating itself. For instance, the concerns of the Siberian regionalists over the construction of the Trans-Siberian in the late 1800s closely parallel Siberians' fears today. They are exasperated with the continued preeminence of non-Siberian interests in every decision made concerning the region. They are afraid that tying the region more closely to Moscow will only perpetuate the center's political and economic stranglehold. In short, Marks' work is most timely. At the turn of the century, the Siberian "Road to Power" was seen through a purely political prism. Now the end of the Cold War and the dawn of a new century have redefined just what constitutes "power". Siberia and its exploitation may indeed be the road to economic prosperity, which lies at the root of power today. As the Pacific Rim region becomes more and more economically integrated, and with Siberia and the Far East holding tremendous potential as emerging markets, it will become ever more important to understand the region, its historical experiences and economic legacy.

Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972-1990. By David Shambaugh. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991. 326 pp. $39.50/Hardback, $16.95/Softcover.

China and Japan in the Global Setting. By Akira Iriye. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992. 156 pp. $22.50/Hardback.

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The end of the Cold War has generated considerable debate about the appropriate pradigm in which to organize the images of the new world disorder. Unfortunately, such inquiries often use American fears or wishful thinking as a point of departure. As the United States turns its gaze towards the Asia Pacific region and considers how to construct "a new Pacific Community," *Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972-1990* by David Shambaugh and *China and Japan in the Global Setting* by Akira Iriye are invaluable aids to understanding the dynamics of this new center of political and economic power. These studies are unique because they move away from the question of how the United States perceives China and Japan. Instead, Shambaugh and Iriye focus on some of the salient issues in Japan and China's foreign relations.

By considering the power, cultural and economic aspects of international relations, Iriye, the director of Japanese Studies at Harvard, presents a periodization that sets Sino-Japanese relations in a new light. After the Meiji resoration in Japan and the Opium Wars in China, the most important question for both countries was

how to achieve the power that Western nations possessed. During this era in which power was paramount, Japan strengthened itself by building industries with the reparations it received after China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5). The unequal treaties that Japan negotiated also kept China's tariffs low and thus created a market for Japan's exports.

As he has long argued, Iriye then discusses how Sino-Japanese relations bewteen World Wars I and II are best understood in economic and cultural terms rather than purely military ones. As economic matters deteriorated, culture became the salient feature of international relations, and for the Japanese, war became a way of restructuring society and redefining culture. Iriyedoes not discount the importance of land, power and resource accumulation as an explanation for Japanese expansionism, but instead argues that culture was the key element that sparked the untenable war on the continent. Not culture in the sense of inherent aggressiveness, but rather the desire to harmonize all five races of Northeast Asia: Han, Mongol, Manchu, Korean and Japanese. With the apparent failure of liberalism and capitalism, Japan's sacred war was launched to purge Asia of the West and create a new cultural consciousness in Asia.

China responded to Japan's aggression by championing Western values of personal emancipation and unity in opposition to tyranny. It was in response to the Japanese invasion that Mao wrote *On People's Democracy*, and Chiang Kai-shek seized upon Sun Yat-sen's *Three People's Principles* to mobilize the country. These expressions of cultural nationalism and commitment to universal values highlight how culture was the central feature of a struggle between two opposing conceptions of Asian order.

The early resumption of trade after the Chinese Civil War, and the infusion of Japanese capital and technology following the normalization of relations in September 1972, made it clear that economics was paramount during the post-War period. The so-called separation of politics and economics in Chinese-Japanese relations allowed Tokyo to overcome the apparent contradiction between its security relationship with the United States and closer economic ties with China. Iriye concludes by reconsidering how the themes that were salient earlier this century—power and culture—affect the current relationship. For Iriye, the most important question is whether China and Japan can achieve cultural rapprochement, whether the Chinese would be willing to cease reminding Japan of its past transgressions.

Denunciation of Japan's militarism has long been a method to educate China's population about the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) "heroic" stance against imperialism. For the Chinese leadership to abandon such a pillar of legitimacy would require something in return. What the Japanese have to offer is the expertise to deal with problems of rapid industrialization. Recent comments by President and CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin and Premier Li Peng reveal how the Chinese leadership now prefers to focus on the benefits of future cooperation. Jiang Zemin acknowledged that Japan will play a greater political role in the Asia Pacific region and Li Peng praised Japan's economic contributions to China. Sino-Japanese cultural rapprochement

combined with Beijing's tacit approval of Japan's political ascendancy in the region would indeed be an important development.

In contrast to Iriye's broad brushstrokes, Shambaugh's work is thick with the details on the changing perceptions of China's "America-watchers" since Kissinger's secret visit in July 1971. He writes: "How could it be that a leading representative of 'American imperialism' had been welcomed into Chairman Mao's study in Zhongnanhai? To make matters worse, this presaged a visit by 'warmonger' Nixon the next year." This conundrum highlighted the need for America-watchers to remake the ideological lens through which the Chinese viewed the United States. Through the painstaking process of interviewing America-watchers and reviewing press treatment of the United States, Shambaugh, a senior lecturer in Chinese Politics at the University of London and editor of *The China Quarterly*, reveals how interpreting the United States became a major industry.

Shambaugh argues that the case of the Kissinger and Nixon visits was obviously a conscious shift in policy supporting a conscious shift in ideology. Paralleling this improvement of ties was the gradual reform of the intellectual environment. "This regime-induced attempt at normative intellectual change, essentially replacing deduction with induction, significantly affected the America Watchers," Shambaugh writes. He argues that the stage was set for broad-ranging intellectual debate on the nature of American politics, economics and foreign policy. With the loosening of ideological strictures, the lines of debate emerged as they would in any society. Some observers, whom Shambaugh labels Marxist, were deductive and clung to categories to explain the United States. Other observers were inductive and their analyses of the United States focus on the democratic process with its pressures of institutional actors and inputs.

One key finding of this study is that Marxists and non-Marxists share the perception of the United States as a hegemon. To explain a deep-rooted Chinese distaste for power politics, Shambaugh relies on the etymological analysis of the term hegemonism (*baquanzhuyi*) which is drawn from the ancient Chinese term for an illegitimate ruler (*ba*) who rules by means of power, not virtue. Yet instead of reaching back into the mists of history to argue such a deterministic lineage for the Chinese policy, it is probably more appropriate to provide a fuller examination of Chinese foreign policy of the late 1960s and early 1970s. A more plausible explanation is that the derogatory term of "imperialist" was no longer appropriate in a de-colonized world and the term "hegemon" was selected. Nevertheless, Shambaugh's description of the importance of this term is probably correct; Foreign Minister Qian Qichen's October 1993 address to the United Nations General Assembly gives full play to the concept.

With Japan as the world's second largest economy and China possessing great potential for economic growth—not to mention the expanding political influence of both—the United States must be clear about what factors influence these countries' foreign policies. Forecasting is always difficult; Iriye and Shambaugh are to be congratulated for their disciplined efforts to devise frameworks that explore the slippery topic of perceptions as an input to international affairs. Through a careful

testing of the analyses in these two studies, we can improve on American economic and political strategies in the Asia Pacific region. Navigators who do not judiciously trim their sails risk much.

The United States and Democracy in Chile. By Paul E. Sigmund. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993. 214 pp. $38.95/Hardcover, $13.95/Softcover.

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Prior to 1973, Chile had experienced almost 150 years of uninterrupted civilian constitutional rule, a fact which clearly distinguishes Chile from all of its Latin American counterparts. The juxtaposition of this unparalleled political stability with one of the most repressive and brutal military regimes in Latin America has been the subject of numerous books and academic studies. Paul Sigmund's book, *The United States and Democracy in Chile*, stands out among this literature due to its unique perspective regarding recent Chilean history. In the book, Sigmund provides a refreshing, novel analysis of the impact of Chilean events on U.S. policy debates between 1960 and 1990. Sigmund also addresses the impact of U.S. policy on Chile and ultimately concludes that the United States has played a significant, although not decisive, role in Chile. His candid evaluation of U.S. involvement in Chile, including criticism of certain actions, augment his premise that the Chileans—not the Americans—have been the crucial participants in the dramatic events that have occurred in Chile since 1960.

Sigmund begins his assessment of the U.S.-Chilean relationship in the early 1960s with the establishment of the U.S. Alliance for Progress. Through this initiative, introduced under President Kennedy, the United States provided public and private loans and investments to Latin American countries in an effort to facilitate economic and social development and promote democracy. Chile was selected by the United States as a showcase model ostensibly for its history of civilian constitutional rule and its desire to implement social and economic reforms. However, the existence of a strong socialist/communist party that regarded a Cuban-like revolution as the solution to the poverty in Chile was probably a more realistic reason. Sigmund reveals the increasing involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Chilean affairs throughout the 1960s, and the growing interaction between the two governments over Chilean budget issues. During this time period, the United States strongly encouraged President Frei (1964-1970) to implement a radical agrarian reform program. Sigmund claims that this may have been one instance where U.S. influence produced a directly negative impact, in that this 1967 reform heightened the polarization in Chile that contributed to Allende's victory in 1970.

Sigmund lucidly delineates the policy conundrum of the United States before and after the election of Salvador Allende. The root of the problem was that the