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Pain was one of the issues debated between Julian of Aeclanum and Augustine of Hippo. For Augustine pain was an evil caused by original sin. Julian argued that, in the context of creation as a whole, pain can be treated as a good, since its moderate forms are creational. Only in excess are they evil. This article aims at presenting Julian's position in detail, not only in the context of the debate with Augustine, but in the wider context of late ancient philosophy and early Christian doctrine. Julian is well acquainted with philosophical and medical texts and with the biblical and patristic tradition. He rejects Augustine's attempt to work all these into a universal theological theory of pain and thereby deny, in Julian's view, philosophy and medicine their relative autonomy. Julian's plea—as a theologian—for a rational and empirical approach to pain draws as much upon ancient sources as it anticipates an attitude towards natural science and philosophy usually associated with much later periods in history.

Pain is a puzzling phenomenon.[1] Scientists and clinicians as well as philosophers and pastors have struggled throughout history to explain its nature and causes and devise ways of handling it.[2] Early Christian authors too have dealt with it, and not just by way of using it for purposes of literary representation.[3] Taking Augustine as an example, I have tried to show in a recent study that though the trained rhetor was of course no

1. See now the fascinating account, from a modern scientific and medical point of view, by Patrick Wall, *Pain: The Science of Suffering* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1999).

2. On the "history of pain," see Roselyne Rey, *The History of Pain*, tr. L. E. Wallace and J. A. Cadden (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995). The ancient history of the concept is dealt with at 10–43, but on too narrow a basis. Rey looks only briefly at the Greek terms πόνος and ὀδύνη. The whole range of terms related to πάθος, vital for a medical and philosophical understanding of pain, remains uncovered. A history of pain in antiquity therefore remains yet to be written.

3. On this aspect, see Judith Perkins, *The Suffering Self: Pain and Narrative Representation in the Early Christian Era* (London: Routledge, 1995).

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stranger to *pathos*,[4] he mainly dealt with pain by reflecting on its various forms against the background of philosophical theories and biblical teaching. While his basic notion of pain is one of physical pain, he also worked with the Stoic concept of pain as an emotion.[5] Under Manichean, Neo-Platonist and biblical influence he developed a concept of metaphysical pain, pain as evil suffered by fallen angels as well as human beings, as punishment for a "fall" and original sin, not just in time, through physical bodies, but in eternity, through spiritual bodies.[6]

Augustine developed large parts of this teaching in his works against Julian of Aeclanum.[7] There he also not merely paraphrased, but cited—extensively—Julian's writings. This is why Julian's elaborate and highly original views on pain can be studied in their own right.[8] Julian's thought "comes down to us couched . . . in Augustine's polemical critique," but not "entirely";[9] there are ways of isolating his positions and analyzing

4. Cf. Josef Lössl, "Dolor, dolere," *Augustinus-Lexikon* 2.3/4 (Basel: Schwabe, 1999): 581–91, 583 ("Rhetoric of pain"). In *conf*. 3.2f. Augustine actually warns against excessive display of pain in the good tradition of Stoic teaching (cf. Perkins, *Suffering Self*, 20–21). See also Josef Lössl, "'Ein überaus heilsames Übel.' Augustinus über den Schmerz," *Wissenschaft und Weisheit* 62 (1999): 3–25.

5. Cf. Lössl, "Überaus heilsames Übel," 5–10; Gerard J. P. O'Daly and Adolar Zumkeller, "Affectus (passio, perturbatio)," *Augustinus-Lexikon* 1.1/2 (1986): 166–80.

6. Lössl, "Dolor," 582–83, 588–89.

7. Like *c. duas epp. Pel.* (CSEL 60:423–570), *c. Iul.* (PL 44:641–874), and *c. Iul. imp*. (CSEL 85.1:3–506; PL 45:1049–1608). Note also the role of Marius Mercator in the controversy. Some texts and opinions attributed to Julian are extant in his dossier, on further details of which see Otto Wermelinger, "Marius Mercator," *DSAM* 10 (1980): 610–15.

For an excellent introduction to Julian of Aeclanum see Mathijs Lamberigts, "Iulianus IV (Iulianus von Aeclanum)," *RAC* 19.149/150 (1999): 483–505. Charles Pietri and others, eds., *Prosopographie chrétienne du Bas-Empire*, vol. 2: *Prosopographie de l'Italie chrétienne (313–604)*, vol. 1 *(A–K)* (Rome: École française de Rome, 1999), 1175–86, is unreliable on a number of details.

8. As was first done by Albert Bruckner, *Julian von Eclanum. Sein Leben und seine Lehre*. *TU* 15.3a (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1897), 143–47.

9. Against Philip L. Barclift, "In Controversy with Augustine: Julian of Eclanum on the Nature of Sin," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 58 (1991): 5–20, 5, who ironically cites François Refoulé, "Julien d'Éclane. Théologien et philosophe," *RevSR* 52 (1964): 42–84 and 233–47, 55, as a source for his claim; ironically, because Refoulé was criticized by François-Joseph Thonnard, "L'aristotelisme de Julien d'Éclane et saint Augustin," *REAug* 11 (1965): 296–304, for his rare attempt to detach Julian's thought from its Augustinian context. While parts of Thonnard's article are useful (e.g. his remarks at 298–300 on late ancient Aristotelianisms) his fundamental point that Julian's thought can only be "properly" evaluated from an Augustinian point of view is questionable. It assumes that Augustine's is a kind of

them independently of Augustine's, and it is precisely a topic like pain, marginal compared to central issues in the debate with Augustine, like God's goodness[10] and justice,[11] evil, sin and guilt, body and soul, gender and sexuality,[12] which reveals Julian, more than the discussion of any of those issues, as an independent mind with his own intellectual background.

The ascription to Julian of two exegetical works previously attributed to Philip the Presbyter and Rufinus of Aquileia or Orosius[13] too has made

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standard Christian position against which Julian's has to be measured. Lamberigts, "Iulianus," 501, seems to express a similar view, when he distinguishes in Julian (1) "Aristotelian reminiscences" and (2) "Christian theology" and demands that (2) must be tested against Augustine's position. Yet what if (1) and (2) belong together, independent of Augustine's influence? Should they not be evaluated in the light of their own background, as, e.g., by Nello Cipriani, "Echi antiapollinaristici e aristotelismo nella polemica di Giuliano d'Eclano," *Aug* 21 (1981): 373–89, and by Lamberigts himself: "Iulianus," 496–98, 500–504 (literature).

10. Cf. Mathijs Lamberigts, "Julian of Aeclanum: A Plea for a Good Creator," *Augustiniana* 38 (1988): 5–24.

11. Cf. Alister E. McGrath, "Divine Justice and Divine Equity in the Controversy between Augustine and Julian of Eclanum," *Downside Review* 101 (1983): 312–19.

12. For a recent discussion of all of these issues in the context of the controversy between Julian and Augustine see John M. Rist, *Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptised* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 131–32, 275–76, 321–27 (taking into account literature up to 1993). On Julian's theology as such, cf. Lamberigts, "Iulianus," 500–504 (with literature up to 1999). Among the issues most popular in recent research are gender and sex. Referring to the studies of Peter Brown, "Sexuality and Society in the Fifth Century A.D.: Augustine and Julian of Eclanum," in *Tria Corda. Scritti in onore di Arnaldo Momigliano*, ed. Emilio Gabba and others (Como: New Press, 1983), 49–70; idem, *The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 387–427, and Elizabeth A. Clark, "Vitiated Seeds and Holy Vessels: Augustine's Manichean Past," in *Ascetic Piety and Women's Faith: Essays on Late Ancient Christianity*, ed. Elizabeth A. Clark (Lewiston: Mellen, 1986), 291–349, Robert A. Markus, "Augustine's Confessions and the Controversy with Julian of Eclanum: Manicheism Revisited," in *Collectanea Augustiniana. Mélanges T. J. van Bavel* 2, ed. B. Bruning and others (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1990), 913–25, 921, writes that "Julian and Augustine both realised that the test case crucial for their respective views of the human self was sexuality," but continues, "[t]here is now a real danger of this subject falling into the grips of a crisis of overexplanation."

13. The *Tractatus in Osee, Iohel, Amos* (CCL 88:115–329) was successfully attributed to Julian by Germain Morin, "Un ouvrage restitué à Julien d'Eclanum: Le commentaire du Pseudo-Rufin sur les prophètes Osée, Joel et Amos," *RBen* 30 (1913): 1–24. In its preface (CCL 88:115.16) Julian calls it an *explanatio* (CCL 88:115.16); *tractatus* is its title in the 9th/10th century Corbie MS (Paris, BN Lat. 12148), which also ascribes the work to Rufinus of Aquileia; cf. Yves-Marie Duval, "Iulianus Aeclanensis restitutus. La première édition—incomplète—de l'œuvre de Julien d'Éclane," *REAug* 25 (1979): 162–72, 164. The present article follows the

it impossible to treat Julian's thought only as embedded in Augustine's. Besides broadening the text basis (compared to Bruckner's) these new attributions also contribute to the revision of Bruckner's opinion that Julian's rationalism and secularism were "in principle atheist" ("im Grunde gottlos")[14] rather than characteristic for a particular brand of early Christian teaching.

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conventions proposed by Lucas De Coninck and Maria J. D'Hont, *Iuliani Aeclanensis expositio libri Iob, tractatus prophetarum Osee, Iohel et Amos . . .* , CCL 88:xviii–xxx and 115–329. Rufinus' authorship was first questioned in 1590. Orosius' authorship was first proposed in 1745, Julian's in 1884. Cf. also Gisbert Bouwman, *Des Julian von Aeclanum Kommentar zu den Propheten Osee, Joel und Amos. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Exegese,* Analecta Biblica 9 (Rome: Pontificio Istituto Biblico, 1958); Irene Strobl, "Eine Untersuchung zum Verständnis alttestamentlicher Prophetie anhand des Julian von Aeclanum zugeschriebenen Kommentars zum Propheten Joel" (Masters thesis, University of Vienna, 1991).

The *Expositio in Iob*, discovered by Alberto Amelli and published in 1897, was at first held to be a corrupt version of Philip the Presbyter's commentary on Job and as such ignored or dismissed as insignificant; cf. Paul Lehmann, *Johannes Sichardus und die von ihm benutzten Bibliotheken und Handschriften,* Quellen und Untersuchungen zur lateinischen Philologie des Mittelalters 4.1 (Munich: Beck, 1911), 119 n. 2. Following the method proposed by Morin, "Ouvrage," Alberto Vaccari, *Un commento a Giobbe di Giuliano di Eclana,* Scripta Pontificii Instituti Biblici (Rome: Pontificio Istituto Biblico, 1915), attributed it to Julian. Josef Stiglmayr, "Der Jobkommentar von Monte Cassino," *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 43 (1919): 269–88, and 45 (1921): 495–96, questioned Vaccari's results, but his doubts were rejected by Adolf Jülicher, *TLZ* 41 (1916): 78–79; Carl Weyman, *Theologische Revue* 15 (1916): 241–42, and 18 (1919): 325; Adhémar D'Alès, *Études* 147 (1916): 132, and *RevSR* 6 (1916): 311–24, 314–22; Dom De Bruyne, *RB* 12 (1915): 595; and Alexander Souter, JTS n.s. 16 (1916): 336–38; and successfully refuted by Alberto Vaccari, "Il commento Cassinense di Giobbe," in *Scritti di Letteratura Ecclesiastica dedicati al A. Amelli*, Miscellanea Amelli, ed. Alberto M. Amelli (Badia di Montecassino, 1920): 43–51. The text is critically edited in De Coninck and D'Hont, *Iuliani Aeclanensis expositio*, CCL 88:xii–xvii and 3–109. Cf. also Ernst Dassmann, "Hiob," *RAC* 15 (1991): 366–442, 379–91.

In addition, Julian was found to have translated, or paraphrased, parts of Theodore of Mopsuestia's *Commentary on Psalms*; cf. the introduction and critical edition by Lucas De Coninck, Maria J. D'Hondt, *Theodori Mopsuesteni Expositiones in Psalmos Iuliano Aeclanensi interprete in Latinum versae quae supersunt*, CCL 88A (Turnhout: Brepols, 1977), and Marie-Joseph Rondeau, *Les commentaires patristiques du Psautier (iii^{e}–v^{e} siècles),* vol. 1: *Les travaux des Pères Grecs et Latins sur le Psautier. Recherches et Bilan*, *OCA* 219 (Rome: Pontificium Institutum Studiorum Orientalium, 1982), 175–88.

14. Thus Bruckner, *Julian*, 176, referring to Adolf Harnack, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, vol. 3, II–III, 1st and 2nd ed. (Tübingen: Mohr, 1890), 183. On a revision of this view, cf. now Otto Wermelinger, *Rom und Pelagius,* Päpste und Papsttum 7 (Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1975), 265, who argues that since Bouwman, *Julian von Aeclanum Kommentar*, Julian should no longer pass as an atheist ration-

The aim of this article is to present Julian's concept of pain as developed in the polemical works against Augustine as well as in the exegetical works, especially his *Commentary on Job* (section 2), against the backdrop of late ancient philosophical theories of pain (section 1) and especially that of a certain tradition of ancient "scientific rationalism,"[15] which also influenced certain strands of early Christianity (section 3).

1. JULIAN'S CONCEPT OF PAIN AND SOME PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES

1.1. *Julian's Bottom Line: Pain is Not an Evil (*Ad Florum *6.17)*

In *Ad Florum*[16] 6.17 Julian of Aeclanum launches an attack against Augustine's concept of original guilt on the basis of a definition from one of Augustine's own works, *De duabus animabus*: "Sin can be nothing but something which the will desires, but justice vetoes, and from which one

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alist. Cf. also Mathijs Lamberigts, "Augustine, Julian of Aeclanum and E. Pagels' 'Adam, Eve and the Serpent,'" *Augustiniana* 39 (1989): 393–435, 434 n. 246, who argues against Elaine Pagels, *Adam, Eve, and the Serpent* (New York: Random House, 1988), 143–44, that Bruckner is generally favorable towards Julian, since he concedes in *Julian*, 64–67, that Julian's criticism of Augustine's doctrine of original sin as Manichean, or even worse, is justified. Lamberigts does not consider however that Bruckner's positive evaluation of Julian's critique of Augustine's teaching of original sin is overshadowed by his negative view of Julian's rationalism. Despite his recognition of the similarities between Julian's and Theodore of Mopsuestia's exegesis in *Julian*, 4–5, 84–85, 113–25, Bruckner does not situate Julian's rationalism in the context of the Antiochene exegetical tradition. As a theologian Bruckner seems more concerned by Julian's rationalism than by Augustine's Manicheism. Note in this context that even Bouwman, *Julian von Aeclanum Kommentar*, 23, criticizes Julian's "radical rationalism and nominalism" (*sic*!). On affinities between Theodore of Mopsuestia's and Julian's thought, cf. Nello Cipriani, "La presenza di Teodoro di Mopsuestia nella teologia di Giuliano d'Eclano," in *Cristianesimo latino e cultura greca sino al secolo iv*, ed. Arnaldo Marcone and others (Rome: Institutum Augustinianum, 1993), 365–78. On the historical connections between the two figures and their likely cooperation in the Pelagian controversy, cf. Lionel Wickham, "Pelagianism in the East," in *The Making of Orthodoxy: Essays in Honour of Henry Chadwick*, ed. Rowan Williams and Henry Chadwick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 200–213, 206–7.

15. On the justification of such an expression, cf. now John F. Healy, *Pliny the Elder on Science and Technology* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1999), 100–105.

16. The *Eight Books to Florus*, written between 420/1 and 425/6, either still in Italy, or during Julian's stay in Cilicia, probably at Theodore of Mopsuestia's, are addressed to Florus, one of Julian's episcopal colleagues from southern Italy who refused to sign the condemnation of Pelagius and now lived in Constantinople; cf. Lamberigts, "Iulianus," 486 and 488–89, Pietri, *Prosopographie*, 850–52.

is free to abstain."[17] Julian had used this definition earlier on in the work to demonstrate the close link between sin, guilt, and individual human freedom.[18] Here he aims in a different direction:

> On the basis of this principle, all those who shy from contradicting him [sc. Augustine], and [thus agree to] consider [with him] the materiality of the body corrupted, are obviously completely (*radicitus*), or as he [sc. the poet][19] puts it, completely and utterly (*exradicitus*), wrong;[20] for already the emotion of fear (*affectus timoris*) and the perception of pain (*sensus doloris*), which according to him [sc. Augustine] whip up a storm to wreck humanity, are instead accomplished teachers of those who have not only done no evil whatsoever, but are born with the key-bolt of a good will, helpers and executors of justice.

Embedded in this polemic[21] is a philosophical argument. Julian distinguishes the material density (*concretio*) of bodies from the sublimity of spiritual entities. Among the latter he counts emotions and sense perceptions like fear and pain as well as intellectual and moral faculties like understanding, freedom, choice, will, justice and love. Evil can only originate from freedom, which in Julian's view is the ability to do good and/or evil.[22] To call a material state "evil," as, in Julian's view, Augustine does,

17. Iul. *Flor.*=Aug. *c. Iul. imp.* 6.17 (PL 45:1538): *peccatum . . . claret nihil esse aliud quam uoluntatem appetentem quod iustitia uetat et unde liberum est abstinere*; cf. Aug. *duab. ann.* 15 (CSEL 25.1:70): *peccatum est uoluntas retinendi uel ammittendi, quod iustitia uetat et unde liberum est abstinere.*

18. Cf. Iul. *Flor.*=Aug. *c. Iul. imp.* 1.78 (CSEL 85.1:93).

19. Julian here alludes to Cic. *fin.* 2, esp. *fin.* 2.26–27. The apposition introduced by *ut ille* [sc. *poeta*] *ait* is however from Plaut. *most.* 5.1.63: *non radicitus quidem hercle, uerum etiam exradicitus*. It cannot be from Cic. *dom.* 34, as Lamberigts, "Iulianus," 491, seems to indicate, since that passage does not contain the word *exradicitus*; cf. also Maurice Testard, *Saint Augustin et Cicéron* 2 (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1958), 87.

20. *Euulsi*, i.e. their argument is invalid. On Late Latin *euello*, to invalidate, cf. Alexander Souter, *A Glossary of Later Latin to 600* A.D. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949), 130.

21. While the polemical context of the passage must always be kept in mind, the question here is not how well Julian represents, or how badly he misrepresents, Augustine's position. These questions are dealt with by Lamberigts, "Augustine, Julian of Aeclanum and E. Pagels"; idem, "Julien d'Éclane et Augustin d'Hippone: Deux conceptions d'Adam," in *Collectanea Augustiniana* 1:373–410. Our interest here is to look at the effects of Julian's position on his concept of pain.

22. On the philosophical significance of this definition of freedom in this context, cf. Christopher Kirwan, *Augustine,* The Arguments of the Philosophers (London: Routledge, 1989), 80–81.

absurdly, by assuming that physical pain is, together with concupiscence and death, a result of Adam's fall,[23] is equivalent to assuming, like the Manichees, an evil substance. According to Julian neither physical pain in the sense of an actual physical complaint nor pain perception (at the emotional level) can as such be considered evil. As far as the suffering of pain is concerned, Julian insists, evil originates solely from a particular kind of reflexive behavior towards physical pain and its mental perception, while, handled with the right attitude, pain can even help one to overcome difficulties in life and perform just acts.

Thus Julian and Augustine hardly seem to differ on the question whether pain originates in the soul or in the body. Both are not entirely clear on the matter, but tend to consider physical pain as the basic notion, while accepting that there exist forms of mental pain too. The distinction at *Flor*. 6.17 between *affectus timoris* and *sensus doloris* clearly indicates that. The difference between Augustine and Julian lies in their evaluation of pain. In contrast to Augustine, Julian does not consider it objectively, as such, an evil. It is not aimed at shipwrecking humanity. In Julian's view only a particular, subjective, mental attitude towards it can be evil. Such an attitude however lies with the responsibility, the freedom and the good will (or lack of it) of the individual who develops it. It is a moral (or immoral) attitude. It is morally good to deal with pain (physical or mental) in an affirmative manner, as a good, something to work with; it is immoral to deny the potential goodness of pain, as Augustine does in Julian's view, and thus open the doors to despair. What Julian does not account for is the question how to judge a case where somebody is overwhelmed by pain and no longer capable of developing any attitude towards it. Moreover, by considering pain at worst indifferent, at best, however, good, Julian, it would seem, tends to see not only the evaluation, but already the nature of pain (i.e. its being a *sensus*) originating in the soul rather than in the body. This would make his concept more different from Augustine's than from certain late ancient philosophical theories. Let us look at this question a bit more closely.

23. On Julian's rejection of the concept of the fall and his idea of "Adam" cf. Rist, *Augustine*, 131–32. Since Rist's focus is on Augustine, he sometimes presents Julian (or, as he usually puts it, "the Pelagians") from Augustine's point of view; for example, he tends to ridicule the "Pelagian" view of Adam's primitive state.

1.2. *A Middle Platonist Position: Calvenus Taurus*

Julian's view is often labelled, sometimes with the intention of denigrating it, as Stoic,[24] which is mystifying, but nevertheless interesting, especially against the background of a story told by Aulus Gellius in his *Attic Nights* (12.5): Gellius reports how the Middle Platonist Calvenus (or Calvisius) Taurus[25] and one of his students were on their way to Delphi to attend the Pythian games. Passing through Lebadia in Boeotia they visited a friend of Taurus', a Stoic philosopher, who had fallen ill. During their visit the illness reached its crisis point. The patient clearly struggled with his pain and seemed on the verge of giving up. A few days later he got better and began to speak. "What you have seen," he said to his visitors, "was certainly not a very pleasant sight, yet it carried a useful experience. . . . It was the encounter and struggle of a philosopher with pain" (12.5.3). The student was far from impressed by this account, especially coming, as it did, from a Stoic: "If pain is so bitter," he asked, "that it weakens one's will and judgment, and compels one to wail and cry out about how evil the raging sickness is, why do Stoics call pain 'indifferent' and not 'evil'?" (12.5.4).

Instead of the Stoic it is Calvenus Taurus, the Platonist, who answers on behalf of his friend. He sets out describing the radical goodness of everything that exists, before he continues: "Truly and in a radically simple sense good is nothing but the honorable, and nothing is considered truly evil but that which is dishonorable. As for the rest, . . . it is in its entirety . . . in between (*in medio*), . . . neither good nor evil" (12.5.7). The criterion, he goes on, to distinguish between good and evil on one hand, and *media*, or indifferents, on the other, is desire. The category of good and evil is governed by will and judgment, the category of indifferents by desire. Indifferents are either desirable, like pleasure, or undesirable, like pain. However, Taurus continues, "since every newborn child is endowed with pain and pleasure as first sensations—even before the appearance of judgment and reason—and is attracted to pleasure by

24. For examples, cf. below, n. 35; on Julian's commentary on Job cf. Charles Kannengiesser, "Job, Le livre de," *DSAM* 8 (1974): 1218–25, 1222, the remark that the work is heavily influenced by "Imperial Stoic ideas." Dassmann, "Hiob," 379–91, observes in contrast that most "Stoic" motifs in Julian's exegesis of Job might as well have been drawn from early Christian sources, beginning with Jas 5.11.

25. Gell. *noct. Att.* 12.5; on Taurus see John Dillon, *The Middle Platonists: A Study of Platonism 80 B.C. to A.D. 200*, 2nd ed. (London: Duckworth, 1996), 237–47, 444–46, esp. 241–42; on his concept of pain as reported in this passage, see Karl Heinz Abel, "Der historische Ort einer stoischen Schmerztheorie," *Herm* 113 (1985): 293–311.

nature, but repelled . . . by pain, . . . reason is hardly able to uproot and destroy those inclinations later on. . . . This," Taurus tells his student, "is why you saw the philosopher struggle. He struggled with the excess (*exultantia*) of pain and he did not give in by wailing and screaming in excess. He held out. He was not going to be oppressed by pain, he was defeating it" (12.5.8–9).

Still not satisfied with the answer, the student asks again: "Why then, if pain is not an evil, must one wail and struggle with it?" (12.5.10). Not everything that annoys you is evil, Taurus responds. Remember the definition of good and evil: Only the honorable is good and only the dishonorable is evil. Pain is not *per se* dishonorable. Only to develop a certain attitude towards it is. Enduring (*tolerare*) pain presupposes suffering from it. Lack of sensation (ἀπάθεια) and numbness (ἀναλγασία) are not forms of endurance. Moreover, the question why and how certain motions of the body compel the will, is essentially different from that which asks for the nature of pain (12.5.10–11). A certain gladiator at Caesar's school is said to have laughed every time they examined his wounds. That attitude has as much or as little in common with the philosopher's struggle with his illness as bowel movements after a banquet, sweat during excessive heat, shivering in the cold, or sneezing and blinking when the nose or the eyes are suddenly affected by the sun shining on them, etc.

The parallels between Taurus' (Platonist, not Stoic!) and Julian's concept are obvious. Both would not consider pain evil, only a certain attitude towards it. It is the excess of pain that can make one develop such an attitude, not its nature. Total absence of pain in the form of ἀπάθεια or ἀναλγασία is not a good, because there is nothing ethically challenging about it,[26] i.e. something (like pain) which might encourage (Julian: "help") the self to strive for perfection.

1.3. *A Pyrrhonist Position: Sextus Empiricus*

Taurus is not a Stoic, but, as a Middle Platonist, a dogmatic philosopher, and, as such, strongly influenced by Stoicism. The view that pain is a *medium* rather than a *malum*, however, is not just held by dogmatic philosophers. In his *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* the radical skeptic Sextus Empiricus argues (3.235f.):

26. Augustine in contrast is ambivalent on this matter. He seems to ascribe to ἀπάθεια properties similar to those associated with beatific immortality and states that it is preferable to being in pain, even though it shares the property of absence of pain with the condition of *stupor*; cf. *en. Ps* 55.6, discussed in Lössl, "Dolor," 585 and 587 n. 51.

> The skeptic, of course, . . . suspends judgment (ἐπέχει) as to whether anything good or evil (κακόν) exists by nature . . . and abstains from the rashness of dogmatism. Instead he follows undogmatically the ordinary rules of life and thus remains impassive in matters of opinion (ἐν μὲν τοῖς δοξαστοῖς ἀπαθὴς μένει), while in conditions that are necessitated his emotions are moderate (μετριοπαθεί); for though . . . he suffers emotions through his senses, the emotions which he suffers are moderate, because he does not hold the opinion[27] that what he suffers is evil by nature; for the added opinion (τὸ γὰρ προσδοξάζειν) that something is of such and such a kind, is worse than the suffering itself, just as sometimes the patients themselves bear a surgical operation, while the bystanders swoon, because they hold the opinion that it is a horrible experience.

Sextus wrote again on pain in *Against Ethicists* (152–59). He sets out with a discussion of Epicurus' principle "if pain lasts, it is light, if it is strong, it does not last," *si longus, leuis, si grauis, breuis* (sc. *dolor*):[28]

> Even that which the skeptics (ἐφεκτικοί) avoid as if it was evil (ὡς κακόν), is not excessively perturbing (οὐκ ἄγαν ἐστὶ ταρακτικόν); for the pain (πόνος) is either small [and caused by things which] befall us daily, like hunger, thirst, cold, heat, etc., or it is very violent and intense, as in the case of those afflicted with incurable torments, during which the doctors often provide powerful anodynes to help the patient obtain some relief; or else it is moderate and protracted, as in some diseases. Now . . . that which befalls us daily perturbs us least, for the remedies against it, like food, drink and shelter, are easy to provide; that which is most intense and perturbing terrifies us after all but for a moment, like a lightning flash; then it either destroys us or is itself destroyed; and that which is moderate and protracted is neither lifelong nor continuous by nature, but has many intervals of rest and periods of relief; for were it unceasing it would not be protracted. The

27. More precisely, "added opinion," πρόσδοξα. According to Christoph Schäublin (*Untersuchungen zu Methode und Herkunft der antiochenischen Exegese*, Theophaneia. Beiträge zur Religions- und Kirchengeschichte des Altertums 23 [Köln and Bonn: Hanstein, 1974]), 26, Theodore of Mopsuestia held a similar view regarding the true meaning of Scripture, the perception of which could be contaminated, in Theodore's view, by the "added hearing" (προσηκούειν) of doctrines not contained in the text; cf. ibid. 26 n. 3 on Theod. Mops. *comm. in Ps* 35:10b (202.23 Devreesse) rejecting messianic exegesis. However, Theodore's aim was not to prevent anyone from privately adding "deeper meaning" to biblical passages for the purpose of spiritual edification, provided the text was not played with fast and loose; Theodore only thought that that was not the exegete's task. See in this context also Julian of Aeclanum's translation of Theod. Mops. *comm. in Ps* 1 (CCL 88A:6–7, 75–90). On the affinities of Julian's hermeneutics with Theodore's in this respect cf. Bouwman, *Julian von Aeclanum Kommentar*, 81.

28. Discussed in Cic. *fin.* 2.93–96 (see below).

> perturbation therefore that befalls the skeptic is in any case moderate and hardly alarming.

After this analysis of types of pain (152–55) Sextus continues by relating pain and blame (156–59):

> Notwithstanding, even if the pain should be very great, we ought not to blame those who suffer involuntarily and by necessity, but nature . . . and, of course, those who draw evil upon themselves by holding certain opinions and making certain judgments . . . ; [and in consequence] those who are perturbed by [the first type of] pain must not be blamed; for the perturbation caused by the pain is not due to themselves but to necessity. . . . However, those who through their own imaginations (τὰς ἰδίας ὑπολήψεις) invent for themselves a host of desirable and undesirable things deserve blame . . . ; for a person who has no additional opinion about pain being an evil is merely affected by the necessitated motion of the pain, a person however who imagines in addition that the pain is objectionable and evil, and only that, doubles thereby the distress which is caused by the presence of the pain. . . . Thus the perturbation due to the belief about an evil as evil is sometimes greater than that which results from the so-called evil itself.

Again the similarities to Julian's concept are striking. Julian, of course, would not consider himself a skeptic, but some of his conclusions match those of Sextus, even if he draws them for different reasons. Julian may not suspend his judgment as to whether *anything* good or evil exists by nature, but he dismisses the opinion that pain is evil by nature. Evil, he argues, like Sextus, is adduced to the suffering of pain through immodesty, the lack of ability to moderate one's emotions and the invention of images or doctrines which create excessive desires and fears.

1.4. *Cicero,* On the Extremes of Good and Evil

There is, of course, no evidence that Julian actually read Aulus Gellius or Sextus Empiricus. The aim so far is not to prove that he did, but to show the similarity of his concept with that of a Middle Platonist and that of a Pyrrhonist. The results of that little survey may prove even more interesting if held against the following; for there exists a text which both Augustine and Julian may have read and which may have influenced both in the way they developed their concept of pain, the second book of Cicero's dialogue *On the Extremes of Good and Evil*, *De finibus bonorum et malorum* 2.

Cicero sets out in this book with the question: What is the *summum bonum*, the ultimate good? He compares two answers: (1) pleasure (*uoluptas*; ἡδονή); (2) the absence of pain (*nihil dolere*; *indolentia*) (2.8–11). His counterpart in the dialogue, the Epicurean L. Manlius Torquatus,

sees no difference; Cicero does. To him (2) is indifferent, (1) alarming. *Voluptas* is a *nomen inuidiosum, infame, suspectum* (2.11). Torquatus' answer is revealing. Epicurus' philosophy may not be the raw "hedonism" of an Aristippus (2.18), but the concept of "pleasure" is materialistic. Joy and happiness have no place in the body: *non dicitur laetitia nec gaudium in corpore* (2.13). No wonder the Epicurean sees no difference between pleasure and the absence of pain (2.16). For the Stoic, on the contrary, if (2) is true, (1) cannot be true, i.e. if happiness consists in the absence of pain, it must also consist in the absence of pleasure; for both are emotions (2.24).[29]

Furthermore, if one calls pleasure a good, one must call pain an evil (2.36). For Cicero, a philosophy that works with such a principle is oblivious of the "science of divine and human matters, appropriately called wisdom" (2.37), i.e. (according to Cicero) metaphysics and theology, and the "doctrine of virtue," according to which "nothing is good but the honorable, nothing is evil but the shameful" (*nihil esse bonum nisi honestum, nihil malum nisi turpe*) (2.38).[30] The doctrine closest to fulfilling that ideal is Stoicism, and there is one other philosophy, outstanding in its splendid honesty, satisfying the basic needs of human nature and leading to a fulfilled life. Cicero does not discuss it in more detail, but he is probably thinking of some Middle Platonist doctrine. On this basis he now rejects all the other models previously discussed, particularly Aristippus' (2.39–40), but also the skeptic ones of Carneades (2.42), Aristo and Pyrrho. Epicurus, he says, is too inconsistent to be judged on the same basis as the rest.

He then continues listing *exempla* from Roman history to demonstrate that true happiness lies in displaying public virtue and a sense of duty and discipline, not in the pursuit of pleasure. The latter, he argues, is not even pragmatic (2.92–95), i.e. it does not work. For even if nearly perfect pleasure were achieved in this life, the *summum malum* of pain would

29. The following paragraphs, including Cic. *fin*. 2.27, which Lamberigts, "Iulianus," 491, cites as a source for *Flor*. 6.17, have no bearing on Cicero's development of his concept of pain.

30. Cicero here cites of course the same definition as Calvenus Taurus in Gell. *noct. Att*. 12.5.7. The only difference is that Gellius replaces *turpe* with *dishonestum*. Unlike Calvenus Taurus however Cicero does not divide indifferents into desirables and undesirables. They are "not to be desired or avoided" (*nec expetenda nec fugienda*), he says, but "chosen or rejected" (*eligenda aut reicienda*). In that respect Augustine's and Julian's moral universes are more similar to Calvenus Taurus' than to Cicero's. The same applies to their evaluation of pain as a good or an evil, rather than an indifferent. See on this at the beginning of the next section.

always linger in the background, posing a constant and real threat. What if, or when, it strikes? Cicero ridicules the Epicurean advice to ignore pain and the principle that intense pain does not last, while lasting pain is not intense.[31] What, he asks, is the measure of pain, or (in this case) of time—hours, days, months (2.93)? The fact is, he argues, that strong pain can last for a very long time and there may be no other choice than that it has to be endured (2.94).[32]

Ultimately this can only be done by virtue. The principle of pursuing pleasure only makes actual pain worse by evoking memories of past pleasures, the notion of losing out on present pleasures, and the prospect of being deprived, maybe forever, of future pleasures. Epicurus' own last words, according to Cicero, defy his philosophy (2.97): "Happiness makes up for the worst pains" (*compensabatur cum summis doloribus laetitia*). This sentence, Cicero argues, makes only sense in the Stoic context, with happiness as the fruit of virtue. Can an Epicurean die happily, if his memories are ones of pain, not of pleasure? Even folk wisdom supports the Stoic cause, for example the saying, *iucundi acti labores*, "how sweet are labors overcome" (2.105), as does Aristotle, when he ridicules the epitaph of the Syrian king Sardanapalus on which the passersby are asked to praise the king as happy for taking his pleasures with him to the grave.

"Let us therefore look elsewhere for the *summum bonum* and leave pleasure to the animals (*uoluptatem bestiis concedamus*)," Cicero adds, as the only distinctive human achievement is to display contempt of pain and death (*contemptio doloris mortisque*) (2.113).[33]

1.5. *Cicero's Influence on Augustine and Julian*

It is clear why both Julian and Augustine should have drawn from Cicero. Like Augustine, Cicero is suspicious of the principle of pleasure, but like Julian, he rejects the idea that pain is an evil, or indeed the cause of an evil, except the evil of individual weakness giving in to the temptation of pain (or indeed pleasure). One has to ask, however, whether the assumption that pleasure (i.e. the affirmation of physical and material well-being) is something repugnant (belonging to the animal rather than the human world) is really consistent with the view that having a body (which is

31. The Pyrrhonist, as we have seen, uses the same advice rather differently.

32. A point which Wall, *Pain*, 160–61, wholeheartedly endorses.

33. According to Seneca the Elder (*Suasoriae* 6.22), Livy informs us that Cicero himself may not exactly have lived up to the first virtue, but that he met his death admirably displaying the second. The expression *contemptio doloris mortisque* is echoed in Iul. *Flor*. 1.83 (see below n. 70).

weak and vulnerable to pain, but also able to perceive pleasures) is, if not good, then at least not evil, but indifferent. Julian's more positive attitude towards pleasure in contrast seems Aristotelian rather than Stoic. Julian seems to try to build a bridge between the principle of pure virtue and the idea that the pursuit of a virtuous life has to take account of the natural appetites. Cicero, in comparison, explicitly dismisses that view on the ground that it might end up justifying "vile desires" (*obscenae uoluptates*) (2.68). A Peripatetic, he thinks, might well end up an Epicurean.

In *Flor.* 6.17 Julian addresses yet another aspect which is not found in the texts discussed so far. He characterizes fear and pain not as indifferent, but as good, in so far as they can help people to improve and become more accomplished in what they already are, intelligent beings with a free and good will who pursue a life of justice. I mentioned already, at the end of section 1.1, that this "ethical" use of the concept raises the question whether for Julian pain is not primarily mental pain in the sense of the Stoic emotion rather than physical pain. The answer is that Julian shares with Augustine the ordinary language notion that pain is primarily physical pain,[34] even though both Augustine and Julian occasionally accuse each other of denying the phenomenon of physical pain and of subscribing, alternately, to Stoic, Manichean, and docetist anthropologies.[35] And Julian also shares with Augustine the basic notion that pain is not an indifferent, which makes them more similar to one another than either of them to Cicero.

34. For Augustine, cf. Lössl, "Dolor," 581–82; for Julian cf. e.g. *Flor.*=Aug. *c. Iul. imp.* 4.50 (PL 45:1368), where the aspect is introduced in a christological context (see also in section 3). The *locus classicus* of a materialist concept of pain is Lucret. *rer. nat.* 2.963–65: Pain is caused by some force impacting upon the atoms that constitute a living body and removing them temporarily from their natural location. When they move back, there is relief. The atoms themselves do not feel pain, because they are simple. Both Augustine and Julian knew (at least parts of) Lucretius' work; e.g. Julian's allusion in *Flor.* 6.17 to Augustine's depiction of life as a shipwreck might refer to Augustine's evocation of *rer. nat.* 2.1–4 in *beata uita* 2.

35. The polemical context of these allegations—cf. e.g. Aug. *c. Iul. imp.* 5.23 (PL 45:1459); Iul. *Flor.*=Aug. *c. Iul. imp.* 4.50 (PL 45:1368)—did not prevent modern authors from repeating them; against Julian see, most influentally, Harnack, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte* vol. 3 II–III, 189 (Julian a Stoic); against Augustine, cf. Harry A. Wolfson, "Philosophical Implications of the Pelagian Controversy," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 103 (1959): 554–62 (Augustine a Stoic). More recent accounts agree that, considering the syncretism in late ancient philosophy, it is not surprising that the thought of either resembles elements of various ancient schools; cf. e.g. Rist, *Augustine*, 154 (Stoicism in Julian), 168–69 (Stoicism in Augustine).

Nonetheless Julian, like Augustine, besides considering it a phenomenon of the body, *also* discusses pain as an emotion (*affectus*), one which plays an important part in forming the individual character. In *tr. Iohel* 2.4–11[36] he speaks of it as one of the "four passions of the souls" (*quattuor passiones animorum*)[37] and one of the "four emotions" (*quattuor affectiones*) which originate, or "emanate" (*emanantes*), from one source (*de una origine*) caused by "some motion which stimulates us."[38] This process yields not only "diverse discomforts" (*pariuntur diuersa incommoda*), but leads to *uniuersa mala*, the latter however yet again only in so far as individual human beings consent (voluntarily and willingly) to be tempted by their emotions to commit immoral acts.

Julian emphasizes that in this particular passage he is "only"[39] allegorizing. The four emotions signify four types of locusts ravaging the

36. Cf. Iul. *tr. Iohel* 2.4–11 (CCL 88:240.115–242.181).

37. The other three being hope (*spes*), joy (*gaudium*), and fear (*timor*), in this order, which differs from that in Julian's "source" (cf. below n. 42), Hier. *comm. in Ioelem* 1.4 (CCL 76:164.130/139): *aegritudo*, *gaudium*, *metus*, *spes*. Julian also applies the different emotions to different locusts (cf. Strobl, *Untersuchung*, 102), but that has no bearing on this discussion. What is important here is that Julian replaces Jerome's *aegritudo* with *dolor*, which might indicate that like Augustine he has a more physical notion of the concept than, e.g., Jerome. The difference between *timor* and *metus* is less fundamental.

38. The idea that emotions originate from a kind of primeval motion (*de una origine motionis uidelicet qua afficiamur*) is Stoic (Zeno *SVF* 1.50). Schäublin, *Untersuchungen*, 151 n. 284, shows that Theodore of Mopsuestia too subscribes to this principal κίνησις.

39. For the reference, cf. below n. 41. Not only is Julian here *only* allegorizing, it is also the *only time* in *tr. Iohel* that he is allegorizing. Bouwman, *Julian von Aeclanum Kommentar*, 80–123, concludes from this that Julian holds allegory in low esteem and that this shows that he is influenced by Antiochene exegesis (cf. also above n. 27), but not that he is himself an Antiochene exegete. This account is problematic. At 111–12 Bouwman argues that it is a distinct characteristic of Antiochene exegetes *not* to allegorize, but that sometimes the Antiochenes tend to "smuggle allegories back into their commentaries." Julian's allegory on Joel 1.4, he continues, is such a case of "bad" Antiochene exegesis, if it does not cast doubts over the Antiochene character of Julian's exegesis altogether. Bouwman does not see that Antiochenes too allegorize, but often for different reasons and according to different criteria than exegetes in other traditions. It is the value that Julian attaches to *his allegory* (i.e., that this is *his only*, and *only his* allegory, and that originally, i.e., as intended by the prophet, the text referred to a locust plague, and not even to invasions by enemy peoples, as Jerome, and even Theodore of Mopsuestia (!) had argued, typologically (cf. below n. 40), that renders him an exegete in the Antiochene tradition. For a detailed discussion of the passage see also Strobl, *Untersuchung*, 100–105.

Palestinian countryside as prophesied by Joel 1.4.[40] Since a locust plague is a much cruder reality than those four emotions, the language which may have been appropriate for the former must be considered hyperbolic if allegorically applied to the latter.[41]

40. Uniquely in premodern times—and, ironically, in this case probably wrongly (though see now James L. Crenshaw, *Joel: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary*, The Anchor Bible 24C [New York: Doubleday, 1995], 88–94)—Julian points out that the passage should be understood literally, i.e. in the sense that Joel meant to prophesy a locust plague, not the invasion of the country by Assyrian, Babylonian, Macedonian, and Roman forces. Cf. Iul. *tr. Iohel* 1.4 (CCL 88:229.51–70, esp. lines 63–67), against Hier. *comm in. Ioelem* 1.4 (CCL 76:163). Theodore of Mopsuestia, *comm. in Ioelem* 1.4 (81.5–14 Sprenger), too typologizes, but argues—on the basis of his restrictive (skeptical) historical approach; cf. above n. 27—that Joel refers only to Assyrians and Babylonians, i.e. he prophesies only about his immediate (contemporary) future, not the long term. (Like all ancient commentators he thought of Joel as a contemporary of Hosea and Amos.) Julian's call for a literal understanding of the passage takes the form of a description of a locust plague in Palestine, which is taken from Jerome's eye witness account in Hier. *comm. in Ioelem* 2.1–11 (CCL 76:178.95–96). It seems as if Julian turns Jerome's account against himself, since he uses it in his own exegesis of Joel 1.4, while he puts the allegory over Joel 1.4, for which he has undoubtedly drawn from Jerome, under his lemma of Joel 2.4–11. Jerome on the contrary had put the allegory to Joel 1.4 and the eyewitness account to Joel 2.1–11; for more details, cf. Strobl, *Untersuchung*, 96–97.

41. Julian contrasts the blustering severity (*fragor seueritatis*) of the prophet's actual words with the subtleness of their allegorical meaning, which he cautiously suggests as just one other possible way (*subtilior intellegentia*) of looking at the text, after having established that it must first of all be taken literally; cf. Iul. *tr. Iohel* 2.4–11 (CCL 88:240.116–17); cf. *tr. Osee* 1.1.10–11 (CCL 88:130.525–28), where he admits that the prophecy of a kingdom of peace for Israel sounds like an exaggeration, if taken literally, as indeed it should be, in his view, for the period of the Assyrian and Babylonian threat. However, applied to the Eschaton, it may sound almost too subtle, he adds. In *Turb*. 3.165 (CCL 88:374.58) he argues that Rom 1.28 (*tradidit illos in reprobum sensum*) is ὑπερβολικῶς *dictum*, as Aug. *c. Iul.* 5.10 (PL 44:788) reports, though only in so far as God does *not* cause people to sin, but respects their freedom. In Julian's view the verse is to be taken literally in the sense that God allows people to sin and be punished. On the significance of the distinction between literary meaning and hyperbole, cf. Bouwman, *Julian von Aeclanum Kommentar*, 92 n. 1; on Theodore, cf. Rudolph Bultmann, *Die Exegese des Theodor von Mopsuestia* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1984), 62–63. Concerning his evaluation of pain the methodical use of this distinction leads Julian to adapt a position similar to that of Calvenus Taurus discussed earlier in this article (section 1.2): pain, as one of the four emotions, is a subtle phenomenon, and has to be treated appropriately. While it may cause various discomforts, which may lead to evil, it must not itself be considered evil, but monitored closely so that it may not lead to an evil by way of an individual giving in to its temptations. To say however that pain itself is an evil would be a gross exaggeration.

Julian's philosophical source here is Cicero.[42] He is the prime Latin witness for the "tetrad"[43] with which the Stoics[44] analyzed the workings of the human soul. In *The Orator* (1.53 and 2.178), *Topics* (74) and the *Tusculan Disputations* (3.23 and 4.11) he mentions the "four perturbations" (*quattuor perturbationes*)[45] of the soul, pleasure or joy (*uoluptas*; *gaudium*), sadness (*tristitia*), fear and pain. However, as the discrepancy of this group with Julian's indicates, Cicero already had his own ideas about how to deal with this scheme. In *Tusc.* 3.24–25 he argues that the four emotions might be reduced further and divided into two groups, one dealing with positives, i.e. desire and pleasure (ἐπιθυμία, ἡδονή; *cupiditas*, *uoluptas*), the other one with negatives, i.e. fear and pain (φόβος, λύπη; *metus*, *aegritudo*). One emotion in each group anticipates the event, the other reacts to it. Interestingly, Julian suggests a distinction between dynamic and static emotions.[46]

Cicero's aim was to reduce the tetrad to a single basic emotion from which all others can be deduced. In two letters to Atticus, *Att.* 2.21.4 and 10.4.6, and in his treatise on friendship, *Lael.* 48, he identifies the concept of *dolor animi*/*animae* with *tristitia*, or *aegritudo*, and considers it the basic form of mental and emotional instability. Like Augustine,[47] Julian would not have been able to agree with that, if only because for him pain was not purely an emotion of the soul, but also a sense perception of the body; and considering how much more positively than Cicero he thinks about pleasure, it is not difficult to comprehend why he replaces *cupiditas*

42. Notwithstanding the fact that his main literary source here is Hier. *comm. in Ioelem* 1.4 (CCL 76:164–65), whom Julian does *not* copy; against Bouwman, *Julian von Aeclanum Kommentar*, 112; on differences between Julian and Jerome, cf. above nn. 37–41; e.g. the "kinetic theory" is not in Jerome. Moreover, Jerome also draws from Cicero; cf. Aline Canellis, "Saint Jérôme et le passions: sur les 'quattuor perturbationes' des Tusculanes," *VC* 54 (2000): 178–203.

43. Or "tetrachord" (Aristo *SVF* 1.373); for further references, cf. Stephen A. White, "Cicero and the Therapists," in *Cicero the Philosopher*, ed. J. G. F. Powell (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 219–46, 229 n. 20.

44. Cf. Zeno *SVF* 1.51, who lists four types of emotions, sadness, fear, desire and pleasure: τῶν παθῶν . . . εἶναι γένη τέτταρα, λύπην, φόβον, ἐπιθυμίαν, ἡδονήν.

45. Cf. also Hier. *comm. in Ioelem* 1.4 (CCL 76:165.175–77), who argues that Latin *passio* is not a good translation for Greek πάθη. Iul. *tr. Iohel* 2.4–11 (CCL 88:240.138) remains unaffected by this remark and speaks of *passiones*.

46. Iul. *tr. Iohel* 2.4–11 (CCL 88:241.141–47): *saltibus . . . promouente[s] . . . absque ulla operis alacritate insiden[tes]*; cf. in this context Julian's "kinetic theory" (above n. 38; cf. also n. 42).

47. Cf. Aug. *ciu.* 14.7 (II 15 Dombart-Kalb); O'Daly, "Affectus," 167–68; idem, *Augustine's City of God: A Reader's Guide* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1999), 155–56.

with *spes*. Nevertheless, despite his more materialistic concept of pain Julian does use the expression in psychological contexts to circumscribe emotional states like anxiety, grief and shame.[48] However, his concern for the material context has consequences for the perception of emotional states. Already in *Ad Turbantium* Julian expresses the view that each emotion must be seen in its individual empirical, i.e. physical and material, context.[49]

Alternating with each other or increasing and decreasing in intensity, emotions make the souls of animate beings interact with their bodies, and the whole beings with their surroundings and with other beings. In that respect all emotions fulfill a positive role in the universe. They possess ontological value, a quality of being, or, as Aristotle put it, "emotional quality" (*affectionalis qualitas*).[50] They are life-enhancing and therefore good; and that includes all emotions, not just the nice and pleasant ones like charity, love and compassion, or the morally upright ones like courage and honesty, but also emotions like greed, desire for power and sexual pleasure, concupiscence, fear, anxiety, grief, shame, mental agony and

48. See e.g. Iul. *tr. Osee* 1.1.5 (CCL 88:124.264–67): *uetus dolor* (divorce); 1.1.6 (126.367–69): *extremus angor*; 2.5.15 (165.199–200): *aerumnae doloresque*; 2.8.8–10 (180.114): *sensus timoris*; 2.9.1–3 (185.16.27–28): *dolor tuus* (fraud); 2.9.5–6 (186.63): *cum dolore* (sc. to eat one's bread in exile); 3.12.12–13 (214.250–56): *sub impetu et dolore*.

49. Iul. *Turb*. 4.294 (CCL 88:390) on the difference between "emotional quality" (*affectionalis qualitas*) as a stable core condition of the soul and "emotions" (*passiones*) as temporary accidents attached to the emotional quality. Julian here draws on Arist. *cat*. 9a.28–29, 9b.19–21, 28–29 and 33, but he extends Aristotle's second point by qualifying emotions as "mental or physical" (*aut animi aut corporis passiones*). Julian's main point here is to criticize Aug. *nupt*. 1.28 (CSEL 42:240–41), who had identified *concupiscentia* as an emotional quality. In Julian's view this is either false, or Manichean (and therefore, of course, in both cases wrong). Augustine responds *c. Iul.* 6.53–54 (PL 44:851–52) that it is Julian who fails to grasp the difference between emotional qualities and emotions. He repeats himself *c. Iul. imp*. 1.47 and 105 (CSEL 85.1:34 and 121–23). Julian's note on emotions being physical or mental only underlines his view that they are marginal compared to the core (emotional) quality of the human being, and that they must be looked at in the context of the relationship between body and soul.

Julian wrote *Turb*. in 419 while still in Italy (cf. above n. 16). Turbantius was a fellow bishop who like Julian had refused to endorse the condemnation of Pelagius and Caelestius. Unlike Julian he seems to have returned to the fold some time after 422; cf. Aug. *c. Iul. imp*. 1.1 (CSEL 85.1:5); *ep*. 10*.1 (CSEL 88:46; *BAug* 46B:166).

50. Cf. Arist. *cat*. 8.9a–10a and above n. 49 on Iul. *Turb*. 4.294 (CCL 88:390). Julian's criticism there is aimed in particular at Augustine's definition *nupt*. 1.28 (CSEL 42:240–41) of *concupiscentia carnis* as an emotion attached to a *mala qualitas*.

physical pain. They are all attached, as accidents, to "emotional quality," and are therefore good; and even if one were to apply stricter standards to the term "good," as the Stoics did, one might still speak of them as indifferent. A prejudicial attitude, however, like, e.g., Cicero's against *uoluptas*, or Augustine's against *concupiscentia carnis* (or *dolor* for that matter)[51] is, according to this model (followed by Julian) not rationally sustainable.

2. JULIAN'S CONCEPT OF PAIN AND CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE

2.1. *The Bottom Line: Julian's Concept of the Radical Goodness of Creation and His Rejection of Augustine's Teaching on Original Sin as Manichean*

Julian is not primarily a philosopher, though he does have a strongly naturalist and rationalist attitude.[52] Yet he develops his positive view of pain as a life-enhancing emotion on the basis of a theological position. He strongly believes in the universe and every individual in it as being created by God out of nothing and irreversably good.[53] On the basis of this fundamental belief he vehemently rejects Augustine's teaching of original sin, according to which a primordial act of human presumption against God reduces the universe to a "fallen" state, determines human acts to be evil by nature, and creates carnal concupiscence,[54] pain and death, phenomena nonexistent before the fall. Only God can save the world and humanity from this scenario of doom, which Julian purports Augustine to teach; and, Julian goes on, according to Augustine, God does save, but only a few, and at a price: the individual freedom of the will, which is evil according to Augustine by virtue of its "fallen nature," will be eliminated and replaced by God's grace.

51. Cf. Lössl, "Dolor," Gerald Bonner, "Concupiscentia," *Augustinus-Lexikon* 1.7/8 (1994): 1113–22, Peter Burnell, "Concupiscence," in *Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 224–27.

52. Probably due to the influence of Antiochene exegetes, particularly Theodore of Mopsuestia; for evidence, cf. in the previous section (e.g., nn. 27 and 41).

53. On the importance of this concept in Julian, cf. Lamberigts, "Julian of Aeclanum."

54. A concept which is narrowed down to "sexual concupiscence" in the debate with Julian; cf. Bonner, "Concupiscentia," 1120–21.

Julian identifies this teaching as essentially Manichean, since it postulates the existence of an evil substance, "fallen nature," a universe in which "the good" is nonexistent, but in which every being, every act and every event is necessarily evil. Underlining this doctrinal point with an exegetical one, Julian cites—in *Flor.* 3.177 and 185—a supposedly Manichean text suggesting an exegesis of Rom 7.19 which in Julian's view matches that of Augustine. According to that text, purportedly a letter of Mani to a female disciple called Menoch, St. Paul's experience of not being able to do the good that he wants to do, but being forced instead, compelled by some interior power, to do the evil that he does not want to do, reflects the profound reality that pain originates from sexual concupiscence (*concupiscentia*; *uoluptas*).[55]

2.2. *Adam: Created Mortal and "Able" to Perceive Pain*

Julian holds against that the view that every human being is born in the same state in which Adam was created by God: perfect, good, just, and yet mortal—θνητός, *mortalis*. He does not hesitate for a moment when he uses that expression in this context.[56] For him there is no doubt: "Adam was created mortal," *Adam mortalis factus*,[57] notwithstanding the fact

55. Iul. *Flor.*=Aug. *c. Iul. imp.* 3.177 and 185 (CSEL 85.1:477 and 483). Markus Stein, *Manichaica Latina 1: Epistula ad Menoch*, Papyrologica Coloniensia 27 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1998), offers good evidence that the text is not a genuine Manichean document.

56. Cf. e.g. *Turb.* 1.58 (CCL 88:355.562): *peccata mortalium*.

57. Iul. *ep. Zos.* 4. 5 (CCL 88:335.336); *Flor.*=Aug. *c. Iul. imp.* 3.147 (CSEL 85.1:453); 6.30 (PL 45:1579–80). Unlike Theodore of Mopsuestia, who would agree with Julian that Adam was created mortal, Julian does not stress that the shadow of mortality hanging over humanity poses a temptation, or natural inclination (ῥοπή) to sin, or additional weakness (ἀσθένεια); cf. Theodore of Mopsuestia, *On Romans* 5.21 (121 Staab). The reason for this slight discrepancy could be that Theodore uses "sin" homonymously, in the sense of a cause, but also of a consequence of pain and death, due to the temptation which the latter are to human beings, though he restricts these effects to Adam and rejects the idea that God punishes all human beings for a sin committed by Adam. (On this point he is again in tune with Julian.) In other words: Theodore sometimes uses "sin" in the meaning of "pain and death"; on Theodore's position, cf. Julius Gross, "Theodor von Mopsuestia, ein Gegner der Erbsündenlehre," *ZKG* 65 (1953/4): 1–15; Ulrich Wickert, *Studien zu den Pauluskommentaren Theodors von Mopsuestia, ZNW* 27 (Berlin: Töpelmann, 1962), 101–20. Wickert is a tad disappointed with Theodore and approvingly cites Henry B. Swete, *Theodori Mopsuesteni in epistolas b. Pauli commentarii* 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1880), lxxxvii: "His [sc. Theodore's] errors are mainly due to an imperfect realization of the nature and extent of human sin." However, this is not all that Swete has to say on the topic. He also argues that the idea of mortality as a catalyst of sin provides Theodore's theology at least with something like a substitute for the doctrine

that Adam and Eve were also created in God's image and likeness. Mortality and all that comes with it, including concupiscence and pain, even pain unto death, according to Julian, is part of the human nature as created by God in the beginning. Bruckner is therefore wrong in labelling Julian a traducianist on the ground that he supposedly teaches that death has been handed down from Adam to all future generations.[58] It is true that in the controversy with Augustine Julian uses traducianist terminology. The reason for this is either that he tries to make himself understood in the context of Augustinian thought, or that this is how his thoughts were communicated by Augustine, or both. Judged by his own standards, however, the reason why Julian holds mortality to be a dimension of human nature is because, in his view, every individual human nature is created individually by God as a "mortal substance," or rather, put in a more precise and less misleading way, as an individual being, a person, consisting of an immortal soul and a mortal body, a person, therefore, who is mortal by definition. The principle of inheritance, in Julian's view, extends only to accidents; the human nature and substance of every individual human person is created by God out of nothing.

Second to being created as mortals, the reason why, as human beings,

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of original sin and "saves it from declining to the level of trivial moralism" (115). Julian uses the expression "death" in a similar way as Theodore uses "sin": Natural death is creational, common to all people and good, "spiritual death," as a punishment for sin, is handed on from generation to generation through sin "in Adam," i.e., in imitation of Adam. While Theodore speaks of natural death as a temptation to sin, Julian speaks of sin transmitting spiritual death, in the sense that each human individual who sins contracts the spiritual death first contracted by Adam by imitating Adam voluntarily; cf. *Turb*. 4.325 (CCL 88:395.472–76); *Flor*.=Aug. *c. Iul. imp*. 2.20–21, 24, 48–49, 52–53, 63–64, 68 (CSEL 85.1:78–79, 197–98, 201, 203, 206, 208); and Bruckner, *Julian*, 115. Both Theodore's and Julian's positions are based on rationalizing and moralizing exegeses of the relevant passages (i.e. Rom 5.12; 1 Cor 15.22). Systematically, both positions are similar to each other and to the pagan models cited above in that they hold that God creates human beings mortal and vulnerable ("able" to suffer pain) so that they have the opportunity to practice their virtues; cf. Theodore of Mopsuestia, *On Romans* 11.15 (156 Staab).

58. Bruckner, *Julian*, 144 n. 1; cf. Iul. *exp. Iob* 14.1 (CCL 88:39), a text not known to Bruckner, in which Julian argues, commenting on Job 14.1 (*homo natus de muliere, breui uiuens tempore, repletus multis miseriis*): children of mortal mothers are necessarily mortal (*de mortale natum necesse est esse mortalem*). This has nothing to do with traducianism. It is our nature, Julian insists: *natura nostra, ut initio finem indicat, ita ortu testatur interitum*. In *exp. Iob* 8.19 (CCL 88:26.77–79) Julian argues that it is by decree of the law of nature that things have to perish in order to make place for new things: *haec est lex naturae, ut in locum pereuntium alteri subrogentur*. On Julian's concept of "spiritual death" and *its* "transmission" cf. above, n. 57.

we are mortal and consequently able to perceive pain, according to Julian, is because we consist of bodies as well as souls.[59] Limited by time and space, bodies not only come, but also cease, to exist at certain times and places. "Mere bodies," like rocks, do just that, nothing else. Animated bodies, however, and especially bodies with rational souls, relate to their birth and death. With their souls these beings reach out towards a higher, eternal, intellectual-spiritual reality, yet they have to accept that like "mere bodies" they are limited by their corporeality. Yet again Julian stresses, against Augustine, that all human beings are born innocent, not affected by a previous fall, that they are capable of living virtuous lives, exercising their free wills and doing the good.[60] If they want to realize their originally intended perfection, all they have to do is to embrace their corporeality and all its implications as good, including their concupiscence, their pain, and finally the prospect of dying, because all these things are part of the way in which they are created by God.[61]

Julian does not deny the existence of evil, but he rejects Augustine's view that it has taken on a quasi-ontological status which keeps it out of reach of individual human responsibility and associates it with God and God's creative activity, while the blame for it continues to rest with humanity. Such a concept calls in question God's goodness as well as justice;[62] for how, Julian asks, could a God be called good and just who not only fails to prevent evil being inflicted upon people who under normal circumstances would be considered innocent, but who actively and indiscriminately inflicts it by creating and maintaining a universe in which (after the fall, as understood by Augustine) every act and every event is naturally evil? What Julian proposes instead is a universe fundamentally in balance, in which evil plays an inferior role, as a cause, or

59. Cf. Iul. *Flor.*=Aug. *c. Iul. imp.* 3.147 (CSEL 85.1:453). In *exp. Iob* 15.14–15 (CCL 88:42–43) Julian points to our *mutabilitas* as the principle of possible suffering.

60. Iul. *Turb.* 1.17b (CCL 88:345); cf. Aug. *c. Iul.* 3.36 (PL 44:721); see also once more *Flor.* 6.17 (cf. above in section 1.1) that there is no corruption in the "concreteness" of the body.

61. Iul. *Turb.* 1.23.41 (CCL 88:346.350); *ep. Ruf.* 18 (CCL 88:339); cf. Aug. *nupt.* 2.25 (CSEL 42:277–78); *c. Iul.* 3.16–17 (PL 44:710–11); *c. Iul. imp.* 6.27 (PL 45:1566–75).

62. Cf. McGrath, "Divine Justice," who argues Augustine's case that human and divine justice are incomparable because of the fundamental difference between divine and human nature. Taking Julian's query a step further one might ask how, if that is the case, Augustine, as a creature, should be able to make a judgment about God's nature of the kind: "We cannot make a judgment about God's nature?" At the level of creation, as Julian already points out, divine justice can only be measured by the standards of human justice.

effect, of partial disruptions to the universal order by sinful, i.e. blameworthy, individual human acts. *Culpabilitas*, "blame," according to Julian, arises from an irrational attitude and behavior of individual human beings known as "excess" (*immoderatio*, *excessus*).[63] Such behavior may disrupt the balance of the natural order of the universe partially and in individual cases, however often, yet it is not capable of overthrowing, perverting or corrupting it as a whole.[64]

In principle, Julian argues, the goodness of the natural order is irreversible and indestructible. Not only the physical, but also the moral and spiritual universes are fundamentally in balance. Only in individual cases, accidentally and partially, may the natural order be upset by instances of ἀκρασία,[65] emotional, intellectual, and consequently moral, human weakness. Significantly, these instances of weakness are not intrinsically evil: they play an important part in the process of individual character building. Like Sextus, Julian would not allow for anything to be called "in principle evil." In Julian's view, we can only know, desire, pursue and finally realize the good, if we also have a corresponding grasp of what is evil. This is why Julian defines freedom of the will as the ability to do good *and* evil.[66] Similarily, he argues, at a passive level, pain, as a result of physical injury, occurs to be either avoided or endured.[67] According to Julian therefore, the emotion of pain (*sensus doloris*), together with the

63. Both, *immoderatio* and *excessus*, are typical and frequent expressions in Julian; cf. Iul. *Turb.* 1.48 and 2.146 (CCL 88:351 and 371); cf. Aug. *c. Iul.* 3.28 and 4.73 (PL 44:716–17 and 775–76); Iul. *Flor.*=Aug. *c. Iul. imp.* 1.47 (CSEL 85.1:34); Iul. *exp. Iob* praef. (CCL 88:3.28).

64. I can therefore not agree with Lamberigts, "Julien d'Éclane," 381, that Julian had to modify his position in the face of the effects of sin on the structure of creation. Those effects, in Julian's view, are always accidental, never substantial. The power of the *prauitatis exempla* and the *consuetudo uitiorum* of *Flor.*=Aug. *c. Iul. imp.* 1.94 (CSEL 85.1:109.64–65) was never held by Julian to be beyond the power of the individual human being's freedom to do the good.

65. Cf. Timothy D. J. Chappell, *Aristotle and Augustine on Freedom* (London: St. Martin's Press, 1995). Chappell looks at the Aristotelian concept of ἀκρασία and shows to what extent Augustine departs from it with his concept of intrinsic evil, or "evil will." Julian is in line with Aristotle insisting on the view that there exists nothing which might be able to fundamentally upset the rationality and goodness of the universe, against Augustine who proposes that there is such a force, namely the inexplicable, intrinsically evil will.

66. Latin *aut* instead of *uel* (cf. above, n. 22).

67. Interestingly, Augustine, too, makes this point in one of his earliest works. In *beata uita* 25 he cites from Terence, *The Eunuch* (761: *nam tu quod uitare possis, stultum admittere est*), but then continues that, according to the Stoic wise man, what cannot be avoided has to be endured; cf. Lössl, "Dolor," 585.

emotion of fear (*affectus timoris*), is instrumental, and vital, for the formation of identity and character in individual human beings.[68]

2.3. *Christ: Victory over Pain—Divine Commission of a Human Challenge*

Equally important according to Julian, and an essential property of the freedom of the will, is the ability to act otherwise. No physical or mental compulsion is strong enough in Julian's view to eliminate that ability. In other words, actual freedom of choice is necessary. It exists by law of nature. "The law alone is not capable of acting otherwise."[69] Augustine stresses the limitations of human freedom. He points out that people under torture tend to tell everything, even lies, to end their agony. Julian insists that he knows cases in which people did not yield to the temptation of pain, but displayed *contemptus dolorum*;[70] and he goes even further. Not only is pain in his view essentially incapable of restricting or eliminating freedom, but it may even heighten one's sense of destiny and purpose, and provide additional assistance in the pursuit of a virtuous life. Vice versa, clarity of mind may enable a person to endure pain to an extent impossible under what might be considered ordinary circumstances.[71]

Julian here thinks particularly of Jesus Christ. For Julian, the suffering Jesus is not miserable. On the contrary—and paradoxically, according to Julian—the more Jesus suffers as a human being, and the more his pain emphasizes the purpose of his humanity (i.e. to be an *exemplum* and thereby revealing his divinity), the less he actually suffers, as a human being that is, though we may assume that he never reaches the point of

68. Iul. *Flor.*=Aug. *c. Iul. imp.* 6.17 (PL 45:1539). For the Stoics, in contrast, the ability to act otherwise is not part of the definition of freedom. Someone can be blamed for something which he or she was determined to do by nature or fate. On a comparison between Aristotle's and the Stoic ("compatibilist") concept, see Richard Sorabji, *Necessity, Cause and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle's Theory* (London: Duckworth, 1980), 243–49; cf. also above, n. 22.

69. Iul. *Flor.*=Aug. *c. Iul. imp.* 1.72 (CSEL 85.1:84.11–12). What the passage actually says here is that the law cannot sin, because it cannot act otherwise, an in some way tautological remark. Cf. also Julian's application of the principle, ibid., 1.98 (115:16–17) in his characterization of Manicheism as a doctrine that holds that in every human being evil nature sins, not being able to act otherwise, *et aliud facere non potest*.

70. Iul. *Flor.*=Aug. *c. Iul. imp.* 1.83 (CSEL 85.1:96), which reminds one, of course, of Cicero's *contemptio doloris mortisque* (*fin.* 2.113); cf. above, n. 33; on the context, cf. Rist, *Augustine*, 132 n. 107 (with further references); on the Augustinian passage, cf. Aug. *ciu.*19.6 (364.20–22 Dombart-Kalb); on its context, cf. O'Daly, *Augustine's City of God*, 196–210, esp. 200–201.

71. Iul. *Flor.*=Aug. *c. Iul. imp.* 2.171 (CSEL 85.1:290).

complete ἀπάθεια.[72] He remains victorious over his pain and defeats it, much like the Stoic in Gellius' anecdote. However, Julian continues, in the Christian context that is only half the story. The purpose of Jesus' humanity is his divinity. As God assumes humanity in Christ, the impassibility, or inability to suffer, of God's divinity is conferred to humanity. At the same time God's divinity, by assuming humanity, assumes also the ability to suffer.[73]

In contrast, what Augustine tries to do, according to Julian, is to separate God from the emotions of human beings and thereby also from human suffering. By doing so he ascribes to God, in Julian's words, "a degree of iniquity which neither the presumption of those in power[74] nor the pain[75] of the disenfranchised[76] could generate."[77] If Christ had not been able to experience sexual concupiscence, Julian asks, how could he have been able to experience pain, let alone pain unto death? Did God perhaps erect a wall in his soul between his ("purely physical") pain and his (emotional) pain perception? Apollinarians and Manicheans hold such views.[78] According to Augustine, Julian continues, Christ is a eunuch,

72. For the reasons, cf. above towards the end of section 1.2.

73. For this passage, cf. *Turb*. 1.16 (CCL 88:345.173–76) on Christ helping human nature, by being an *exemplum*, to do even more good than it can do naturally, or ordinarily (cf. *Turb*. 2.109 [CCL 88:365.91] on having justice even apart from faith in Christ); *Turb*. 3.218 (CCL 88:382.349–50) on the human nature of Christ; *Turb*. 3.216 (CCL 88:381.345–46) on Christ possessing a *sensus carnalis* (Julian's word for what Augustine calls *concupiscentia carnis*) and on Augustine being an Apollinarian for denying it. The Apollinarian charge implies that Julian believes that in Christ God assumes human nature; cf. Cipriani, "Echi." See now Mathijs Lamberigts, "Pélage: la réhabilitation d'un hérétique," *RHE* 95 (2000): 97–111, 104, on a number of recent studies highlighting the "orthodox" nature of "Pelagian" christology, of which Julian may be considered a special case. Concepts like *exemplum* and *imitatio*, Lamberigts argues, should no longer be seen merely as "external" concepts, but as elements of a more fundamental understanding of the relationship between God and humankind in Christ. The same holds true, one may add, of the "Pelagian" teaching on the sacraments. Julian's concept of "the sacrament" "improving nature," i.e. making better a nature which is already good, is a view which was not held by Augustine, but which was introduced into "orthodox" western sacramental theology in the twelfth century; cf. the note in Philip Cary, *Augustine's Invention of the Inner Self* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 143 n. 16.

74. Literally "those dressed in purple."

75. Here *dolor* seems to mean something like "cry of angry despair."

76. Literally "widows and orphans."

77. Iul. *Flor.*=Aug. *c. Iul. imp*. 3.33 (CSEL 85.1:371–72).

78. The former on the ground that Christ does not have a human soul and does therefore not share in human emotions and thoughts, the latter because sexual concupiscence and similar emotions are only felt by evil natures, in which Christ does not share; cf. Iul. *Flor.*=Aug. *c. Iul. imp*. 4.50 (PL 45:1368).

not for the kingdom of God, but by nature.[79] Instead of projecting a relationship between divine and human nature in Christ and those inspired by him, Julian implies, Augustine suggests a struggle between the two, at the end of which the winner suppresses the loser. What, Julian asks, is the value of Jesus being a eunuch, if his state is determined by his nature rather than being inspired by the call to God's kingdom? For that call, Julian argues, is actually the way in which the divine nature is present in Christ.[80] It is Christ's divinity which renders his pain meaningful, gives it a purpose and by doing so overcomes it, not by suppressing the human nature or eliminating it in a deadly struggle, but by calling it and transforming it, e.g. concupiscence becoming charity, presumption magnanimity and suffering superior sense of purpose. For Julian it is vital that Jesus Christ is no different in that regard from the rest of humanity, *Christus nihil de naturalibus minus habuit*. As far as his divinity, i.e. his bestowal to the point of identity with God's grace, is concerned, his God-given chastity is victorious over pain, *castitas eius superatrix dolorum*. In

79. Iul. *Flor.*=Aug. *c. Iul. imp.* 4.52 and 57 (PL 45:1369 and 1373).

80. Julian accuses Augustine of using the term "human nature" homonymously, speaking of Christ's "human nature" as the criterion of salvation, while calling it "fallen" and incapable of doing good in everybody else's case. In fact, he argues, Augustine speaks of two different natures. As a result "salvation in Christ" does not work in Augustine's model. It only works if Christ has the same human nature as every other human being, that is, not a "vitiated nature," but a nature that is essentially good and capable of doing good. Christ, Julian continues, differs from the rest of humanity not by having a different (noncorrupt instead of corrupt) nature. Yet neither are the virtues associated with Christ, which require more than what may be naturally required for a virtuous life—like chastity or love of one's enemy—merely naturally developed by human nature, or plucked (or forced) on to it from outside (e.g., by a divine grace which takes over victoriously), as if it were not capable of developing them itself. Rather, they are developed by human nature on the basis of its own power to do good *as well as* in so far as human nature is assumed by divine nature in Christ in the sense of being called into the kingdom of God. In other words, for Julian, human nature acts through its own power, corresponding to the grace of God present in Christ. Augustine, according to Julian, confuses the matter by first calling human nature "fallen" and incapable of a virtuous life, and then ascribing to Christ a kind of virtue, like chastity, which seems to be an attribute of *his* human nature, instead of being in him, like in every other human being, the response of a human nature, created good and capable of doing the good and living a virtuous life, to a call to lead such a life, and pursue, in biblical terms, the kingdom of God. On the theological implications (especially on Julian's concept of nature), see Refoulé, "Julien d'Éclane," 66–72; on the christological context cf. Joanne McWilliam Dewart, "The Christology of the Pelagian Controversy," *SP* 17.3 (1982): 1221–44, 1233–44; on Augustine, cf. now William Harmless, "Christ the Pediatrician: Infant Baptism and Christological Imagery in the Pelagian Controversy," *AugSt* 28 (1997): 7–34.

a universal sense, finally, Christ is not less human being than true God, *Christus non minus homo uerus quam uerus deus*.[81]

2.4. *Job: A Man Struggling with Pain and with God*

For Julian, as for the Antiochenes, especially Theodore of Mopsuestia,[82] but not the later Augustine,[83] the soteriological focus in christology lies less on Christ's suffering (his cross) than on the life of Christ as an example for those who want to imitate Christ by leading a virtuous life, and on the triumph of the resurrection in anticipation of a successful outcome. Yet in one of his works Julian does address the problem of excessive, innocently suffered pain as a theological problem; and he seems to realize that it might just be capable of undermining his concept of, on the one hand, (moderate) pain as a good, a helper towards justice (*Flor.* 6.17), and, on the other hand, excess as a result of culpable individual human behavior. The work in question is Julian's *Expositio in Iob*. It is the figure of Job, significantly called throughout *exp. Iob.* "holy," *sanctus Iob*,[84] who compels Julian to refine, though not to retract, his positions developed in the writings against Augustine.

The suffering Job, Julian argues, is entirely innocent. His pain is not the result of *immoderatio* on his part, contrary to what his "friends" suggest.[85] Therefore it cannot be intrinsically evil, but must have a (good)

81. Iul. *Flor.*=Aug. *c. Iul. imp.* 4.57 (PL 45:1373).

82. Cf. e.g. Wickert, *Studien*, 141–42; Hans Norbert Sprenger, *Theodori Mopsuesteni Commentarius in XII Prophetas*. Göttinger Orientforschungen 5.1 (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1977), 148; Peter Bruns, *Theodor von Mopsuestia: Katechetische Homilien 1–2*. Fontes Christiani 17 (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1994), 137–38, 158–59 and passim. A standard study on Theodore's christology, like Richard A. Norris, *Manhood and Christ: A Study of the Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), hardly treats the topic as such.

83. Cf. Jürgen Hammerstaedt, "Crux," *Augustinus-Lexikon* 1.1/2 (1996): 143–52.

84. Iul. *exp. Iob* 5.17 (CCL 88:17.67); on the theological significance of Julian's treatment of the subject at a point in history when Job became more and more seen as a christological figure, cf. Willi Geerlings, "Hiob und Paulus. Theodizee und Paulinismus in der lateinischen Theologie am Ausgang des vierten Jahrhunderts," *JbAC* 24 (1981): 56–66, 58, 60–61; on the wider tradition of looking at Job as a model for how to endure pain, see Günther Datz, *Die Gestalt Hiobs in der kirchlichen Exegese und der "Arme Heinrich" Hartmanns von Aue*. Göppinger Arbeiten zur Germanistik 108 (Göppingen: Kümmerle, 1973); on the Patristic context, cf. Dassmann, "Hiob," 379–91.

85. Iul. *exp. Iob* praef. (CCL 88:3.28). Interestingly, it was not only Job's friends who suggested lack of moderation on Job's part (or on that of the author of Job), but also Theodore of Mopsuestia, who denied the canonicity of the book, in part because of the "unbiblical" (meaning: "undignified") way in which it depicts its hero; cf.

purpose. Job's grief, over the loss of his possessions, his children, and his health—with rare but typical interest in medical detail Julian diagnoses Job's skin condition as elephantiasis—is the expression of a positive attitude. In fact, Julian calls it a virtue. It would be a negative attitude, according to Julian, if Job had fallen mute and displayed *stupor animi*.[86] It is what Job's "friends" suggest, that he should pull himself together and hide his grief, that sounds utterly inane to Julian. It is, he writes, precisely by grieving that Job keeps his complexion and displays *patientia*. His firmness, as Job himself puts it Job 6.12, is not one of stones: *nec fortitudo lapidum fortitudo mea*.[87] Rather, his heart is human, the seat of emotions. These must be cultivated, Julian points out, which includes their display, albeit in moderation.

Exp. Iob provides a good example for the way in which Julian applies his theory of pain to a particular case. Pain, according to Julian an emotion originating in the soul, but triggered by an impact on the body, affects positively the individual human being's striving towards moral perfection, the formation of character and the cultivation of virtues. In so far as it is an emotion, it is not only suffered, but also expressed. The "complaint," Julian points out, is an aspect of pain.[88] As such it is neither sinful nor irrational. By suffering pain and complaining about it Job is not out of his mind. Rather he abstains not only from sin, but also from irrational behavior.[89] Moreover, his pain intensifies Job's sense of destiny. Job would not be Job, if he had not to endure the kind of suffering which he endures. Indeed he would not be Job, if he were not reacting to his

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Schäublin, *Untersuchungen*, 77–83; Dassmann, "Hiob," 403–5, 419–20. Partly in response to these criticisms Theodore's brother Polychronius of Apameia wrote a commentary on Job, from which Julian draws; cf. Vaccari, *Commento a Giobbe*, 131–84. Some passages in Iul. *exp. Iob* which read like an apology of Job, belong to that material and may have originally been intended as a response to Theodore's criticisms. Stiglmayr, "Jobkommentar," 275–76, took that as an argument against Julian's authorship of *exp. Iob*. He would have expected to find Julian on Theodore's side; but cf. Vaccari, "Commento Cassinense," 49.

86. Iul. *exp. Iob* 1–2.20 (CCL 88:7.125).

87. Iul. *exp. Iob* 6.12 (CCL 88:20.55–56), and 7.1 (CCL 88:21): life as a military service: *militia est uita hominis super terram*, and Julian's additional remark: *cum de naturae mortalis condicione.*

88. The synonymity of "pain" and "complaint" in ordinary English still accounts for that.

89. Like quarreling with God in a stupid manner; cf. Iul. *exp. Iob* 1–2.22 (CCL 88:7.140–44): *in omnibus his non peccauit Iob labiis suis, neque stultum quid contra deum locutus est*; cf. Deut 32.6: *populus stultus . . .* ; Ps 13.1, 52.1: *dixit insipiens . . .* ; 73.18: *populus insipiens. . . .*

suffering the way he does, namely by complaining, protesting, and, ultimately, challenging God.

To think, as Job himself does early on during his complaint, that it is better not to exist than to exist suffering excessive pain, is fallacious.[90] The fallacy rests on the widespread opinion that to be dead is a bit like resting or sleeping after a hard day's work, and that to be nonexistent, in the sense of having never been born, is similar to being dead. A thorough investigation of the principles of existence and nonexistence and of life and death yields no evidence to support that view. Those who heed a death wish like Job in the early stages of his suffering betray instead a certain lack of experience in life. They do not understand what it means to live, in contrast to "being dead."[91] Interestingly, as his suffering continues, and increases in intensity, Job recognizes that his perception of his pain as unbearable (*nimietas doloris*)[92] is a sign of him beginning to cope.

As the story unfolds, Job gradually learns how to relate his pain to his life. He begins to understand the nature of pain and thus discovers the key to conquering it. He begins to understand that to be human means to be mortal and vulnerable,[93] that each generation must die in order to make space for the next,[94] that mortality and vulnerability come with corporeality,[95] but that physical pain may sometimes only hide far deeper and more severe mental ills.[96] However, learning all this and thereby increasing his knowledge does not make Job much happier at first. On the contrary, the closer he draws to the heart of the matter, the more intense his crisis becomes. His nights are increasingly filled with pain, as he is deprived of his sleep by *insomnia*.[97] His death wish has in the meantime turned into a gnawing fear of death, which makes him feel his pain even more intensely, while patience fails in her role as *moderatrix dolorum*.[98] Well-wishing bystanders uttering inanities only add to the grief.[99] Reason offers neither a solution nor consolation.[100] The mind is perplexed by the painful absurdity that the ordeal of the person in pain is decreed by

90. Iul. *exp. Iob* 3.1–3 and 3.17 (CCL 88:13 and 17.67).
91. A state brilliantly described by Jim Crace in his novel of the same title.
92. Iul. *exp. Iob* 9.23 (CCL 88:28.93–96).
93. Iul. *exp. Iob* 14.1 (CCL 88:39).
94. Iul. *exp. Iob* 8.19 (CCL 88:26.77–79).
95. Iul. *exp. Iob* 15.14–15 (CCL 88:42–43).
96. Iul. *exp. Iob* 16.13–15 (CCL 88:46.60–62).
97. Iul. *exp. Iob* 17.12 (CCL 88:49.71–73).
98. Iul. *exp. Iob* 17.13 (CCL 88:49.74–75).
99. Iul. *exp. Iob* 19.1–2 (CCL 88:51.2–3); 32.1 (CCL 88:61.1–12).
100. Iul. *exp. Iob* 19.7 (CCL 88:52.26–27).

superior powers. Protest, *clamor*, outcry, is the only remaining way to respond under the circumstances.[101] Yet it does not reduce the pain, let alone take it away. Covered in festering wounds, Job resembles a decomposing body, but the common wisdom that corpses do not suffer is no longer valid.[102] Job's body may already be like a corpse, yet Job suffers physical pain as well as the mental agony of being let down by his God. As if all his pain were not enough, he feels angry and sad.[103] At the end however he retains his faith in the goodness of God. "What is the ultimate iniquity?" he asks. Julian provides the answer: "Not to believe in God's goodness and justice."[104] Thus at the end Job hands himself over to God: *ecce deus magnus, uincens scientiam nostram*; and Julian adds: "If [God is] great by nature, then also in terms of wisdom and justice. It is therefore not possible to submit God to the scrutiny of our judgment."[105]

Exp. Iob is a comparatively short work. In fact, it has been suggested that in its present state it may only be an abridged version of a more voluminous original.[106] While that remains a possibility, it obviously yields plenty of material, even in its present state, to secure Julian's authorship and enrich our knowledge of his views on pain. It may well draw from a larger source, but it also stands in its own right. "A commentary which lets the text speak for itself, restricts itself to paraphrase or brief explanatory remarks" and directs the reader's attention away from itself and to the text, it has characteristics identified already by Rudolf Bultmann as typical for the Antiochene school of exegesis.[107] However, Julian makes the reader look at the text with *his* eyes and he appropriates the aporetic open ending of the book of Job for *his* purpose.

His concern is to present Job as an example supporting his view that as human beings we have no means of judging God on why such a thing as (excessive) pain exists, and that it would therefore be irrational and, by implication, immoral, if we began to question God's goodness and justice. Moderate pain, according to Julian, is founded in the order of creation, excessive pain is a result of excessive human behavior, or irrational attitude,[108] easily avoided through the proper use of reason and freedom in

101. Iul. *exp. Iob* 21.4 (CCL 88:58.16–21).

102. Iul. *exp. Iob* 30.19 (CCL 88:82.71–74); cf. Aug. *ep.* 187.5 (CSEL 57:85.11–12); *en. Ps* 108.17 (CCL 40:1592.8).

103. Iul. *exp. Iob* 30.28 and 30.31 (CCL 88:83.107–10 and 84.121–23).

104. Iul. *exp. Iob* 31.28 (CCL 88:86.105–9): *in creatoris iniuriam . . . credere . . . nequitia*[*e*].

105. Iul. *exp. Iob* 37.26 (CCL 88:97.83–85).

106. On this discussion, see De Coninck (CCL 88:xiv n. 61); cf. also above n. 85.

107. Bultmann, *Exegese des Theodor von Mopsuestia*, 34.

108. Cf. above n. 65 on the concept of ἀκρασία.

the struggle for a virtuous life. Christ is the ultimate exemplar for that kind of struggle, while Job, for his part, demonstrates that even a prehistoric pagan with no links either to the Greco-Roman or to the Judeo-Christian tradition can learn the lesson, if God wishes to teach him it in his own way.[109]

3. JULIAN'S CONCEPT OF PAIN AND LATE ANCIENT SCIENCE

3.1. *"Eve's Complaints"*

It is important to note that by calling pain "a helper" towards virtue and justice (i.e. as a good to work with) Julian is not intending to play down or to minimize the severity of suffering.[110] It is his soteriological concern for the humanity of Christ that compels him, as a theologian, to reject the idea that the human *sensus doloris* is a result of Adam's and Eve's eviction from paradise,[111] i.e. that it did not exist before the fall. How, he asks, should Christ, who is without sin, have been able to assume something (i.e. the human *sensus doloris*) which did not exist before sin began to exist? Beyond that, Julian also argues from common human experience. Pain, he points out, is not in every respect the bogey which Augustine is trying to create. Most forms of pain are moderate. They can be tackled in perfectly natural ways. Of course, all of them are ethically and spiritually

109. On Job living *ante legem* see Iul. *exp. Iob* praef. (CCL 88:3.20–25) and ibid., 16.19 (46.77–84): In his suffering Job is inspired by the Holy Spirit and, although *extra legem*, proclaims things which can otherwise only be found *in legis sacrae litteris*; 33.15–16 (90.41–48): God speaks to Job in visions and dreams, which would never happen, *si magisterium bonae uitae iam in litteras contulisset*. Cf. also above n. 73 on *Turb*. 2.109 (CCL 88:365.91).

110. As Brown, "Sexuality," 59–60, points out with regard to Julian's attitude towards sexuality, we must not be "irritated by young Julian," but consider that his premises greatly differ from those of Augustine. In other words, we must not judge Julian by Augustinian standards. By the way, Julian was over forty years old at the time of the debate with Augustine.

111. Iul. *Flor.*=Aug. *c. Iul. imp.* 6.17 (PL 45:1538–39); for references on Julian's christological concerns in this context, cf. above, n. 73; on Augustine's position, cf. Lamberigts, "Julien d'Éclane," 386–87. Augustine's concepts of pain and death are structured like his concept of freedom (cf. above, n. 22). Before the fall Adam "was able not to die" (*posse non mori*), an ability which he lost after the fall, yet not only he, but every human being born after him. After Adam's fall people "are not able not to die" (*non posse non mori*), except the blessed in heaven, who "are not able to die" (*non posse mori*) any more. Augustine's solution has impressed people as systematically neat (cf. Lamberigts, "Julien d'Éclane," 386 n. 65), though his homonymous use of *posse* is clearly problematic. Julian's critique focuses on Augustine's exegesis (cf. below).

challenging, but not all of them require the attention of the local bishop. The progress and daily practice of medicine too, for example, deserves to be taken seriously, even from a theological point of view.

Augustine is scathing about the idea that Adam and Eve could have felt in any way uncomfortable in paradise. He lists a whole host of "natural" complaints, affecting mainly women, which in his view are sufficient proof that a "paradise" with such forms of pain could not seriously be called a paradise: menstrual pain, incredible pains at birth, the physical pain suffered by girls at losing their virginity, various forms of pain caused by sexual desire, love, and loss.[112] For each of these Julian argues that its principal form is creational; only its excess (multiplication) is sinful and evil. Equally, all these phenomena are perceived very differently by different women, moderately (positively or negatively) by some, immoderately (positively or negatively) by others. Neither aspect of immoderation and excess proves that the principle of any of these phenomena is evil.

To underline this point Julian in turn attacks what he sees as Augustine's obsession with gynecological and obstetric subjects[113] and asks how the aging bishop of Hippo imagines that procreation would have been carried out in his paradise, like sowing wheat, or lice growing from the pores of the earth, without any kind of human emotion, be it desire, passion, the pleasure of sexual intercourse, the maternal feelings during pregnancy, birth and child rearing? One would have to be quite inhuman indeed, he adds, to assume that any of these emotions were evil by nature, only because they are not in every respect, for everyone, and in every single case perfectly and unequivocally positive experiences.[114]

Augustine develops his position from an exegesis of Gen 3.14–19. This passage relates how God punishes Eve with the pains of pregnancy and childbirth and the rearing of children, and Adam with the sweat of hard

112. On details, cf. Lössl, "Dolor."

113. Elizabeth A. Clark, *The Origenist Controversy: The Cultural Construction of an Early Christian Debate* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 194, expresses surprise at both bishops' interest in the subject, though Brown, "Sexuality," 64, finds that it can be easily explained in terms of the public interest involved in πολιτικὴ παιδοποιία, "procreation for the good of the city," which was also "what the doctors had wished to write about," from whose writings Julian and Augustine drew their medical knowledge.

114. Iul. *Flor.*=Aug. *c. Iul. imp.* 5.15 (PL 45:1445–47); on the cultural historical background of Julian's position (e.g. the importance he attaches—on the basis of current medical theories—to sexual pleasure as an essential element of the civic task of procreation) cf. Brown, "Sexuality." The focus hereinafter is more on the theological and scientific historical background.

labor, and how God evicts Adam and Eve from the garden of Eden (Gen 3.23–24). In Julian's view this tells as little of a transmission of sin, guilt, and punishment in the act, the elements, or the process of procreation, as the actual existence of genital shame, labor pains and hard work. The passage is first and foremost about Adam and Eve as individuals. Augustine in contrast ends up treating them as "types." Julian has nothing against typology in principle. He concedes that the whole of humankind is implicated in Adam's sin, but only by way of imitation, he insists, not of generation.[115]

Julian also rejects Augustine's view that certain complaints and the oppression suffered by women are the result of original sin.[116] This is not to

115. Cf. Iul. *Flor.*=Aug. *c. Iul. imp.* 2.145 and 173 (CSEL 85.1:267 and 292–93): *imitatione, non generatione*; Lamberigts, "Julien d'Éclane," 409–10, argues that against Julian Augustine proposes in fact a rather literal, historical, exegesis of Gen 3, that he does not overly "idealize" Adam and that his reflections on the differences between the pre- and the post-lapsarian state are based on a literal understanding of Gen 3.23 (God evicting humanity from paradise). Nevertheless, one could argue that the application of what is said in Gen 3 about Adam and Eve to the whole of humanity amounts to typology.

116. Iul. *Flor.*=Aug. *c. Iul. imp.* 6.25 (PL 45:1559). Rist, *Augustine*, 112–21 (esp. 120 n. 86) and 322, following Paula Fredriksen, "Beyond the Body-Soul Dichotomy: Augustine on Paul against the Manicheans and the Pelagians," *RecAug* 23 (1988): 87–114, 112, finds Julian's views on sexuality sterile and male-centered compared to Augustine's wholesome eroticism. Yet at 118 Rist shows that Augustine too subscribes to the androcentric concept of virility; and concerning Julian's androcentrism Brown, "Sexuality," 60, writes that Julian shared the view held by "medical scientists" in his time that for a woman to conceive, both partners had to have an orgasm (*summa uoluptas*; cf. also *Turb.* 1.15 (CCL 88:343.118): *homines . . . ex maribus nascuntur et feminis*; *Turb.* 1.28 (CCL 88:347.276–77): *deus . . . maris creator et feminae*; and *Turb.* 1.75 (CCL 88:359.712): *opus parentum*). Rist, *Augustine*, 322, draws the view that Julian denied women a sex drive (*motus feminae*) from Augustine; cf. *Turb.* 3.181 (CCL 88:376.147), where Augustine says without providing any evidence: *feminae autem quas ab isto motu immunes facis*. Julian had argued that the "vigor of the members" (cf. Aug. *nupt. et conc.* 2.35.59 [CSEL 42:317]) becomes only "apparent in men," not, as Rist understands, that it exists apparently only in men (Aug. *c. Iul.* 5.5.23 [PL 44:797–98]). Julian thinks of marriage not as "simply" a union of bodies (against Rist, *Augustine*, 322 n. 5). For him marriage would not exist without mutual *physical* attraction and the desire to procreate (cf. Aug. *c. Iul.* 5.16.62 [PL 44:818]) and without the creational goodness of the body which has also been assumed by Christ. On Augustine's trouble with this kind of concept of the body, cf. Cary, *Augustine's Invention of the Inner Self*, 45–46, 50–51. Brown, "Sexuality," 59–63, depicts Julian as a goodly conservative who judges procreation and its pleasures from the point of view of a municipal leader who wishes to see his *ciuitas* filled with children from conventional families, and who would not think in this context of male domination as an evil, but as constitutive for the dominant social order, as long as it is not practiced in excess; cf. also Pagels,

defend injustice against women, as little as Augustine aimed at improving the situation of women. Rather, in Julian's view, Augustine confuses the natural differences between men and women, which are creational and therefore good, with the disadvantages and the misery which can develop out of these differences by way of sinful excess.

Gen 3.16, he argues, is not about God creating pains for Eve, or allowing them to come to exist. The text tells us that they are "multiplied."[117] They existed from the beginning, in a moderate form, which was good; and then increased subject to particular social and cultural conditions dominated by sinful excess. The question for Julian is therefore not whether or not labor pains should exist in principle. In his view it is natural and good that they exist as a physical phenomenon and as an emotion accompanying childbirth. For Julian, the relevant questions are: who suffers excessive pain with them? How "bad" is that pain? What can be done to minimize it? In Julian's view theology must begin with reality as it is and acknowledge that it is essentially (*naturaliter*) good. It must also recognize the contribution of nature and the sciences dealing with nature (e.g. medicine) in healing certain limited ills. Then it can better define its own role of showing nature how to transcend itself in Christ.[118]

Adam, Eve, and the Serpent, 429. Kari E. Børresen, "Patristic 'Feminism': The Case of Augustine," in *Collectanea Augustiniana* 1:411–28, 415, sides with Augustine for his view that male domination is a result of original sin. Clark, "Vitiated Seeds," 324–25 (cf. eadem, *Origenist Controversy*, 194–250), does acknowledge Augustine's contribution in this field. Yet in her view Julian too has a point. After all he does not query Augustine's calling the oppression of women an effect of any odd sin, but of *original* sin, a "natural evil" (in Julian's understanding), against which nothing can be done on the human level, i.e. through the use of free will (therefore the charge of Manicheism). Julian could also argue on the practical level that Augustine's teaching as such contributes little to changing the situation of women for the better (cf. below). In fact it could be used as an excuse for excessive behavior. One could argue (against Fredriksen, Rist and Børresen) that Julian's down-to-earth views, his concern for the practical (e.g. health issues), and his fundamental ethical ("human rights") stance (cf. above n. 62) might not be less wholesome, appropriate to human nature and in tune with Christian tradition than Augustine's tendency towards what one might equally consider a kind of effeminate eroticism.

117. Iul. *Flor.*=Aug. *c. Iul. imp.* 6.26 (PL 45:1562); cf. Lössl, "Dolor," 584–85 and 587 n. 47, on the discussion between Julian and Augustine of different forms and degrees of intensity of birth pangs in various animals, and below n. 119 on birth pangs being, according to Julian, quite a "normal" phenomenon (nothing to quibble about) and n. 120 on birth pangs being unproblematic for women with "more natural" lifestyles, i.e., in ancient terms, women from "barbaric peoples."

118. Cf. Iul. *Turb.* 1.16 (CCL 88:345.173–76); cf. above, n. 73 and also below in the following section, where Julian argues that Augustine should respect the fact that medicine sets itself a very strict limit as to what it can do and what it cannot do.

If theology claims that what it teaches can bypass a supposedly corrupt nature and re-create reality out of nothing, it is pretending.

Julian therefore ridicules Augustine's view that baptism eliminates original sin, when he asks, whether it makes a difference for women in labor to be baptized or not. Augustine is outraged, but Julian is more serious than it seems at first glance; for if Augustine claims that baptism eliminates original sin, but people continue to suffer from ills supposedly caused by original sin, the question arises as to when and how the suffering will stop, or be transformed. If the answer is "after this (earthly) life," the question then arises as to why one should get baptized (and convert) now, since it has no effect on the present life, as Augustine himself concedes.

In contrast, Julian argues, it does matter whether, apart from their spiritual life, women take physical exercise or not, or, more generally, whether they live "natural," healthy, lives. For example, women in cultures with more "natural" lifestyles like those of the Scots or North African pastoralists seem to have fewer and less severe troubles at childbirth than women in the more refined cultures around the Mediterranean with all their social and cultural restrictions, which in many respects prevent women from developing natural relationships with their bodies and emotions.[119]

3.2. *Primitivism vs. Scientific Progress*

However, Julian does not take an entirely negative view of his culture. Progress in medicine compensates in his view for an increasingly decadent lifestyle and the accompanying decline in public health. Thus even in those cultures and societies, in which less natural ways of life predominate and in which illnesses and all sorts of physical and mental complaints abound, there is no reason why pain should be allowed to create the kind of misery which Augustine seems to have in mind when he demonizes the phenomenon in the way he does.[120]

119. Iul. *Flor.*=Aug. *c. Iul. imp.* 4.44 and 6.29 (PL 45:1363 and 1577); cf. also at the beginning of the next section. The expression *usus feminae* in *Turb.* 1.62 (CCL 88:355–56) refers to the natural or unnatural use of genitalia, male and female: *in bene utentibus genus concupiscentiae modus que laudatur et in turpibus excessus eius punitur*. On how Julian takes "women's complaints" for granted, however, arguably, not in a cold and merciless fashion, but by putting them in context and ascribing to them a certain degree of meaning, cf. *tr. Osee* 3.13.9–13 (CCL 88:219.162–64): *et eos dolores angoresque sentirent, quos feminae solent in partubus experiri*; *tr. Iohel* 1.6–8 (CCL 88:232.170–72): *sed ita irriguis et plurimis, ut solent feminae quas luctus uiduitatis oppressit, et eorum uirorum societate priuantur, quibus fuerant a uirginitatis suae tempore copulatae*.

120. Iul. *Flor.*=Aug. *c. Iul. imp.* 4.44 and 6.29 (PL 45:1363 and 1577).

Julian blames Augustine for not acknowledging the value of medicine and he counts the bishop of Hippo among the *oppugnatores medicinae*.[121] Augustine, he argues, would not understand the nature and purpose of medicine, or recognize its self-professed limitations. He treats it as a competitor of theology. This is because he treats theology as a universal science. Yet if people are ill, they are, generally, helped more by doctors than bishops. As long as medicine does not think of itself as a universal science, or aim at eliminating all diseases or conquering death, Julian implies, it is a perfectly valid complement to theology and shows where the limits of the latter lie. Medicine targets specific illnesses and improves the lives of individuals in specific cases. Instead of aiming at the impossible by trying to avert what is caused by necessity and fate, it aims at what is possible and thus proves its usefulness. The fatalistic conclusion that it is useless, because whoever is meant to die is going to die anyway, and whoever is meant to live is going to live with or without it, is frivolous, if not blasphemous. While the principles of death and pain, mortality and physical vulnerability, are natural and therefore good, techniques which help to avoid and ease pain, and improve life, are equally good and blessed by God.

121. Iul. *Flor.*=Aug. *c. Iul. imp.* 5.47 (PL 45:1482–83); cf. also Brown, "Sexuality," 62–63, on *Flor.* 5.11 (PL 45:1440) Julian ridiculing Augustine's attempts at matching his specialist medical knowledge by calling him a *nouus physicus*. Augustine's case has recently been argued by Harmless, "Christ the Pediatrician," in whose article the label *nouus physicus* takes on a slightly sinister connotation. Augustine, Harmless argues, assumes the role of physician "as a pastor faced [with] stark realities: dying children and frightened mothers" (33). Harmless does admit that Augustine was a rhetor (i.e., preacher) who fought "a war of metaphors" (ibid.), which means he may occasionally have resorted to hyperbole. This becomes clear when we consider that Julian too was a pastor. The situation of his flock was hardly less dramatic than that of Augustine's: cf. Gennad. *uir. ill.* 46 (78 Richardson) on Julian disposing of his fortune to help his flock in a relief effort in *tempore famis et angustiae*. Yet Julian did not assume the role of *physicus*. For him it was fundamental, no matter how dramatic the immediate situation, to grant to secular ("natural") ways of improving human conditions (like medicine, natural sciences and social redistribution on a personal scale) their fair share over against the claims, e.g., of church and state. Ironically, as Andreas Kessler has recently indicated, it could have been precisely Julian's euergetism at the outset of his episcopal career that raised suspicions about his orthodoxy and dragged him into the Pelagian controversy; cf. Andreas Kessler, *Reichtumskritik und Pelagianismus. Die pelagianische Diatribe de diuitiis*, Paradosis, Beiträge zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur und Theologie 43 (Freiburg, Switzerland: Universitätsverlag, 1999), 56.

3.3. *Medicine, Philosophy and Religion*

Julian's advocacy of medicine draws the circle to a close. Ancient medicine was closely connected with philosophy.[122] Philosophical and medical theories cross-fertilized each other.[123] Medical theories on pain, like one only recently recovered in the *Corpus Hippocraticum*,[124] are complementary to philosophical theories like those related above under section 1. In fact, if we accept Lucretius' theory[125] as a philosophical theory, we can do the same with Hippocrates's *loc. hom.* 42, where pain is said to arise from extremes, e.g., of cold and heat, from too great or too little amounts (e.g., of food or weight), from too dry or wet conditions, and whenever something is altered against its nature, and upset, or destroyed. Correspondingly, pain is cured by opposites. In some cases the cure can also be similar in nature to the ill. But there are specific cures for every single disease.[126]

Yet ancient medicine was also closely tied to religion,[127] though there were differences. One may have to distinguish different types of medicine

122. See, e.g., the seminal paper of Ludwig Edelstein, "Ancient Philosophy and Medicine," in *Ancient Medicine: Selected Papers of Ludwig Edelstein*, ed. Owsei and C. Lilian Temkin (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), 360–66; and, focusing on a more specific example, James Allen, "Pyrrhonism and Medical Empiricism: Sextus Empiricus on Evidence and Inference," *ANRW* II.37.1 (1993): 646–90; cf. Ambrose's note *in Ps* 12.37 (CSEL 64:136) that physicians are also called ἐμπειρικοί, because they begin their work with an inquiry into the affected parts of the patient's body; cf. Fridolf Kudlien, "Cynicism and Medicine," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 48 (1974): 305–19 (Cynics and Stoics shared ideas; some of them may have tended to "glorify" disease; yet generally "common sense" prevailed).

123. As, e.g., in Galen; cf. Teun L. Tieleman, *Galen and Chrysippus on the Soul*. Philosophia Antiqua 68 (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 3–129.

124. Cf. now Anargyros Anastassiou and Dieter Irmer, "Zur Schmerzentstehungstheorie der hippokratischen Schrift *De locis in homine* 42," *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* 134 (1991): 39–49; Elizabeth M. Craik, *Hippocrates: Places in Man* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998).

125. Cf. above, n. 34.

126. Compare the ancient Chinese theory related by Vivienne Lo, "Tracking the Pain. Jue and the Formation of a Theory of Circulating Qi through the Channels," *Sudhoffs Archiv* 83 (1999): 191–211, 191, cited from *Jiangling Zhangjiashan Hanjian Maishu Shiwen*: "So bone pain is as if being hacked at, muscle pain is as if being bound, blood pain is as if saturated, channels pain is as if flowing, flesh pain is as if floating and when the qi is agitated there is chaos."

127. Thus Ludwig Edelstein, "Greek Medicine in Its Relation to Religion and Magic," in *Ancient Medicine*, ed. Temkin and Temkin, 205–46; Gary B. Ferngren and Darrel W. Amundsen, "Medicine and Christianity in the Roman Empire," *ANRW* II.37.3 (1996): 2957–80; and Darrel W. Amundsen, *Medicine, Society, and Faith in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 5–12.

here, more rationalist and scientific ones and more "religious" ones.[128] Similar distinctions must be made for early Christian attitudes,[129] and for pagan attitudes towards Christianity. There existed for example a widespread belief among pagans that Christianity was essentially a healing cult. Origen had to refute Celsus' charge that Christians invoke the name of Christ in a magic way to heal the sick.[130] On the other hand Origen's praise of medicine bears at the same time witness to the fact that early Christian writers were also able to appreciate the achievements of classical culture.[131]

Invective against medicine, or certain parts or forms of it, in contrast, was not exclusively a Christian habit, as, famously, in Tatian, nor must it be mistaken as a sign of general hostility against, or ignorance of, medicine.[132] Nemesius of Emesa and Basil of Caesarea, for example, express themselves so eloquently in scientific and medical matters that it has been assumed, though probably wrongly, that they received some kind of medical training. At the same time both have also been said to show little sympathy for the practice of scientific research as such.[133] Similarly Ambrose of Milan, who may have collected, preserved and handed down as much contemporary medical knowledge as was available to a scientific layperson of his time, but whose main use of it was as imagery for the work of Christ.[134]

This "use" (χρῆσις) of medical motifs for theological purposes may in

128. Cf. e.g. the distinction made by John M. Riddle, "High Medicine and Low Medicine in the Roman Empire," *ANRW* II.37.1 (1993): 102–20.

129. Cf. e.g. the examples in Amundsen, *Medicine, Society, and Faith*, 127–57.

130. Orig. *c. Cels.* 8.55–58 (GCS Origenes 2:271–75).

131. Orig. *c. Cels.* 3.12 (GCS Origenes 2:211–12); cf. also Tertullian's praise of the usefulness of medical knowledge in *De corona* 8.2 (CCL 2:1051.12–14); cf. Amundsen, *Medicine, Society, and Faith*, 146.

132. On Tatian, cf. Amundsen, *Medicine, Society, and Faith*, 158–75; on a famous pagan polemicist against medicine, Cato senior, cf. Beat Näf, "Anfänge römischer Medizinkritik und ihre Rezeption in Rom," *Gesnerus* 50 (1993): 11–26. In either case the discussion went on at a high level of reflection with the attackers showing a considerable degree of medical knowledge. Both examples also show that there were groups among Christians and pagans who could be called *oppugnatores medicinae*.

133. David S. Wallace-Hadrill, *The Greek Patristic View of Nature* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1968), 3.

134. Cf. Gerhard Müller, "Arzt, Kranker und Krankheit bei Ambrosius von Mailand," *Sudhoffs Archiv* 51 (1967): 193–216; on the soteriological use of medical imagery in early Christianity in general (e.g. the motif of *Christus medicus* or *medicina Christi*) cf. Gervais Dumeige, "Le Christ médecin dans la littérature chrétienne des premières siècles," *Rivista de archeologia cristiana* 47 (1972): 115–41; for more recent discoveries and literature, cf. David Knipp, *"Christus medicus" in der frühchristlichen Sarkophagskulptur*, Supplements to *Vigiliae Christianae* 37 (Leiden:

fact have been the main characteristic of "patristic" "medical writing"; and there were clearly restrictions as to how far authors could go in using medical material, restrictions which authors might have ignored at their peril. For instance, comparing Christ to a physician, Eusebius of Caesarea in his *Ecclesiastical History* cites from Hippocrates' *On physicians* 1.[135] Yet in another paragraph in the same work he cites an antiheretical text which condemns a group of Roman Christians who study mathematics, logic and medicine to such an extent that some of them even pray to Galen.[136] Interestingly, that same group, led by a certain Theodotos of Byzantium,[137] has been suggested to have introduced the kind of rationalist methods of Biblical exegesis employed some centuries later by the Antiochenes and Julian of Aeclanum.[138]

Not everyone subscribing to Galen was always immediately accused of heresy. Like Julian of Aeclanum and Theodore of Mopsuestia, Ambrose wrote that human beings are created mortal, and that the human soul is taken from divine, the body however from animal matter.[139] Most physiological details in his commentary on the creation of the world (*Hexaemeron*), can be traced back, mostly via Basil, to Galen, Philo, or even Plato.[140] Ambrose however did not get involved in a debate with Augustine over whether nature (creation) is essentially good or corrupt; nor was he declared a heretic for teaching that (in Christ) that same nature is entirely independent from, and therefore on an equal footing with, God.[141]

Brill, 1998), 1–23; and Rainer Henke, *Basilius und Ambrosius über das Sechstagewerk*, ΧΡΗΣΙΣ / Chrêsis: Die Methode der Kirchenväter im Umgang mit der antiken Kultur 7 (Basel: Schwabe, 2000).

135. Euseb. *hist. eccl.* 10.4.11 (GCS Eusebius 2.2:866.4–13).

136. Euseb. *hist. eccl.* 5.28.14 (GCS Eusebius 2.1:505): Γαληνὸς γὰρ ἴσως ὑποτινῶν καὶ προσκυνεῖται.

137. Cf. Winrich A. Löhr, "Theodotus der Lederarbeiter und Theodotus der Bankier—ein Beitrag zur römischen Theologiegeschichte des zweiten und dritten Jahrhunderts," *ZNW* 87 (1996): 101–25, 103 n. 6 (literature).

138. Cf. Schäublin, *Untersuchungen*, 30; Löhr, "Theodotus," 103 n. 6.

139. *De Noe* 24.86 (CSEL 32.1:474); *Ex* 6.7.43 (CSEL 32.1:234); cf. Müller, "Arzt, Kranker und Krankheit," 197.

140. Cf. Müller, "Arzt, Kranker und Krankheit," 197–98, who draws on Wilhelm Gossel, *Quibus de fontibus Ambrosius in describendo corpore humano hauserit* (Leipzig: Seele, 1908), esp. for Ambr. *Ex*. 6.54–74; see now also Henke, *Basilius und Ambrosius*.

141. Wickert, *Studien*, 27 and 31–35, has pointed out that instead of tackling this issue, orthodoxy ran for cover behind the formula of Chalcedon—and later, one might add, that of Orange. It is interesting however how nowadays a scholar like Wickham, "Pelagianism in the East," tends to treat Theodore of Mopsuestia as a basically orthodox theologian, while Julian is still presented as an intransigent heretic.

For Ambrose those were marginal issues; for Theodore and Julian they lay in the center of their concerns. Even though Julian ostensibly stressed that the claims of medicine were much more limited than Augustine assumed,[142] what he in fact proposed was a theological explanation and justification of natural philosophical and scientific research in its own right. In doing so he may not have solved once and for all the question concerning the nature and causes of pain, but some of his suggestions have stood the test of time remarkably well.

CONCLUSION

To summarize briefly the results of this inquiry: Julian of Aeclanum shares with Augustine and the late ancient Latin-speaking community a common, ordinary-language notion of *dolor*, pain, as a class of physical phenomena and an emotion of the soul. Unlike Augustine, however, Julian considers neither aspect principally evil. Instead he argues that both aspects of *dolor* are in principle creational and as such good. Creation is contingent. Human beings are created mutable and mortal. As a consequence bodies are vulnerable. They age and die. Souls are mutable and develop emotions. None of these facts are as such evil. Evil can only arise from a certain way in which human beings relate to their bodies and their emotions. If by means of their free wills they accept the challenge of fear and pain towards a life of justice, it will result in triumph and happiness; if they do not use their freedom well, their misery is largely self-inflicted.

Julian accepts that in the present state of the universe and of human society we are no longer confronted with the basic form of pain, but with pain multiplied by sinful excess, or immoderation, part of which is self-inflicted, but part of which is inflicted gratuitously upon innocent people. However, taking Job as an example, he illustrates that even under these difficult circumstances it is still possible to tackle even excessive forms of pain and despair by using the natural moral powers with which human beings are endowed through creation.

Structurally Julian's model of pain and "pain management" is very

142. On how limited the claims of ancient medicine actually were, see Amundsen, *Medicine, Society, and Faith*, 30–49 (physicians did not consider it their duty to prolong life and kept their distance from moribund patients, partly out of decency and respect, partly because they feared to be taken to court for malpractice or worse); ibid. 50–69 (although abortion is condemned in the so-called Hippocratic oath, it was widely practiced, along with infanticide, especially in cases of birth defects).

similar to a number of late ancient philosophical models, not only Stoic ones, as frequently suggested, but also Middle Platonist and skeptic ones. There is evidence of Julian being, like Augustine, directly influenced by Cicero's account in the second book of *De finibus*. However, Julian departs in some crucial points from Cicero as well as from Augustine's interpretation of Cicero, which reveal him as standing under Aristotelian influence (cf. his distinction between emotional quality and emotions as accidents).

On the theological level, Julian grounds his concept of pain on his strong belief in God and creation as unequivocally and irreversably good, against what he sees as Augustine's attempt to undermine this doctrine through his teaching on original sin. Julian argues the biblical and traditional Christian character of his concept by showing how it can be applied to the figures of Adam and Christ. The implications of his views on Christ are particularly intriguing. Julian has a strong notion of the human nature of Christ, i.e. the fact that Christ is fully human and that during his life on earth he suffered and died as a human being, endowed with nothing but the moral faculties of an ordinary human being. In Julian's view this precisely reveals Christ as the Son of God and makes him the sacrament that ennobles the ordinary, but already as such good, natures of the faithful. Moreover, as an example Christ justifies and helps to overcome suffering well beyond the confines of the church.

I could not analyze in detail the dependencies between Julian's christology and that of Theodore of Mopsuestia. Some similarities however are obvious. It is well known that Theodore's two-nature christology leaves many questions open, but in this context it is important to note that Julian put to Augustine the crucial question as to his views on the physical quality of the body: that of Christ, the human body and also the physical nature of the universe as a whole.

It is in this context that Julian stresses, for example, that marriage is essentially a union of bodies, not of souls; that medicine should have its—carefully limited—part in questions of gynecology and obstetrics; and that taking the body as body, i.e. as a physical reality, seriously, e.g. by taking exercise or treating it medically, is as relevant—ethically, spiritually and soteriologically—as running to church to receive the sacrament at the hand of the bishop.

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